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Abstract 
 
This thesis aims to explore the potential of small diasporas to contribute to 
development and politics at ‘home’.  Thereby informing inter-disciplinary thinking at 
the intersection of migration studies, development studies and politics.  I argue that 
where there is a discussion of diaspora’s political engagement in the existing 
migration-development literature, it is either hidden behind the shield of 
‘development’ or restricted to questions of violent conflict.  The central claim of the 
thesis is that the migration-development nexus needs to address formal politics 
more explicitly.  The Gambian diaspora are an interesting group to research 
because the country has not experienced violent conflict in recent years and the 
diaspora are making contributions to development at ‘home’.  However, they are 
also simultaneously seeking to intervene in homeland politics, which they view as 
another form of development contribution.   
 
This research is a multi-sited study conducted in The Gambia, UK, and US.  This 
thesis is based on 24 interviews with 52 participants undertaken in The Gambia 
with elites, students, government officials, politicians, and return migrants between 
February 2013 and December 2014.  49 interviews with members of the Gambian 
diaspora in the UK and US, and 10 interviews with heads of Gambian diaspora 
associations in the UK.  The four research questions in this thesis address (1) 
development interventions, (2) political interventions, (3) the responses to these 
interventions from The Gambia, and (4) the relationship between development, 
migration and politics.  The data used to address them came primarily from the 
interviews, participant observation, textual and visual materials acquired from 
newspapers, social media, archives, and secondary sources in the academic and 
grey literatures.  Qualitative coding techniques were used for thematic data 
analysis. 
  
The thesis concludes that the political activities of some members of the UK and 
US Gambian diaspora are inhibiting the ability of the diaspora as a whole to have 
any ‘real’ impact on national development.  This is perpetuating the distrust 
between the homeland government and those outside the territory.  Subsequently, 
development contributions are mainly focused on the family scale.  Whilst these 
political interventions have some effects at ‘home’ they are only one component in 
a broader set of interventions seeking to change Gambian politics (alongside 
diplomatic efforts, structural economic forces and human rights lobbies for 
example) and their impact is constrained by the limited resources and capacities of 
those in the diaspora.  Conceptually the thesis concludes that whilst it is useful to 
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maintain the distinction between development and politics for the purpose of 
organizing the analysis, in practice the two are inseparable.  The case that is being 
made in this thesis is that politics in The Gambia is an ‘anti-development machine’, 
as formal political engagement is a barrier to active development in the 
country.  Thus, paradoxically it requires diasporans who are sincerely committed to 
the development of The Gambia to withdraw from politics, despite simultaneously 
arguing that improving the political process is a part of development.  Two weeks 
before submitting this thesis, a Presidential election occurred in The Gambia, 
which dramatically changed the political context of the country and its diaspora. 
However, given the timing, it was impossible to re-write this thesis to take account 
of the election, though some comments have been added to the conclusion. 
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Chapter 1: 
An introduction to the Gambian diaspora 
 
1.1 Introduction 
 
It was 6:30 am, on the morning of Tuesday 30th December 2014, when I was 
woken from a deep sleep by the ringing of my mobile phone.  At first, I thought it 
was my alarm going off, but when I looked at the screen I saw my sister’s face, she 
was calling from Namibia.  As I answered the call, I was wondering why she would 
call me this early in the morning and prayed that she was not interrupting my sleep 
to engage in frivolous conversation. “There is a coup in Gambia, President 
Jammeh has been overthrown.” Her voice bellowed through the speakers.  I sat up 
on my bed immediately; suddenly getting that extra two hours of sleep no longer 
mattered. I asked her “who has overthrown him?”  “A group of Gambian men in the 
US went to attack the State House.  There is news that they have taken over and 
Jammeh is gone”, she answered. This man had been at the epicentre of Gambian 
politics since he seized power in 1994.  I was stunned at what I was hearing.  I 
hung up and sat in silence for what felt like a very long time.  So many questions 
were going through my mind at this point (not all to do with my research).  
Composing myself, I arose and made my way down to my mother’s bedroom. I 
woke her to share what I had just heard; she looked stunned.  She then suggested 
we call my dad and other sister who were in The Gambia for the Christmas 
holidays.  Neither of them responded to our calls causing us to resort to the next 
best thing; the online diaspora-owned radio ‘Freedom Newspaper”. We listened 
intently to what the presenter was saying.  His voice was filled with excitement as 
he reported news about an armed group of Gambian dissidents from the US 
engaged in gunfight with state guards at the State House. 
 
At around 7:00am, I received a text message from another contact in The Gambia 
confirming that an attempted coup was indeed taking place. It stated, “I heard 
heavy weapon fire from 2:00am until around 4:00am.  I heard the exchange of fire.  
I am following it.  I understand some vehicles are being turned back at the Denton 
Bridge.  I hope this goes through.” Shortly after this exchange, I heard on Freedom 
radio that three of the coup-plotters were killed and the coup had been foiled.  
 
Later that morning, the stories of the event began to unfold, and more information 
became available. But, what was most striking was the reaction of Gambians on 
social media. I cannot make the claim that the posts on Facebook reflected the 
views of the entire Gambian population, however, it quickly became apparent that 
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many people at ‘home’ did not support this form of intervention from the diaspora.  
For example, I came across a Facebook post, which said: 
 
[Gambia jama rek (peace) we are a praying nation, God will never let us 
down.  People in Europe with their children claiming they are Gambians 
and wishing bad for their country will fall on their heads, they are enemies 
of the nation…] 
 
The rhetoric in the posts became increasingly aggressive as some people in The 
Gambia started portraying the entire Gambian diaspora population as villains. 
Simultaneously, some members of the Gambian diaspora were also criticising the 
coup-plotters for staging an amateur and flawed take-over and for going against 
efforts for a peaceful non-violent democratic change.  For example, soon after one 
of my interviewees said: “the 30th December attacks were condemned by everyone 
because it was uncalled for.  Their actions can be defined as terrorism and most of 
them were not citizens because they had denounced their citizenship” (Interviewee 
17, male, 30s and highly educated professional).  This interviewee has strong 
personal connections to the government and President Jammeh.  However, their 
response was still surprising because during our personal conversations he talked 
about his dislike for President Jammeh and how he would support a change of 
leadership in The Gambia. Thus, I wondered if he would have said the same thing 
if the coup had succeeded, but I did not ask for fear of causing offence.  
 
After the events of the 30th December 2014, I was left feeling confused by the 
reaction of my Gambian network.  Having completed fieldwork in The Gambia two 
weeks prior to this event and from the many formal interviews and informal 
discussions I had with them. I was given the impression that they were unhappy 
with the political leadership in the country and thus would welcome the intervention 
of the diaspora. Perhaps the climate of authoritarian politics in The Gambia meant 
that people felt obligated to make these public statements in support of a system 
they had previously told me they did not support, but my sense was that there was 
more to it than this. Their hostility to the coup attempt was sincere. They wanted 
change but clearly, this was not how they wanted political change to take place in 
the country. 
 
The reactions to this event illustrate the many paradoxes and contradictions in how 
Gambians at ‘home’ view politics and the political involvement of the diaspora and 
it prompted a series of questions that underpin this project: What do the Gambian 
people want from politics? How can I believe that what they say they want is what 
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they actually want? How do people in The Gambia see the diaspora? What 
emotions shape their relationship with the diaspora? What are the emotions in the 
diaspora that led to the coup attempt?  What are the divisions within the diaspora? 
How is it that what seems so obvious from the perspective of the diaspora (the 
flaws in Gambian politics) can seem anything but obvious for those within Gambia? 
Given what I knew about the frustrations of the diaspora, why did I find the coup-
attempt so surprising? Why did the Gambian opposition parties not use this as an 
opportunity to help change the political environment? Why did the Gambian military 
refuse to support of the coup plot?  Is a democratic political change likely to occur 
in The Gambia or will there need to be another similar intervention from within to 
effect political change? 
The Stalemate in Diaspora-Homeland Relations in The Gambia 
Like many developing countries, a significant number of people born in The 
Gambia now live abroad.  According to data from the International Organization for 
Migration, there were 89,634 Gambians living outside of the country in 20151.  The 
skilled emigration rate of Gambians was at 64.7% in 20002, making it the second 
highest amongst sub-Saharan African countries.  The institutions in the country 
suffer from the brain drain of highly skilled professionals, but many people in The 
Gambia are greatly benefitting from the financial and material contributions of the 
diaspora.  According to C Omar Kebbeh, a Gambian Economist working for the 
Bureau of Economic Analysis at the US Department of Commerce, the inflow of 
remittances into The Gambia in 2011 was more than twice the foreign direct 
investments (FDI) flows ($90.7 million to $35.9 million) (2013:6).   
 
Certainly, diaspora remittances play an important part in migration and 
development theory and policy debates, not only because they sustain households 
(Gupta et al. 2007, de Haas 2012, Nyamongo et al. 2012, Chami and Fullenkamp 
2013 and Gamlen 2014), but also because they are believed to contribute to 
national development (Torres and Kuznetsov 2006, Gupta et al. 2007, Terrazas 
2010, Hammond 2011, Ratha et al. 2011, Newland 2011, 2012, Teferra 2015, 
Amagoh and Rahman 2016). According to data from the Central Bank of The 
Gambia, migrant remittances were roughly 20% of the country’s GDP in 20133. 
                                                                
1 http://www.iom.int/countries/gambia 
2 Research conducted by Frédéric Docquier and Abdeslam Marfouk (2004) on measuring the 
international mobility of skilled workers from 1990 to 2000 
3 The exact amount of the inflow of diaspora remittances in The Gambia cannot be measured accurately 
because a large proportion of the remittances enter the country through unofficial channels, such as 
people hand carrying money. According to one interviewee “on one occasion I was given 12, 000 euros 
to bring back to Gambia to give to a family member” (Interviewee 62). They said they did not declare 
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The empirical evidence in this research revealed that the Gambian diaspora remit 
money to their families for food, clothing, school fees, medical bills, purchasing 
land, building houses, establishing small business enterprises, and embarking in 
hometown and village-led development projects through Hometown Associations.  
The interviewees posited that the money sent for these activities contribute to the 
economy through taxation within The Gambia. 
 
However, the central problem currently facing the Gambian diaspora is that, in 
general, they are sceptical about the ability and intentions of the Government of 
The Gambia in relation to the implementation of the national development agenda. 
Put bluntly, many in the diaspora see the government at ‘home’ as an obstacle to 
the development they would like to see for themselves, their families, their 
communities and their country. They do not accept the government’s claims that it 
is already delivering development. 
 
Reciprocally, the problem the Gambian government faces is that, to some extent, 
without the diaspora’s support, it is unable to maximize diaspora contributions in 
socially productive ways that could contribute to national development. Whilst there 
is an increasing understanding of how ‘home’ country governments can develop 
policies and institutions to enrol diasporas (Gamlen 2014). Such an agenda and 
knowledge base is of little value in this instance because there is a breakdown in 
the relationship between the government and many members of the Gambian 
diaspora, who say they are extremely dissatisfied with the political leadership of the 
country and thus are openly critical of the government. This is what I characterize 
in this thesis as ‘the current stalemate’ in Gambian government-diaspora relations. 
 
The core strategy of the small number of Gambian diaspora groups that have 
formally mobilized politically is to expose what they perceive to be the negative 
activities of the Government of The Gambia to the international community, mostly 
centred on the government’s human rights violations of Gambians at ‘home’.  
Whilst other sources (diplomatic and international journalistic sources for example) 
might well have as much influence on donor decision-making, the fact that parts of 
the Gambian diaspora are lobbying the international community means that the 
government do not trust the diaspora in general.   
 
Consequently, the Government of The Gambia does not appear to differentiate 
between the politically involved diaspora and the wider Gambian diaspora. They 
                                                                                                                                                                   
this money to customs and according to customs regulations there are no restrictions to carrying foreign 
currency into The Gambia 
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seem to have grouped the entire Gambian diaspora population together in 
marginalizing them from national development projects.  The government views the 
diaspora as unsupportive and untrustworthy despite having openly made claims 
that they welcome those in the diaspora who want to contribute to development. 
However, the interviews revealed that the Gambian government ministries have 
made it difficult even for their overseas supporters to get involved by making the 
lines of communication difficult to access. Such an impasse raises significant 
academic and normative questions: how did this situation arise? What does it 
suggest about theories of the migration-development-politics relationship? How is 
diaspora-led or diaspora-funded development happening in The Gambia despite 
such a conflictual context? How might The Gambia move beyond this dead-end 
without resorting to violence? 
 
Diaspora Interventions in Politics in The Gambia 
 
The empirical evidence in this research revealed the involvement of the Gambian 
diaspora in contemporary Gambian politics picked up momentum after the events 
of the 10th and 11th April 2000, when the Gambian security forces opened fire on 
student protesters, killing 14 students and one journalist.  The Gambian Student 
Union (GAMSU) was protesting against the beating of student Ebrima Barry by fire 
service officers in Brikama, which led to his death.  The students felt the 
government did not investigate the matter properly and thus took to the streets to 
show their disapproval.  Since this incident, many members of the Gambian 
diaspora have become highly critical of the government’s political practices and its 
use of violence.  Thus, a small proportion of the diaspora has mobilized in their 
host countries (the majority of these groups are located in the UK and US) and 
formed civil society organizations and/or become extended branches of the 
Gambian political opposition groups.  
 
This is the fraction of the diaspora that is referred to in this thesis as the ‘political 
diaspora.’ This group is distinguished by their explicit and conscious engagement 
in homeland politics.  They claimed to be driven by the desire to rescue the 
Gambian people from the human rights violations they are experiencing under the 
leadership of President Jammeh.  The politically involved groups feel it is their 
responsibility as ‘citizens’ of The Gambia to ‘save’ the people from an authoritarian 
undemocratic rule.  But of course, the interviews and participant observation in this 
thesis revealed that not every Gambian wants to be saved from President Jammeh. 
In fact, the data showed that Jammeh has many loyal supporters who explicitly 
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reject the political involvement of the diaspora, which the ‘political diaspora’ feel is 
unwarranted, ill-informed and self-interested. 
 
The Gambian political diaspora have established their own media outlets to 
engage in discussions, organize demonstrations, and lobby the governments in 
their countries of residence to take certain action against key members of the 
Gambian government. For example, the diaspora has been lobbying the US 
government to impose a travel ban on top government officers including President 
Jammeh and to seize his mansion in Potomac, Washington.  This group argue that 
this property was purchased with money belonging to the country.   
 
An opening hypothesis of this thesis is that the ability of the Gambian diaspora in 
general to influence either political or developmental change is greatly influenced 
by the effectiveness of their activities.  The interviews undertaken revealed that the 
political diaspora have achieved some success with their advocacy i.e. creating 
awareness of the deteriorating human rights conditions in the country.  However, 
the thesis argues that there are significant ambiguities relating to the impact the 
Gambian ‘political diaspora’ believe themselves to be having on influencing politics 
a ‘home’. There are unanticipated negative consequences. For example, the 
attempts of members of the diaspora outside this politicized fraction to engage in 
development activities at ‘home’ is undermined by the stalemate between 
government and diaspora.  
 
The interviews also revealed that the majority of the Gambian diaspora prefer 
either to stay clear of formal public politics or choose to engage anonymously 
online, to avoid risk and negative consequences for themselves and their families 
at ‘home’.  Many of them believe that being politically explicit will make their 
families at ‘home’ targets of the national security services.  My interviewees 
suggested that fear of political repression is just as high amongst critics of the 
Gambian government in the diaspora as it is for people on the ground. 
 
However, one of the aims of this thesis is to breakdown the ‘firewall’ between 
‘politics’ and ‘development,’ by showing how development and politics are 
connected in The Gambia. The ‘theoretical’ discourse that operates within 
academia sees the distinction between development and politics as an illusion.  
For example, the entrenchment of authoritarian bureaucratic power through the 
institutions and aspirations of ‘development’ is a familiar story in Africa.  Most 
famously analysed in Lesotho by the anthropologist James Ferguson (1990) in his 
classic account of the political effects of a multi-sectoral development programme 
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in his book ‘The Anti-politics machine’.   On the other hand, ‘a practical’ discourse 
that operates in The Gambia is that some members of the Gambian diaspora and 
Gambians on the ground portray development as both political and apolitical.  For 
example, methodologically it was easier for Gambians to talk about development 
than politics (largely due to issues of fear). However, there was also a sense from 
some Gambians that they believe Jammeh constantly and explicitly uses 
development achievements for political purposes. So part of the argument is that 
the practical side of this idea is paradoxical because some people can make the 
link explicit, whereas others find it more useful to keep them separate.  
This thesis tries to insert a stronger focus on diaspora politics into the migration 
and development debate by showing how the political activities of the small groups 
in Gambian diaspora have multiple effects on migration and development in The 
Gambia.  For example, the political activities of these groups have resulted in the 
wider Gambian diaspora being marginalized from national development. Thus, 
aside from their contributions at the family level (which is their primary focus) and 
to a much lesser extent the village/town level, the Gambian diaspora are not able 
to have much impact at the national level. In addition, the political activities of the 
diaspora have also exposed key issues such as human rights and bad governance 
(key conditions for development aid), which have contributed to the country losing 
aid from major donors and exacerbated poverty in the country. This shows that 
having a strong focus on diaspora politics in the migration and development debate 
is necessary, at least in the Gambian context.  
 
The academic literature on the intersections between diasporas, development and 
politics make a series of claims that are scrutinized in this thesis: (1) increasingly 
diasporas are being recognized to play an active role in the development process 
of their countries of origin (Kapur 2001, 2003, Nyberg- Sorensen et al. 2002, 
Gundel 2002, Turner et al. 2003, IOM, 2006, de Haas 2006, 2012, Terrazas 2010, 
Davies 2012, Judge and De Plaen, 2011, Newland, 2011, 2013, Ratha et al. 2011, 
Agunias and Newland 2012, Crush et al. 2013, Gamlen 2014, Mercer and Page 
2014, Resende – Santos 2015, Chikanda et al. 2016); (2) notions of autochthony 
and the ‘politics of belonging’ are assumed to explain why some members of 
diaspora have an inherent desire to assist their homeland in development as well 
as in politics (Lampert 2009, Kleist 2013, Kleist and Turner 2013); (3) diasporas 
have played significant roles in the domestic politics of their homelands, they are 
seen as instruments to influence political outcomes (Sheffer 2003, 2013, Hägel and 
Peretz, 2005, Brinkerhoff 2009, Esman 2009, Davies 2012, Lyons and Mandaville 
2012, Adamson 2015 , NurMuhammad et al. 2015, Boccagni et al. 2015) and; (4) 
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diasporas can be either peace-makers or peace-wreckers, in times of crisis in their 
‘home’ countries (Koser 2003, Bernal 2006, Smith and Stares 2007, Baser and 
Swain 2008, Brinkerhoff 2011, Hoehne et al. 2011, Iheduru 2011, McGregor and 
Pasura 2014).  
 
1.2 Research Rationale, Aims, Objectives and Specific Research Questions 
 
The overall aim of this research is to understand the role and significance of the 
Gambian diaspora in seeking to shape politics and development in The Gambia.  
The question that underpins this study is to find out whether ‘small diasporas’ can 
contribute to development and politics at ‘home’ and thereby to inform thinking at 
disciplinary and inter-disciplinary levels about the intersection of migration studies, 
development studies and politics.  Much of the literature in diaspora studies do not 
explicitly try to define the concept of ‘small diaspora’ but the few that have 
attempted define ‘small diaspora’ in three ways. First, they are groups from small 
countries with small economies such as the Pacific Island Countries like Tonga, Fiji 
and Samoa (OECD 2015).  In Africa, these are groups from countries like The 
Gambia, Cape Verde, and Djibouti.  Second, ‘small diasporas’ are also defined by 
their size (Kuznetsov 2006).  For example, countries such as Chile and Scotland 
have smaller size diasporas than countries like China or India.  Similarly, Gambian 
has a smaller size diaspora than Nigeria and Ghana.  Third, ‘small diaspora’ have 
limited financial resources when compared to large groups like the Jewish, 
Chinese and Indians diaspora in the US (Devane 2006, Eckstein 2013, Ye 2014).  
Based on these three definitions, the Gambian diaspora fits comfortably within the 
concept of ‘small diaspora’ because they are small in size, The Gambia is a small 
country with a small economy and the diaspora has limited financial resources. 
Thus, by bringing the developmental and political interventions of ‘small diasporas’ 
into conversation with each other the thesis sets out to forge new ground and 
contribute to the argument that  
Even relatively small diasporas can and do establish and activate such 
organizations on the international level.  For example, this is the case of 
the relatively small Palestinian, Serb, Kurdish, and Catalonian diasporas.  
Each of these diasporas is involved in activities on the international level to 
promote their interest in their homelands and hostlands (Kokot et al. 
2013:72)  
This introduction has set out to show the Gambian situation is an intellectually 
provoking one because the key parties lack trusts in one another. Furthermore, 
there is also a profound contradiction between the political ambitions of some in 
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the diaspora and the development ambitions of others. So, both analytically and 
normatively, the rationale for the study becomes one of solving two puzzles: how 
did it get to this stalemate between diaspora and government? And, how can I 
disentangle the relationship between politics and development in the diaspora? As 
a member of the Gambian diaspora there is little point in hiding the fact that 
searching for a productive route out of the current impasse is a part of the 
motivation for undertaking this research. Ultimately, my motivation is to help the 
country and its citizens (both those at ‘home’ and overseas) to move forward. I 
return to this normative dimension of the study in the final part of the concluding 
chapter of the thesis.  
 
Additionally, within the broad fields of both ‘migration and development’ and 
‘migration and politics’ this thesis develops a distinctive path. Subsequently, 
through this research, I have noticed that the Gambian diaspora has received very 
little academic research attention in comparison to other African diasporas like the 
Somali, Ethiopian, Ghanaian, Cameroonian, Nigerian, South African and 
Zimbabwean (to name a few).  Analytically, the Gambian diaspora is an interesting 
group to study because they are involved in non-violent conflict with the 
Government of The Gambia. For Mohammed Bamyeh (2007) and Robin Cohen 
(2008) ‘conflict diasporas’ are refugees who flee from war either because they 
were civilians or combatants. Whereas for Gabriel Sheffer (2007) and Khachig 
Tölölyan (2007), ‘conflict diasporas’ are stateless and likely to support irredentist, 
secessionist and national liberation movements in their homelands, even if these 
are actively involved in bitter conflicts. Based on these definitions the Gambian 
diaspora does not meet the criteria for ‘conflict diaspora’ because they are neither 
stateless nor do they come from a conflict state like the American-Irish, 
Palestinians, Somalis, Eritrea, Ethiopia or Liberians.  However, I argue that the 
Gambian diaspora should still be defined as a ‘conflict diaspora’ because conflict is 
not defined only by violence but also a breakdown in the relationship between 
parties (see Gregory el al, 2009).  Additionally, real peace is not just the absence 
of war rather it is the opportunities for development, protection of rights and 
political inclusion. Without this, diasporas can engage in conflict with their ‘home’ 
governments. Therefore, I argue that the literature in diaspora studies should 
expand the definition of ‘conflict diaspora’ to include the Gambian diaspora. And to 
support this argument, this thesis will show that the conflictual diaspora-homeland 
political relations outside the context of actual armed conflict, post-conflict 
reconstruction, or peace-building are important for further exploration in the field of 
transnational diaspora politics.  
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This research is a multi-sited study of the UK and US Gambian diaspora.  A total of 
83 interviews in the UK and The Gambia were undertaken, with 111 participants.  
Observational and textual data were collected in The Gambia, the UK, and the US, 
from members of the diaspora, both those who are politically involved and those 
that are not.  Also, those belonging to diaspora associations in the UK and those 
that do not.  The interviewees included 88 men, 13 women and 10 associations. 
The samples were young, middle aged, old, professionals, skilled workers, and 
students.  
 
This thesis addresses four main research questions: 
 
1. How, why and where does the diaspora contribute to development in The 
Gambia? 
2. How has the Gambian diaspora in the UK and the US intervened in politics 
in The Gambia? 
3. What is the response to these interventions in The Gambia? 
4. What are the wider implications of this study in understanding the 
relationship between development, migration, and politics in the Gambian 
context? 
 
There are five main arguments in this thesis. The first argument is that the direct 
socio-economic development contributions of the Gambian diaspora are largest at 
the family level, to a much lesser extent at the town/village level and seldom at 
national level. This is due to fraught relations between the diaspora and the 
Government of The Gambia. The second argument is that the Gambian diaspora 
feel they have a strong obligation towards their families in The Gambia. This drives 
them to maintain links with the country and will override the incentive to get 
engaged with politics where it is perceived that their political engagement might 
threaten the ability to support their family.  The third argument is that in the recent 
past the lack of cohesion of the political Gambian diaspora groups and of political 
opposition parties in the country has reduced support from Gambians on the 
ground. This in turn has reduced the ability of the political diaspora to deliver their 
desired political change in The Gambia.  The fourth argument is that the political 
diaspora justifies its activities by claiming to fight for the people in The Gambia, 
whom they believe are unable to defend their rights because they are living in fear 
of politically enforced violence.  The fifth argument is that there is a strong link 
between politics, development, and migration in The Gambia, however the 
relationships are as often contradictory as they are complementary. 
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1.3 Thesis Structure 
 
This thesis contains eight chapters after this introduction.  Chapter 2 begins by 
defining the concepts ‘development’ and ‘politics’. It then moves on to discussing 
the literature on the migration and development nexus. Before going on to define 
the global diaspora, and then discussing the migration history of Africans migration 
and the importance of the homeland to the African diaspora. The review defends 
the merits of strategically essentializing the African diaspora in order to provide a 
general explanation for why they remain so involved in their homeland affairs4.  
This chapter will also critically review the literature on 'diaspora and development' 
and the transnational political engagement of diaspora.  The key argument being 
made in this chapter is that research in diaspora studies and ‘migration and 
development’ studies tends to shy away from debates about the formal political 
practice of the diasporas. As such there are gaps in knowledge about how politics 
at ‘home’ has been transformed by the diaspora. 
 
Chapter 3 is the country profile of The Gambia.  This chapter provide a brief 
description of the geography, ethnic composition, demography, gender, religion, 
and poverty in The Gambia and then moves to discuss the political and economic 
history since independence. The chapter will also describe the post-independent 
migration history of Gambians to Western countries and the Gambian diaspora 
associations in the UK.  The main aim of this chapter is to highlight some of the 
developmental and political issues in The Gambia that would create understanding 
of why the Gambia diaspora intervene at ‘home’.   
 
Chapter 4 is the methodology chapter, which provides details about the methods 
used to collect the data that informed this empirical research.  It also sets out the 
research design and the various elements of the data collection stage of the 
research.  This includes discussions of the sampling, triangulation/ data testing, 
detailed accounts of the three phases of fieldwork, the data analysis process, 
research limitations, risks, research ethics, sensitive issues, and research 
positionality.   
 
Chapter 5 explores the different socio-economic development contributions of the 
Gambian diaspora.  This is the first empirical chapter, which addresses research 
question one and the first and second main arguments in the thesis. The chapter 
                                                                
4 The idea of ‘strategic essentialism’ is taken from Gayathri Spivak. It argues that despite 
acknowledging the reality of internal heterogeneity it can be strategic for a particular group to present 
themselves as homogeneous in order challenge those who have power over them. In this case, by 
asserting the uniformity of the African diaspora, whilst knowing there is considerable diversity within that 
category.  
 21 
looks at the development contributions of the Gambian diaspora in The Gambia at 
three scales, the family, town/village, and national level. Then moves on to discuss 
the contributions to the Gambian diaspora in the development of four sectors, 
health, education, housing, and agriculture.  The main findings in this chapter are: 
(1) the Gambian diaspora are making the most significant direct contribution at 
family level, which helps to augment household consumption and alleviate 
household poverty, (2) it is seldom that they make direct contributions to national 
development projects, however, their contributions at family and town/village levels 
are having a multiplier effect on the country’s economy and, (3) the Gambian 
diaspora are contributing to development of the health, education, housing and 
agriculture sectors, however, they are having a more profound effect in 
modernising the housing stock in The Gambia. 
 
Chapter 6 focuses on the constraints and challenges the Gambian diaspora 
encounter when contributing to socio-economic development in The Gambia.  This 
chapter is an extension of chapter 5 and it addresses the second main argument.  
This chapter looks at challenges at family, town/village, government, and 
institutional levels.  The finding in this chapter revealed that some barriers are real 
whilst others are perceived.  However, combined they provide an excuse for some 
members of the Gambian diaspora to be inactive in development at ‘home’. This 
chapter argues that most of the barriers exist partly because the state controls 
resource allocations and determines who to involve in national development. 
  
Chapter 7 focuses on the political interventions of the Gambian diaspora.  It 
discusses the political mobilization of the Gambian diaspora in the UK and the US, 
their mobilization activities and tools as well as the triggers and justifications for 
their political interventions. The chapter also assesses the effectiveness of the 
political interventions of the UK and US Gambian diaspora. The aim of this chapter 
is to demonstrate how the diaspora seeks to influence democratic political change 
when faced with the challenge of a rallying large-scale support and divided and 
self-serving opposition parties and politicians. I use ‘social movement theory’ as 
the main theoretical framework to explain the mobilization of the UK and the US 
Gambian diaspora civil society groups. This chapter addresses research questions 
two and three as well as the third and fourth main argument.   
Chapter 8 identifies and discusses the relationships between 'politics and 
development', 'politics and migration' and, 'migration and development' in the 
Gambian context.   One of the main aims of this chapter is to articulate a better 
understanding of the relationship between development, politics and international 
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migration in The Gambia. I argue that fundamentally, politics in the Gambia causes 
underdevelopment and it is this underdevelopment that drives international 
migration – as is illustrated by the dramatic growth of the ‘backway’ in recent year. 
This chapter addresses research question four and the fifth main argument. 
Chapter 9 is the concluding chapter, which summarizes the entire thesis as well as 
reflects on the contributions this thesis makes to the field African diaspora studies 
and development studies.  In this chapter, I also give details about the 
contributions of the thesis to wider knowledge about the Gambian diaspora, ‘small 
diaspora’ and ‘conflict diaspora’.  The conclusion then moves on to discuss future 
research direction in the field of African diaspora studies and development studies 
and closes with policy ideas and my update of the recent presidential elections in 
The Gambia with resulted in President Jammeh being democratically removed 
from power. 
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Chapter 2: 
Theorizing the African Diaspora, their 
Development and Political Activities  
 
2.1 Introduction 
 
This chapter will introduce the fields of ‘diaspora and development’, ‘diasporas in 
politics’, and ‘migration and development’ to which the thesis plans to contribute 
with a new case study from The Gambia. The overall aim of this chapter is to 
develop a theoretical framework that will guide the analysis in this empirical 
research, whereas the objective is to critically assess the key literatures in the 
relevant fields.  The main argument in the chapter is that diaspora-development 
literature pays relatively little attention to the formal role of the African diasporas in 
homeland politics, and discussions of politics are either hidden behind the shield of 
‘development’ or solely in relation to violent conflict. The contribution of this thesis 
is to add to literature on peaceful diaspora political engagement in the context of 
the migration-development nexus.   
 
The development contributions of diasporas to their homeland have become an 
increasingly important feature of recent policy debates (Mercer et al. 2008, Agunias 
and Newland 2012, Crush et al. 2012, Chikanda et al. 2016).  It is now widely 
assumed that diaspora communities have a major contribution to make to 
development in their countries of origin (Davies 2012).  As such, much of the 
literature that exists in 'migration and development' and ‘diaspora studies’ tends to 
focus on the positive relationships between international migration and socio-
economic development (Horst et al. 2014).  This is known as the ‘migration and 
development’ optimism (de Haas 2012) and in this context, “Migration is no longer 
seen by many as a loss of human capital investment that ultimately results in a 
brain drain.  Instead, migrants are “heroes of development” whose activities 
produce transformative impacts on both migrant sending and receiving societies” 
(Castles and Delgado Wise 2007: 3 cited by Chikanda et al. 2016; 2).  The migrant 
activities referred to here include sending remittances, skills and knowledge 
transfers, and entrepreneurial capabilities to their homelands (Ratha and Plaza 
2011, Eckstein 2013, Ho and Boyle 2015).  
 
The literature often draws a distinction between ‘diasporas’ and ‘transnational 
migrants.’ It suggests that transnational migrants regularly participate in 
transnational economic and political activities in their ‘home’ countries from their 
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host country (Levitt 2004).  They are more mobile and their relationships with the 
host country are based on accessing the opportunities that are available to them in 
given periods. For example, attaining higher education qualifications or business 
opportunities (Vertovec 2009). According to Peggy Levitt (2004), ‘home’ means 
more than one country for transnational migrants and using the Indian immigrants 
from Gujarat State to illustrate, Levitt talks about how they own homes in 
subdivisions outside Boston, work, attend school, and build religious 
congregations, while simultaneously sending money back to India to open 
businesses or improve family homes and farms.  Transnational migrant may also 
rely on connections in their ‘home’ country for their current business and make 
frequent visits to ‘home’. However, ‘diasporas’ also maintain links with their ‘home’ 
country through investments, sending remittances, building houses, taking part in 
development and visiting that country occasionally.   Thus, the meaning of both 
concepts overlap, and separating them would risk neglecting the rich “panoply of 
definitions” (Faist 2010; 13).  The fact is diasporas also engage in transnational 
political and economic activities, therefore either concept would work in this thesis, 
however, I have decided to use the term diaspora as this is the term the 
participants used to describe themselves. 
Going back to the point I made earlier in the introduction chapter pertaining to the 
literature in diaspora studies shying away from discussions of politics.  I argue in 
this chapter that the literature either effectively depoliticizes the political practices 
of diasporas by calling it ‘development’ or relating it exclusively to questions of 
violent conflict (Koser 2003 and Bernal 2006, 2014 and Baser 2015).  For example, 
it can be argued that the establishing citizen’s rights and women’s rights are part of 
development and in so many ways profoundly a political trajectory because it is 
about setting up the ‘rules’ of who participates in decision-making and can access 
resources. But, empirical evidence shows that diaspora interventions in peaceful 
homeland politics is nothing new (Lyons 2007, Knott and McLoughlin 2010), as 
illustrated by Gabriel Sheffer (2003) who asserts that the Jewish diaspora has 
played a significant role in influencing Israeli domestic politics since the Cold War 
in 1947, by creating successful mechanisms to provide financial and political 
support.  In fact, in much of the literature on diaspora studies, the Jewish diaspora 
are used as a classic example of the everyday transnational engagement of the 
diaspora in politics both violent and non-violent. Their contributions to the building 
of the state of Israel and lobbying the US government to include their issues in US 
policy process in 1972 and 1974 (Hägel and Peretz 2005) has clearly impressed 
many academics writing in this field as a model of what is possible, though not 
common.   
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There are five sections in this chapter, the first section will seek to define and 
conceptualize the terms development, politics and African politics.  The second 
section will seek to critically review the literature on the broader topics of ‘migration 
and development’.  The third section will seek to use the literature to define the 
global and African diaspora.  This section will argue for the merits of strategically 
essentializing the African diaspora in an attempt to show how the connections 
(family, friends, businesses and properties) they have in their ‘home’ countries 
drive them to simultaneously set out to contribute to development and to intervene 
in politics.  The fourth section covers the literature on narrower topics within the 
migration-development field by looking at African diasporas in development. The 
fifth section gets to the core literature with which this thesis engages by looking at 
the field of diaspora engagement in homeland politics.  Lastly, the concluding 
section draws together the key arguments in the literature. 
 
2.2 Defining the Terms  
 
Development  
 
Defining the term ‘development’ is not an easy task because it is used in different 
ways by the different academic disciplines engaged in the field of development 
studies (de Kadt 1974). For example, development economists might define 
‘development’ using economic indicators like gross domestic product (GDP), 
income per capita and would conceptualise it using an economic model (Collier 
2007, and Moyo 2011).  In contrast, development sociologists such as Bernstein 
(1973), Barnett (1988) and Harris (1989) would define ‘development’ on a broader 
canvas as the enrichment of human life (Sen 1999) in which desirable 
socioeconomic changes contribute to improved quality of life and living conditions 
for the majority of people within a locality (Rist 2009, Todaro and Smith 2012, 
Wanyama 2013).  The indicators of living conditions include education, 
employment, health, infrastructure, income, shelter, and equality. They are the 
‘basic needs’ that represent the absolute minimum necessary for survival (Paul 
Streeten 1979).  However, according to Emanuel de Kadt (1974), the problem with 
defining ‘development’ in sociology is that it does not attract the attention of 
policymakers who prefer to use economics to diagnose a country’s problems. From 
de Kadt’s (1974) point of view, ‘Applied Economics’ are more respected than 
‘Applied Sociology’, particularly in crisis situations (1). 
 
However, from the literature it is clear that ‘development’ is a loaded term (Staudt 
1991), attached to changing theories and qualifiers. Most textbook accounts of the 
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history of the evolution of practical ‘development’ started with Modernization 
Theory. The key thinkers of this theory were American historian economist Walt 
Rostow (1960, 1971, 1990) and political scientist Samuel Huntington (1971). 
Modernization Theory posits a linear series of stages of development and a set of 
prescriptions about how to move between them. Another ‘development’ theory that 
emerged as a critique of Modernization Theory was Dependency/ 
Underdevelopment Theory.  The key thinkers of this theory were Andre Gunder 
Frank (1971, 1984, 1994), Samir Amin (1987) and Walter Rodney (1972). They 
argue that the exploitation of the satellite countries (Third World) by the metropolis 
(the west) has resulted in the underdevelopment of Africa states in particular. In 
addition, the development of the core was premised on the active under-
developing of the periphery. However, neoliberal development theory led by Bela 
Balassa (1971, 1981) and Deepak Lal (1983), emerged in the 1980s as a solution 
to the underdevelopment of the Third World.  The main idea of this theory was 
based on enabling free trade at a global scale and stripping away state 
interventions in commodity production and exchange. Such narratives of the 
different development theories are of course very familiar and oversimplified but is 
justified here to make the point that the disagreements are not only about what 
‘development’ is and how to measure it, but also how to foster it.  
 
Additionally, the different development theories have often been criticized for being 
Eurocentric (Cowen and Shenton 2003), because they place theory building in the 
metropolitan heartland. ‘Development’ practice in Africa is even more Eurocentric 
being steered mainly by non-African external participants such as former 
colonizers (UK and France), neo-imperialists (US and China) (Matunhu 2011, 
Black 2015) and international financial institutions (World Bank and IMF) (Shirley 
2008, Moyo 2011). What has been unfortunate for development countries is that 
the development industry divides the globe between ‘developed’ and 
underdeveloped’ (Staudt 1991) and uses a highly generalized ‘one-size fits all’ 
pathway to  ‘development’ practice which takes little account of the diversity and 
heterogeneity of developing countries. When put into practice what works in one 
country may not in another (Black 2015). For example, the neoliberal structural 
development programmes of the 1980s and 90s were only successful in countries, 
like The Gambia, that not only adopted the principles wholeheartedly but also 
tailored the policy to suit the country context.  Furthermore, ‘development’ qualifiers 
that seek to increase its precision have prefixed ‘development’ over the years. 
These include ‘human development’ (which combines social and economic criteria 
to advancement), ‘sustainable development’ (the need to conserve natural 
resources), ‘participatory development’ (attempts to increase Citizen participation 
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in decision-making) and ‘equitable development’ (concern with rising disparities 
and social justice) (Black 2015; 30).    
 
The changing theories and qualifiers of ‘development’ have led analysts such as 
Gilbert Rist (2009) to label the term over-stretched and a “plastic word” (11).  
However, I would argue that this academic desire for analytical precision has little 
impact on the fact that ‘development’ is desired in every aspect of Gambian society. 
For example, Gambians associate ‘development’ with growth and progress and 
within these qualifiers, ‘development’ is relative as it means different things to 
different people. Thus, ‘development’ comes to be defined in a multiplicity of ways 
(Cowen and Shenton 2003) and its characteristics depend on the approach 
observers, analyst and practitioners adopt to solve a particular developmental 
problem (Zafarullah and Huque 2012: 44). In this thesis,  ‘development’ is defined 
in sociological terms, and is most aligned to the ‘human development’ definition 
because this is closest to the understanding of most of the interviewees whose 
definition of ‘development’ is best captured by Amartya Sen’s (2001) definition of 
the term, for example, “the expansion of human capacities and quality of life” (144). 
Like Sen, the interviewees believed that both the government at ‘home’ and their 
family members in the diaspora could enhance their capacities and facilitate an 
improved quality of life, by increasing public spending, creation of jobs and sending 
remittances. 
 
However, this thesis aims to go beyond finding an interpretation of the definition of 
‘development’, to understanding how ‘development’ is managed, particularly by the 
state (Zafarullah and Huque 2012, Turner et al. 2015 and Bawole et al. 2016).  
Bawole et al. (2016) define development management as, “generally, development 
management is a deliberate attempt to cause development by actively steering 
institutional and organizational changes towards greater levels of efficiency and 
effectiveness” (2).  This involves consciously managing processes and building the 
capacity needed to improve the lives of people and removing the constraints that 
limit their achievements, for example, political, institutional, social and cultural 
constraints (Brinkerhoff and Coston 1999; 347). Development in this sense is a 
planned, intentional activity in which actors move towards specific goals in the 
name of progress.  
 
Part of the literature argues that development management is inherently political 
(Staudt 1991, Brinkerhoff and Brinkerhoff 2006) because it deals with a process of 
planned social and economic change.  Moreover, the language, labels and 
authority of those seeking to manage this process determine how development is 
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treated (Staudt 1991). In the context of a capitalist state, for example, a democratic 
government might place more emphasis on entrepreneurialism and free markets 
as a means to deliver development. Whilst a socialist government might see 
development in terms of central government’s interventions in markets to control 
the distribution of profits for the common good. In each case, the language and 
labels of development will be different as will the ability of government to deliver. 
However, according to Abouassi (2010), citizens in the Global South are often 
more cautiously tolerant of allowing politics into development than citizens in other 
parts of the world. Abouassi explains that in the Global South, they view the state 
as the manager of development following many decades in which governments 
have made national ‘development’ their core focus. Thus, neither the individual, nor 
the private sector, nor civil society are expected to manage national development 
by African citizens, even though they are also acknowledged as important actors, 
but for most people, governments must take the lead role.  
 
The evidence from this research suggests that the interviewees in The Gambia and 
the diaspora see the state as the key institution that manages development in the 
country because the government decides the development priorities and how they 
are implemented. For example, until recently, the practice of female genital 
mutilation and cutting (FGM/C) was not considered a ‘development’ priority partly 
because it has cultural implications5 even though gender equality is. Thus, the 
treatment of FGM/C as a developmental issue lacked political support and faced-
off against stringent cultural beliefs. To address this, in 2010 UNICEF could only 
work with local charities like GAMCOTRAP and TOSTAN6 to implement community 
empowerment programme that offered microfinance and adult literacy in exchange 
for communities to abandon the practice of FGM/C.  Knowing that there was a lack 
of political endorsement, UNICEF worked at the grassroot level in 40 Sarahuleh 
communities in the Upper River Region, resulting in only 2 Mini Declarations on the 
Abandonment (UNICEF 20147). However, in November 2015, FGM/C became a 
national development priority when President Jammeh publically banned the 
practice8.  According to an informant at UNICEF, they were now able to directly 
work openly on FGM/C issues in more communities and UNICEF has received the 
go ahead to reach and sensitize Muslim religious leaders, who are in the process 
of producing a fatwa9 against the practice.  Whereas prior to this ban the Imams 
would not speak out against the practice because President Jammeh was openly 
                                                                
5 It was believed by the participants in the study that ‘culture’ has a strong influence over politics in 
Africa, particularly since politicians do not want to be seen going against culture because of the fear that 
it would affect votes.   
6 http://www.tostan.org/empowerment-women-and-girls 
7 Presentation at the Global In-depth review meeting in The Gambia  
8 https://www.theguardian.com/society/2015/nov/24/the-gambia-bans-female-genital-mutilation 
9 Islamic ruling  
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in support of it. However, the government has now validated the newly revised and 
re-costed UNICEF FGM/C strategy and the key insight here is that arguably it was 
not until the Government of The Gambia made FGM/C a  ‘development’ priority 
that the wider Gambian population started to see it as such.  
 
In conclusion, critics of ‘development’ such as Maggie Black (2015) argue it is very 
contradictory because it often reinforces the very poverty it claims it is trying to 
eliminate. For example, certain development projects like the World Cup in Brazil 
made poor Rio communities living in the favelas, targets of a real estate land grab.  
This mega project attracted many private investments in Rio particularly from real 
estate tycoons, but simultaneously caused the displacement of people living in the 
slums of Rio 10  (Zirin 2014).  Human Rights Specialist Balakrishnan Rajagopal 
describes this form of forced dislocation as “development cleansing” (cited by 
Black 2015; 14) and it is for this reason that ‘development’ is at times criticized for 
having adverse effects on poor people.  However, I maintain the argument that 
‘development’ should be allowed to remain a relative term that is understood in 
context rather than one with a fixed, absolute definition.  Thus, people should be 
allowed to define it in a way that suits their context, which is what this thesis has 
attempted to do by using ‘development’ in the way that is defined by the 
participants in the research.  In terms of development management within the 
Gambian context, I argue that ‘development’ is inherently political from the 
perspective of the people, the government, and multilateral institutions who attach 
conditions relating to political practice to developmental aid. Nevertheless, having 
shown how the concept of ‘development’ will be used the thesis.   The natural step 
would be to move on to define the other key concept such as politics. 
 
Politics and African politics 
 
Politics, in its most general abstract sense, is about the socially constructed rules 
by which a group of people live (Heywood 2013). For example, the social rule that 
decides whether an unelected monarch or an elected representative in a 
parliament will make decisions about resource-allocations. Politics, according to 
Held and Leftwich (1984):  
 
Is a phenomenon found in and between all groups, institutions (formal and 
informal) and societies, cutting across public and private life. It is involved 
in all the relations, institutions and structures that are implicated in the 
activities of production and reproduction in the life of societies.  It is 
                                                                
10 http://www.truth-out.org/progressivepicks/item/24587-target-favelas-the-neoliberal-scramble-for-
world-cup-wealth 
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expressed in all the activities of co-operation, negotiation and struggle over 
the use, productions and distribution of resources which this entails (144) 
 
According to this quote, politics affects every aspect peoples’ public and private life. 
It is the process of making rules, which govern the distribution of power and 
resources in society (Leftwich 2004). It is also the process of changing those rules 
or defending them within a particular place. Arguing about what these rules should 
be in public is seen as central to the practice of politics in some contexts. For 
example, should the production of these rules be left to elite groups of experts or is 
it a matter that everyone in the society concerned should participate in? According 
to Jean-Jacques Rousseau (1762) who shaped what is known as the modern 
participatory European democracy, every citizen in society should participate in 
decisions that shape his or her life through mechanisms like voting (Heywood 
2013).  
 
The heart of politics is in theory about conflict-resolution in the context of scarce 
resources and different people wanting different things. It is about finding 
institutions and mechanisms that can reconcile differences between people 
effectively and achieve consensus. In reality, such an ambition is not always 
successful as not all conflicts are resolved through recourse to the agreed political 
rules. This is where the academic study of political practice comes in. More critical 
academic readings of politics around the world are calling for broader definitions of 
politics as the study of power (Squires 1999).  They suggest that in practice politics 
is a long way from the pursuit of conflict-resolution and instead is often the 
manipulation of government institutions or state bureaucracies in the interests of 
the powerful. Additionally, politics is the joust between different forms of power 
amongst elites (for example the power of the diaspora and the power of the 
government) usually at the expense of the weak. 
 
Thus, the idea of politics as an abstract process of rule making and conflict-
resolution often struggles to disentangle itself from popular images of the 
corruption, hypocrisy, self-aggrandizement, violence, ideology, lies and failure of 
individual politicians around the world. The academic and everyday use of the term 
politics is often at odds and, like ‘development’, it is another highly contested term 
(Leftwich 2004). For example, the members of the Gambian diaspora who 
participated in this research argue the practical field of politics generally covers the 
practices of government (how government operates).   Whereas, the institutions of 
democracy (elections and political parties), adherence to the constitution 
(particularly in relation to the state monopoly on legitimate violence and defence of 
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basic rights) and the representation of ideas when providing the public with 
information about what is happening in The Gambia (for example control over the 
media). 
 
Typically, the academic theories and frameworks of the practice of politics applied 
in contexts like The Gambia use variants of patrimonialism and neo-patrimonialism 
(prebendalism, clientelism and the politics of the belly), which are seen as the 
hallmarks of postcolonial African state politics (Chabal and Daloz 1999, Bayart et al. 
1999, 2009, Boone 2003, Daloz 2003, Ganahl 2013). The key idea is that those in 
authority who are the ‘patrons’ buy the obedience and support of political ‘clients’ 
using resources stolen from the state (Van de Walle 2007). The whole system is a 
triangular hierarchy that reaches from the base of the population to the summit of 
the polity, as one person’s patron is the client of someone else higher up the 
bureaucracy (Eisenstadt 1973). This patronage system is both informal and 
personalized as it is all about the number of connections that the powerful patrons 
have with their clients. It blurs the political boundary between public and private 
since public resources and positions are used for private gains and private 
friendships and social contacts become central to public authority and promotion 
within the administration. Neo-patrimonial states are often governed by personal 
rule in which the authority of the leader is beyond question and they personally 
control of running the affairs of the state (Hydén 2013; 99). Subsequently, analyst 
Bratton and Rothchild (1992; 263) depicted contemporary African politics as ‘weak’ 
and ‘soft’ because they assert that African governments are unable to apply 
governmental regularities throughout the political space of their countries. Yet one 
of the benefits of neo-patrimonialism is that it can translate social relations into 
geographical ones as the obligations between patrons and clients have a regional, 
spatial expression.  
 
In most of the literature, the definition of the concept of ‘African politics’ is broad 
and focuses on ‘leadership’, ‘governance’, ‘democracy’ and where possible 
‘development’ (Boone 2003, Hydén 2005, 2013, Thomas 2010). In other words, the 
focus here is on formal politics and state politics (as opposed to the politics of 
gender, ethnicity, religion or identity). The strong separation of state politics, 
identity politics, and personal politics is empirically hard to sustain, but for the 
purpose of setting out an initial analytical framework is an illusion that is retained.  
However, a more recent narrative sub-divides the post-colonial period in Africa. 
According to Chazan (1999), the first part of the 1960s saw single-party 
governments and the consolidation of patterns of rule in Africa.  Then the latter part 
of the 1960s was the introduction of military rule and with it came the entrenchment 
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of administrative regimes and instability.  By the 1970s, there was the rise of 
authoritarian rulers and personal coercive modes of rule.  The 1980s saw repeated 
military takeovers, populist uprising, and growing economic malaise.  Then in the 
1990s came democratic systems, which began to replace former one-party system 
(140).  This breakdown is extremely crude and simplistic in that it masks 
considerable geographical heterogeneity, but it is useful for developing a broad 
narrative of current African political systems or at least articulating how they 
emerged in the aftermath of decolonization. But, the drawback of this breakdown 
does not include the developmental outcomes of these systems, which perhaps 
could be obtained by looking at the political leadership in Africa.  As according to 
Heinz Arndt (2011) political leadership plays a key role in development because 
leaders whose focus is on the management of the state as a whole as opposed to 
focusing on increasing their own authority are more likely to bring development to 
their countries.   
Still, African politics has a prominent place as the exemplar of concepts associated 
with ‘corruption’ within state theory globally (Ganahl 2013). As Routley (2016) put it, 
“the ‘natural’ state of African politics is configured as radically corrupt” (30). Such 
analysis has itself been criticized as racist for its naturalization of the idea that 
criminal states are normal in Africa (Bayart et al. 1999, 200911). Certainly, these 
are extremely negative views of African politics and though there is some accuracy 
in the literature in terms of African leaders treating state resources as their own 
and abuse of power.  Such narratives do not acknowledge the recent (post-1990) 
democratizations in African politics, which is partly attributed to the demands of 
African people themselves (including the diaspora) and (but more ambiguously) to 
aid conditionality.  Recent events in some African countries have shown the 
citizens becoming more involved in politics and influencing democratic change. For 
example, the general elections in Nigeria in March 2015 were described as an 
unprecedented success because young Nigerians ensured their voices were heard 
and they disseminating information about the electoral process, which resulted in a 
peaceful democratic political change in the country. This is not to say that Nigerian 
current politics cannot be understood through patron-client relationships, or that 
corruption has ended, but that neo-patrimonialism alone is insufficient to 
understand what is happening today in African states. Therefore, suggestion that 
this approach captures the totality of African politics is not tenable.  
                                                                
11 The authors argue that corruption at major scales, squandering of natural resources, and privatization 
of State institutions are features of public life in Africa, suggesting that the State is becoming a vehicle 
for organized criminal activity 
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In summary, the existing work shows a long history of state politics in Africa that 
pre-dates the colonial period as well as a rough pattern of how a distinctly African 
politics evolved across the continent after independence. There is an over-arching 
dominant analytical framework drawn from neo-patrimonialism, but there is a need 
to add some nuance to that framework not only in terms of challenges that came 
from aid conditionality, but more importantly from recent African assertions of 
democratic will. However, there is limited work that tries to link political change to 
intentional development. Thus, the thesis seeks particularly to build on this claim of 
the partial sufficiency of neo-patrimonialism as a framework for analysing African 
politics because it opens up a space for taking seriously the engagement of African 
citizens in bureaucratic and administrative systems, including those ‘citizens’ in the 
diaspora. Thus, this thesis will focus on the effects of African politics on 
development (refer to definition above), particularly in relation to leadership, 
governance, and democracy. 
 
Lastly, within the discussions of politics in The Gambia fear plays a prominent role 
in determining the behaviours of the Gambian diaspora and those at ‘home’. For 
example, fear prevents many Gambians abroad from openly participating politics 
because they fear that their families will be targeted. And for the majority of 
Gambian at ‘home’, the fear of state-sanctioned violence prevents them being 
politically engaged. According to Psychology Today12, fear can be triggered by 
traumas and bad experiences such as violence, terrorism and natural disasters.  It 
is defined as an emotion that is subjective in the sense that it is in a person’s mind.  
However, from a legal standpoint, fear becomes objective when there is supporting 
evidence (Clayton 2016). Within the debates of the ‘politics of fear’, fear is 
triggered by political propaganda disseminated by the mass media in the form of 
intimidating symbols and experiences such as crime and terrorism (Altheide 2009).  
For example, during the EU referendum in the UK in 2016, Ukip leader and Leave 
campaigner Nigel Farage unveiled an anti-migrant poster, which was compared to 
“Nazi-style propaganda” on social media13 to arguably incite fear and racial hatred 
against EU migrant.  In the interviews, the fear of political persecution appeared 
strong among all participants. For the most part, evidence of state-sanctioned 
violence against political oppositions and critics of the Gambian government 
supported the feelings of fear. Fear of persecution in the country is a ‘real’ and 
objective emotion because it is supported by evidence.  Discussions of fear appear 
throughout the thesis in sections such as religion, dependency, risks and sensitive 
issues, physical safety, brain drain and weak institutional capacity. The next 
                                                                
12 https://www.psychologytoday.com/basics/fear 
13 https://www.theguardian.com/politics/2016/jun/16/nigel-farage-defends-ukip-breaking-point-poster-
queue-of-migrants 
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section focuses on the broader literature on ‘migration and development’ nexus 
2.3 Migration and Development 
 
“Financial flows from migrants and their descendants are at the heart of 
the relationship between migration and development” (Terrazas 2010:3) 
Between the 1950s and the 2000s, there have been several shifts in the debates 
around the ‘migration and development’ nexus.  According to Hein de Haas (2012), 
“the debate about migration and development has swung back and forth like a 
pendulum, from optimism in the postwar period to deep ‘brain drain’ pessimism 
since the 1970s toward neo- optimistic ‘brain gain’ since 2000” (8).  De Haas 
explains that during in the postwar period and the era of modernisation 
development theory, migration was seen as a process that benefitted both 
destination and origin countries.  This was because surplus labour from poor 
countries provided wealthy countries with much-needed labour, and the 
expectation was that the remittances and skills and knowledge that migrants 
acquired before returning ‘home’ would greatly help developing countries in their 
‘economic take-off’ (11).  The issue of the migration of highly skilled nationals from 
poor to wealthy countries was introduced in UN discourse in the 1960s and at this 
point, it was clear that the organisation saw migration as a tool to stimulate growth 
in both origin and destination countries.   
However, by the late 1960s, there was a shift in the debate to a more pessimistic 
direction and this coincided with the surfacing of dependency and 
underdevelopment theory (Binford 2003).  During this time, migration became 
linked with both the idea of brain drain (loss of skills from poor regions) and the 
dependency on remittances from migrant-sending regions and countries, which 
was believed to aggravate problems of underdevelopment (de Haas 2012).  The 
term brain drain was first linked to the migration of British scientists to North 
America from post-war Europe but it is now connected to the recurring patterns of 
underdevelopment in ‘developing countries’ (Bréant 2013; 100). Typically debates 
about brain drain focus on the loss of skilled professionals, such as medical 
doctors, who cost a lot to train, but who have skills that are valued in global 
markets at a far higher price than they are in the healthcare systems of Africa. 
 
In response to the problems of brain drain, international organisations began 
focusing on return migrants and consequently the United Nations Development 
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Programme (UNDP) initiated the TOKTEN programme (Transfer of Knowledge 
Through Expatriate Nationals) in 1977 in Turkey to encourage highly skilled 
migrants to do short-term missions in their countries of origin to promote 
development (Bréant 2013; 100). Governments in the global north offered 
scholarship programmes like the Commonwealth Scholarships to provide 
opportunities to migrants from developing countries to gain education and 
expertise to take back and develop their countries of origin (Uwem, 2002, Manning 
2003, Skeldon 2005, 2009).  
Yet, despite these efforts, Ionescu (2006) argues that it has been difficult to 
determine conclusively the impact return migrants make to development because 
their contribution cannot be measured as easily, as say the inflow of remittances. 
However, the impact of return migration is central to the discussion of the benefits 
and costs associated with migration because remittances are believed to play an 
important role in bringing foreign exchange and lowering poverty in a country. 
Additionally, migration is believed to lead to other forms of beneficial transfers to 
‘home’ countries, such as technological, managerial and entrepreneurial know-how 
(Gubert and Nordman 2008; 1). Gubert and Nordman (2008) study of return 
migrants from Morocco, Algeria and Tunisia, revealed that that returnees show 
high ability to create small or medium businesses and to generate jobs. However, 
returnees also “face Administrative constraints, too much competition, not enough 
capital, lack of experience and management difficulties” (16).    
Carling et al. (2016) extend the return migrant and development debate further in 
their paper ‘Root causes and drivers of migration.  Implications for humanitarian 
efforts and development cooperation’ where they argue that the possibilities and 
realities of return migration can affect the developmental activities of migrates in 
their homeland, such as, the circumstance of which they have returned 
(deportation, removal or assisted return), and what they experience upon their 
return. For instance, though some returnees are motivated to help develop their 
countries, they can become discouraged by “experience of corruption, nepotism, 
and sometimes kleptocracy can alienate idealistic returnees and undermine the 
sense of patriotism that spurred their return in the first place” (30).  In their case 
study of Iraqi Kurdistan migrants, they found that corruption emerged as the major 
concern for those contemplating return as well as for those who had returned (33).  
Nevertheless, it can be argued that though understanding the circumstances for 
return and experience of returnees is important to understanding why they may not 
have an impact in offsetting the problems of brain drain in poor countries (Sanjeev 
Gupta et al. 2007). The fact is that some sub-Saharan African countries are paying 
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a heavy cost for the large-scale migration of African healthcare professionals to 
OECD countries (Mills et al. 2011). Table 1 presents data from a study conducted 
by Mills et al. in 2011 on the number of doctors emigrating from sub-Saharan 
countries to Canada, USA, UK and Australia.  
Table 1: Doctors emigrating from sub-Saharan countries to Canada, USA, UK and 
Australia 
Source country Destination 
country 
No of source 
country doctors 
in destination 
country 
Estimated lost 
investment for 
source countries 
($millions) 
Ethiopia  Canada, USA, UK 
and Australia 
567 25 
Kenya Canada, USA, UK 
and Australia 
328 117 
Malawi Canada, USA, UK 
and Australia 
41 2 
Nigeria Canada, USA, UK 
and Australia 
7106 645 
South Africa Canada, USA, UK 
and Australia 
10822 141 
Tanzania Canada, USA, UK 
and Australia 
81 3 
Uganda Canada, USA, UK 
and Australia 
409 14 
Zambia Canada, USA, UK 
and Australia 
206 12 
Zimbabwe Canada, USA, UK 
and Australia 
380 40 
Source: Mills et al. 2011:13 
 
This data shows a significant financial loss to source African countries, whereas 
Gupta et al. (2007) article, ‘Making Remittances Work for Africa,’ highlights the 
magnitude of the loss of human resource in Africa in the medical field. For example, 
Gupta et al. (2007) report that between 2002 and 2003 almost one-quarter of new 
overseas-trained physicians working in the UK’s National Health Service (NHS) 
came from sub-Saharan Africa. The same reference claims that about 80% of 
nurses from Liberia and equal number of doctors from Mozambique was working in 
industrial countries (3).  Thus, there is no denying from this data brain drain is a 
huge developmental problem for some African countries.  However, not wanting to 
leave the problems of brain drain unresolved, in the 1990s the UN system 
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attempted to shift the discussions around ‘migration and development’ to an 
exchange in which the interest of all stakeholders are adequately protected.  
According to de Haas (2012), it was during this time that the debates on ‘migration 
and development’ shifted to what he calls neo-optimism.  It was also during this 
time that neo-liberal development ideas were in full swing.   
Accordingly, on the 1st February 2000, the UN General Assembly adopted 
Resolution 54/212, urging:  
Member States and the United Nations system to strengthen international 
cooperation in the area of international migration and development in order 
to address the root causes of migration, especially those related to poverty, 
and to maximize the benefits of international migration to those concerned, 
and encouraged, where relevant, interregional, regional and subregional 
mechanisms to continue to address the question of migration and 
development (UN 2000: 4) 
 
However, from this resolution, the UN system appeared keen to take leadership in 
the process of institutionalizing global migration governance (Bréant 2013).  There 
are still no institutional systems of global migration or agreed global international 
deals and treaties around migration. However, within the UN debates around the 
time of the millennium, some African countries and individuals were keen to bridge 
the gaps caused by brain drain.  For instance, African countries came together in 
Dakar in October 2000, to promote and strengthen the participation of migrants in 
the development of their countries of origin.  The West African Regional Ministerial 
meeting reportedly triggered a series of other events, like a workshop in April 2001 
in Libreville to prepare IOM Resolution 614, which laid the foundation of the 
programme called Migration for Development in Africa (MIDA).  At the individual 
level, young African professionals living abroad like Didier Acouetey established a 
recruitment agency called ‘Afric Search’ to find jobs in the African continent for 
African professionals living outside (Bréant 2013; 103).  Additionally, AfricaRecuit 
was established in 1999 by Dr Titilola Banjoko in the UK, which focused on 
capacity building through human resources using its various networks within and 
outside Africa14. 
 
During the period of neo- optimism the literature on ‘migration and development’ 
and development policy broadened to include the contributions diasporas make to 
economic growth and social modernization in their ‘home’ countries The 
                                                                
14 http://www.africarecruit.com/Overview.htm 
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discussions focused on maximizing remittances to enhance development in 
countries of origin (Newland 2011).  Subsequently, homeland governments and 
international organisations began to take notice of the potential of migrants as 
important development actors and there came a proliferation of ‘migration and 
development’ policies that targeted migrant investments, skills, knowledge, and 
entrepreneurial capabilities (Ratha et al. 2011 and Gamlen 2014). Key examples 
are Mexico’s co-development policies (private-public collaboration between the 
government and its migrants) like ‘Three for One’ in Zacatecas and the ‘My 
Community’ (Mi Comunidad) in Guanajuato (Torres and Kuznetsov 2006). These 
policies provided an avenue for the Mexican government to tap into migrant 
remittances and direct them towards community development projects.  For 
example, the ‘Three for One’ policy encouraged migrants to contribute $1 whilst the 
Mexican federal government, states and municipal authorities each contribute $1 to 
community infrastructure projects.  Thus, $1 from a migrant turns into $4 at ‘home’.  
Consequently, this led to a $4.5 million investment in development at ‘home’, which 
has funded 400 projects in eight years (Torres and Kuznetsov 2006).  Additionally, 
the ‘My Community’ policy attracted migrants to invest in establishing maquiladoras 
(manufacturing) firms in seven municipalities. Migrants and local investors provided 
half of the capital and the state government contributed the other half.  As a result, 
12 maquiladoras firms were in operation and 500 jobs were created for local 
people in June 2000 (Torres and Kuznetsov 2006; 113). These examples 
demonstrate that creating development-friendly migration policies are more 
effective than governments marginalizing migrants or establishing policies that 
seek to manage migration (Newland 2004).  
 
However, despite the apparent success achieved by the Mexican government, 
such policies merit critical scrutiny. Generally, policymakers are criticized for 
paying little attention to the practices of migrants, which determine where their 
developmental interests lie. According to the co-founder of the Migration Policy 
Institute, Kathleen Newland (2011), future migration-development policy should be 
based on deeper analysis of both migrant practices and analysis of the best 
practices that have emerged from governments over the last two decades (8). 
Additionally, Hein de Haas (2012) asserts that in order to develop a more nuanced 
view of ‘migration and development’, policymakers have to think of more subtle, 
sensible and realistic policy responses. To achieve this, it is crucial for the debate 
to move beyond the ‘negative versus positive’, ‘brain drain versus brain gain’ and 
‘consumption versus investment’ (12).  
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Therefore, I argue that a nuanced view of the ‘migration and development’ debate 
can be achieved through looking at it from a gender perspective and 
mainstreaming gender into ‘migration and development’ policies. For instance, 
there is certainly a gender element in remittances sending and receiving, shown 
clearly in studies of migrant women.  For example, Hammond’s (2011) study of 
migrant Somali women in Lewiston, Maine, USA revealed that they participate in 
sending remittances ‘home’ and consequently, this has opened doors for the 
women to participate in clan matters that were once only accessible only to men.  
Such as, the diya system, which is a dispute resolution and social safety, net 
mechanism whereby the clan looks after its members (139).  “Since very often 
women are in a better position than men to contribute to such things as 
compensation for a crime committed, or a dowry for a girl about to be wed, they are 
beginning to play a role in the diya”(140).  Similar studies of migrant women in Viet 
Nam (Niimi and Reilly 2008), Philippine women in Italy and Dominican Republic 
women in the US (UN-INSTRAW and UNDP 2010) all reveal that these women 
send remittances more frequently than their men.   Additionally, in the case of 
Philippine and Dominican Republic women, they are able to sustain their 
remittance sending practices for a longer period of time than their men and they 
send money to a greater number of recipients at ‘home’, including to women (28).  
In Senegal, women who receive remittances have more opportunities to invest in 
capitally intensive ways according to analyst Beth Buggenhagen (2004, 2012). 
“Women often invest a proportion of male remittances into rotating credit unions 
and ritual associations through which they finance their own local trading activities, 
the purchases of housewares, and family ceremonies” (Buggenhagen 2004; 48-49).  
However, not all women migrants have control over where they remit, for example, 
in Albanian tradition once a woman is married, her responsibilities are transferred 
from her family to her husbands. Thus, their remittances are directed to her 
husband’s family.  However, it would still be beneficial for policymakers to explore 
the remittance practices of migrant women and where their interests lie in order to 
formulate more ‘sensible’ ‘migration and development’ policy responses. 
Davies (2012) argues that the ‘migration and development’ nexus is not as 
straightforward as is sometimes assumed, particularly in the African context where 
it is complex, multi-layered and unexpected dimensions and relationships are 
revealed. Thus acknowledging the profound importance of this context is 
imperative because development in Africa is determined by the uneven and 
contested political geography of the region (103).  Therefore, there are many 
factors to consider in the ‘migration and development’ relationship, and viewing it 
just from a positive perspective restricts the possibilities for negatives outcomes to 
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be addressed in analysis or policies.  So, whilst this thesis starts from the 
assumption that migrants make worthy contributions to their ‘home’ countries, 
empirical evidence also suggests that African countries need to hold on to their 
highly skilled and educated professionals because only then can they achieve 
sustainable development. This is because remittances are insecure financial 
contributions from migrants, which are affected when the economic power of the 
sender changes.  For example, if the sender loses their job then they may not send 
remittances ‘home’.  
 
Furthermore, Nyamongo et al. (2012), argue that the “volatility of remittances 
appears to have a negative effect on the growth of countries in Africa” (240). 
Meaning they believe migration or migrant remittances cannot accelerate 
development or be a substitute for a sustained, domestically engineered 
development effort through industrialization or the growth of new job-creating 
businesses such as services. Critics of the ‘migration and development’ nexus 
argue that you cannot have development without new firms and investments that 
generate taxes as well as employment. Thus, the poverty reduction effect of 
migrant remittances is not as significant as it is assumed (Nyamongo et al. 2012).  
For instance an earlier study by Gupta et al. (2007) of 233 poverty surveys in 76 
developing countries, including 24 in sub- Saharan Africa revealed  “a 10 percent 
rise in the remittances to GDP ratio is associated with a fall of a little more than 1 
percent in the percentage of people living on less than $1 a day” (4). Thus, there is 
the question of who is receiving remittances and how are it is spent? 
  
On the other hand, the more recent arguments in the ‘migration and development’ 
literature is that the expertise, skills and knowledge from highly skilled and 
educated migrants can yield sustainable development in their  ‘home’ countries if 
migrants use their skill to help develop businesses, institutions, industries and good 
policies that could guide development. However, Hugo Bréant (2013) argues 
against the idea that there is an inherent connection between ‘migration and 
development’ because he asserts that intentional development may be a 
secondary consequence of migration but not often a motive for emigration in the 
first place (112).  Bréant adds that few migrants plan to emigrate in order to 
develop their countries of origin, and in addition, many emigrants are not inclined to 
get involved with development activities even if they are in a position to do so.  
Thus, mobility does not always result in development.  This indicates another shift 
in the ‘migration and development’ debate, which appears to be going in a neo-
pessimistic direction.  In which case, it may be wise for policymakers to take heed 
of de Haas (2012) advice in that they should:  
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Reverse their perspective on migration and development. Rather than 
asking what migrants can do to support development, or to forcibly, 
unrealistically and harmfully link the issue of return or temporariness to 
development, governments would be much better off identifying how to 
make conditions in origin countries attractive for migrant to invest socially, 
politically and economically (21). 
Research on ‘migration and development’ has done useful work to refocus the 
attention of both academics and policymakers onto migrant contributions to their 
countries of origin. Even though I would argue that the swing between optimism 
and pessimism in the migration-development field present an unhelpful dichotomy 
that does not really capture a more messy reality in 21st Century West Africa. I 
would also argue that research in this field tends to shy away from debates about 
the role of formal politics in ‘migration and development.  The narrow focus on 
economic development impact in this field means that cultural, social and 
especially the political dimensions of the engagement between migrants and their 
countries of origin is, relatively speaking, under-examined. This leaves gaps for 
more nuanced analysis of the complex and ambiguous role of migrants in changing 
their homeland. Additionally, much of the current work in ‘migration and 
development’ sits within the field of development studies (broadly construed) and 
tends to search for the sunnier, positive aspects of diaspora intervention, thus 
maintaining a built-in aversion to formal politics, which is generally seen as a 
barrier to effective ‘development’. The whole literature around ‘good governance’ in 
development studies suggests ‘politics’ is often seen not just as a barrier to, but 
distinct and separate from ‘development’.  Perhaps, this is why Ferguson, (1990) 
argues that in practice ‘development’ can become an ‘anti-politics machine’ 
because it actively tries to do political things without acknowledging politics. 
Methodologically I argue that historically most of the contributors in the ‘migration-
development’ research field fall into the category of ‘outsiders’ (not belonging to the 
groups they are studying). As with development studies, there is not only an 
instrumental sense that outsiders risk missing complex and less obvious issues 
that determine groups’ migratory practices and development activities. But there is 
a sense that it is inherently important that some of the voices in this field should 
come from the very diasporas being studied. Additionally, much of the literature in 
‘migration and development’ tends to focus on high-level policy.  However, to 
achieve more in-depth and nuanced analysis of the discourse, I argue that it is 
imperative academics and policymakers take a bottom-up approach and involve 
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individuals and communities in research and policy formulation processes 
alongside the participation of government officials and international organisations.  
This thesis seeks to supplement the existing ‘migration and development’ literature 
both by adding a diaspora voice to the analysis and by working from a more 
ethnographic bottom-up perspective, rather than looking at high-level policymaking. 
The next section of this chapter focuses on creating a better understanding of what 
constitutes a diaspora as this concept is a vital precursor to this research and 
therefore needs careful consideration. 
2.4 Global Diasporas 
 
“A ‘diaspora’ must therefore have a number of factors involving the origin 
of the (voluntary or forced) migration; settlement in one or more several 
countries; maintenance of identity and community solidarity, which allows 
people to make contacts between groups and to organise activities aimed 
at preserving that identity and; finally, relations between the leaving state, 
the host state, and the diaspora itself…”  (Dufoix, 2008:21) 
 
Historically the term ‘diaspora’ was linked to the Jewish experience of forced long-
term separation from the homeland and scattering over a wide geographical area 
(Lacroix and Fiddian-Qasmiyeh 2013).  However, there have been significant shifts 
in the use of the term over the years from a “notion associated with suffering loss, 
and victimization (to) self-conscious communities that call themselves Diasporas” 
(Vertovec, 2009:129).  Such is the confusion that one point of view seems to 
question the usefulness of having specific criteria that define a diaspora and 
distinguish it from other experiences of migration. However, analyst Oliver 
Bakewell (2008) argues for tighter and clearer definitions of the term in order to 
enhance its value as a precise specialist term.  Nicholas van Hear (2010) and 
Pnina Werbner (2010) share a similar opinion while Werbner argues that the term 
has been stretched, remodelled and re-conceptualised to where earlier definitions 
no longer fit with what currently exists. A review of the canonical literature in 
diaspora studies (Hall 1990, Safran 1991, Clifford 1994, Brah 1996, Cohen 1997, 
2008, Cohen and Vertovec 1999, Braziel and Mannur 2003, van Hear 2005, Dufoix 
2008) confirms that this concept is not a straightforward one and has been 
attached to various definitions and contradictions over the years.   
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The review of some literatures in diaspora studies initially presented a strict criteria 
in defining the term ‘diaspora’, with William Safran (1991) insisting on limiting it to 
minority expatriate communities whose members share several characteristics like: 
 
 They, or their ancestors, have been dispersed from an original 'centre' to 
two or more foreign regions; 
 They retain a collective memory, vision or myth about their original 
homeland including its location, history and achievements; 
 They believe they are not – and perhaps can never be – fully accepted 
in their host societies and so remain partly separate; 
 Their ancestral home is idealised and it is thought that, when conditions 
are favourable, either they or their descendants should return; 
 They believe all members of the diaspora should be committed to the 
maintenance and restoration of the original homeland and to its safety 
and prosperity; and 
 They continue in various ways to relate to that homeland and their 
ethnocommunal consciousness and solidarity are in an important way 
defined by the existence of such a relationship (Safran 1991, 83-84) 
 
Borrowing from these characteristics, sociologist, Robin Cohen (2008) goes further 
to argue that there are nine features of a true diaspora but insists diasporas are not 
required to display every one of these traits, just a significant number: 
1. Dispersal from an original homeland, often traumatically (slavery, 
holocaust, genocide etc) 
2. Alternatively, the expansion from a homeland in search of work, in pursuit 
of trade or to further colonial ambition (Lebanese, Indians, Chinese 
traders) 
3. A collective memory or myth about a homeland (Jewish Diaspora/Israel, 
blacks (Garveyites/Africa and Rastafarians/Ethiopia) 
4. Idealisation of the supposed ancestral home (Rastafarian and Zionist 
movement) 
5. A return movement or at least a continuing connection (Zionist movement) 
6. Strong ethnic group consciousness sustained over a long time (Sikhs), 
7. Troubled relationships with host countries (Armenians, Jews, Africans, 
Sikhs etc) 
8. A sense of co-responsibility with co-ethnic members in other countries  
9. The possibility of a distinctive creative, enriching life in tolerant host 
countries (all modern world diasporas?) 
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The ninth feature of a ‘true’ diaspora perhaps needs more explanation in terms of 
defining what constitutes a creative and enriching life.  According to Cohen (2008), 
this involves more opportunities for the diaspora to enrich their lives and gain 
intellectual achievements whilst being in their host countries.  For example, Cohen 
claims that the Jewish diaspora could not have achieved their intellectual and 
spiritual achievements in the diaspora if they stayed in their “narrow tribal society 
like that of ancient Judea” (2008, 167). Arguably, those achievements would 
include education, employment and financial stability, but Cohen does not make 
this feature as explicit as the others do.  This may be because one person’s 
definitions of a creative and enriching life is different from another, and perhaps 
Cohen decided it would be best to leave it to the individuals’ interpretation.   
Furthermore, the older literature also argues that a distinguishing feature of a 
diaspora is their existence over at least two generations (Bulter 2001).  It suggests 
that only second and third generation migrants constitute as ‘true’ diaspora and not 
first generation.  Therefore, a criticism of Safran and Cohen’s features is that there 
is no mention of temporality in these characteristics.  It can be argued that perhaps 
it was so obvious to Cohen that he felt it did not need saying, but traditional 
definitions have always emphasized the fact that diasporas have to endure over 
several generations to really be considered as such (van Hear 2010; 37).   
Nevertheless, early definitions of the diaspora presented by Safran and Cohen 
have the great merit of precision and clarity and actual empirical communities can 
be tested against these criteria.  However, they can also become restrictive.  The 
problem with having such strict criteria like the ones in the lists Safran and Cohen 
present is they impose limits that restrict writers from exploring emerging 
characteristics of ‘new’ diasporas in new contexts (van Hear 2005).  Therefore, 
increasing the risk of writers rejecting interesting empirical material because the 
characteristics displayed by certain groups do not fall within the requirements of 
the categorical definition. Thus, essentializing diasporas by defending a set of strict 
criteria creates inflexibility within the definitions, which ultimately means that writers 
end up arguing about the categories rather than the concrete realities they are 
observing. In addition, there is also the dilemma that some groups choose to define 
themselves as ‘diasporas’ even though they do not meet the criteria, in which case 
it is hard to justify why external analysts like Safran and Cohen would be entitled to 
tell them they are not a diaspora. 
Rogers Brubaker (2005) provides slightly more flexible definitions of what he 
believes constitutes a diaspora in his paper ‘The ‘diaspora’ diaspora’.  Brubaker 
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(2005) analyses three core criteria that he says are constitutive of a diaspora, and 
within each criterion, he provides different options for interpretation.  For example, 
the first is dispersion in space, which can be interpreted as forced or otherwise 
traumatic dispersion but can also include dispersion because of “ethnic 
communities divided by state frontier or as that segment of a people living outside 
the homeland”(5). Brubaker (2005) asserts this “allows even compactly settled 
populations to count as diasporas…” (5). The second criterion is homeland 
orientation “to a real or imagined homeland as an authoritative source of value, 
identity and loyalty” (6).  This includes maintaining a collective memory or myth 
about the homeland, regarding it as the true ideal ‘home’ to which one would return, 
collectively committed to maintenance and restoration of the homeland and 
continuing relation in the homeland in ways that would significantly shape one’s 
identity and solidarity (5).  The third criterion is boundary maintenance, which 
involves preservation of a distinctive identity in the host country with the diaspora 
maintaining boundaries by deliberately resisting assimilating in their host societies 
(6).  
Bakewell (2010) may argue that Brubaker’s criteria are too open and perhaps loses 
the value of what should be used as a more precise specialist term.  This would be 
a valid criticism in that Brubaker’s definition leaves room for extended analytical 
appraisal, which can become confusing.  However, I would argue that Brubaker’s 
definitions are more useful than Safran and Cohen’s characteristics and features of 
a diaspora because it is more inclusive and it allows for diaspora groups that do 
not fit in Safran or Cohen’s definition to be included.  This shows that striking a 
balance between having a definition of diasporas that is flexible enough to include 
some groups but not too flexible that it loses its essential meaning of groups who 
have settled outside of their countries of origin is challenging.  
 
Pnina Werbner (2010) adds that certain new generalizations about the diaspora 
concept have come to be widely accepted and often repeatedly rediscovered.  For 
example, early discussions in diaspora studies stressed the social heterogeneity of 
diasporas.  This definition is very relevant to this thesis because recognizing the 
internal heterogeneity of the Gambian diaspora is important to understanding their 
relationship with ‘home’ and the people there.  The Gambians diaspora are 
heterogeneous by education, class, gender, age, religion and ethnic background. 
And understanding their differences helps to understand their engagement (in 
terms of how, why and where they engage in development or politics in The 
Gambia) with the ‘home’ country, as well as their engagement within the diasporic 
communities. For example, some interviewees said they preferred to focus on 
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integrating into their host society rather than engage in development or politics at 
‘home’. Some participants take part in funding village development projects via 
their associations and others preferred to do it individually. And some interviewees 
are open and explicit about their political activities and would take part in public 
demonstrations whilst others preferred to engage online and conceal their identity. 
Additionally, there are differences between the genders and generations in terms 
of how they engage politically as well. The young Gambians mostly engage in 
public demonstrations, whereas the older generation will not. And the Gambian 
women tend to keep their political opinions and participations private, whereas the 
men are more open to sharing information about their political and development 
activities. Lastly, some interviewees said they do not attend events organized by 
the diaspora associations because they preferred to limit their engagement with the 
wider Gambian diaspora.  Subsequently, this thesis has attempted to highlight the 
internal heterogeneities of the sample group where necessary in order to avoid 
portraying a homogenised Gambian diaspora. 
 
The second emergent consensus according to Werbner recognizes that diasporas 
are historical formations in process (meaning that though diasporas are formed by 
the past they are still changing in the present). The third growing consensus 
recognizes the dual orientation of diasporas to fight for citizenship and equal rights 
in place of settlement, whilst simultaneously continuing to foster transnational 
relations and to live with a sense of displacement and loyalty to other places 
beyond the country of settlement. Fostering transnational relations is particularly 
important to many of the participants in the Gambian diaspora who say they strive 
to maintain strong connections with their homeland either through their family 
connections or through networks.  The fourth generalization is the emergent 
understanding that many diasporas are deeply implicated both ideologically and 
materially in the nationalist projects of their homelands (74).  Again, some groups 
in the Gambian diaspora who are engaged in development and politic at ‘home’ 
display these characteristics.  
 
However, another important shift, which Werbner does not touch on, is the 
increasing emphasis on both the centripetal quality of a diaspora (its capacity to 
cohere together as a unity) and its centrifugal quality (its tendency to splinter) that 
stems from its internal differences.  Nevertheless, what this evolution of definitions 
shows is that over a couple of decades “diaspora became the keyword to explain 
the hitherto seemingly inexplicable flows and counter-flows of migrants and 
refugees” (Chariandy 2006, cited in van Hear 2010; 70), while also retaining parts 
of the traditional meaning.  
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In the literature, it is clear that the ‘concept’ of diaspora is moving with the times, to 
suit the periods and context in which it is used.  To remain relevant, it is expected 
that ideas and concepts will shift to adopt or reject definitions that are no longer 
relevant.  In essence, it is unrealistic to expect the definition of diasporas to remain 
the same, when arguably there are plethora of reasons (other than it being forced) 
for people to migrate and settle in other countries.  Nevertheless, the concept of 
‘diaspora’ is central to this thesis, despite it remaining a contested term, with 
different disciplines and individuals treating it in broader or narrower ways and 
placing emphasis on different aspects of diaspora experience. Whilst the ‘checklist’ 
definitions of Safran and Cohen provide useful certainty, the looser way of treating 
the term provided by Brubaker and Werbner are more productively deployed in 
data collection in the context of small diasporas. There is a need to include people 
in the sample and there is no incentive to exclude them because, for example, they 
are first generation migrants who cannot be part of the ‘diaspora’ as this rules out 
relatively new African diasporas like the Gambians.   
 
The next section of this chapter talks about the African diaspora and the 
importance of the homeland, which I argue is key to understanding why Africans in 
the diasporas contribute to development and intervene in politics at ‘home’.  
 
African Diaspora Studies  
“Within the literature, three different types of diaspora within Africa can be 
identified: those that look to their homeland outside Africa; those that are 
considered as diasporic mainly as part of a much larger diaspora living in 
other continents; and finally ‘indigenous’ African diasporas who look to 
their origins in different parts of Africa and where the majority population 
remain within the continent” [Bakewell, 2008:16] 
The movement of Africans in and out of the continent began long before George 
Shepperson and Joseph E. Harris coined the term African diaspora in 1968 
(Manning 2003) and certainly before European-controlled transatlantic slavery 
(Akyeampong 2000, Segal 2001, Koser 2003, Ifekwunigwe 2003, 2013, Zeleza 
2005).  Yet, the transatlantic slave trade is often used as the starting point of the 
forced migration of Africans in the field of African Diaspora studies.  According to 
Paul Tiyambe Zeleza (2008), this reduces the pattern of dispersal of Africans to the 
slave trade (8).  The ‘Atlantic model’ used to conceptualize the dispersal of 
Africans (Ifekwunigwe 2003) has also been challenged by prominent African 
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scholars like Cheikh Anta Diop (1990) who asserts that there is archaeological 
evidence which proves that continental Africans were subjected to forced migration 
around the world before the Atlantic slavery.  As well as historical evidence of the 
‘voluntary’ ‘international’ migration of Africans, such as Egyptian and Ethiopian 
seafarers, trans-Saharan and Moorish traders and the Mandingo mariners, before 
the transatlantic slave trade (cited by Koser 2003). Furthermore, there are 
historical accounts of African settler communities that can be traced back to two 
thousand years ago in Europe particularly in the southern Mediterranean from 
Rome to Andalusian Spain, in Russia and Britain (Zeleza 2008; 10).  Thus, many 
African scholars have collectively advocated for the literature to move away from 
making the transatlantic slave trade the starting point of African migration.  As they 
believe that the focus on slavery risks distracting people from post-slavery 
migrations of Africans. Khalid Koser explains, “a preoccupation with slavery and its 
descendants has diverted our attention from striking new patterns and processes 
associated with recent migration" (2008; 3). However, despite these African 
analysts making their position in this debate clear, there is still some ambivalence 
amongst contributors in determining the exact starting point of African dispersal. 
Ronald Segal (2001) dates it back to the Islamic slave trade, but I argue that 
considerations should also be given to the ‘Bantu Expansion’ from the Niger basin 
to Southern Africa (c 1500BCE). 
 
Notwithstanding the debates about the ‘start point’ of African migration, the 
intention of this research is to investigate the connections modern post-slavery 
African Diasporas have with their countries of origin, which drives them to 
contribute to the development and intervene in the politics at ‘home’.  As such, this 
research will adopt the African Union’s definition of the African diaspora because it 
is flexible and emphasizes their relationship to development and ‘home’.  After all, 
you could be a short-term first generation migrant who fulfils hardly any of Cohen’s 
criteria and still fit into the definition offered by the AU. 
 
The African Diaspora consists of peoples of African origin living outside the 
continent, irrespective of their citizenship and nationality and who are 
willing to contribute to the development of the continent and the building of 
the African Union.  (AU Report, 2005: 7.)   
 
Africa: the Sacred Homeland for Africans? 
In some of the canonical literature in African diaspora studies, it is argued that the 
connection between the African diaspora and the African continent is embedded in 
 49 
their shared history, identity, race and attachment to place. There are ‘black’ 
political movements such as Rastafarianism (Marcus Garvey 1918; Emperor Haile 
Selassie 1927), Negritude (Leopold Senghor, 1964) and (to a lesser extent) Pan- 
Africanism (W.E.D Du Bois 1917) that hold on to the belief that the ‘black race’ 
‘belong’ in Africa in the same way the Zionist movement embraced the idea of the 
Jews belonging to Israel. These ideologies share problematic notions of exclusion, 
ethnic homogeneity, timelessness and a primordial ideology that is politically 
inflexible. In short, they accept ‘race’ as a reality. In ‘Black Orpheus,’ his preface to 
a collection of new poetry edited by Leopold Senghor, Jean-Paul Sartre (1948) 
describes the Negritude movement as a form of ‘anti-racist racism’ capturing a 
sense of the paradoxes of linking race to place. But, in this thesis, I argue that 
though the African diaspora is made of heterogeneous and fragmented groups 
exhibiting social division such as class, race, ethnicity, religion, political affiliation 
and social status (Chikanda et al. 2016; 5). It can still meaningfully be said to think 
of Africa as a ‘homeland.’ 
Therefore, the notion that black people share a connection to a place of origin 
(Africa) through which their cultural expression can be traced back to their African 
heritage.  Is illustrated by the fact that after many years of slavery in America, 
some freed black slaves were resettled in ‘Liberia’ from 1822, because both they 
and their sponsors (the American Colonial Society) felt that was where they 
belonged. Then the world was categorized racially and centred on the notion that 
Africa was the desired prime destination for black people, within this period 
(Manning 2003).  However, this has created some problematic aspects to the 
Liberian constitution as a result of its history.  For example, the 1986 constitution 
states “only persons who are Negroes or of Negro descent shall qualify by birth or 
by naturalization to be citizens of Liberia”. This has wide implications for policy 
because non-African permanent residents are crucial contributors to the Liberia’s 
economic activities and innovation system 15  mainly the wealthy Lebanese 
community.  
The opposing views to the idea that the connection between the African diaspora 
and the African continent is embedded in their shared history, identity, race and 
attachment to place come from renowned scholars Stuart Hall (1990), Paul Gilroy 
(1993) and James Clifford (1994).  Who proposed to abandon defining black 
identity as being connected to a sacred homeland in Africa because they argue 
that cultural identities of blackness emerge from the transnational and intercultural 
spaces of their diasporic experience (Zeleza 2005) and not from a historical place 
                                                                
15 An editorial by Samuka Kanneh a civil servant in the Liberian government 
http://www.capitoltimesonline.com/index.php/editorial/item/104-rethink-discriminatory-nationality-law 
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of attachment.  In essence, these scholars are arguing that cultural identities are 
not fixed, but are constantly changing and that there is a never-ending process of 
becoming black. In particular, Gilroy asserts that race is a social construct and 
black people in Britain have a false sense of self-consciousness because they see 
themselves through the eyes of others.  An experience labelled as ‘double-
consciousness’ (double- consciousness was first developed by Du Bois (1903) and 
re-articulated by Fanon (1952).   
Double consciousness implies the thought process of being a Negro (i.e., 
Black) or an American (i.e., non-Black). To be a Negro is to be colored, 
Black, African American, or to be associated with the cultural heritage that 
stems from Africa.  To be American is to be a Black person in skin 
pigmentation who mentally identifies with White people and European 
culture (Moore 2005; 752) 
Gilroy asserts that diasporas have hybrid cultural identities and as such, those 
identities cannot be traced back to any one place.  Whereas, Hall (who is also one 
of the great scholars of black identity in Britain) proclaims, ‘black’ identity is 
basically a politically and culturally constructed category that marginalizes black 
people in British culture. Black identity is always peripheral to a dominant sense of 
Englishness characterized by British racism. Hall further argues that British culture 
places all black people (despite their different histories, traditions and ethnic 
identities) in a single category that includes the idea of belonging to one sacred 
homeland of Africa. Africa, the place becomes centrally related to racist claims in 
Britain that black people should ‘go home’.  However, Clifford supports Gilroy and 
Hall’s arguments that black identity is socially constructed in the context of racism, 
political domination and economic inequalities, but he criticizes Gilroy for relating 
the experiences of blacks in Britain with African American histories, and attempting 
to place a uniform approach to black experience when they have different patterns 
of struggle.    
These scholars brilliantly argue their position and make salient points pertaining to 
the heterogeneity of the black diaspora, and at the same time explaining why not 
every member of the black diaspora has an attachment to Africa. However, Hall 
and Gilroy’s anti-essentialist arguments raise the question; why do they reject the 
idea that ‘black’ diasporas have a connection to a sacred homeland in Africa when 
they are both of ‘black’ descent themselves? Arguably, Hall’s rejection of the 
essentialist argument perhaps stems from the fact that he is from a Caribbean 
background (born and raised in Jamaica), whereas Gilroy was born and raised in 
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London.  Thus, both scholars cannot see Africa playing a central role in shaping 
‘black’ identity.  But for Africans from mainland African like the Gambian diaspora, 
there is a strong connection to Africa. However, these are clearly my assumptions 
and the answer can only come from Hall and Gilroy themselves, thus they should 
only be taken hypothetically. But, for many of the new African diasporas of 21st 
century London the challenge for them is to retain the highly critical and political 
sense of what blackness means in the UK taken from Hall and Gilroy, whilst also 
recognizing and celebrating their meaningful connections to Africa and to their 
country of origin.  
Subsequently, many contemporary diasporas around the world have shared 
identities with their homeland. As such, some individuals in diasporas chose to play 
a part in its development and politics.  For example, the findings of Koser’s (2003) 
study of the Eritrean diaspora revealed that some members of the diaspora 
continued to make a voluntary 2% income tax contribution to the Eritrean state at 
the time because they felt it was their duty to support their country. However, the 
Eritrean story has become much more complex and conflictual with many post-
independence refugees being coerced into paying this ‘voluntary’ tax in exchange 
for citizenship if they want to re-engage with the states. The ability of the state to 
check and verify one’s status have made the tax binding for those who want to 
avoid potential risks to themselves and relatives.  In which case they are required 
to pay the 2% tax for the years they have missed. The Eritrean diaspora is 
profoundly divided with the divisions relating to the time when they left the country 
(Demissie 2015). This shows that the link diasporas maintain with their homeland 
is neither the simple ‘mythic idealisations’ of Cohen and Safran nor the forgotten 
disinterest of Gilroy, Hall and Clifford. Rather this thesis adopts the theoretical 
framework that posits the relationship between some diasporic communities and 
their homelands have to compete with their relationship to other places, and the 
politics at ‘home’ can shape the character of those relationships, which are 
different for different groups in the diaspora. Imperatively, most contemporary 
African diaspora groups are able to trace their roots to specific countries where 
they still have families and networks and they demonstrate their interest by sending 
money and visiting ‘home’ (Page and Mercer 2012).  However, this does not mean 
it is the only place, which matters to them. The next section moves on to discuss 
the narrower literature on the development, the African diaspora, and the 
paradoxes of their history of migration.  
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2.5 Development and the African Diaspora 
 
“Diasporas accumulate human, financial, and social capital for the 
development of their home communities.  Governments of countries of 
origin can have crucial role in channelling the initiative, energy, and 
resources of diasporas into economies and societies and institutionalising 
the linkage of the diaspora to the socio-economic activities of their home 
countries” [IOM 2011:16] 
 
Within the literature on ‘diaspora and development’, remittances feature centrally in 
the debates as the main form of diaspora contribution to their ‘home’ countries.  
This is largely because remittances emerge as an important form of capital flow in 
some ‘home’ countries (Teferra 2015). According to data from African 
Development Bank (2015), African migrants remitted US$26 billion to West Africa 
in 2014 of which US$ 20.9 billion was sent to Nigeria16.  Subsequently, the focus 
on diaspora remittances within the literature is attributed to the fact that they have 
a multiplier effect on a country’s economy and peoples’ lives.  For example, the 
monies diaspora remit to their families allows for goods to be purchased and 
services to be paid for, which in turn supports local businesses and contributes to 
the country’s GDP mainly via taxation.  Remittances are also used to invest in 
health, education, housing, and entrepreneurialism (Terrazas 2010, Hammond 
2011, Amagoh and Rahman 2016).  However, within the recent literature, there are 
nuances to the debate whereby more emphasis is being placed on 
entrepreneurialism, skills and the mobilization of diaspora networks (Mullings 2012).  
These are viewed as being more sustainable forms of development for ‘home’ 
countries (Chacko and Gebre 2013), as such programmes like the Migration for 
Development in Africa17 (MIDA) were founded to help mobilize skilled Africans in 
the diaspora to support development in at ‘home’ through skills and knowledge 
transfer.  Within the Great Lakes region, more than 150 institutions have benefited 
from capacity building initiatives provided by over 400 temporary expert missions 
involving diaspora members under this programme (IOM 2013).  
This section of the literature review chapter will seek to use the literature in African 
diaspora studies to address the first research question, which is how, where and 
why the diaspora contribute to socio-economic development in their homelands.  It 
will begin with discussing how diasporas contribute to development, looking mainly 
                                                                
16 African Development Bank Group (2015) http://www.afdb.org/en/blogs/measuring-the-pulse-of-
economic-transformation-in-west-africa/post/remittances-from-west-africas-diaspora-financial-and-
social-transfers-for-regional-development-14614/ 
17 MIDA was established after a workshop in April 2001 in Libreville, to prepare IOM Resolution 614 
(Bréant 2013; 103 
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at diaspora remittances, and investments.  Then it will move on to look at where 
diasporas direct their contributions, this will focus on the family, town/village, and 
the national level. As well as the motivations for why the diaspora contribute to 
development in their homelands and the barriers they encounter when trying to 
make development contributions at ‘home’. Lastly, this section will include 
discussions about the challenges of having diaspora development-centred and 
diaspora-led development in the homeland.   
To begin, the literature on African diaspora studies shows that the African diaspora 
is contributing to development in their ‘home’ countries in a number of ways.  This 
includes remittances, investments, skills and knowledge transfer, philanthropy, 
patronage, advocacy, volunteerism, circular and return migrants (Ho and Boyle 
2015).  For example, in 2009, the Senegalese diaspora in France financed up to 
€3.3 million worth of projects in Senegal (Plaza and Ratha 2011:193).  In Cape 
Verde, in 2013, the diaspora deposited over $530 million in diaspora savings 
“emigrant accounts” in the commercial banks. This benefitted businesses and 
consumers as it has helped to support the credit expansion of the country 
(Resende – Santos 2015:90).  And Carling and Talleraas (2016) assert that the 
rapid growth of the Cape Verde economy has been driven by remittances, 
development assistance and tourism (18). In Somalia, the diaspora was reported to 
send US$1.3 – 2 billion per year of which US$ 130-200 million is for relief and 
development purposes (Hammond et al. 2011).  Lastly, the Ethiopian diaspora 
through the Tigray Development Association had: 
Constructed a total of 121 primary schools, provided grants to 750 primary 
schools to implement school improvement plans, rehabilitated 16 war-
affected primary schools, and conducted school feeding programmes that 
benefited more than 32,000 children in 80 drought-affected schools.  
Certain measures were also taken to improve the quality of education in 
secondary schools. For instance, 14 schools were furnished with 
equipment, chemicals, and books (Zewde et al. 2014: 142)  
There are many other examples in the literature of the African diaspora making 
development contributions at ‘home’. However, the purpose of illustrating some of 
their contributions here is not to suggest that every African diaspora group 
contributes to development in their ‘home’ countries in this same way or at the 
same scale, rather it is to demonstrate the different ways in which some African 
diaspora groups engage in development at ‘home’.   
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In the literature in African diaspora studies I discovered that diaspora contributions 
in their ‘home’ countries are directed in three areas, the family, town/village and 
national, but the family is the primary focus of the diaspora.  Again, this is not to 
suggest that diaspora contributions are fixed in these areas.  Rather, the literature 
argues that the family is very important to the diaspora because they have a strong 
sense of obligation towards them (Sinatti and Horst 2014, Horst et al. 2014) and 
families in developing countries are highly dependent on the financial support they 
receive from the diaspora (Obadare and Adebanwi 2009). Thus, the remittances 
diasporas send to their families are believed to increase household spending 
(Gupta et al. 2007, Nyamongo et al. 2012, Gamlen 2014), by augmenting private 
consumption and alleviating transient (household) poverty in receiving countries 
(de Haas 2012, Chami and Fullenkamp 2013).  Largely because they are used to 
pay for feeding, school fees, clothing, healthcare, accommodation, utility bills, 
religious celebrations, weddings, and burials (Mercer and Page 2010, Judge and 
Plaen 2011).  However, though this may help to fill the immediate needs of families, 
its developmental impact has been questioned in parts of the literature, which 
argues that contributions at the family level rarely go towards productive 
investments (Horst et al. 2014).  In essence, analysts such as Newland (2011) 
believe that remittances sent for private consumption have limited impact on 
sustainable growth and development, making this one of the challenges of having 
family-led development in a country. 
At town/village level, diasporas are also known to contribute to development 
individually or via their associations (Evans 2010). Mercer et al. (2008) make a 
seminal contribution to this field with their research of two Cameroonian and two 
Tanzanian communities in Britain.  They found that though these groups engage in 
development projects in their hometowns, such as the construction of schools, 
health facilities, water supplies, toilets, town halls, libraries, internet cafes and 
orphanages (228). “The capacity of home associations to improve the material 
quality of life in the homeplace is limited and awkward” (229).  This is largely 
because “their development projects are sometimes overambitious, ill-conceived, 
perverse or reflect personal political ambition of the leadership” (230) as well as 
being poorly articulated, transitory, intermittent and opportunistic.  However, though 
this may appear as an overly negative conclusion, the authors attempt to balance 
this view with some observations about the merits of hometown the associations 
under study. For example, the fact that the cost of development projects is not as 
inflated as if development professionals implemented them, as well as 
development is defined according to what matters to them thus development 
becomes more targeted. Additionally, unlike international agencies and NGOs, the 
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diaspora had long-term commitments to development in their hometown.  These 
are interesting findings because increasingly African diasporas are celebrated for 
their roles in enhancing development in their ‘home’ countries.  However, the 
empirical evidence in this research suggests that not only is there more to learn 
about these groups but the outcomes of their contributions are not always as 
promising as believed.  As such, Mercer et al. argue for new conceptualizations of 
what diasporas bring to development (50).   
In a later paper Mercer and Page (2010) argued that diaspora associations “in all 
their diversity are better characterised by an attachment to place rather than an 
attachment to ethnic group” (113).  It is, they suggest, a mistake to assume that 
diaspora associations are defined by ethnicity. “There are a number of immediate 
problems with this view, not least the reliance on a static and essentialist view of 
ethnicity, which assumes that diaspora associations are generally mono-ethnic 
groups attached to an ethnically homogeneous ‘homeland’”(113). This emphasis 
on place-based rather than ethnic identities provides a different analytical 
perspective to how this research should view African diaspora associations and 
their relationships with ‘home’. The empirical evidence on the case study group in 
this thesis also suggests that the formation and functions of the Gambian diaspora 
associations have less to do with their ethnicity and more to do with their shared 
interests to one place measured at a variety of scales.  After all, there are more 
complex ways to belong to a ‘perceived’ homeland, which does not fall within the 
narrow concept of the ethno-national identity (Mavroudi 2015:184). Based on this, 
it would be pertinent to refrain from using the term ‘ethno- national’ to describe the 
Gambian diaspora associations in the UK, as they are not ethnically based groups. 
The literature in African diaspora studies also argues that African diasporas are 
contributing at the national level, by producing financial flows and enhancing 
economic growth primarily through their remittances and direct investments.  
According to a study by Nyamongo et al. (2012) on the role of remittances and 
financial development on economic growth in 36 countries in Africa between 1980 
and 2009.  The findings revealed that firstly, remittances appear to be an important 
source of growth for these countries in Africa during the period under study, 
second, the volatility of remittances appears to have a negative effect on the 
growth of countries in Africa and third, remittances appear to be working as a 
complement to financial development (258). These findings show remittances 
being an important contributor to the economic growth; however, remittances do 
not have the same impact on the economies of all African countries. For example, 
Nigeria is one of the largest recipients of diaspora remittances but it only makes up 
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a small proportion of the country’s overall GDP, 7% according to the World Bank in 
2013.  
Additionally within the literature, the African diaspora are reported to contribute to 
various sectors in their ‘home’ countries, particularly in areas of health, education, 
agriculture, and housing. There are multiple examples spread across Africa but 
here I have only pulled evidence from just a few African diasporas to illustrate this 
sectoral diversity. For example, in 2006, the Twinning Centre Volunteer Healthcare 
Corp collaborated with the Network of Ethiopian Professionals in the Diaspora, to 
recruit 44 diaspora volunteers with expertise in healthcare to work in 30 sites in 
Ethiopia (Terrazas 2010; 13). In addition, members of the academic diaspora from 
Ghana established a Network to facilitate a joint graduate- level curriculum in areas 
that are critical to the country’s needs (Tettey 2016; 175).  The members of the 
Network served as external examiners for graduate dissertations at partner 
Ghanaian universities.  They also provided financial and technical support to help 
upgrade a computer laboratory at the Ghanaian university, by paying for the 
expansion of the bandwidth capacity and provided 15 headsets and 25 webcams 
to facilitate interaction via Elluminate (178-79).  Then in 2014, the Diaspora 
Investment for Agriculture Initiative18 by IFAD supported the investment of eight 
Somali diaspora investors in the AgriFood Fund programme in Somalia, to which 
they contributed 40% to 60% of the US$ 435,600 financing that was awarded to six 
business owners in agriculture (IFAD 2016). Lastly, the Rwandan diaspora 
collaborated with their ‘home’ government to establish the One Dollar Campaign to 
commemorate the genocide in April 1994.  This resulted in the diaspora funding 
the building of student housing for genocide orphans in Kigali (Turner 2013; 271).  
The pre-occupation with development impacts means that there has been less 
research on diaspora motivations in recent years (Galetto 2011). Instead, older 
ideas developed by economists have been the root of claims that rational self-
interest and family-based strategies is core to explaining why people remit.  Stark 
and Lucas (1988) argue that migrants furnish their family with remittances, in 
exchange for insurance.  They call this trade-in-risks example, as the migrant and 
the family have an incentive to turn to each other, by entering into an exchange 
agreement (469).   However, each individual member of the diaspora has their own 
motivation profile that contributes to his or her investment decisions (Nielsen and 
Riddle 2007: 7). On the other hand, Chikanda et al. (2016) assert that diasporas 
are motivated to invest at ‘home’ if there is availability of investment opportunities, 
                                                                
18 The intent of the initiative is to leverage diaspora funds and their engagement in sustained economic 
growth through investment in agriculture, particularly in rural areas 
https://www.ifad.org/documents/10180/4fab1867-3435-4597-8968-80877b933faangage  
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earning capacity for diasporas, minimal level of local development, suitable 
investment opportunities, and intra-household arrangements that facilitate the 
adoption of investment opportunities (2). However, I would add to this list the 
emotional linkages (to families and friends) diaspora have at ‘home’ 
(Moniruzzaman 2016).   The desire to want to help the homeland to develop 
(Mavroudi 2015) as well as strong social networks that bind people together 
transnationally, which motivates groups like the Somali diaspora to support their 
country of origin (Hammond et al. 2011).  This broad list may not be applicable to 
all diasporas, however, it is important that this research demonstrate what drives 
the Gambian diaspora to contribute to development at ‘home’ in ways that can 
guide policymakers in The Gambia to formulate diaspora engagement policies in 
the future.  
Therefore, the assumption that all diasporas want to engage in development at 
‘home’, is best understood by looking at who, what, when and why diaspora chose 
to help develop (Mavroudi 2015). Therefore, it is pointless to homogenize the 
African diaspora as it runs the risk of ignoring groups who chose to contribute to 
development in their host countries and not at ‘home’. For example, studies of the 
South African diaspora in Canada (Crush et al. 2012, Crush 2013, and 
Ramachandran 2016) revealed that a significant number of them appeared 
detached from their country of birth, unconcerned about its future and disinclined to 
engage meaningfully with it (Ramachandran 2016:66).  The reason being that the 
South African diaspora in Canada has a fraught relationship with their country of 
origin because of apartheid and anti-apartheid struggles, which left some members 
of the South African diaspora in Canada (particularly the blacks) with unhappy 
memories of ‘home’. Ramachandran (2016) argues that the South African diaspora 
were separated by class, race, and ethnicity thus they were never a homogenized 
group (79).  However, the wealthy members of this diaspora group are making 
significant contributions to the development of Canadian institutions.  Therefore, 
the question then is does this make the South Africans in Canada less of a 
diaspora, because their contributions are not directed in their ‘home’ countries? On 
the one hand, according to the African Union definition of a diaspora, it does 
because it explicitly says African diasporas are people who are “willing to 
contribute to the development of the continent and the building of the African 
Union.”  On the other hand, it can be argued that this opens room for more 
discussion about the role of the diaspora in development in the literature because 
currently, the ‘diaspora and development’ literature tends to focus on diaspora 
contributions at ‘home’ and not to the host country. For example, Plaza (2013) 
argues that diaspora contributions in destination countries are often downplayed or 
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minimized, however, she was referring to African diasporas within Africa and not in 
the West.   But this argument also applies in western countries, where there are 
historical accounts diasporas contributing to building institutions in the UK.  For 
example, a BBC documentary entitled ‘Black Nurses: The Women Who Saved The 
NHS’ told the untold stories of how thousands of Caribbean women answered the 
call to come and help build Britain’s National Health Service19. 
Within the literature, I also discover some of the problems with diaspora-centred 
and diaspora-led development in ‘home’ countries. Diaspora-centred development 
refers to when the governments of ‘home’ countries try to capitalize on potential 
diaspora resources by developing policies that attempt to engage their diaspora 
(Délano and Gamlen 2014).  For example, in 2009, the Rwandan government 
created the Rwanda Diaspora Policy, which has three pillars and one of them 
focuses on engaging their diaspora in development processes by offering treasury 
bonds and stocks to Rwandans living abroad.  This policy was designed to collect 
their financial resources to invest in national development (Fransen and Siegel 
2013; 15).  However, similar to some of the academic literature, these policies also 
tend to treat the diaspora as a homogeneous group, who are not divided by class, 
race, ethnicity, religion or political affiliations (Chikanda et al. 2016; 5).  In addition, 
Ho and Boyle (2015) argue that diaspora-centred development lacks a theoretical 
base and are implemented in a very opportunistic manner by ‘home’ countries 
prompted to act by global development agencies (167). What this means is that Ho 
and Boyle (2015) believe diaspora-centred development strategies mostly focus on 
diaspora money rather than on the other non-financial contributions of the diaspora. 
For example, the Ethiopian government in 2010 prohibited the diaspora from 
engaging with “human rights, conflict settlement, and reconciliation, citizenship and 
community development, and justice and law enforcement services” (Hoehne et al. 
2011; 78). Yet, at the same time, the government sought to persuade the diaspora 
to finance major infrastructure projects, such as dams on the Nile, which was 
opposed by international development banks (Kebede 2015). 
Another problem with diaspora-centred development is that policymakers have to 
balance the desire to tap into diaspora resources, without giving them too much 
influence in homeland affairs or opportunity to threaten the power of the existing 
political elites, which is difficult to achieve.  For example, the Ethiopian diaspora in 
the US invest the most in their ‘home’ country but also tend to be the most 
politically active and influential (Chacko and Gebre 2012; 503).  The group of 
literature concludes that diaspora-centred development policies are failing their 
                                                                
19 http://www.bbc.co.uk/mediacentre/proginfo/2016/47/black-nurses 
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mission because they are not engaging groups that are not motivated by a state-
led development plan (Chikanda et al. 2016).  But on the other hand, it can be 
argued these policies have been encouraging groups that are interested in being 
part of state-led development in countries like Ethiopia, Ghana, Nigeria, and 
Rwanda and Senegal (Kebede 2015, African Development Policy Centre 2011, 
Fransen and Siegel 2013).  Thus, this perhaps explains the rise in interest in 
diaspora-centred development in the literature, arguably, in response to its 
‘perceived’ success. 
On the contrary, the literature on diaspora-led development argues that it is more 
effective to reach grassroots and the people who really need it without any 
intermediaries.  However, part of the problem with diaspora-led development  
(Mercer et al. 2008,) is that the capacity of diasporas to implement successful 
development projects is limited since they have little or no training in implementing 
development projects and are unlikely to use log-frames, monitoring procedures or 
independent evaluation reports  (2008; 230). Therefore, diaspora-led development 
projects are not believed to be as effective as they are portrayed in some of the 
literature because they create undesirable development outcomes, such as 
dependency on remittances as well as increase developmental disparities because 
they tend to be concentrated in areas, where the richer population can be found.  
Analysts Davies (2012), Skeldon (2005, 2008) and Page and Mercer (2012) all 
found this to be true in their own research and they concluded that the spatial and 
social inequality effects of diaspora-led development are true for interventions 
other than just remittances.  
Therefore, the problem is not whether diasporas are contributing to development in 
their countries of origin, which they clearly are (de Haas 2006, 2012, Terrazas 
2010, Newland, 2011, 2013, Ratha et al. 2011, Resende – Santos 2015).  Rather, 
there are a number of barriers, which affect the impact of diaspora contributions on 
the development in their ‘home’ countries.  Such barriers also include high levels of 
demands and expectations from their families, lack of cooperation and willingness 
to work with the diaspora by those inside the country, high levels of bureaucracy, 
weak human resource capacity, and marginalization by homeland governments.  
For example, the high demands and expectations placed on the diaspora can 
become a barrier when diasporas are required to make self- sacrifices in order to 
meet those demands. Hammond (2011) study of the Somali diasporas in Lewiston, 
Maine, USA, revealed that some members of the diaspora are not able to fulfil their 
own ambitions for personal and professional growth because of they have to 
provide for their families back ‘home’.  For example, her interview data revealed 
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that a participant named Hassan; a part-time student is supporting five people who 
are living away from the core of the family, which has settled in Kenya. In addition 
to regular payment, Hassan sends six additional payments for ‘extraordinary 
expenses’ year (136-137).   Additionally, “the choice that Hassan feels obliged to 
make—to sacrifice his further study in order to support his family—is typical of 
many of those I interviewed”(142). The demands and expectations placed on some 
Somali diasporas like Hassan have forced him to self-sacrifice by not obtaining 
further education and potentially affecting his ability to increase his own economic 
power in the future to be able to help their families more. 
Other barriers such as lack of cooperation and willingness to work with the 
diaspora by those inside the homeland, the high levels of bureaucracy, and weak 
human resources were illustrated in the literature using the Ghanaian, Ethiopian, 
and Cape Verdean diaspora case study examples mentioned earlier.   For example, 
the Ghanaian academics in the diaspora, who established a Network to support the 
development of a Ghanaian university, complained that: 
It quickly became apparent that a number of faculty members in Ghana 
were unwilling to participate in the initiative because they could not see 
any direct pecuniary gains for themselves.  They assumed that the 
diaspora members of the network were engaged in the project because of 
some financial reward, incentive or motivation, and thought that they 
deserved the same (Tettey 2016; 180)   
Whereas, the Ethiopian diaspora complained about ‘Bureaucratic red-tape’ when 
trying to establish businesses, which included “rules and regulations, an inordinate 
amount of paperwork, and associated delays” (Chacko and Gebre 2012; 502).  
And in Cape Verde, the diaspora complained about the organizational and human 
resources limitations at the public agencies tasked with diaspora responsibilities 
such as the Ministry of Communities and the Institute of Communities (Resende-
Santos 2015:94).  
However, according to the literature the marginalization of diasporas from national 
the development in their ‘home’ countries, is the biggest barrier for some groups in 
the diaspora. As such, some key international development agencies have 
embarked on encouraging homeland governments to allow their diaspora to take 
part in development (Agunias and Newland 2013).  According to part of the 
literature in diaspora studies, the marginalization of diasporas can affect diaspora 
remittances and limit diaspora contributions to the household level. Kapur (2003), 
asserts, “it is politics that impact remittances” (22).  For example, the Gambian 
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government is extremely sceptical and reluctant to involve the diaspora in the 
national development agenda.  This is because the government feels the diaspora 
is too critical of them and they have concerns that some Gambians in the diaspora 
will pose a threat to their power if they are allowed to take part in homeland affairs.  
However, if the Gambian government wanted to engage the diaspora without 
threats to their position, then they could offer treasury bonds and stocks specifically 
to the diaspora like in Rwanda.  Or privileged tax regimes for diaspora investments 
like in Uganda. However, at the moment, there are no targeted diaspora-centred 
development initiatives or policies in The Gambia.  
According to Bréant (2013), the Togolese diaspora provides a strong example of 
how governments affect diaspora contributions.  In his paper, ‘What if diasporas 
didn’t think about development? A critical approach of the international discourse 
on migration and development’, Bréant explains that the Togolese diaspora was 
very disengaged with development in Togo because of the hostile relationship they 
had with former President Eyadema, compared to now when they have a more 
cordial relationship with the new government.  He states that the relationship 
between President Eyadema and the diaspora, expatriates and emigrants was 
fraught because they were seen as opponents and thus were rarely directed 
towards local development actions. This clearly shows a need to explore the role 
politics in migration and development debates because as Hein de Haas (2012) 
has pointed out,   “if states fail to implement reform, migration and remittances are 
unlikely to fuel national development- and can even sustain situations of 
dependency, underdevelopment and authoritarianism” (19).  This argument is 
pivotal in this thesis, which aims to provide a good understanding of the relations 
between the Gambian government and diaspora, in terms of why it is currently the 
way that it is and the impact it has on diaspora development contributions. 
However, since 2007, the World Bank’s Africa Diaspora Program (ADP) has 
worked with national governments, the African Union, and other development 
donors to increase diaspora engagement with various development priorities 
(Gamlen 2014).  Clearly, this is seen as the way forward for solving some of the 
development challenges in Africa, particularly as non-African countries like Mexico 
and Philippines have registered great success in engaging their diaspora in their 
country’s development agenda.  For instance, Mexico experienced significant 
growth in their construction sector by instructing the federal government financial 
institution Sociedad Hipotecaria to provide long-term financing and mortgages to 
emigrants that want to build houses in Mexico (Gupta et al. 2007: 7).  Moreover, in 
the Philippines, the government has gone far ahead of many other migrant-sending 
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countries in developing initiatives to engage with its diaspora (Nicolas 2016: 33).  
For the past three decades, the government have created a plethora of initiatives 
targeting the diaspora, which in turns has contributed to growth in their economy.  
For example, the Philippine government eliminated practices that drove off 
remittances like overvalued exchange rates and mandatory remittance quotas and 
replaced them with giving tax breaks and privileged investments options for 
overseas residents (Newland 2012).  Both governments have successfully 
removed obstacles that were preventing remittances being used to facilitate 
development (Chami and Fullenkamp 2013).  
The table below details the incentives some African countries offer their diasporas 
as a means of engaging them in national development.  Though these incentives 
are very encouraging for diasporas that want to invest in their ‘home’ countries, 
they do not guarantee engagement from all diasporas. 
Table 2: Diaspora incentives in some African countries 
Countries  
 
Diaspora incentives  
 
Cape Verde 
 Tax-free high interest rates savings account, specially 
designated “emigrant accounts” in homeland banks  
Burundi 
 Created the Directorate of Diaspora in October 2009 
Ethiopia  
 Ethiopian Government enacted a law in 2000, to permit 
Ethiopians in the diaspora with foreign citizenship to be 
treated as nationals, by offering a ‘‘Person of Ethiopian 
Origin’’ identification card (locally known as the Yellow 
Card) for foreign nationals of Ethiopian origin 
 Income tax exemption from 2 to 7 years; 100% duty 
exemption on importation of machinery and equipment for 
investment projects 
 Land to diaspora for residential purposes 
Ghana 
 Dual Citizen Act 2000 
 Foreign currency bank accounts 
Nigeria  Foreign currency bank accounts 
Rwanda 
 National Bank of Rwanda (BNR) in cooperation with the 
Rwandan diaspora set up the Rwandan Diaspora Mutual 
Fund (RDMF).  Investing financial resources from 
Rwandans living abroad in corporate bonds and stocks 
Uganda 
 Privileged tax regimes and planning codes for diaspora 
investors – even those who no longer have Ugandan 
citizenship.   
Source:  Assembled by Sainabou Taal 
 63 
The next section looks at the transnational political engagement of the African 
diaspora and illustrates the various ways in which they engage in politics at ‘home’. 
2.6 The Transnational Engagement of the African Diaspora in Politics at 
‘home’ 
“Diasporas can try to directly influence homeland politics from abroad, e.g. 
by financing specific causes or spreading their vision of national identity 
and politics …” [Hägel and Peretz, 2005:473]  
 
Within the literature on the transnational engagement of diaspora in politics at 
‘home’, there are many examples of diaspora groups that have played significant 
roles in the domestic politics of their homelands.  For example, during the late 19 th 
and 20th centuries, there was an increase in the transnational homeland activities 
of diaspora around the world.  Groups such as the Irish Fenians organized 
themselves in the United States to oppose British rule in Ireland and Germans 
around the world supported the building of a “Greater German Empire”.  The 
Chinese communities in the Americas mobilizing to support the 1911 Revolutions 
in China and Jews around the world mobilizing around the cause of Zionism, and 
the ideas of a Jewish homeland 20 ”(Adamson 2015).  This shows that the 
boundaries of politics have changed over the years to where diaspora groups are 
able to participate in the politics of their homelands from afar (Lyons and 
Mandaville 2012, Boccagni et al. 2015).  Advances in telecommunication and 
international travel have made it relatively easy for diasporas to maintain political 
links with ‘home’ and to be involved in shaping domestic and international policies 
(Brinkerhoff 2009, Esman 2009 and NurMuhammad et al. 2015).  This section of 
the chapter will seek to use the narrower literature on transnational diaspora 
politics to understand how and why African diasporas engage in politics at ‘home’, 
using social movement theory to explain the political mobilization of the African 
diasporas.  This section will also discuss the mobilization tools used by the 
diaspora and their impact in influencing politics at ‘home’. 
The seminal collection ‘Politics from Afar: Transnational Diaspora and Networks’ 
edited by Terrence Lyons and Peter Mandaville (2012), places diasporas in the 
same league as political parties, interest groups, civil society groups and 
insurgencies as instruments to influence political outcomes at ‘home’.  However, in 
their introduction, the editors argue that diasporas are distinctive because they 
challenge contemporary notions of how political life should be organized (3).  
According to Lyons and Mandaville, globalization has made it possible for 
                                                                
20 http://www.worldpoliticsreview.com/articles/16224/blurring-the-lines-diaspora-politics-and-globalized-
constituencies 
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transnationals’ to influence politics at ‘home’, and the political thinking and 
strategies developed by those in multiple locations around the world have shaped 
how diasporas are mobilized, issues are framed and outcomes are determined (3). 
Concurrently, the meaning and practice of national belonging and political 
participation are being reshaped through voting and the extension of citizenship 
rights across borders (Ragazzi 2014).  Lyons and Mandaville argue that the most 
effective way to mobilize diasporas is to tap into issues of identity that are specific, 
parochial and territorially based (15).  However, they also recognize that some 
regimes do challenge a diaspora’s legitimacy and block their political access 
because they view certain diasporas as threatening and vilify them as disloyal and 
traitorous (14). In addition, the authors argue that the economic dimension of 
migration such as remittances often serve as an important vehicle for political 
endorsements. And new forms of media such as blogs, satellite television and text 
messaging have multiplied the places where political agendas are set, strategies 
developed and leaders identified (10).   
This book provides a solid guide for any discussion on the contemporary 
transnational political engagement of diasporas. It demonstrates how diaspora 
politics affects many areas relevant to academics, policymakers and development 
practitioners. One of the particular strengths of this book are the questions that be 
been raised. For example, how have politics in countries of origin been 
transformed by the current upsurge in the political activism of increasingly mobile 
transnational population? And who is doing the mobilizing?  
By looking for answers to these questions I discovered gaps in the knowledge 
within the literature about how politics at ‘home’ has been transformed by the 
diaspora. I also found that little attention is given to the roles certain actors within 
‘home’ countries play in enhancing or reducing outcomes of the political activities 
of diasporas.  For example, in this thesis I argue that part of the reason the 
Gambian diaspora has not been able to achieve political change in the country is 
because the opposition political parties and people on the ground have not been 
supportive of their political interventions. In my subjective opinion, this proves that 
it imperative the literature analyses not just the homeland government, but other 
homeland actors and the political patterns of migrant communities in all their 
diversity.  In order to get a better understanding of how politics in countries of origin 
have been transformed by diaspora involvement (Lyons and Mandaville 2012).  
JoAnn McGregor and Dominic Pasura (2014) argue that the literature on diaspora 
politics has predominantly focused on the context of violent ‘crisis’ and the impact 
 65 
of diaspora engagement through remittances and other interventions during such 
crises. In other words, it still has a broadly negative assessment, which is in 
contrast to development thinking which sees diaspora engagement in conflict in 
Africa as potentially more positive (4).   This difference in focus can be attributed to 
the various roles diasporas play in their ‘home’ countries, which can either place 
them in positions of peacemakers or peace-wreckers (Smith and Stares, 2007, 
Hoehne et al. 2011).   For example, research on members of the Ugandan Acholi 
diaspora in London revealed that this group helped to resolve conflict at ‘home’ by 
successfully bringing together representatives from the Ugandan and Sudanese 
government with the rebel group Lords Resistance Army to facilitate a conflict 
resolution (Baser and Swain 2008, Iheduru 2011).  Whereas, research on the 
boundary wars between Eritrea and Ethiopia showed that diaspora on both sides 
perpetuated the conflict by contributing millions of dollars to their homeland 
government for the purchase of weapons (Koser 2003, Bernal 2006).  
Similarly, Jennifer Brinkerhoff (2011) argues that within the pedagogy of diaspora 
studies there tends to be more focus on the support diasporas give to insurgencies 
and their contributions of political instability, rather than their role in conflict 
reconciliation.  Brinkerhoff asserts that diasporas play varied roles in conflict 
management, which can result in peaceful resolutions, as illustrated by the 
diagram below. 
Figure 1: Conflict phases and approaches to conflict management 
Source: Smith and Stares 2007; 26 
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This diagram illustrates the general cycle of conflict management of any conflict 
and any attempts to manage it.  The outside of the line shows the stages of conflict, 
and the inside shows the role diasporas (among other actors) could play during 
every stage of conflict. McGregor and Pasura (2014) argue that viewing diasporas 
as peacemaker is more useful because it recognizes their heterogeneity, plural 
interests, spatial variation, and change over time (8).  But does viewing diaspora as 
peacemaker truly help us to recognize their heterogeneity?  I argue that the only 
way to understand the true heterogeneous nature of diaspora in conflict is to 
understand the extent and willingness of diasporic groups to get involved in 
homeland affairs (Mavroudi 2015) and not by creating distinctions between those 
who are peacemakers and peace-wreckers as members from one diaspora group 
can assume both positions.  Thus, it is important that the literature does not 
analyse the political engagement of diasporas at ‘home’ using a one-size-fits 
framework.   
 
Within the debates of the transnational diaspora, politics there is a gender element 
that needs to be addressed but is widely under-researched. Analyst Liza Mügge 
(2013), found this out after conducting a gendered analysis of transnational politics 
of migrant women.  She discovered that not only is transnational politics completely 
dominated by men but also the role of women in it is mostly invisible and private 
(67).  In her research on ‘Women in Transnational Migrant Activism; Supporting 
Social Justice Claims of Homeland Political Organizations’, Mügge (2013) 
uncovered that for a period of 20 years there were only two Turkish migrant 
transnational political organizations directed by women and these were the leftist 
Turkish Women’s Federation in the Netherlands (HTKB) and International Free 
Women’s Foundation.  However, in both transnational programmes ‘the woman 
question’ was clearly subordinated to a broader political programme in these cases 
of Marxism and Kurdish nationalism (77). Mügge (2013) made a very salient 
observation about the literature not giving more attention to the role of women in 
transnational politics, particularly as often women are compelled to engage in 
politics when they are directly affected.  For example, according to David Gardin 
and Marie Godin (2013), there is increasing political involvement of Congolese 
women in the diaspora in the field of women’s rights advocacy, given the situation 
in Eastern Congo where women were exposed to widespread sexual assaults and 
gender-based violence.  This opened up new paths of political action and on 
certain occasions, led to transnational forms of engagement of women.   
However, Krook and Childs (2010) assert that though social movement and 
suffrage have been a central focus in studies of women, gender and politics. 
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Women have largely been excluded from other areas of political participation like 
election, political office and international politics.  For example, the informal norms 
associating women with the private sphere and men with the public continue to 
exert influence, leading to fewer women than men holding top-level political 
positions (4).  That is to say, women participating in politics are often relegated to 
more ancillary roles such as cooking, doing clerical work and mobilizing female 
voters (6).  However, there appears to be no other solution to this problem in the 
literature other than encouraging women to assume roles that are more active in 
political leadership (Boccagni et al 2015).  Which is clearly difficult to achieve in 
societies like The Gambia where cultural practices and customary laws place 
women in subordinate roles.  Nevertheless, this thesis explores the role of 
Gambian women in the diaspora and at ‘home’ in politics and draws some very 
interesting comparisons between them. 
 
Another gap within the literature on diaspora transnational political engagement is 
the limited focus on the generational difference in how diaspora intervene in politics 
at home (Gardin and Godin 2013 and Abdile 2014). Gardin and Godin (2013) 
argue that there are different ideas of political engagement between different 
generations within the Congolese diasporic community.  According to their article  
‘Saving the Congo’: transnational social fields and politics of home in the 
Congolese diaspora’, the authors explain that youth activists in the London 
Congolese diaspora organize their social movements ‘horizontally’ in contrast with 
the organizational model of the first generation’s leaders. This often revolved 
around political party structure and was more rigid and hierarchical. This division 
between the older and younger generations has resulted in the disengagement of 
many Congolese youths, who see the older generation as being more interested in 
increasing their reputation in the diaspora and in Kinshasa than in delivering 
political progress in the DRC.  This demonstrates the internal challenges and 
divides within diaspora groups, even when they share the same issues at ‘home’.  
Thus, this thesis argues that diaspora engagement in politics at ‘home’ is partly 
determined by individual interpretations and opinions of what is happening in their 
‘home’ countries, which is often shaped by their age and in some instances gender. 
 
Still, within the literature, I found that social remittances21 (Levitt and Lamba-Nieves 
2011) are another effective mechanism for diasporas to influence in politics at 
‘home’. In addition, so are providing financial support to opposition parties or for 
                                                                
21 Social remittances are ideas, values, norms and information diasporic actors, who gained particular 
experiences, knowledge, and skills from abroad bring to their homeland and political engagement of 
diasporic actors is a key example of social remittance because they transfer those attributes to their 
homeland (Hoehne et al. 2011; 77) 
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conflict reconciliation and post-conflict reconstruction and, diaspora activism 
(staging demonstrations and protests, advocacy and lobbying host governments to 
shape policies that are favourable or challenging to their homeland governments).  
Vertovec (2005) asserts that: 
 
Different diaspora-based associations may lobby host countries to shape 
policies in favour of a homeland or to challenge a homeland government; 
influence homelands through their support or opposition of governments; 
give financial and other support to political parties, social movements and 
civil society organizations; or sponsor terrorism or the perpetuation of 
violent conflict in the homeland.  (5) 
 
Boccagni et al. (2015) argue that diaspora engagement in politics at ‘home’ 
through social remittances involves them transferring the political ideas and 
practices they see in their host countries (448).  For example, the Liberian 
intellectuals living in the US drew on the 150-year-old American constitution to form 
the basis for their indigenous models of political legitimacy and decision-making 
during the transition at the end of the Liberian civil war (Moran 2005; 460).  In 
addition, according to Mezzetti et al. (2014) individuals of the Somali diaspora in 
Italy and in Finland who participate in local elections and join political parties have 
transferred this political activism to Somalia, in the form of diffusion of political 
ideas (183).  However, the question that remains to be answered is, are social 
remittances an effective route for engagement?  According to Anar Ahmadov and 
Gwendolyn Sasse (2015), too little is understood of the significance of social 
remittances in diasporic engagement in homeland affairs because this cannot be 
measured and diaspora do not always transfer their skills.  Additionally, sometimes 
transnationally active migrants can reproduce salient homeland political ideologies.  
For example, though migrants can carry new political views that can make them 
agents of change in their countries of origin.  Diaspora networks also help to 
reproduce the norms and rituals underpinning migrants’ homeland political 
identities, because such networks are often fragmented along the lines that 
correspond to cleavages in the countries of origin (Guarnizo and Díaz 1999 cited 
by Ahmadov and Sasse 2015; 1172). 
Part of the literature also argues that there are other more effective ways for 
diasporas to engage in politics at home other than using social remittances, such 
as  making financial contributions to political parties that could change the balance 
of economic, political, and military power (Horst 2008), as well as influence 
decision-making in homeland politics (Baser and Swain 2008).  For instance, the 
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remittances sent by Somalis from Norway and elsewhere during different conflicts 
served two purposes in Somalia.  The first supported clan conflict in the Mudig and 
Galguduud regions in 2004 and 2006, when the Saleebaan and Sacad clan were in 
full conflict over grazing land.  And the second contributed to peace-building 
through indirect engagement such as economically sustaining their families, 
providing forums for developing strategies for political reforms, and building 
infrastructures such as schools and hospitals (Hoehne et al. 2011).  
The Somali diaspora provides a good example of how remittances can sustain 
parties engaged in conflict as well as provide basic needs and services to the most 
vulnerable in conflict (Brinkerhoff 2011). Clearly, the financial support diasporas 
provide to facilitate their political engagement have different outcomes for different 
groups.  For example, groups like the Cape Verdean diaspora were reported to 
have been instrumental in influencing a change from the one-party state in 1991 
through the support they gave to the opposition party (The Movement for 
Democracy) that won the multi-party elections that year (Andrade 2002 cited by 
Iheduru 2011).  On the other hand, the Zimbabwe diaspora who aligned 
themselves with the Movement for Democratic Change opposition party against 
Mugabe ZANU (PF) government (McGregor and Pasura 2014; 7), have not been 
able to achieve their goal of political change in Zimbabwe. The reasons being that, 
unlike the Cape Verdean diaspora who have full voting rights in their presidential 
elections.  The Zimbabwe diaspora is only allowed limited presidential and 
legislative voting rights and Mugabe’s skilful domestic, regional, and international 
political strategies proved significant obstacles to political change, and South 
Africa’s leadership consistently supported the regime…undermining the impact of 
domestic political opposition as well as the potential political impact of the diaspora” 
(McGregor and Pasura 2014; 7).  This shows how provisions such as extending full 
voting rights to diasporas to engage in homeland politics can determine their 
effectiveness in influencing politics.  
There is a wide range of tools in which diasporas use to take advantage of 
technology and liberal democratic rights in their host countries when pursuing their 
political goals at ‘home’. For example, political activism of African diasporas often 
takes form through online engagement and cyber-activism, as well as staging 
demonstrations and protest, advocacy, fundraising and lobbying powers in their 
host countries to facilitate their inclusion in homeland politics.  For example, in 
2011- 2012 the Congolese diaspora in Europe and the US mobilized to contest the 
re-election of Joseph Kabila as President of DRC by organizing public 
demonstrations and picketing in front of the Congolese embassies, 10 Downing 
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Street and the Stock Exchange in London, the White House in Washington DC and 
the International Criminal Court in the Hague (Gardin and Godin 2013; 113).  They 
also circulated petitions, wrote to British Members of Parliament, and attended 
forums such as those organized by UK All Party Parliamentary Groups (126).  
Whereas the Ethiopian Muslim diaspora involved in rights base advocacy are 
reportedly actively engaged in enhancing the wider game of democratic politics in 
Ethiopia. By sending delegations in Badr-Ethiopia and the Network of Ethiopian 
Muslims in Europe (NEME) to Ethiopia to advocate for legislative and public 
policies for the “protection of the civil and humanitarian rights for Ethiopian Muslims 
by advancing the freedom of worship according to one’s belief and the right of the 
people to assemble peaceably, and by petitioning the government for a redress of 
grievances” (see Feyissa 2014: 106).   
These forms of diaspora activism are nothing new even with the changes in 
technology. Ramla Bandele (2010) provides a historical account of political 
activism by the Universal Negro Improvement Association’s (UNIA), who attempted 
to establish merchant marine called the Black Star Line (BSL) from 1919 to 1921.  
Bandele found that the political activism of the BSL was motivated by race and 
discrimination because black seamen and longshoremen were being replaced by 
returning white soldiers.  The activism that the BSL engaged in was primarily 
fundraising for the purpose of establishing a profitable transport business to 
facilitate building a black nation-state on the continent of Africa and foster black 
economic independence in that state and throughout the diaspora (749).  Between 
1919 and 1920, the UNIA was able to raise $800,000 for its plans (750).  However, 
the fall of the BSL came as a result of internal and external problems from varied 
participation levels diaspora sister communities looking first at their own interests, 
global economic crisis and the US and Britain applying pressure and aggravating 
disagreements between the competing black organisations in order to preserve 
their own economic power and position within the marine transport industry. 
However, though this activism was directed at the host country, it is relevant to this 
current study because it demonstrates first, how internal issues within the diaspora 
can affect the effectiveness of their political engagement, and second, how politics 
and business can be very closely linked.  
Returning to analyses of the present, research has shown that host countries play 
an important role in facilitating the environment for diasporic interventions in 
homeland politics (Zapata-Barrero et al. 2013).  According to Adamson (2015), the 
power of diasporas is further intensified via social media and living in global cities 
like London that act as a hub for diasporas to engage in politics in places as 
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diverse as Nigeria, Somalia, Iraq, and Bangladesh. However, the political activism 
of the African diaspora is also centred on their participation in online forums (Crush 
et al. 2016).  Increasingly diaspora groups are using the Internet to unite around a 
political cause and galvanize members for action (Siapera 2014). Also increasingly, 
the academic literature is discussing the ‘digital diaspora’ or groups that organize 
online on behalf of homeland causes (Simon Turner 2008, Bernal 2013, Eric 
Turner 2013, NurMuhammad et al. 2015, Quinsaat 2015, Adamson 2015). But how 
useful is the Internet, in particular, social media sites in mobilizing the diaspora?  
On the one hand, I argue that in this digital age the Internet is the most useful and 
cost-effective tool for the diaspora to mobilize large groups for a cause. But on the 
other hand, Nur Muhammad et al. (2015) argue that the Internet allows for 
selective engagement because some people who engage online will not take part 
in physical demonstrations.  This is viewed as a new model of activism called 
clicktivism22, whereby ‘digital activists’ engage in politics through online petitions 
and mass emails.  This form of activism is criticized for undermining the intensity 
and quality of political engagement because it becomes a matter of clicking a few 
links (White 2010).  So for groups like the Gambian diaspora who are trying to get 
the attention of the international community and host governments, their presence 
online is felt more heavily than physically at protests and demonstrations where the 
turnout is often significantly lower than expected.  
In this thesis, I argue that the political mobilization of diasporas can be better 
understood using ‘social movement theory’ (McAdam et al. 1996, Sökefeld 2006, 
Marsden 2014, Quinsaat 2015), as this paints a picture of a movements’ life-cycle 
as it is occurring, starting from emergency, coalescence, institutionalization, and 
decline (see Pullum 2014:1378).  The social movement theory posits that 
diasporas need political opportunities that would enable the rise of social 
movements.  Political opportunities are important to the formation of diaspora as 
they include “communication, media and transport, as well as the legal and 
institutional (for example multiculturalist) frameworks within which claims for 
community and identity can be articulated” (Sökefeld 2006; 270).  For example, 
Victoria Bernal (2013) talks about how political events at ‘home’ provide an 
opportunity for the Eritrean diaspora to use the Internet to “participate in real time 
in homeland current events and to produce and/or circulate national political 
content from outside the nation” (246).  
Social movement theorists also posit that diasporas need mobilizing structures, 
such as networks of people, to allow them to form groups to address their shared 
                                                                
22 https://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2010/aug/12/clicktivism-ruining-leftist-activism 
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issues and interests (Sökefeld 2006; 269).  For example, the Gambian political 
diaspora has approximately 11 groups who have the shared interest of influencing 
a democratic political change in The Gambia. According to Pierre Bourdieu (1991), 
the transnational political field gives diasporas power to mobilize and form opinions 
in ways that they cannot in their ‘home’ countries (cited by Brun and van Hear 
2012). And Koinova (2012) asserts that the advantage these diasporic 
organizations have is that they are autonomous in their ability to solicit funds and 
frame their own meanings to events take place in their homelands.  But often a key 
problem with these groups is that they behave as though they are speaking and 
acting in the name of others, particularly those at ‘home’, while at the same time 
ignoring the voices of those who do not want the diaspora to speak for them. This 
thesis argues that sometimes diasporas are self-aggrandizing in their political 
interventions and this often hinders the effectiveness of their political engagement 
and their relationship with those at ‘home’  
Another useful concept in the social movement theory, which adds to our 
understanding of the political mobilization of diaspora, is the framing process. This 
is the process of assigning meanings and interpretations to events in ways that 
would mobilize and legitimize action (McAdam et al. 1996, Sökefeld 2006).  
Seminal contributions on the role of framing in social movement theory can be 
found in the work of David Snow and Robert Benford (2000).  Snow and Benford, 
claim that framing is the strategic effort by groups to transform certain conditions 
into issues, such as human rights, which help to define grievances and claims 
(Sökefeld 2006:270).  For example, the Zimbabwean diasporas have continued to 
mobilize physically and on cyber-space to make the world more aware of human 
rights violations and torture in Zimbabwe, particularly on matters like 
Gukurahundi23 that would otherwise have been long forgotten (Mbiba 2012).  In the 
case of the Gambian diaspora, political mobilization of some members was framed 
around the events of the April 2000 shootings of student protesters in The Gambia 
by national security forces.  This event was interpreted as a gross human rights 
violation and lack of freedom of expression in the country.  
However, it is important to recognize that diasporas can also make positive 
contributions after negative events such as violent conflict have taken place in their 
‘home’ countries.  Post-conflict Liberia provides a useful example of diasporas 
getting involved in national politics in ways other than through direct confrontation 
with the state (Antwi-Boateng 2011).  For example, in 2007, members of the 
                                                                
23 Refers to the murder, rape, and torture of members of the Ndebele tribe in Zimbabwe by Robert 
Mugabe's 5th Brigade in 1980s.  http://www.thestandard.co.zw/2016/06/12/mugabes-gukurahundi-
threats-revealing/ 
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Liberian diaspora became heavily involved in the Liberian Truth and Reconciliation 
Commission (LTRC) by mobilizing to promote international justice and human 
rights as part of the LTRC process for national healing, unity, and peace (Iheduru 
2011).  In essence, the mobilization of this African diasporas group supports an old 
but relevant assertion made by McAdam et al. (1996) that “the very notion of 
framing reminds us that mobilization and ongoing collective action are 
accomplishments, even in the context of favourable environmental conditions” 
(339).  It is equally important to recognize that in many cases the various diaspora 
mobilization efforts have (so far) resulted in limited policy changes and rights, and 
demands for inclusion in homeland affairs are not always (or even often) met 
(Kleist 2013). 
The main weakness of social movement theory is that it assigns negative reasons 
to the political mobilization of diasporas, whereas there are reasons other than 
having grievances or addressing negative events in their ‘home’ countries for 
diaspora mobilize politically (Pullum 2014).  For instance, Ghanaian government 
have effectively mobilized the diaspora politically as a means to getting them to 
engage in development. The government passed a Dual Citizenship Act in 2002 
(Kleist 2013), offering its citizen abroad dual citizenship and dual nationality. 
Additionally, other African states have extended voting rights to their diasporas to 
allow them to vote in presidential or legislative elections (Bermudez and Lafleur 
2015).  For example: 
Most Francophone African countries, namely Benin, Central African 
Republic, Chad, Côte d’Ivoire, Djibouti, Gabon, Guinea, Mali, Niger, 
Rwanda, Senegal, and Togo, permit ‘personal’, ‘proxy’, or ‘mixed’ 
(personal or proxy) voting by emigrants in either presidential and 
legislative/sub-national elections or both, as well as in referendums.
 
All 
Lusophone countries (Angola, Cape Verde, Guinea-Bissau, and 
Mozambique) and Equatorial Guinea allow ‘personal’ voting for the 
diaspora in presidential elections (Cape Verde allows voting for both 
presidential and legislative elections).  Of all former British colonies in 
Africa, only Botswana (presidential), Ghana (limited presidential and 
legislative), Lesotho (legislative by post), Mauritius (legislative/sub-national 
by proxy), Namibia (presidential and legislative), South Africa (limited 
presidential and legislative), and Zimbabwe (Iheduru 2011:191) 
Though there is some scepticism from analyst Okechukwu Iheduru (2011), who 
argues that African states are engaging their diaspora not out of free will but 
because they are responding to the apparent foreign aid fatigue among 
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international financial institutions and aid donors.  African governments are being 
pressured to redefine emigrants as ‘development partners’ or ‘stakeholders’ and to 
renegotiate the citizenship of diasporas to enable the ‘home’ states to tap into their 
resources, especially remittances (197). I argue that this only partially explains why 
some African states appear keen to engage their diasporas into homeland affairs.  
As according to Enoh (2014), the Cameroonian diasporas’ demands for inclusion in 
mainstream social, economic, and political participation was openly denied by the 
Cameroon government and the diaspora have been banned from participation and 
inclusion in the municipal, legislative and the presidential elections because the 
government fear the unknown.  
Finally, a survey of the literature on why diasporas engage in transnational politics 
at ‘home’ revealed a number of theories and some empirical data from case 
studies. For example, the homeland is under threat (Ethiopian and Eritrean 
diasporas), aspirations to establish own states and self-determination (Palestinian 
diaspora), corrupt and oppressive governments (Gambian diaspora), strengthening 
national identity (Ghanaian diaspora), showing support to particular ethnic and/or 
religious groups (Sri Lankan diaspora), and making emotional and financial 
investments in the homeland (Senegalese Murid diaspora).  
Finally, my last criticism of the literature is that little is known about the impact 
diaspora political interventions have on the people at ‘home’ (in terms of families of 
those involved in politics being in danger), the host country (mitigating against 
conflicts between groups who support different political parties at ‘home’) and the 
relationship between the ‘home’ and the host countries.  For example, the many 
tensions between the Gambian and Senegalese government include President 
Jammeh accusing the Senegalese government of harbouring Gambian dissidents 
plotting to destabilize the country and granting them political asylum (Point 
Newspaper 2013)24, the Gambian government still not taking action to start the 
construction of the Gambia/Bridge and the alleged Gambian involvement in 
Casamance. This question of impact on others is an interesting area for further 
research within the pedagogy of the transnational political engagement of the 
diaspora.  
2.7 Conclusions 
The literature on development studies revealed that the concepts used in this 
thesis such as ‘development’, ‘politics’ and ‘diasporas’ are highly contested and 
                                                                
24 http://thepoint.gm/africa/gambia/article/jammeh-accuses-senegal-of-harbouring-gambian-dissidents 
 75 
difficult to define.  This is because they are used in broader or narrower ways by 
different analysts and in different disciplines (de Kadt 1974, Hall 1990, Safran 1991, 
Clifford 1994, Brah 1996, Cohen 1997, 2008, Cohen and Vertovec 1999, Braziel 
and Mannur 2003, Leftwich 2004, Bakewell 2008, Dufoix 2008, van Hear 2005, 
2010 and Werbner 2010). Additionally, reviewing the literature on ‘migration and 
development’ nexus also showed that this relationship is not as straightforward as 
it is often assumed (Rist 2009, Davies 2012, de Haas 2012).  However, the 
migration-good vs migration-bad way of thinking is profoundly unhelpful since the 
reality is that migration is good and bad for development (de Haas 2012).  
 
Within the literature we also learn that the starting point of the forced migration of 
Africans cannot be determined, (Akyeampong 2000, Segal 2001, Koser 2003, 
Ifekwunigwe 2003, 2013, Zeleza 2005), but respective of this, the thesis takes a 
strong position to connect the African diasporas to a sacred homeland in Africa 
because I argue that this helps to explain why new African diasporas make 
contributions to development and intervene in politics at ‘home’.  
 
The literature on diaspora studies revealed that the African diasporas are indeed 
making development contributions at ‘home’ to their families, towns/villages and at 
national level, through remittances and investments (Kapur 2001, 2003, Nyberg- 
Sorensen et al. 2002, Gundel 2002, Turner et al. 2003, IOM, 2006, de Haas 2006, 
2012, Terrazas 2010, Davies 2012, Judge and De Plaen, 2011, Newland, 2011, 
2013, Ratha et al. 2011, Agunias and Newland 2012, Crush et al. 2013, Gamlen 
2014, Mercer and Page 2014, Resende – Santos 2015, Chikanda et al. 2016). 
Even though there are key problems that have been identified with diaspora-
centred development and diaspora- led development, in that they do not always 
yield positive results as expected (Skeldon 2005, 2008, Mercer et al. 2008, Davies 
2012, Ho and Boyle 2015, Chikanda et al. 2016). However, contributions from the 
diaspora are very important in sustaining and alleviating families from poverty 
(Stark and Lucas 1988, Mohan 2006, Lindley 2010, Mercer and Page 2010, 
Hammond et al 2011, Hammond et al 2011, Hammond 2011, Enoh 2014).  This is 
also the most important level of development for the Gambian diaspora.  
 
The literature also reports that diasporas engage in politics at ‘home’ from afar 
(Lyons and Mandaville 2012) through their various mechanisms including using the 
Internet or staging public protests and demonstrations (Simon Turner 2008, Bernal 
2013, Eric Turner 2013, Gardin and Godin 2013, NurMuhammad et al. 2015, 
Quinsaat 2015, Adamson 2015).  This they hope would allow them to influence 
politics at ‘home’, however to understand how and why they are able to have an 
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influence.  The thesis uses social movement theory to create a better 
understanding (McAdam et al. 1996, Sökefeld 2006, Marsden 2014, Quinsaat 
2015).  I argued that this is the best theoretical framework to use to explain the 
political mobilization of members of the Gambian diaspora, despite it receiving 
criticism for only assigning negative reasons for diaspora mobilization. 
 
Returning to the aim of this chapter, which was to develop a theoretical framework 
that will guide the analysis in this empirical research. I argued that the literature on 
migration and development, diaspora studies in general and African diaspora 
studies, in particular, provide sufficient critical analysis and case study examples to 
allow for this aim to be achieved. However, the main gaps in the literature are; very 
little is known about the case study group of the Gambian diaspora.  Therefore, this 
thesis will contribute knowledge about this particular group by providing in-depth 
analysis of their political and developmental activities.  Additionally, the literature 
also pays much less attention to small diaspora groups that are making significant 
contributions in their ‘home’ countries in comparison to the attention it gives to 
large and wealthy groups like the Jewish, Indian and Chinese diasporas. As such, 
this empirical research of the small Gambian diaspora will also contribute 
knowledge to our understanding of small diasporas, their development 
contributions and political interventions at ‘home’. Lastly, the literature on ‘conflict 
diaspora’ also needs to be broadened to include the political activities of diasporas 
at ‘home’, and in particular in situations of non-violent conflict (Smith 2007), like in 
the case of the Gambian diaspora. In this sense, I argued that it keeps the idea of 
political conflict, without necessarily assuming it is violent conflict.  
 
An aim in this research is to fill the gaps in the literature with a new case study and 
to also contribute to the field of African diaspora studies and development studies. 
But ultimately one of the goals of this thesis is to try and breakdown the firewall 
between ‘politics’ and ‘development’ by using the Gambian case study to show 
how these two concepts work ‘hand in hand’ within the Gambian context.  This is 
something that the literature on migration and development, development studies 
or African diaspora studies has not tackled in depth. Rather discussions of formal 
politics have remained in the field of political science, whereas debates about the 
formal political practice of diasporas have been hidden either under the shield of 
‘development’ or within discussions of violent conflict.  Therefore, this thesis brings 
the ideas of formal politics (elections and political parties) into debates of African 
diaspora and development studies. 
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Chapter 3:  
Depicting The Gambia and its Diaspora 
 
3.1 Introduction 
 
The aim of this chapter is to first give an account of the history of The Gambia in 
order to analyse its current context.  This chapter is a vital prerequisite to 
understanding the arguments in this research as it sheds lights on some of the 
challenges in the country, which perhaps drive the diaspora to intervene through 
development/politics.  Therefore, another aim of this chapter is to anticipate the 
links that can be drawn between the current conditions in the country and the 
interventions of the diaspora detailed in the empirical chapters that follow.  The first 
section of this chapter discusses the history, geography, ethnic composition, 
demography, gender, religion, and poverty in The Gambia.  It then moves on to 
discuss the political and economic history of the country since independence in 
1965. The second section discusses the migratory history of Gambians, the 
diaspora and their associations.  The last section is the conclusion, which draws 
together the key arguments and discussions. 
 
3.2 The history of The Gambia 
 
The Gambia became a crown colony in 1821 but its present borders were not 
established until 1889 when an agreement was reached at the Anglo-French 
Convention (Perfect 2008, 2016).  Between 1821 and 1889, this British colony 
consisted only of the capital Bathurst (Banjul) but later expanded to include the full 
territory of what previously had been the protectorates (the rural areas). During the 
process of decolonization of African countries, The Gambia was considered too 
small and poor to become independent. The British government was considering 
joining The Gambia with Senegal to form a Senegambia Federation (Perfect 2008) 
based on the recommendations of a team of UN experts.  However, a group of 
educated Gambian elites25 who shared the desire for an independent Gambian 
state formed political parties and spent fourteen years fighting for the country’s 
independence.  Then on the 18th February 1965, The Gambia finally gained 
independence from the British and became an independent Commonwealth Realm, 
a constitutional monarchy with the Queen of England as supposed Head of State 
(like Canada and Australia today). 
                                                                
25 Reverend J C Faye (Democratic Party), I. M Garba Jahumpa (The Muslim Congress Party), Pierre S 
Njie (United Party), and Dawda Kairaba Jawara (People’s Progressive Party) (ABS Taal 2014) 
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Geography  
 
The Gambia is the smallest countries on the African mainland, made up of a 
narrow strip of land approximately 400 kilometres long and 30 kilometres wide.  
The total land area is 10,689 square kilometres, which forms an enclave within 
Senegal and has a small coastline to the west of the country opening onto the 
Atlantic Ocean. Its main geographical feature is the River Gambia, which runs 
through the entire country and is used to transport goods from one end to the other. 
 
Figure 2: Map of The Gambia  
 
Source:  www.geology.com 
 
Demography  
 
The population of The Gambia has been growing on average at a rate of 3.3 
percent per annum (Population and Housing Census Preliminary Results 2013).  In 
2013, the population of The Gambia was recorded at 1.8 million, however, 
considering the small size of the country this makes it one of the most densely 
populated African states26.  Rapid population growth since 1993 has seriously 
affected the government’s ability to equitably distribute resources and deliver 
services. In addition, the rapidly increasing population has also exacerbated 
unemployment issues.  The job market in The Gambia is simply not able to meet 
the demands of school leavers, many of whom are subsequently migrating out of 
the country (UNICEF 2010). 
                                                                
26 http://www.unescoafrica.org/edu/index.php/en/country-context 
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Figure 3: Population size and growth 
 
 
Source: 2013 Population and Housing Census Preliminary Results 
 
The high population growth and density in the country have resulted in the 
government re-establishing the National Population Policy 2007- 2015.  This policy 
aims to tackle the problems associated with high population growth and density in 
the areas of education, health, and family planning by reducing birth rates.  The 
government recognizes that people are more exposed to extreme poverty, poor 
sanitation, HIV infections, and tuberculosis (TB) as a consequence of rapid 
population growth in the context of poor urban services.  As such, the Ministry of 
Health and Social Welfare (MoHSW) in collaboration with development partners 
have developed Water, Sanitation and Hygiene (WASH) programmes across the 
country and behavioural change messages to sensitize the Gambian population.  
For example, during the height of the Ebola outbreak in West Africa in 2014, the 
Gambian government through the ministry and partners, provided public offices 
with hand sanitizers and put up notices reminding people to wash their hands with 
soap and water to prevent the spread of Ebola, this luckily did not reach the 
country.  This shows the government recognizes the risks high population density 
poses to disease spread and thus attempted to do something about it.  
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Figure 4: 2013 Population Densities by Local Government Area   
 
Source: 2013 Population and Housing Census Preliminary Results 
 
The national household size in The Gambia has experienced a small decline since 
the last census in 2003. According to the preliminary results of the 2013 census, 
the decline in average household size has been in predominantly urban Local 
Government Areas (LGAs) like Banjul, Kanifing and Brikama and in Kuntaur, a 
predominantly rural LGA. But places like Kerewan, Janjanbureh and Basse LGAs, 
have experienced an increase (2013; 11).  However, the census did not provide 
any explanations for the decline in urban areas and increase in rural areas. 
 
Table 3:  Household size in The Gambia 
Household size Year 
8.3 persons 1973 
8.9 persons 1993 
8.6 persons 2003 
8.2 persons 2013 
Source: 2013 Population and Housing Census Preliminary Results 
 
Ethnic composition 
 
The Gambia is ‘home’ to a number of different ethnic groups that also exist in a 
number of other countries in the sub-region, like Senegal, Mali and Guinea Bissau 
(to name but a few).  The ethnic breakdown in the country consists of Mandinka: 
36 percent, Fula: 22 percent, Wolof: 15 percent, Jola: 11 percent, and Serahule - 8 
percent, with the rest of the Gambian population belonging to much smaller ethnic 
groups such as the Serer, Creole, Manjago (Population and Housing Census 
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200327). However, this ethnic breakdown does not include the other nationalities 
currently living in the country like Senegalese, Sierra Leoneans, Nigerians and 
Ghanaians.  
 
There is great tolerance between ethnic groups and religious faiths in The Gambia 
(Saine 2009), as inter-marriages between these groups are a common practice. As 
such, there is little history of ethnic tension, which is a particular benefit to tourism.  
However, in instances where ethnic difference does creep up, it is usually to 
criticize the political parties for putting the interests of one ethnic group over the 
other. For example, the former ruling People’s Progressive Party (PPP) were often 
accused of putting the interests of Mandinkas first, and the current ruling party 
APRC is accused of appointing more Jolas in top-level government positions than 
any other ethnic group. Nevertheless, despite these grievances, there has not 
been any form of violent ethnic clashes in the country. 
 
Religion  
 
Gambian people predominantly belong to the Muslim faith, with around 90% of the 
population identifying themselves as Sunni Muslims, 9% as Christians and 1% 
having traditional beliefs28.  According to Gambian historian, Dr Florence Mahoney, 
Muslim traders brought Islam to the country from Senegal introduced to them by 
Berbers and Moors from North Africa in the eleventh century (1995; 91). Another 
Gambians academic Dr Sulayman Nyang (1977) claimed Islam came to the 
Senegambia as early as the ninth century, from Mauritania in the form of 
“marabouts, merchants and jihadi warrior” (130). However, Portuguese traders 
brought Christianity to The Gambia in the 15th century and asked the Prince Bemoi 
of the Jollof Empire to embrace the religion in exchange for their aid (Gray 2015; 
9).  
 
The Gambia has historically been marked by the peaceful coexistence between 
people from different ethnic groups and religious backgrounds. For example, the 
Point Newspaper (21st September 2011) describes the visit from a Catholic 
delegation, led by Father Edu Gomez, to pay a courtesy call on the country’s most 
senior Muslim cleric Imam Ratib of Brikama to congratulate the Imam and Muslims 
on the occasion of Koriteh which marks the end of Ramadan29. However, recently 
                                                                
27 There is not a recent data on the ethnic composition.  The published Population and Housing Census 
2013 do not have this information available. 
28 http://www.accessgambia.com/information/religion.html 
29This information was published on a blog post by Ebou Taal 
file:///Users/sainaboutaal/Desktop/phd%20data/gambia%20data/misc/Senegambian%20History%20and
%20Culture:%20ISLAM%20and%20PEACE%20IN%20A%20WORLD%20IN%20CRISES%20IN%20TH
E%20TWENTY-FIRST%20CENTURY.webarchive 
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(February 2016) this peaceful co-existence was threatened when President 
Jammeh declared the country an Islamic State.  This caused great concern for the 
Christians who fear that “over-zealous religious adherents may feel that 
government has not gone far enough in entrenching their faith and then take the 
law into their own hands” (The Knights of Saint Peter and Paul, 2016). 
 
Religion and politics are increasingly woven together in The Gambia.  Thus, it is 
safe to say that there is no separation between the state and religion, as some 
religious leaders are seen openly involved in politics. For example, some Islamic 
clerics have given the impression that they believe Jammeh has the ‘divine right of 
kings’ (the doctrine that kings receive their directive to rule straight from God) to 
rule the country.  For example, Imam Ratib of Banjul was reported saying during 
his visit to State House in December 2015, “it was Allah who gave him (Jammeh) 
to us”30.  This is significant for religious Gambians who may perhaps interpret going 
against President Jammeh as going against Allah.  
 
But, to put this in context, President Jammeh has also targeted and arrested 
religious leaders for opposing his views and using religion to condemn his actions.  
For example, in 2012 President Jammeh ordered the arrest and detention of Imam 
Baba Leigh for publically saying the execution of death-row inmates (which had 
been ordered by the President) was not Islamic. In this instance, perhaps it can be 
argued that the support some religious leaders give to Jammeh is driven by the 
fear of persecution.   
 
Gender Relations 
The Gambia is a polygamous society, where men can have up to four wives 
because Islam permits it.  It is also a predominantly patriarchal society with some 
cultural practices and customary laws placing women and children in subordinate 
roles (Chant and Brickell 2010, Chant and Touray 2013). Girls and boys are 
assigned different roles within the family, particularly in the rural areas where girls 
are often pulled out of school early for marriage, to help their mothers with 
domestic work and farming or because their families cannot afford to pay their 
school fees. Recognizing this as a social and developmental problem, in 1996 the 
government created the Ministry of Women’s Affairs under the Office of The Vice 
President (who is a woman), to provide policy guidance to Government and 
stakeholders on gender issues and women (The Gambia Gender and Women 
Empowerment Policy 2010-2020).  Then in 2000, the government introduced free 
                                                                
30 http://observer.gm/muslim-leaders-express-support-for-islamic-republic-declaration/ 
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education for girls, under the Education for All Initiative supported by UNICEF. And 
in 2012 the government tried to show gender parity by awarding women 9.4 
percent permanent seats in parliament31. 
Irrespective of these efforts, gender disparities in Gambian society still places 
women at a disadvantage domestically and professionally.  It is believed that 
women in the rural communities are more affected by this, as they are more 
responsible for the ‘home’, generating income to feed their families, bearing, and 
raising children.  Whereas, in the urban areas middle-class women are more likely 
to have ‘maids’ take care of their domestic chores and raise their children. 
According to Judith Carney and Michael Watts (1991), there have been gender 
divisions of labour within the Gambian farming system since the 1730s and has 
continued to the present. Carney and Watts assert, “women provided the majority 
of labor time on the pumped plots while the male household head maintained his 
customary control over maruo production” (674). Another study by Jagne et al. 
(2007) revealed that on average Gambian women spend 8/9 hours a day on farm 
work whilst men put in approximately 4 hours a day.  At the same time, women are 
reported to have no control of their cash income and often sacrifice their own 
nutritional needs for the men and children in their households (UNICEF 2010).   
 
These studies paint Gambian women as weak and vulnerable members of society. 
This may be true for some Gambian women but there is great heterogeneity 
among them.  For example, when the ‘miniskirt revolution’ in the UK in the 1960s 
made its way to The Gambia in 1969, it became a symbol of freedom of expression 
for urban Gambian women.  According to Hassoum Ceesay (2012), the feminist 
‘mini skirt’ movements disrupted social norms and religious beliefs.  Urban women 
wore miniskirts in rebellion and as a symbol of emancipation from the patriarchal 
society that placed them in subordinate roles despite objections from religious 
leaders, and pressure on the PPP government to ban this piece of clothing.  This 
form of personal freedom was upheld because the urban women used their vote as 
leverage, which they knew the government needed. Though the miniskirt itself is 
less symbolic now, this story describes strong, dynamic, and politically aware 
Gambian women, who still exist despite the gender disparities in the country. 
 
Poverty  
 
Poverty in The Gambia is exacerbated by internal and external factors, for 
example, the economic recession in donor countries, the recent Ebola outbreak, 
                                                                
31 UN Inter-Parliamentary Union (2016) http://www.ipu.org/wmn-e/classif.htm 
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poor economic management, and harsh political conditions. In 2012, The Gambia 
ranked 165 out of 187 of the world’s poorest countries with comparable data based 
on a composite measure of three basic dimensions; health, education and income.  
This index places The Gambia below the regional average with life expectancy at 
birth being at 58.5 years (UNDP Human Development Index 2013)  
 
The African Development Fund (2006), Oxford Poverty and Human Development 
Initiative (2016), and International Fund for Agricultural Development (IFAD) in 
2016 all carried out studies on poverty in The Gambia and shared similar findings.  
These studies confirmed that The Gambia was indeed one of the poorest countries 
in Africa.  According to the IFAD report, this is partly because the country lacks 
economic diversity, which is a major barrier to poverty reduction.  Additionally, the 
disparities between rural and urban, men and women mean that people living in 
the rural areas are more exposed to poverty and women are most vulnerable to 
poverty. 
To tackle the poverty issues in the country, the Government of The Gambia has 
developed a number of poverty reduction strategy plans over the years.  For 
example, the PRSP I (2002-2006), PRSP II (2007-2011), and Programme for 
Accelerated Growth and Employment (PAGE) (2012-2015), with each one running 
their course but achieving less than their expected outcomes.  The main focus of 
the last national strategy document the PAGE’s was to create employment and 
improve industries to tackle the poverty in The Gambia. However, youth 
unemployment remains as one of the main challenges in The Gambia as 36.7% of 
the Gambian population are aged 13-30 and 38% of young Gambians were 
unemployed in 2014 (UNDP 2014).   
The Government of The Gambia has plausible policy documents in place that show 
poverty-reduction to be a central official aspiration. Strategies such as the 
Agricultural and Natural Resources Policy (ANRP) 2009-2015, (which commits the 
government to transforming the country’s agriculture into a robust, market-oriented 
sector), the Gender and Women Empowerment Policy 2010-2020, and the 
National Youth Policy 2009-2018, all show the government’s willingness to 
formulate plans to tackle the poverty issues. However, their efforts are often 
hindered due to lack of financial resources, skilled staff and political will. Senior 
civil servants who were interviewed for this thesis said they feel demoralized by the 
lack of job security because of President Jammeh’s constant hiring and firing of 
Permanent Secretaries and Ministers.  Thus, on the one hand, the government 
appears to be tackling poverty in The Gambia by establishing national policies and 
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poverty reduction strategy documents but on the other hand, they also appear to 
be impeding their own efforts.  
Politics 
 
The Gambia became a full Republic in April 1970 with President Sir Dawda Jawara 
and People Progressive Party (PPP) as the leader of the first independent 
government.  After gaining independence in 1965, Queen Elizabeth II remained the 
Head of State to 1970.  During this period, the PPP government made two 
attempts to replace the monarchy with a republic in a referendum but lost on the 
first attempt in November 1965.  However, in 1966 the PPP government won more 
seats in the general election, which facilitated their win in the second referendum in 
1970 (Perfect 2008). In the 1970s and 80s the country was known internationally 
for its multiparty democracy, which was an ‘exception’ on the African continent 
where military regimes and authoritarian leaders were the norm (Gailey 1980, 
Sallah 1990, Wiseman 1996, Edie 2000, Hughes and Perfect 2008, Perfect 2008, 
2016, Saine 2009, Saine et al. 2013).  However, this glowing reputation was 
disrupted first in 1981, with an attempted coup led by Kukoi Samba Sanyang 
(Perfect 2016), then again on the 22nd July 1994, by four Lieutenants in the 
Gambia National Army (GNA), Yahya Jammeh, Edward Singhateh, Saihou Sabally 
and Sadibou Hydara (Perfect 2016), who succeeded in overthrowing President 
Jawara in a bloodless military coup after ruling the country for nearly three decades.   
 
Calling themselves the Armed Forces Provisional Ruling Council (AFPRC), which 
later became Alliance for Patriotic Re-orientation and Construction (APRC). 
Lieutenant Yahya Jammeh and his co-conspirators took over the country and 
orchestrated referendums and changes to the constitution that would secure his 
win three years later in the national elections in 1997 and thereafter (Wiseman 
1996, Edie 2000, Saine 2009, Perfect 2008, Perfect and Hughes 2008, Saine and 
Ceesay 2013).  Jammeh and his small group of loyalists ignored the desires of the 
Gambian people expressed through the Constitutional Review Committee (CRC) to 
have a presidential term limit included in the Constitution and to increase the 
presidential age from thirty to forty years, which was supported by the Gambian 
Bar Association (Saine 2009).  In addition, the new constitution did not allow former 
PPP members and other civil servants to stand in the 1997 presidential elections 
and it disqualified people who had been ‘dismissed’ from public office, as was the 
case for many who worked in the Jawara administration (Saine 2009).  Therefore, 
with these measures in place, thirty-year-old Yahya Jammeh won the presidential 
election in 1997. 
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In the first interview with the coup plotters on the 25th July 1994, Jammeh and his 
co-conspirators claimed they were motivated to overthrow the PPP government 
because of overwhelming corruption in the country. But although many Gambians 
agreed that corruption by top government officers was a huge problem (Saine and 
Ceesay 2013), subsequent evidence suggests that the desire to acquire significant 
amounts of wealth and power was also a strong driver of the coup. According to 
external analysts, President Jammeh’s leadership has been marked by violations 
of the rights of Gambians throughout (Amnesty International Report 2015/ 2016 
and Human Rights Watch Report 2015).   
 
In the 22 years of his leadership, President Jammeh has maintained tight controls 
over the state apparatus and lived a lavish lifestyle while poverty continues to 
ravage the country (Saine 2009).  However, Gambian analyst Abdoulaye Saine 
(2009) also recognizes that Jammeh has brought some ‘real’ development to The 
Gambia in the form of expanding access to health and education to those living in 
rural areas, by building schools, hospitals, and roads. But, these positive 
development initiatives need to be placed alongside his lack of transparency and 
intolerance for any political opposition.  
 
The recent attempted coup to overthrow President Jammeh on the 30th December 
2014 by the six Gambian dissidents from the US has made him tighten his grip on 
the country even harder by ordering arbitrary arrests and allowing the national 
security services to openly brutalize Gambians with impunity 32  (Amnesty 
International 2015). The interviews revealed that people in the diaspora and The 
Gambia believe Jammeh is becoming increasingly paranoid about losing his 
position which they say explains why he is constantly reshuffling his cabinet 
ministers, firing top army officers and state guards, keeping army officers ill-
equipped and storing heavy artillery in his ‘home’ village of Kanilai (Interviewees 
2,15,16,28,and 65).  Such claims are hard to substantiate, however, what is certain 
is that in his small circle, Jammeh has kept those he believe are loyal to him and 
expelled those he thinks are not.  The current political situation in The Gambia has 
triggered some members of the diaspora to become politically engaged because 
they claim to be the only people that can help The Gambia out of ‘dire’ political 
conditions (Interviewees 4 and 21).  
 
In essence, the formal political system in The Gambia has remained largely 
unchanged since independence, despite having two very different types of leaders.   
                                                                
32 By the 30th January 2014 30 people including a 14 year old boy name Mustapha Lowe were arrested. 
https://www.amnesty.org/en/latest/news/2015/01/gambia-charge-or-release-family-members-alleged-
failed-coup-plotters/ 
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The system is still based on democratic principles in that it has a multiparty political 
system and holds parliamentary elections every five years. The table below shows 
the political parties in The Gambia, their leaders and number of seats per party in 
the current Gambian National Assembly. 
 
Table 4: Gambian Political Parties 
Parties Leaders Number of seats 33 
Alliance for Patriotic  
Re-Orientation and 
Construction (APRC) 
President Yahya AJJ 
Jammeh 
43 
United Democratic 
Party (UDP) 
Ousainou Darboe - 
National Reconciliation 
Party (NRP) 
Hamat Bah 1 
People’s Democratic 
Organisation for 
Independence and 
Socialism (PDOIS) 
Halifa Sallah - 
National Convention 
Party (NCP) 
Dr Lamin Bojang - 
People’s Progressive 
Party (PPP) 
Omar Amadou Jallow - 
Gambia Moral 
Congress (GMC) 
Mai Ahmad Fatty - 
Gambia Party for 
Democracy and 
Progress (GPDP) 
Henry Gomez - 
Source: Inter-Parliamentary Union34 
 
Elections in The Gambia are organized and managed by the Independent Electoral 
Commission (IEC). According to section 43, chapter 5 of the 1997 Constitution, the 
IEC is responsible for conducting and supervising voter registration, registering 
political parties, ensuring the date and times of elections and referendums are 
determined in accordance with the law, ensuring that candidates in elections 
declare their assets at time of nominations, and announcing results of elections 
and referendums.  But most important, the Commission should not be subjected to 
                                                                
33 There were 53 seats in the last parliamentary elections in 2012.  Four of those seats were won by 
independent candidates 
34 http://www.ipu.org/parline-e/reports/2117_E.htm 
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the direction or control of any other person or authority.  However, despite the 
constitutional independence of the IEC, critics of the status quo argue it is unfair 
that President Jammeh appoints the chairman, even though it is stated in part two, 
section 42 of the constitution. The opposition parties highlight the paradox in this 
document in that they believe it allows Jammeh to appoint people he can control 
and manipulate to suit him. However, having the majority of seats in the national 
assembly also allows Jammeh to manipulate the laws of the country.  For instance, 
the recent reforms to the electoral law passed by parliament July 2015 have made 
it even harder for opposition parties (particularly small ones) to operate.  In June 
2015, President Jammeh introduced a new amendment to the election law, 35 
increasing the fees for running for elections by 100 times.  Making candidates pay 
1 million dalasi (£15,000) to stand for presidential elections.  Additionally, the new 
electoral law states that parties are supposed to conduct congresses every two 
years and submit their annual financial reports to the IEC for scrutiny.  Furthermore, 
all executive members of all political parties must be resident in the country, and 
individual parties must now supply 10,000 signatures for registration instead of the 
500 that had previously been required36. An interviewee from one of the Gambian 
diaspora civil society groups working with the political opposition in The Gambia 
claimed that this electoral bill will make opposition parties look to the diaspora for 
help  (Interviewee 14, male, 50s, professional/activist). I can assume this claim to 
be accurate, as this interviewee has been working closely with leaders of 
opposition parties like the PPP, UDP, NRP and PDOIS.  Additionally, since this bill 
was passed, the diaspora founded organization Gambia Democracy Fund (GDF) 
have set up a ‘gofundme’ account for the opposition party, raising $21,386 in 19 
days37.  
 
However, despite receiving support from the diaspora, in April 2016 the United 
Democratic Party (UDP) opposition political parties staged a peaceful protest for 
new electoral reforms.  This was a first for the opposition parties who have 
previously been criticized for being inactive when the government makes 
unfavourable decisions.  However, the demonstrations ended in violence as 
dozens of Gambian men and women were arrested and allegedly beaten by the 
national security services 38 . The UDP’s National Organising Secretary Solo 
Sandeng, subsequently died while in custody and in July 2016 and the UDP leader, 
Ousainou Darboe and 18 others were convicted and sentenced to three years in 
                                                                
35 http://observer.gm/independent-electoral-commission-amendment-bill-enacted/ 
36http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/africaandindianocean/gambia/11694614/Gambias-
president-increases-cost-of-running-for-election-by-100-times.html 
37 https://www.gofundme.com/the-gambia-coalition-convention-2v3yp5zg 
38 https://www.theguardian.com/world/2016/may/04/gambia-yahya-jammeh-protests-uprising-solo-
sandeng 
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jail for taking part in an unauthorized demonstration39. The outcomes of this April 
2016 protest support the claims made by the politically involved Gambian diaspora 
and some of the literature that diasporas engagement in politics involves much less 
risk than for those at ‘home’.  Nevertheless, the ‘unjust’ way in which the 
government handled this protest triggered a series of other protests in The Gambia 
with people openly displaying their dissatisfaction with the APRC government in 
general and President Jammeh in particular.  These protests indicated that some 
Gambians are now no longer willing to live in fear and silence. The photograph 
below is of the leader of the UDP party, Ousainou Darboe and his party members 
protesting for electoral reforms.  The protests were held in the Greater Banjul Area 
called Serekunda, Westfield. 
Figure 5: Protest by the opposition party for Electoral Reforms 
Source: Kibaaro News 
                                                                
39 http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-africa-36853700 
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Economy  
 
The Gambian economy performed reasonably well after independence until the 
early 1980s, when it began to decline due to the international oil crisis, droughts, 
and a fall in groundnut prices (Sallah 1990, Radelet 1992, 1993, Saine 2009, 
Perfect 2008 2016). It has been argued by analyst David Perfect (2008) that the 
economic downturn was a combination of both of these external factors and 
internal issues, such as poorly selected investment projects, a growing budget 
deficit, poor economic policies and over expenditure of the government on 
unproductive public enterprises (parastatals). These factors pushed the Gambian 
economy to the brink of collapse in 1985.  The economic problems were so severe 
that the IMF and other donors refused to continue providing assistance to the 
country until a broad and comprehensive Economic Recovery Programme (ERP) 
was implemented in every sector. According to former-President Sir Dawda 
Jawara: 
  
The government was obliged to consider and adopt the ERP, which was to 
help (the) development efforts of the country and was quite successful 
despite its difficulty.  The ERP was approached and adopted as a whole 
and comprehensively despite rough conditionality 40  (Interview Jawara 
2013) 
 
The conditions of the ERP were the devaluation of the dalasi by 25% to boost 
exports, the revitalization of agriculture through changes in pricing policies, the 
promotion of tourism and fisheries, a reduction in the size of the civil service, an 
improvement in the performance of the parastatal sector, a cut in the budget deficit, 
and a reorientation of the public investment programmes in exchange for a 
rescheduling and refinancing of the country’s external debt (Perfect 2016; 128-9). 
According to Jawara, the roughest conditionality in the ERP was freezing civil 
servants’ wages as well as reducing the overall size of the civil service. This meant 
that some people in the Gambian Gambian civil servants lost their jobs though I do 
not have any data on the absolute numbers. Nevertheless, the Ministry of Finance 
developed and implemented the ERP and reformed every economic sector in the 
country (Radelet 1992). Subsequently, the Gambian economy grew approximately 
12 percent from 1985-88. The success of this neo-liberal structural adjustment 
programme is perhaps surprising given the general assumption in the development 
studies literature that such changes are counter-productive (Easterly 2003). 
However, the success of this programme in The Gambia was attributed to it being 
                                                                
40 Interview was conducted with the former President Jawara at his residence in Fajara, The Gambia on 
Friday 1st March 2013. 
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designed specifically for the country context and receiving little objection from the 
public when it being implemented (Radelet 1992). 
  
By 1994, the economy was recovering from the previous economic problems, 
however, the military coup created additional challenges for the economy.  Major 
donors, like the British, stopped aid to the country until a democratic government 
was restored. After the coup, Jammeh and his party lacked their own economic 
programme and vision, according to Gambian academic Abdoulaye Saine (2009). 
But in 1996, they introduced a neoliberal economic policy called the Vision 2020, 
which aims to transform The Gambia into a middle-income country that builds on a 
well-trained human resource base through a private sector led development 
strategy.  According to the Vision 2020 strategy document, the government aims to 
enhance the contributions of the service sector (which constitutes 50% of the 
economy’s output) by boosting the financial services, international trade and 
tourism41 in the country. However, despite having this detailed plan in place, the 
recent economic performance of the country indicates that it is not yet close to 
middle-income criteria partly because the country lacks the financial and skilled 
human resources to implement the programmes effectively. 
Notwithstanding, the main drivers of the Gambian economy have been the 
agricultural and tourism sectors.  According to the Gambia National Agriculture 
Investment Plan (2011-2015), the agricultural sector employs 75 percent of the 
country’s population, and women make up more than 50% of the labour force 
(IFAD 2016).  However, the problems that affect the agricultural sector include the 
increasingly erratic rainfall, seawater intrusion into cultivable lands, food price 
volatility, and financial crises42 (IFAD 2016; 1).  Nevertheless, the future potential of 
the agricultural sector in relation to national development seems positive because 
the sector is the largest employer, and it meets 50 percent of the national food 
requirements.  Additionally, the agricultural sector contributes 25 percent of the 
GDP and shares the country’s total exports of 70 percent, thus constituting a 
substantial part of The Gambia’s foreign exchange earnings (Gambia National 
Agriculture Investment Plan (2011-2015). Furthermore, small-scale farmers appear 
to be central to the farming system and pivotal in increasing Agriculture Gross 
Domestic Product (AGDP). They are likely to produce ‘development’ over the 
medium and long term because they cultivate most of the lowland rice and 
horticulture as well as engage in processing and marketing of agricultural products. 
According to a Gambian agricultural expert, even though groundnut production has 
                                                                
41 http://statehouse.gov.gm/vision-2020-part-1-long-term-objectives/ 
42 https://www.ifad.org/documents/10180/e12761e1-8d18-4ab2-82df-5ddf5cacb305 
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significantly declined over the year, there is scope to increase productivity, as it is 
cultivated in every district in the country and quite adaptable to the agro-ecology of 
The Gambia.  However, this expert also recognized the need to diversify the crop 
production base in the country by growing and exporting rice, onions, soybeans 
and sugarcane.  
The tourism sector is one of the biggest sources of foreign exchange in the country 
(Wolfgang et al. 2014). However, tourism has attracted a significant number of 
foreign men and women to the country to engage in paedophilia and other sexual 
activities (Brown 1992, UNICEF Study on Sexual Abuse and Exploitation of 
Children in The Gambia 2003, Chant and Evans 2010).  The Gambia has a 
reputation for being ‘hotspot’ for sex tourism, which places the government in a 
difficult position of wanting to stop the exploitation of local Gambians on the one 
hand but also needing the revenue from tourism on the other. 
 
The other sectors which have recently been experiencing significant growth have 
been the telecommunication and banking sectors, largely because of investments 
by Nigerian banks and Lebanese telecommunication companies.  However, the 
concerns associated with these new economic contributors are exposure to money 
laundering.  For example, Prime Bank (Gambia) Limited was implicated in 
laundering  $200 million a month in drug proceeds from cocaine traffickers, which 
led to the bank’s liquidation in January 2013 (Corr and Vadsaria 2013).  
However, despite the many challenges facing the Gambian economy, there has 
been some growth since 2000 (see graph below).  This is driven mainly by good 
performance in the agricultural sector43.  But the Gambian people are not enjoying 
the benefits of the growing economy because poverty continues to increase every 
year.  Perhaps, part of the reason the economic benefits are not reaching the 
grassroots is because the additional income is being used to service high debts. 
For example, in 2006 the country repaid 133.1 percent of GDP to service its 
external debt.  Also in 2006, the country qualified for Heavily Indebted Poor 
Country (HIPC) debt relief, and after that remission of debt, repayments were 
reduced to around 40% of GDP. This has now risen to around 50% of GDP in 2015 
(Central Bank of the Gambia). Also, at the end of 2012, the debt repayments were 
roughly 111.5 percent of exports plus remittances (Nord et al. 2013; 2), which 
shows that government’s debts are increasing faster than the national economy is 
                                                                
43http://www.youthpolicy.org/library/wpcontent/uploads/library/2012_African_Economic_Outlook_Gambi
a_Eng.pdf 
 93 
growing.  Therefore, spending on development is less and dependence on aid and 
loans is more44. 
Figure 6: The GDP Growth (annual %) of The Gambia 
 
Source: The World Bank – World databank45   
 
3.3 The Migratory History and Features of The Gambian Diaspora and their 
Associations 
 
The difficulty of obtaining data on the history of migration of Gambians to Western 
countries particularly during the pre-independence period means that the thesis 
has had to focus on the migration of Gambians to Western countries in the post-
independence period where there is some data available though this is limited.  In 
2010, it was estimated that approximately 65,000 Gambians live abroad, 
constituting around 4 percent of the population (Kebbeh 2013). This has now risen 
to approximately 89,634 Gambians living abroad in 2015 (IOM 2015). The majority 
of Gambians to migrate to Spain (to work on farms) and other countries in Europe, 
the US and Africa, according to figure 7 According to Gambian economist C Omar 
Kebbeh (2013), the emigration trends of contemporary Gambians show that from 
the 1960s Gambians migrated largely to the UK for studies and work.  Then there 
was a shift in the late 1980s as Gambians began migrating to North America in 
search of work and better living conditions because the Gambian economy was 
performing poorly and there were inadequate services at ‘home’ and because the 
USA provided more opportunities than the UK. The third push factor came in 1994 
when the country experienced a military coup d’état, which caused many 
                                                                
44 UNDP Global Partnership for Effective Development Co-operation (2014) Country Policy Brief 
http://www.undp.org/content/dam/gambia/docs/GMB_UNDP_Gambia_Policy_Brief.pdf 
45http://databank.worldbank.org/data/reports.aspx?Code=NY.GDP.MKTP.KD.ZG&id=af3ce82b&report_
name=Popular_indicators&populartype=series&ispopular=y 
 94 
Gambians to migrate to the UK and other Europeans countries as asylum seekers.  
And more recently, many young Gambians are embarking on the ‘backway’ 
migration journey on boats to the Mediterranean.  According to Eurostat figure, 
Gambian asylum applications in EU countries in 2015 are 12,395, rising from 960 
in 2008.  This has prompted receiving EU countries to tighten their immigration 
policies to Gambians.  However, this has not stopped many young Gambian men 
and women from migrating to Europe, illegally, in search of better opportunities 
(Kebbeh, 2013). 
 
One of the benefits of the migration of Gambians is that they are sending 
remittance to help their families and simultaneously furnishing the economy. As 
outlined in some of the literature, migrant remittances help to alleviate household 
poverty, fund town/village developments, contribute to a country’s GDP as well as 
brings foreign exchange into a country (Kuznetsov and Sabel 2006, Skeldon 2009, 
de Haas 2012, Newland 2011, 2013). However, the unfortunate aspect of this is 
that the Gambian government is not able to effectively tap into migrant resources 
to enhance development in socially productive ways because the relationship 
between the government and a proportion of Gambians abroad is fraught. 
  
Figure 7: The distribution of Gambian emigrants by destination country, 2010  
 
Source: The World Bank, 2010. Global Bilateral Migration 
 
The Gambian UK and US Diaspora  
 
The Gambian diaspora in the UK and the US comprise of a heterogeneous group 
of people. According to the figure 7, there were approximately 5,198 registered 
Gambians living across the UK and 7,472 in the US in 2010. However, there are 
also a significant number of unregistered Gambians living in these countries.  The 
Gambian diaspora is composed of first, second and even third generation migrants 
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and the empirical evidence from this research suggests that the majority of first 
generation Gambians in the diaspora have maintained links to the country through 
their families and/or properties.  This is perhaps because they are a new diaspora 
that they migrated out of the country not too long ago. The second and third 
generation seem to follow the footsteps of the first generation in maintaining their 
links to the country through the same channels. Their engagement is demonstrated 
through the remittances they send and trips they make to their country of heritage. 
 
The Gambian diaspora also form hometown associations through which they 
engage in development projects, such as building hospitals, sending medical 
supplies and equipment to local hospitals, donating books to school libraries, and 
offering scholarships to students, details of which are discussed in chapter 5.  The 
empirical evidence shows that a significant number of Gambians in the diaspora 
also put great efforts into integrating into their host societies, whilst simultaneously 
pushing their children to retain their emotional links to the country.  For example, 
the Gambian cultural week is held in London every summer and it brings together 
Gambians around the UK and other in European countries. During this event in 
2013, I spoke to many Gambian parents who claimed to have attended for the 
purpose of re-establishing old friendships and to strengthen unity within the 
Gambian community, as they are “all one Gambia”.  The informants also said they 
use this event as an opportunity to teach their children about Gambian culture.  
The table below provides a typology of Gambians living in the UK and the US.  
These categories are not fixed as the members move from one category to 
another.  
 
Table 5: Typologies of the Gambian diaspora in the UK and US 
Diaspora Descriptions  
Students These groups study in UK and US 
colleges and universities.  They migrate 
to the UK with student visas and in 
some cases stay and find jobs. Their 
migration is usually facilitated by 
academic or professional scholarships 
or privately funded by their families 
(parents).   
Skilled and professional diaspora These groups have acquired higher 
education qualifications from abroad 
and they work in reputable institutions in 
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areas such as higher education, 
medicine, legal services, or engineers.  
They tend to keep links with the Gambia 
through family or extended family who 
they support.   
Unskilled These groups tend to have limited 
academic qualifications unlikely to be 
beyond- high school level and they find 
work in the service sectors, such as 
supermarkets, security, and cleaners 
and care workers. They entered the UK 
and US usually with holiday visas and 
overstayed. To gain the correct 
immigration status, they married a 
citizen of their host country and have 
children. These groups also maintain 
their links to the country through family 
and friends and they often send 
remittances ‘home’.  Arguably, the 
unskilled Gambians in the diaspora tend 
to originate from the rural areas and 
have been exposed to extreme poverty, 
which has affected their education. 
Political exile diaspora The older generations in these groups 
tend to come from the educated elite 
class, which is not the same for the 
younger generation of exiled Gambian 
diasporas.  Though they left the country 
for fear of their safety, they still maintain 
their links to the country and send 
remittances.  
Illegal diasporas These groups tend to not have the 
correct immigration status to remain in 
the UK or US because either they have 
overstayed their visa period or they 
entered the UK or US using someone 
else’s travel documents. However, they 
tend to find jobs that pay cash in hand 
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or they borrow work documents like a 
National Insurance number from friends 
or family in order to work.  This group 
also has the responsibility of caring for 
their families in The Gambia, thus they 
engaged in various income-generating 
activities (both legal and illegal) to send 
money ‘home’.  However, as their target 
is to obtain the correct immigration 
status, most would get married to 
nationals and have children to secure 
their stay in their host countries. 
Second and third generations  These groups are born in the UK or US 
to migrant parents, but have remained 
rooted in their host countries, and have 
UK or US citizenship. However, they 
tend to visit the country on holiday and 
establish their own links and network of 
friends 
Business diaspora  These groups travel between The 
Gambia and their host countries.  They 
divide their time between ‘home’ and 
host country because they tend to have 
homes and families in both.  They are 
not always highly educated but often 
highly skilled as they juggle their 
businesses in both places. 
Source: Identified by Sainabou Taal 
 
Gambian Diaspora Associations in the UK 
 
There were approximately 15 Gambian associations across the UK in 2013 (see 
appendix 2 for a list). Most of these associations were established when a member 
of the community passed away and people came together to raise funds to 
repatriate the deceased back to The Gambia. These hometown associations have 
varied numbers of registered members, ranging between 50 and 500. The 
interviews with the associations revealed only six of them were involved in 
development activities in The Gambia but they were infrequent.  This finding is 
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similar to Giles Mohan (2006) study of the Ghanaian diaspora in Milton Keynes, 
which revealed their development activities in Ghana were also not frequent. 
 
This research focused on the UK Gambian associations because they were more 
easily accessible. The interviews revealed that the association organize social and 
cultural activities to promote Gambian culture in their host countries and amongst 
the younger generation.  These associations also help members with immigration 
problems as well as those struggling to integrate into their host society.  These ten 
associations claimed to be apolitical and therefore did not provide space for 
political discussions; however, there are individuals in the associations who are 
involved in the political interventions of the Gambian diaspora at ‘home’.  
 
Some of the main challenges in the associations are building their memberships 
base and getting members to be active and pay membership fees.  Additionally, 
there is a great lack of trust and co-operation between the associations, which 
affects their ability to collaborate on events (these will be discussed in more detail 
in chapter 6).   Furthermore, the gender relations in these associations are such 
that the financial activities (including setting budgets and collecting membership 
fees) tend to be handled by the men, and the women are given domestic roles 
such as cooking and organizing refreshments at events. 
 
3.4 Conclusion 
 
This chapter demonstrates the many political, economic and developmental 
challenges in The Gambia, as well as the efforts made by the government to 
address them through some key policies and initiatives.  However, I argued that 
these challenges drive some Gambians to first migrate overseas and second 
intervene in the country through development and/or politics.  It is clear that the 
poverty and political conditions in the country drives the diaspora to intervene in 
homeland affairs.  For example, the current political situation in The Gambia has 
many people living in fear and unable to enjoy certain liberties, which has 
subsequently triggered some members of the Gambian diaspora to intervene in 
politics on their behalf.  And their most effective form of political intervention is 
exposing the activities of the government, in particular, human rights violations to 
key international donors in the hope that it would put pressure on the government 
to respect the rights of Gambians. The Gambian diaspora is able to mobilize 
transnationally and form opinions that are unfavourable to their ‘home’ government, 
with little personal risk in comparison to those on the ground.   
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In addition, the poor performing economy has also meant that a large proportion of 
people in The Gambia are relying on their family and friends in the diaspora for 
financial and material assistance. Thus, some members of the Gambian diaspora 
feel they have a right to intervene in homeland affairs because are they filling the 
socio-economic development gaps created or exacerbated by the Gambian 
government. 
However, the empirical findings also revealed that the relationship between the 
government and Gambians abroad was not always a difficult one.  According to 
former President Jawara: 
My government had a good relationship with the diaspora and was able to 
maintain it because the Gambian embassies kept in touch with the 
Gambian diaspora. When I was President, I would meet members of the 
diaspora on my travels and had direct contact with them.  And Government 
representatives always maintained the relationship.  
This shows there is hope for the country to move forward from the current 
stalemate created by the relationship breakdown between the current Gambian 
government and the diaspora.  By looking at how the previous government 
managed that relationship. Though this would be a difficult task because some 
people’s feelings towards Jammeh has drastically changed from when they 
believed he would rid the country of corruption to the seeing him grossly violate the 
rights of Gambians and mismanage the national resources.  On the other hand, it 
is also important to recognize that Jammeh is not responsible for all the 
development challenges in The Gambia. For example, there are other factors (pre-
Jammeh) that contributed to the economic challenges in the country.  For example, 
The Gambia inherited a single cash crop export economy of groundnuts from the 
colonialism, which gets affected by the climate and the world economy. And more 
important every government since independence has found it difficult to diversify 
the economy. Therefore, I argue that the effects of colonialism in The Gambia 
warrants further research because the findings show that Jammeh had to contend 
with economic issues beyond his control. 
Finally, as mentioned in the introduction and literature review chapters, this 
research aims to contribute to knowledge about the Gambian diaspora who have 
not received much research attention. However, this chapter has shown that the 
lack of data (both quantitative and qualitative) on the migration of Gambians has 
made it impossible to discuss the pre-independence migration history of Gambians 
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to Western countries. It has also made it difficult to determine the geography of the 
Gambian diaspora within the UK and US and the socio-economic characteristics of 
different groups from secondary sources. Therefore, there is scope for more 
research to further enhance knowledge about the Gambian diaspora in the UK and 
US and the impacts they have on development and politics in The Gambia. 
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Chapter 4:  
Embarking on a Research Journey 
 
4.1 Introduction 
 
In chapter 2 it was argued that there is a need for more empirical research on the 
roles played by small diasporas in development as well as in politics at ‘home’. In 
particular, groups like the Gambian diaspora who have not received research 
attention despite the significant amount of remittance they send ‘home’ and their 
increasing involvement in politics.  This chapter sets out the research design, 
methods, and data used in this study in its attempt to meet this empirical goal. This 
research is a multi-sited study of the Gambian diaspora in the UK and the US and 
Gambian citizens in the ‘home’ country. It uses purely qualitative data although 
some quantitative figures from secondary sources have also been incorporated. 
 
This chapter opens with descriptions of the puzzle that motivated my research and 
how my ideas evolved into a thesis.  This is followed by a discussion of my 
understanding of ‘methodology’ and my reasons for choosing a qualitative 
approach.  There is also a discussion of the key research questions, which 
organize the empirical research and from which the thesis design flows.  After that, 
the chapter turns to more practical matters such as giving an account of how 
interviewees were selected and how the triangulation of data was approached.  It 
then moves on to detailing the three-stages of fieldwork and data collection on 
which this thesis is based.  This chapter also discusses the data analysis process 
and the limitations of the research, which includes addressing the sensitive issues, 
risks, ethics, and questions about the researcher’s positionality.   
 
4.2 The Journey to this Research Project 
 
Growing up as part of the Gambian diaspora, I was inspired to research this group 
as an academic piece of work because I was intrigued by the intricacies of the 
relationship between the Gambian diaspora and ‘home’.  I understood the strong 
links the diaspora had with the people in The Gambia but I wanted to have a 
deeper understanding of how those links determine the activities of members of the 
Gambian diaspora who chose to get involved at ‘home’, what they did and why. 
 
Additionally, my own curiosity about life in The Gambia encouraged me to move 
there in 2010.  But after spending eighteen months living and working in the 
country for the national government and international development organisations.  
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It became clear to me that the country’s public and private sectors were suffering 
from the brain drain of highly skilled professionals.  The scale of this flow was 
captured in a World Bank report in 2010, which stated that 62% of the educated 
Gambian populace lived abroad and drew attention to the problematic 
development consequences. However, it was also clear to me that the financial 
contributions from the diaspora had a significant impact on alleviating household 
poverty and increasing consumptions at the household level. Thus, migration both 
undermined and sustained Gambian development and this paradox intrigued me. 
When I returned to the UK in 2012, I began conversing with members of the 
diaspora and found there were some frustrations about the practice of ‘politics’ in 
The Gambia. Yet these people remained in the diaspora and their capacity to 
intervene in politics from overseas seemed to be constrained even as they 
declared it to be a central goal. Again there was a paradox as the Gambian 
diaspora seemed to have leverage because of their resources and remittances, but 
they also seemed powerless to have any political impact at ‘home’. These 
contradictions seemed to merit further examination.  
 
Like any researcher, I had multiple choices (some conscious, some unconscious) 
about how my ideas, my data and my analysis relate to the process of research, 
the production of knowledge and, indeed, to the world itself.  But, before I could 
make any decisions about how I was going to design this research, I needed to 
gain some understanding around the philosophies of what research is.  Most 
textbook accounts of knowledge production organize these ideas along three axes: 
ontology (‘theories of being’), epistemology (theories of knowledge), and 
methodology (‘theories of method’).  Thinking about my research through this 
framework helped me to bring my beliefs and choices into the foreground (Greener 
2011).  Thus, I sought knowledge in the literature on qualitative research methods 
and found key questions posed by Guba and Lincoln (1994), very useful.  The 
questions that guided the planning process of this research were: 
 
• “What is reality like and, therefore, what is there that can be known about it?”  
• “What is the relationship between the knower and what can be known?” 
• “How can the would-be knower go about finding out whatever he or she believes 
can be known?” (108).    
 
These questions helped me to understand ideas in the different research 
paradigms (Blaikie 2010).  Additionally, I learned how different research 
approaches fit within the different answers to these questions.  The table below 
from Guba and Lincoln (1994) proved to be very useful in this process.  
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Table 6: Basic belief (metaphysics) of alternative research paradigms 
 Positivism Post-positivism Critical theory Constructivism 
Ontology reality is 
apprehendable
- this is known 
as naïve 
realism 
reality is 
apprehendable 
– based on  
approximation 
which makes it 
an imperfect 
reality- this is 
known as critical 
realism 
Reality is 
shaped by 
social, 
political, 
cultural, 
economic and 
gender 
values – this 
is known as 
historical 
realism 
Reality is locally 
and specifically 
constructed – 
this is known as 
relativism 
Epistemology The 
researcher 
and 
participants 
are 
independent 
and the 
researcher is 
capable of 
studying the 
participants 
without 
influencing it 
or being 
influenced by 
it- this is 
known as 
dualist and 
objectivist 
The researcher 
can approximate 
but will never 
fully know. Their 
findings are 
probably true 
but subject to 
falsification- this 
is known as 
modified dualist 
and objectivist 
The 
researcher 
and 
participants 
are assumed 
to be 
interactively 
linked with 
the values of 
the 
researcher 
inevitably 
influencing 
the findings – 
this is known 
as 
transactional 
and 
subjectivist 
The researcher 
and participants 
are assumed to 
be interactively 
linked and 
therefore findings 
are created as 
the investigation 
proceeds – this is 
known as 
transactional and 
subjectivist 
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Methodology Hypotheses 
are set and 
tested using 
mainly 
quantitative 
methods – but 
conditions of 
experiment 
must be 
controlled to 
avoid 
outcomes 
being 
improperly 
influenced– 
this is known 
as 
experimental 
and 
manipulative 
Hypotheses are 
falsified rather 
than verified – 
which may 
include 
qualitative 
methods – this 
is known as 
modified 
experimental/ 
manipulative 
Conversation 
between the 
researcher 
and 
participants 
must take 
place in a 
way that 
would 
transform any 
lack of 
knowledge 
and 
misunderstan
ding into 
informed 
consciousnes
s – this is 
known as 
dialogic and 
dialectical 
The relationship 
between 
the researcher 
and participant 
can be refined 
through 
mediation and 
translation of 
language – this is 
known as 
hermeneutical 
and dialectical 
Source: Guba and Lincoln, 1994; 109 
 
Ultimately, such tables invariably seem a bit simplistic and overly tidy in its 
categorization. However, I could empathize with elements of these paradigms that 
helped me to understand my own position, drawing particularly on post-positivist 
and critical realist traditions. On the one hand, I do feel that interviews and 
observation can guide researchers towards the possibility of re-presenting an 
already existing reality, but it is a representation that has to be understood as an 
interpretation of that reality. On the other hand, I am also drawn to the sense of 
knowledge production as a conversation or dialogue between the researcher and 
the object of their studies is more dynamic than a process of hypothesis testing. I 
hoped that the process of generating the data for this thesis was as consciously 
productive and elucidating for the people I encountered during my studies as it was 
for me. 
 
Once I had a better understanding of research methodologies, I began formulating 
my research questions.  During the process, I had to answer additional questions, 
like ‘if these are my questions, then what data do I need?’ and ‘if this is the data I 
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need then what methods do I use to generate that data?’  Through answering them, 
I came to the realisation that this would be a qualitative study because I needed 
rich descriptions and individual points of view, which arguably could only be gained 
using qualitative methods, like in-depth interviews and to a lesser extent, 
participant observation. These are the data acquisition methods, which give a 
deeper understanding of people’s behaviour and ideas. 
 
As stated in the introduction chapter, there are four research questions in this 
thesis and they are as follows: 
 
1. How, why and where does the diaspora contribute to development in The 
Gambia? 
2. How has the Gambian diaspora mobilized politically in the UK and US to 
intervene in politics in The Gambia? 
3. What is the response to these interventions in The Gambia? 
4. What are the wider implications of this study in understanding the 
relationship between development, migration, and politics in the Gambian 
context? 
 
The decision to use a qualitative methodology is based on recognizing my own 
assumption that it allows for an interpretive approach to the subject matter (Denzin 
and Lincoln, 2011).  “Interpretive methods of research starts from the position that 
our knowledge of reality, including the domain of human action, is a social 
construction by human actors…”  (Walsham 2006; 320).  Walsham defines ‘reality’ 
as how people make sense of the empirical world, thus is ‘reality’ a social 
construction.  Orlikowski and Baroudi (1991) argue, “that people create and 
associate their own subjective and intersubjective meanings as they interact with 
the world around them” (5).  Therefore, ‘reality’ also is shaped by people's social 
interactions. These interactions are different for everyone; it is possible to discern 
some general patterns and the search for these patterns are what underpin the 
ambitions of a qualitative research study.  As such, no single objective truth can be 
discovered from interpretive research and knowledge cannot be replicated or 
generalized.  Therefore, believing that ‘reality’ is subjective and socially 
constructed makes it difficult to discern if some of the claims made in the interviews 
are real or perceived. Thus, in this thesis I have treated claims made by the 
interviewees as perceptions or falsehoods where there is no concrete evidence to 
suggest that they are objective truths. However, this should not be seen as a 
disadvantage for this study as the aim is to understand the realities and 
perceptions of this heterogeneous group of people in order to identify patterns 
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about what motivates them to get involved with development/politics The Gambia. 
The authority in this study is drawn from the depth of engagement rather than 
through recourse to representative sampling and statistical hypothesis testing.  
 
4.3 Data Acquisition Methods 
 
 In-depth Interviews 
 
I chose to use in-depth interviews as one of the data acquisition methods in this 
research because it allowed me to embed myself in the milieu of the groups and 
build relationships that would enable me to obtain rich and descriptive information 
from the Gambian diaspora and those on the ground. The interviews allowed me to 
“get to grips with the contexts and contents of different people’s everyday social, 
cultural, political and economic lives” (Crang and Cook 2007; 60).  This was 
extremely useful for this research because I gained insight into how the 
interviewees embody certain practices, feelings, and perspectives on the subject 
matter (Crang and Cook 2007 and Hitchings 2012). For example, the practice of 
sending money ‘home’, brought feelings of pride and happiness for the majority of 
interviewees (the diaspora and recipients), whose perceive this as a responsibility. 
 
In general, the interviews I conducted in the field went well and I was able to obtain 
useful insight on the topics that were discussed.  However, I had two difficult 
interviews, which resulted in me having to re-evaluate and adjust my interviewing 
techniques and approach.  For example, the first challenging interview was 
conducted on the 25th July 2014 at a beachside bar with a non-Gambian man, who 
has lived in the country for a significant number of years, married a Gambian 
woman and adopted a Gambian child.  This man (interviewee 56) was part of a 
Listserv called “Community of Gambianist scholars” of which I am also a member.  
I noticed his contributions to the group were often controversial and thus I believed 
he would be an interesting person to interview because it seemed he had a lot to 
say about different aspects of Gambian society and people. I assumed that as a 
non-Gambians he would be open to speak to me about politics.  However, this 
assumption was entirely incorrect as the interview was a complete failure.  It was 
uncomfortable for both the interviewee and I because he became rude and 
aggressive when I brought up the topic of politics.  The interviewee refused to be 
recorded or give consent or answer my questions.  They also tried to threaten me 
indirectly, by insisting that I give them the names of my primary and secondary 
supervisors, indicating that they were going to get in contact with them to report me.  
I learned from this interview that I needed to build relationships with all my 
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interviewees first and recognize that fear of political repression was as much a 
factor for non-Gambians living in the country as the Gambians. This made me think 
about the question of ethics and consent, thus I could not use the data I collected 
from this interviewee. 
 
The other challenging interview was with a Gambian religious Imam in the US who 
had fled from political persecution.  This interview was also unsuccessful because I 
began by asking him to explain his reasons for leaving the country, which was 
clearly a sensitive issue.  The interviewee immediately got uncomfortable and 
defensive, and even though he did not end the interview immediately, he rushed 
through his answers and did not give me a chance to probe.  This was another 
error on my part because I went into this interview again assuming I knew this 
interviewees’ story because I had been following it online.  This annoyed the 
interviewee because they wanted to tell me their own story. They explained that 
they did not like how I started the interview and they would have preferred I asked 
them to give their background and not go straight into why they left the country. I 
realized this was an amateur mistake of a young researcher and thus had to 
accept that the information I was going to gather from this interview may not be 
helpful.  However, I had the opportunity to meet this interviewee in person at the 
forum in New York and was able to redeem myself as a genuine researcher by 
sharing my findings and participating in discussions with the wider group. 
 
Both interviews were a huge learning experience because I made mistakes that 
any new researcher would make.  I went into the interviews with too many 
assumptions and did not invest time in building a relationship with the interviewees 
and gaining their trust.  In hindsight, I would have received better outcomes from 
the first difficult interview if I had conducted the interview over the course of several 
separate occasions as well as waited to ask the more sensitive questions later. 
 
I also learned from the interviews that the interviewees responded better if they 
knew we had people in common.  Thus, before each interview, I would find out the 
connections I had with the interviewees and I would use that to create some 
familiarity between the interviewees and myself.  For example, realising that family 
or personal connections are extremely important to Gambians, I would find out if I 
knew their children or other close relatives and I would start the interview by asking 
about that person and telling the interviewee my relationship with them.  This 
proved to be very useful and it made the interviewees more open in talking to me.  
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Participant Observation 
 
Participant observation allows researchers to capture data that would otherwise be 
missed out in statistical studies (Phillips and Johns 2012).  According to Davies 
(2008), the quality of data from participant observation is judged in terms of its 
reliability, validity, and generalization. The reliability relates to the repeatability of 
research findings and their accessibility to other researchers and the validity refers 
to the ‘authority’ and correctness of the findings.  However, generalization is more 
complicated as researchers are often reluctant to make claims about 
generalizability beyond their immediate locale (95).  The purpose of using 
participant observation in this research is to learn about the social realities of the 
diaspora and people in The Gambia.  Participant observation is also about building 
up the trust between the researcher and the diaspora in the hope of increasing 
openness and thoughtfulness in interviews. This method is considered less artificial 
than interviews because the researcher’s presence is less formal and less visible 
(see discussion of positionality later) so, the ambition was that participant 
observation gives a better insight into the workings of the diaspora as if the 
researcher was not there.  
 
During my time in The Gambia, I attended the July 22nd celebrations at the 
national stadium in October 2014. The celebrations were in honour of the 22nd 
July 1994 military coup, which the government and their supporters have termed 
‘the revolution’.  I attended this event to observe, take pictures, and speak to 
supporters of the government.  Whilst making my way into the stadium, I saw 
crowds of people, (young/ old, men/women, boys/ girls) singing, and dancing.  The 
majority of them were wearing green (the government party colour) and the elderly 
women wore traditional outfits made with material that had President Jammeh’s 
face printed on it.  There was a high presence of armed paramilitary officers and 
the atmosphere felt intimidating even though people appeared celebratory.  I 
approached a group of young girls and boys (the green boys and girls) and asked if 
I could take photographs of them, but they absolutely refused.  This made me 
cautious about my presence and whom I spoke to. 
 
In the stadium, the people were clearly tired and dehydrated from sitting under the 
hot sun but they continued to cheer and clap for every official vehicle that entered 
the stadium.  The heat was so extreme that members of the military band were 
fainting and being taken away by paramedics, yet people seemed undeterred to 
show their loyalty to the president, whom I learnt arrived five hours late.  I left the 
stadium after two hours when I began feeling unwell from the heat. 
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What I learned from doing participant observation at this event was that it is 
important to blend in, especially in uncertain situations and to be prepared (for 
example, I should've taken water to drink and wore sunglasses and a hat so I 
could've stayed until the end of the event or at least to see President Jammeh 
arrive). Though people appeared happy, I did not feel safe to tell them that I was a 
researcher, because I did not want to create suspicion. Thus, I joined in with the 
crowd to cheer and clap for the officials entering the stadium.  However, because 
of this, the people who sat beside me were open in talking about why they support 
the regime, and I was able to turn this information into interview questions for the 
politically involved Gambians in the diaspora.   
 
Textual Material 
 
This research also acquired secondary data from textual material, including 
newspapers, reports from the British colonial Administration, online newspapers, 
blogs, Facebook posts, listserv group (Community of Gambianist scholars) 
Gambian, group chats on mobile applications such as Viber and WhatsApp, 
Government of The Gambia reports, studies, surveys and policies, and report from 
various UN agencies, IOM, EU, IFAD, World Bank, Amnesty International and 
Human Rights Watch.  
 
Whilst in The Gambia, I frequently visited the national archives located in the 
capital city of Banjul, to look through the colonial reports and newspapers. My 
original intention was to gather information about the political, development and 
migration history of the country, in order to address research question four as well 
as have data for chapter 3.  The archival materials gave details of the problems of 
underdevelopment and poverty since colonial times and possibly before.  The 
newspaper articles dated back from independence to the early 2000s, and they 
confirmed some of the claims made by interviewees (for example in relation to 
President Jammeh‘s political strategies).  For example, in the articles published 
directly after the 1994 coup d’état, Jammeh promised that the country would not be 
a dictatorship because he would improve leadership, governance and reforms to 
the electoral commission. These articles helped me to capture the mood at that 
time and to understand the disappointment of those who argued in interviews that 
Jammeh had gone back on his words.  
 
In addition, there was many useful data collected from the Internet (Ó Dochartaigh 
2012) for this research. The Internet is believed to be a powerful and efficient tool 
for researching (Olalude 2007). However, I learned that it was necessary to 
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evaluate Internet sources, because as Rubin et al. (2009) asserts, “along with 
much information and websites of top quality, there is enough propaganda, 
disinformation and misinformation on the Internet that it pays to develop the 
suspicious side of your nature” (86). For example, I found with some of the 
information from the blogs, Facebook posts and diaspora-owned newspapers, 
which seemed questionable.  Thus, it took more time than expected to fact check, 
as I had to apply the CARS checklist46  created by Robert Harris and Andrew 
Spinks in 2007, to determine if the data was accurate or simply speculative.   
 
I also wanted to understand why some information was presented in certain ways 
and in what context some arguments were being made online.  This required 
getting information about the contributors themselves, which was at times 
challenging especially on Facebook, which allows people to maintain their 
anonymity and selective engagement.   This was different to listserv group (where 
membership is more effectively limited) as the contributors on this forums want to 
be known. This certainly shaped different types of political discussion because on 
Facebook the language was much more aggressive and people used profanities 
(see p. 206).  Whereas, the language used in the listserv group was more 
professional and academic.  The contributors also made effort to provide data and 
evidence to support their claims.  There was also a lack of trust from people on 
Facebook, for example, I contacted many Gambian based on their posts, but I 
hardly received any responses to my messages. However, on one occasion, I saw 
an interesting comment accusing members of the Gambian diaspora of being 
‘internet warriors’, who are too cowardice to identify themselves because they 
know they are wrong for tarnishing the country’s image.  I immediately sent a 
message to this person, explaining that I was a researcher and would like to speak 
to them about their post.  The person replied to my message simply saying, “I don’t 
trust you.”  
 
4.4 Sampling 
 
The majority of interviewees were referred by a group of initial key contacts.  The 
advantage of using this method was that the interviewees were more open to 
talking to me because they had close relationships with the people who introduced 
me to them.  And within the Gambian culture, relationships are easier to build when 
there are mutual connections.  For example, during an interview with a key contact 
in London, I mentioned that I wanted to interview one of the key players in the 
Gambian political diaspora in the US.  My contact informed me that this person 
                                                                
46 Credibility, Accuracy, Reasonableness, Support http://www.virtualsalt.com/evalu8it.htm 
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was going to be in the UK the following week and would be staying at their house.  
They agreed to introduce me to them and later that week confirmed that the person 
had agreed to take part in the research and that I could go to their house for the 
interview.  During the interview, I established a relationship with this interviewee 
from the US who later became a valuable contact.  They introduced me to 
colleagues in the diaspora civil society groups in the US and invited me to attend 
the forum in New York, where I was able to make further connections.  
 
However, the disadvantage of using this method to recruit participants was that it 
did not allow me to get a diverse sample of people, as my contacts were referring 
me to people who had similar views to them.  Realizing the need to capture the 
points of views of pro-government in this research, in particular, I went on social 
media (Facebook) and searched for President Jammeh supporters to interview.  
 
However, I was only able to interview five women in the Gambian diaspora and 
eight women in The Gambia, out of the 82 interviews I had conducted.  Though I 
was not aiming to get a representative sample for statistical purposes, this was 
frustrating considering that women make over 50% of the Gambian population and 
a similar proportion of the diaspora. However, when I made contact with possible 
female participants, they either did not respond to my messages or claimed to be 
too busy to take part in the research.  I even proceeded to send the interview 
questions via e-mails, which were not returned despite sending a number of 
reminders.  It was extremely difficult getting Gambian women to take part in the 
research and though I cannot be certain why the majority of women I contacted did 
not want to be involved. I can perhaps attribute it to a number of possible reasons 
based on my observations and subjective experiences with other Gambian women.  
The first, possible reason could be the lack of time and availability as some 
participants stated. This is understandable because Gambian women in the 
diaspora and at ‘home’ work outside and inside of the home to generate income as 
well as raise their children (as discussed in chapter 3) with little assistance from the 
men. Thus, perhaps they were discouraged after reading on the research 
information sheet that interviews would take one hour. Another possible reason 
could be that perhaps Gambian women preferred to keep their political opinions 
and development contributions private (Krook and Childs 2010, Mügge 2013), this 
is partly because political discussions in The Gambia and the diaspora are 
dominated by the men (see p. 200).  And the last possible reason could be that the 
women were not comfortable talking to me the reason being young and unmarried.  
I came to this last conclusion after living in The Gambia and witnessing how 
sceptical Gambian women are of other women, particularly those that are young 
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and unmarried. This last claim is not easy to verify as it is based on my own 
subjective perspective of being among other Gambian women.  However, the 
consequence of not having more female voices in this research is that it has 
missed out on capturing some gender perspectives that the male interviewees 
would not have considered.    
 
4.5 Triangulation 
 
During the course of the fieldwork, I compared the findings from the different 
methods and triangulated them.  In experimental science, ‘triangulation’ refers to 
the process of independent research projects answering the same questions. 
Where these independent processes reach the same answer (ideally via different 
methods), the conclusions are thought to have more validity. For example, if two 
different medical laboratories test a drug independently and both conclude it is 
beneficial then we are more likely to believe them than if there is only one test. Like 
most qualitative social science research, this project can only loosely be described 
as ‘experimental’ when compared to medical science.  Whilst there are many 
‘variables’, it is not possible to speak clearly of dependent and independent 
variables let alone to control confounding variables. In this context, triangulation 
takes on a different character, for example, claims made in interviews were 
supported by data from observations and textual material. However, although this 
is not ‘triangulation’ in a classic scientific sense (because our routes to answering 
these questions are not independent) this should, at least, provide some assurance 
of the quality of the data.  
 
Therefore, I used different methods to answer different parts of the research 
questions and I tested the data from one method with the other.  For example, in 
addressing research question 1, I observed a group of students at the University of 
The Gambia talking about their tuitions fees and overheard one of them explain 
how their older brother in the UK is sponsoring them.  Therefore, I created an 
interview question, which asked the students in the group interviews about the 
financial support they or their families were receiving from relatives in the diaspora. 
I found that over half of the students were receiving money from relatives abroad 
and some of that money was going towards their tuition fees.  
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4.6 Answering the research questions 
 
Table 7: Answering the research questions 
Research 
questions 
Sources 
1  Interviews: members of the Gambian diaspora in the UK and US, 
diaspora association heads, academics, economists, civil servants, 
students and private sector business owners and in The Gambia. 
 Textual materials: World Bank reports and statistics from the 
databank, UN reports, Government reports and studies, the Gambian 
constitution, Central Bank of The Gambia data, newspaper articles, 
journal articles and books 
 Visual material: photographs and YouTube video clips 
2  Interviews: members of the UK and US Gambian diaspora, those that 
are politically engaged and those who are not. Academics, 
economists, students and private sector business owners in The 
Gambia 
 Participant observation: attended meetings, forums and symposiums 
organized by the civil society groups in the UK and US 
 Textual materials: blogs, Facebook posts, groups chats on Viber, 
diaspora online newspapers, reports from human rights 
organizations, UN and EU, UK and US government reports on The 
Gambia, journal articles and books 
 Visual materials: photographs and YouTube video clips 
3  Interviews: members of the UK and US diaspora civil society groups, 
and those who are not politically engaged and the Gambian 
opposition political parties 
 Participant observation: July 22nd celebrations In The Gambia, civil 
society symposiums in London and civil society forum in New York 
 Textual material: online newspapers, blogs, Facebook posts, groups 
chats on Viber, Whatsapp chats, reports from human rights 
organizations, journal articles, books and UN reports 
 Visual materials: photographs 
4  Interviews: members of the Gambian diaspora in the UK and US, 
diaspora association heads, academics, economists, civil servants, 
students and private sector business owners and opposition political 
parties in The Gambia. 
 Textual materials: books, journal articles, blogs, chats on Whatsapp, 
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newspaper articles and archival reports 
 Visual materials: photographs 
Source: Assembled by Sainabou Taal 
4.7 Fieldwork 
 
The practical design and execution of my research were completed in three stages 
from July 2014 to September 2015.  However, before starting fieldwork officially, I 
conducted a pilot study in The Gambia for one week in February 2013, where I 
interviewed the former vice-chancellor of the University of The Gambia and former 
the President of The Gambia at his home in Fajara.  I was able to gain access to 
the vice chancellor because I already had a relationship with him.  However, a 
family member facilitated the interview with former President Sir Dawda Jawara via 
one of his sons. The purpose of this pilot was to determine if there was a story to 
be told and whether my ideas could turn into a PhD research.  However, these 
interviews did not fully help me to answer these questions and therefore, upon my 
arrival in London, I made contact with Gambian diaspora associations in the UK, 
political activists and began attending events. 
 
I identified one Gambian diaspora association in the UK and made contact with 
their Secretary, who agreed to meet me in Stratford (Westfield).  I explained to 
them about my research and the stage I was in (pre-upgrade), as well as the 
information I required.  I also assured them that data I collected would be 
anonymous before they gave their consent to be interviewed.  After the interview, 
they agreed to send me the contact details of the other Gambian diaspora 
associations in the UK and out of the 15 associations, I approached I was able to 
interview 10.  This exercise took place from mid- February to end – April 2013.   
 
Following on from this, I went on Facebook and sent friend requests to a number of 
people who were openly involved in the political activism.  In doing so, I was able 
to make contact and build a relationship with two key people in the Gambian 
political diaspora groups in the UK, who invited me to their events and introduced 
me to individuals that were also politically involved.  I attended my first political 
event in London in August 2013, where I conducted observations and identified 
more people to take part in this research. 
The multi-sited study officially began in The Gambia in July 2014 and ran to 
December 2014 (6 months). I collected data from interviews (with consent), 
conducted participant observation, took photographs and video recordings, and 
gathered newspapers articles and archival materials. I returned to London and 
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began organizing and analysing my data until the end of February 2015.  Then in 
March 2015, I entered the second stage of fieldwork, which involved interviewing 
(with consent) Gambians in the UK and US, conducting observations at political 
events organized by the diaspora civil society groups and engaging in web-based 
research.  This ended in June 2015 (4 months) and I proceeded to organize and 
analyse the data until early August 2015.  Then in September 2015, I began the 
third stage of my fieldwork, when I travelled to New York for one week to attend a 
civil society forum organized by one of the Gambian diaspora civil society groups.  
This event was for two days and the data I collected was analysed and used in the 
research. 
 
First Stage of Fieldwork in The Gambia 
 
I arrived in The Gambia in the second week of July 2014 during the Ramadan 
(month of fasting), which was not a good time to begin collecting data, as things 
were slow and I was advised by a family member to wait until after the Ramadan to 
start approaching people.  Thus, after the fasting was over, I put together a list of 
people I wanted to interview including civil servants, economists, students, 
academics, and political opposition party members.  With the help of a family 
member who is well placed in Gambian society, I was able to identify people 
working in these roles.  However, before conducting the interviews, I obtained a 
research permit from the National Centre for Arts and Culture in Banjul.   
 
By the end of the fieldwork in The Gambia, I conducted 24 semi-formal interviews 
with 52 participants in total, each interview lasting between 1 to 4 hours.  The 
interviewees gave consent verbally because some were worried that the consent 
form could be traced back to them if they signed it.  Thus, realizing that this could 
be an issue, I informed my supervisor and was advised that I could accept verbal 
consent. The level of formality adopted during the interviews depended on the 
environment where the interviews took place. For example, the majority of the 
interviews were done at the interviewees’ places of work or in their homes.  
However, I found that I had to maintain a certain degree of formality during all the 
interviews because the interviewees responded well to it. 
 
The interviews helped me to answer all four-research questions as well as unveiled 
some interesting information that I had no previous knowledge it existed.  For 
example, an interviewee who worked for the previous government until 1994 
informed me that there was an agreement in place to establish a university in The 
Gambia at that time of the coup. However, many people in the country do not know 
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this because the government has led them to believe that the idea came from 
President Jammeh himself. Consequently, the population associates this key 
national developmental contribution to President Jammeh. 
  
Furthermore, whilst in The Gambia, I had the opportunity to attend some social 
gatherings, where I would engage with people on different levels.  At family 
gatherings, I would bring up the topic of the diaspora and listen to what people had 
to say. These informal discussions were useful because people did not see me as 
a researcher (even though I made it no secret that I was doing a PhD) and thus 
they spoke freely. For example, during a birthday lunch for a family member at a 
local restaurant, I was having general conversations with some of the guests whilst 
the waitress was bringing out our food.  I noticed one guest take out his mobile 
phone and take pictures of his food. Then he voluntarily said, “I take pictures of 
food and beautiful places to upset Pa Nderry at Freedom.”  Pa Nderry owns one of 
the diaspora newspapers and radio stations and he is extremely critical of the 
government.  This sparked a conversation about the politically involved diaspora, 
and the impression I got from this group was that they were against the diaspora 
intervening in politics from the outside.  
 
Second Stage of Fieldwork in London 
 
The second stage of fieldwork in London commenced in March 2015 and I used a 
similar process of seeking help from family members to get access to potential 
participants. I also relied heavily on social media platforms like Facebook, blogs, 
and listserv group and diaspora online newspapers, like Freedom, Kibaaro, and 
Gainako to identify participants.  From this, I created a list of people I wanted to 
interview and began making contact with them in mid-March 2015.  I sent e-mails 
and messages on Facebook and where possible, made telephone calls.  The 
majority of the interviews were conducted over the telephone because of the 
location of the participants was not easily accessible (a significant number of the 
lived in the US or across the UK) due to cost factors. However, few interviews were 
conducted on Skype and face-to-face.  The interviews lasted between 1 to 3 hours 
and consent was given verbally because some people shared the same concerns 
as those in The Gambia. After each interview, I asked the interviewee if they knew 
people that would be willing to take part in the research and by doing this; I was 
able to interview 49 Gambians living in the UK and the US.  This number consisted 
of people that are politically involved and those that are not, but were politically 
aware. As well as a mixture of young, old, male, female, and highly skilled (achieve 
tertiary level education) and skilled (technical training) members of the Gambian 
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diaspora.  The interviewees were mainly with first generation diasporans meaning 
that they born and raised in The Gambia and only migrated to the UK and US 
within the past twenty-five to thirty years. The interviewee also worked in different 
fields such as academia, journalism, finance, NGOs, and services sector.  
 
I attended political meetings organized by the Gambian diaspora and occasionally, 
I would be asked to make a statement about my research.  Thus, at one of the 
political events, I decided to share some research findings from my fieldwork in 
The Gambia.  These findings were quite controversial and against some of the 
arguments made by the diaspora. For example, I informed the group that some 
people in The Gambia felt political change could only be achieved from inside the 
country and from the outside. In essence, they were saying they did not believe the 
Gambian diaspora could effect political change in The Gambia from outside the 
country. However, the response was surprising because the most participants 
agreed with this statement, and seemed to have a similar perspective to Gambians 
on the ground regarding the lack of impact with their political interventions. 
  
Throughout the fieldwork, I received many comments from the interviewees about 
how valuable they felt my research would be to the country and how much this type 
of in-depth research of the Gambian diaspora was needed.  They clearly had high 
expectations for this research, which was worrying for me because I got the 
impression that some interviewees thought my thesis would provide solutions to 
the problems the diaspora were encountering with their political interventions in 
particular.  Thus to manage their expectations, I had to keep reiterating the aims of 
this research, which is to fills a gap in knowledge and create a better 
understanding of the Gambian diaspora in the UK and the US. 
 
The data I collected from the interviews with members of the Gambian diaspora in 
the UK and the US helped to answer all four of the research questions and the 
observations helped to verify some of the claims made during the interviews.   
 
 
 
 
Third Stage of Fieldwork in New York 
 
In August 2015, I received an invitation via Skype to attend the ‘International Civil 
Society Forum on The Gambia: Human Rights; Democracy; Governance; 
Transparency; and Regional Security’ organized by Coalition for Change – The 
Gambia, in New York on the 1st October 2015.  I arrived in New York on the 29th 
September and waited anxiously for the event. I met some of my interviewees in 
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person for the first time and they appeared even more open to me than before. I 
guessed this was partly because they felt they already knew me and I had made 
the journey to New York to attend an event that was clearly important to them. 
 
At times during the forum, I noticed there was some disconnect between the 
Gambian opposition party leaders at the forum and the diaspora, as the former 
seemed to not what to respond to some of the questions from the audience. I also 
got the impression that they welcomed the financial contributions of the diaspora, 
but were not particularly interested in the diaspora being involved in politics in the 
country.  The latter was so obvious, that a representative from one of the human 
rights organizations who is a non-Gambian, pointed this out to me.  Lastly, the data 
from the observations conducted at this event helped me to answer research 
questions two and three.  
 
4.8 Data Analysis  
 
The data analysis process took place after each stage of the fieldwork, and it 
included cleaning and organizing data into folders and spreadsheets.  The primary 
data from the interviews and participant observation were handwritten and then 
typed, which meant I did not have to do any transcribing. The interview data was 
transferred onto a spreadsheet, with individual sheets for the interviews conducted 
in the UK and The Gambia.  The layout of the spreadsheet consisted of; column A 
going down, which had the interview questions and row 1 going across, which had 
the initials, gender, and locations of the interviewees. The responses were copied 
and paste next to the questions and I used two columns at the end to make my 
‘comments’ and ‘analysis’.  The comments were the observations, ideas and 
issues that needed further research, whereas, the analysis column highlighted the 
key arguments and themes that kept appearing as well as signposts to theoretical 
arguments or empirical evidence.  I also highlighted key quotes to use in the thesis. 
Having prepared the data in this way I was able to undertake a thematic analysis47. 
The themes in this research were concepts, for example, ‘development’, ‘politics’ 
and ‘migration’.  Under each concept, I pulled out data from the interviews, 
participant observation, textual materials, and visuals that addressed the research 
questions containing these concepts.  For instance, I took the different expressions 
from interviews pertaining to remittances and placed that under the development 
theme.  And from this data, I discovered that contributions of the Gambian diaspora 
                                                                
47 I decided to analyse the data manually because I was not confident in using software packages such 
as NVivo.  I did not have training on using software packages because I missed the free training 
sessions offered by the university. Thus, I felt the analysis would be more reliable if I did it manually 
rather than use a package I was not familiar with. 
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were at three different scales, family, town/village, and national.  These became 
sub-headings in chapter 5 and 6.  
 
The interview data also contained many repetitive patterns, which were extracted 
during the analysis. For example, there were repetitions in the reasons the 
interviewees gave for migrating out of The Gambia, as captured in the table below.  
This information shows that education is important to the diaspora, and according 
to the literature on migration, the pursuit of higher education can drive people to 
migrate to other countries where they can attain that goal. Thus, this fell under the 
migration theme. 
 
Table 8: Reasons for migrating out of The Gambia 
Category  Number of people 
Marriage 3 
Fear of persecution 2 
Studies 25 
Exile 1 
Employment 1 
Grievance with political conditions 
in the country 
3 
Health  1 
Greener Pastures and economic 
prosperity 
10 
Other 6 
Source: Sainabou Taal 
 
I used descriptive codes of words or short phrases to systematically assign a 
summative or essence-caption to the portion of data (Saldaña 2016).  This 
provided an inventory for indexing and categorizing the data (Miles et al. 2014). For 
example, to code the interview transcripts I used words like ‘obligation,’ ‘burden’ 
‘grievance,’ ‘trigger,’ ‘motive,’ ‘democracy’, and ‘human rights’ etc.  To code the 
participation observation and visual data, I used phrases such as ‘examples of 
mismanagement of funds,’ ‘negative impressions of the diaspora’, ‘support for 
Jammeh’ ‘example of influencing politics’ and ‘examples of grievances’.  Lastly, to 
code the textual data and visuals, I used words to describe what that data was in 
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relation to, ‘30th December’, ‘power’ and ‘July 22nd’. In essence, the coding 
exercise helped me to link my data to explanations, as coding is an interpretive act 
and not a precise science (Saldaña 2016).  This was very useful as it also helped 
me to identify the information I needed and arrange them into relevant chapters, 
which made the subsequent writing process easier. 
 
4.9 Limitations of research 
 
The main limitations I experienced whilst undertaking this study was contending 
with limited resources (time, money, research assistants).  For example, I had to 
stop collecting data because I ran out of time, and I could not conduct many face-
to-face interviews with members of the diaspora because a significant proportion of 
them lived across the UK and in the US.  Thus, there was a cost factor and I had to 
resort to using cheap telecommunication tools such as the telephone and the 
Internet.  Additionally, I could not afford to hire a research assistant whilst in The 
Gambia due to the cost factor.  Having extra support with data collection would 
have allowed me to interview more people in The Gambia, particularly, the 
recipients of diaspora remittance.  However, when I attempted to hire a young man 
at the national archives office, he quoted a price of £500 
  
Sensitive Issues 
 
The main sensitive issue in this research is the discussion about politics in The 
Gambia.  This topic is often avoided or discussed covertly in the privacy of people’s 
homes.  This is because the government is known worldwide for being repressive 
and ruling through fear.  Thus, anyone caught talking openly about politics in a 
manner that is deemed critical of the government is likely to be at risk of being 
blacklisted, harassed or even imprisoned by the national security service.  Knowing 
that there have been instances where the government has targeted the families of 
their critics made me vigilant about my safety and also parents who reside in the 
country.  I was extra careful with who I spoke to and the questions I during the 
interviews. This meant that most of my interview questions had to focus on 
development and the diaspora, and even with that, I had to be cautious about how 
I spoke about the diaspora because some are seen as opponents by the 
government. 
 
I got the sense that many people in The Gambia were holding back on telling their 
true feelings about the political conditions in the country particularly their 
dissatisfaction with the government because they would complain about certain 
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things, which I knew they blamed the government for but would not explicitly say it.  
For example, they would make statements like ‘things are tough in this country’, 
‘food is expensive’, ‘there are no jobs’ and ‘taxes are too high’ but would never link 
them to the activities of the government.  Additionally, the fear of being caught 
talking about President Jammeh in public was so high that people used nicknames 
when referring to him.  For instance, whilst getting my hair braided at the salon the 
hairdresser kept referring to President Jammeh as ‘Baboucarr’ and when I asked 
her why that was she said that where she lives the youths call him that when they 
do not want the elders and others to know they were talking about Jammeh. 
 
Risks 
 
The main risk I was exposed to in The Gambia was having my research being 
perceived as too critical of the government and thus putting my family, the 
interviewees and I at harm.  Therefore, any discussions about politics in The 
Gambia were approached with caution, partly, because there was the fear of being 
heard by security officers and persecuted.  Additionally, there are legislations in 
place that arguably stifle ‘freedom of speech’, for example, the Information and 
Communication Act 2013, which permits the government and security services to 
prosecute persons accused of “spreading false news against the Government”. 
This puts people in very precarious positions, as the government determines what 
constitutes as ‘false news’.  Therefore, people in The Gambia avoiding discussions 
of politics in public altogether.  For example, whilst undertaking an interview at the 
Management Development Institute, I accidently showed him the front cover of my 
upgrade paper, which was a picture of protesters holding placards saying, 
“Jammeh must go”.  The interviewee immediately showed expressions of shock, 
worry and suspicion and I got the sense that they were in two minds about allowing 
the interview to go ahead.  Therefore, by unintentionally allowing the interviewee to 
see the cover, I believe that I put both of us at risk, and I got the impression that 
the interviewee felt the same way. 
 
However, to mitigate the risk of being in unsafe environments in The Gambia, I 
conducted the majority of interviews in public places, however, I went with a family 
member on the few occasions I interviewed the people at their homes. 
 
Research Ethics 
 
Following the principle of maintaining the professional and personal integrity of 
researchers from the UCL Ethics Code of Conduct was extremely important in this 
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research.   I was as honest as possible, except on occasions when I came across 
useful data unexpectedly at informal events in The Gambia like at the family 
member’s birthday lunch. However, everyone there was aware that I was doing 
PhD research and they had some knowledge about my topic. But mostly important, 
I adhered to legal and ethical requirements relevant to the area of research, which 
is to keep all participants anonymous. This was necessary because most 
interviewees were worried about maintaining their anonymity and thus refused to 
be recorded. Therefore, by providing them with the information sheet I drafted as 
part of my ethics application, which explained the aims of the research, and 
guaranteed anonymity and confidentiality of the data.  I was able to put the 
participants at ease.  I also took all necessary action to protect the identity of 
participants after I obtained verbal consent and this included not putting their name 
on documents and storing interview transcripts in password-protected laptops.  
 
Notwithstanding the risks involved, I did not get the sense that any of the 
interviewees in the diaspora and The Gambia were more vulnerable than others 
because everyone was exposed to the same risks, which is why I took the 
necessary action to ensure that their identities were protected.  
 
Lastly, I plan to disseminate the findings of the research to the interviewees who 
want to see them.  I feel that this research has been objective in its presentation of 
data and would, therefore, be of particular interest to those in the diaspora and 
policymakers in The Gambia.  My ethical obligation is to share the findings and to 
allow those who participated in this study to see how their contributions have been 
presented in this research. 
 
Positionality 
 
In the last twenty years or so much has been written about the researcher’s 
location within the research context.  Thus, with increasing interest on positionality 
in qualitative research particularly in feminist scholarship (Sultana 2007), it is 
clearly important to pay attention to the positionality of the researcher as well as 
the power relations between researcher and researched, and the use of the 
knowledge that is being produced.  Thinking about my own positionality in this 
research, I found it easy to position myself within the group I am studying because 
I belong to that group. Being part of the diaspora and having shared understanding, 
feelings and responsibilities at ‘home’ mattered significantly in this research as I 
understood the complexities and intricacies in the relation to ‘home’.   I also 
understood what the interviewees meant about certain realities at ‘home’ whether 
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they said it explicitly or not. This had a positive effect because I was considered as 
‘an insider’ and I had ‘insider’ knowledge (Henry 2003) of certain 'Gambian' terms 
and expressions that an 'outsider' would not immediately understand.  For example, 
I understood when one interviewee explained that their younger brother paid a 
smuggler to get them to Libya, where they made their way to Spain because they 
had ‘nerves’ (strong desire to travel).   
In the article, ‘Beyond the insider-outsider divide in migrations’ by Carling et al. 
(2013) asserts, “an insider researcher is a member of the migrant group under 
study, whereas an outsider researcher is a member of the majority population in 
the country of settlement” (1).  They also claim that informants are able to detect a 
researchers’ position from their name, which may signal a particular migrant 
background.  However, Carling et al. (2013) argue that research from an outsider 
position often comes with particular challenges in migration research.  For 
example, “if the researcher is perceived to be associated with, or have influence 
on, the authorities, informants might expect assistance or fear of negative 
repercussions from sharing information”(17).  In which cases the information they 
receive could be broad and indirect. Furthermore, “research conducted by an 
outsider can also be met with ideologically motivated scepticism, seen as 
exploitative and neo-colonial” (17). On the other hand, the notion of ‘insider’ is 
founded on a logic of ‘us and them’, which comes with some privileges mainly 
inclusion, however, this can easily obscure the information the researcher gathers.  
This is because there is the risk that having a shared ethno-national origins could 
lead to the differences of class, education or migration history being missed, or the 
researcher not taking these differences seriously (17).   
Going into this research as an ‘insider’, I concur to Ganga and Scott’s (2006) 
assertion that being ‘an insider’ in migration research is more complex and multi-
faceted than is sometimes acknowledged.  Because although I was able to gain 
access to people easily it did not guarantee that, I would obtain rich data 
(Pechurina 2014) or prevent me from having to critically examine the power 
relations (Sultana 2007) between the interviewees and myself.  Thus, my 
positionality had to be negotiated constantly and I had to adjust to the change in 
hierarchies during the interviews I conducted in the diaspora as well as in The 
Gambia.  For example, throughout the fieldwork, I found that the interviewees 
placed me in different roles, where I had to negotiate my position and power 
relations in order to obtain the information I needed for this research.  For example, 
some interviewees saw me as a ‘daughter’, ‘sister’, ‘young and naive,’ ‘sexually 
available’ and ‘suspicious.’  
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However, the fact that I am a young, single and female had its advantages and 
disadvantages.  For example, the advantage was that as the majority of the 
interviewees were men, I appeared unthreatening to them and thus was able to 
gain confidential information and access to private meetings like the meeting on 
the second days of the forum in New York. This experience confirmed the point 
made by geographer Linda McDowell (1988) that men perceive women doing 
research to be ‘unthreatening’ or ‘not official’, thus confidential documents are often 
made accessible or difficult issues are discussed relatively freely with women (cited 
by England 1994; 248).    
 
However, what concerned me most about my positionality was that the older male 
interviewees in the diaspora spoke down to me.  It was unclear whether it was 
because of young my age (which they associated with naivety) or that I am softly 
spoken or I used my uncles and siblings to make the introductions.  But I felt this 
was a disadvantage because they had condescending attitudes towards my work 
and me.  For instance, they would ask me questions to test my knowledge about 
the topic.  One participant was telling me about the US government removing The 
Gambia from AGOA, and then he asked me if I knew what AGOA stood for.  In 
these instances, I had to assume a subordinate role to show that I respected their 
position as older men, which in Gambian culture places them in at the top of the 
social hierarchy.  This meant that I had to make the patriarchal bargain described 
by Kandiyoti (1998), for the purpose of getting the best results.  This certainly 
prolonged the interviews but often the end result of the interviews was the 
interviewees became more open to me. 
 
Another instance where being young, female, and single worked against me was 
with the male interviewees who tried to blur the line between professional and 
personal.  For example, some interviewees tried to flirt with me and asked personal 
questions about my relationship status. One interviewee asked me if I was single, 
and when I replied yes, they said, “that’s good for me, I was hoping you were 
single.”  I realized then that I had to negotiate my position to where I seemed open 
to having personal discussions with these interviewees, but remained focused on 
getting answers to my questions. Although I felt offended at times, I could not show 
it because I felt that I had to be diplomatic when responding to their advances and 
make them feel like what they were saying was important in order to collect the 
data I needed. 
 
Another realization was that whilst in The Gambia the feeling of being ‘an insider’ 
was not as strong as when undertaking interviews in the diaspora.  This was 
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because the people treated more like a ‘guest’, even though they knew I was 
Gambian.  It seemed some could not ignore the obvious difference between them 
and me, in particular, my British accent, which let them know that I have lived out 
of the country for a long time.  Therefore, some interviewees perhaps felt I could 
not relate to issues of deprivation in the country because I did not live there.  
Clearly, there was some truth to this assumption but I tried to position myself as a 
sympathizer and I listened to them speak without interrupting, which put the 
interviewees at ease because it made them feel like I was genuinely interested in 
what they were saying. 
  
I was under no illusion that the only reason I was able to get access to people, 
particularly influential members of the society such as the leaders of the opposition 
political parties, the Deputy Governor of the Central Bank and even former 
President Jawara was because of my family connections.  Coming from a family 
that belongs to the educated elite class, and that is well connected in Gambian 
society helped me greatly during the research process.  Thus, the majority of 
interviewees in The Gambia treated me very well and with a lot of respect, which I 
am certain I would not have gotten if I did not have my family connections.  
However, I also wondered whether this had an impact on the responses I was 
given, but I could not test this query because I could not erase the fact that it was 
my connection that gave me access to them.  Some interviewees were overly 
professional even when the interviews took place at their homes. They spoke to 
me in English even when I made it known that I spoke Wollof (one of the local 
languages).  Part of me believed that this was their way of acknowledging the fact 
that I was ‘not an ordinary Gambian’ (as people euphemistically put it), in terms of 
my background, personal history and education. 
 
Finally, the only situation where I felt like I was in the position of authority was 
during the interviews with groups of students at the University of The Gambia. I 
was in a superior position because I was also working as their lecturer and thus 
they afforded me a degree of respect that I did not get from other interviewees like 
some of the older men in the diaspora.  This shows that coming from an educated 
elite class in The Gambia does not have any advantages in the diaspora because 
arguably the diaspora creates a level playing field for all Gambians. However, the 
two groups of students I interviewed genuinely treated this research as an 
important and interesting contribution to knowledge and they demonstrated this by 
staying behind after class to take part.   
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4.10 Conclusion 
 
The strategy for conducting the fieldwork for this research clearly had its 
advantages and disadvantages.  On the one hand, gaining access to participants 
was relatively easy because the group I was studying considered me ‘an insider’ 
and the fact that the country is small made it relatively easy to make connections.  
Additionally, my family connections also helped me to gain access to people in 
high places in Gambian society.  However, a disadvantage was that I found it 
extremely difficult to get women to take part in the research. 
 
Before going out into the field, I felt prepared because I had the theoretical 
knowledge of research methodology and methods.  However, once I began 
collecting data, I made the mistake of going into some interviews with assumptions 
and then letting those assumptions dictate how the interviews were conducted.  
These errors reflected the fact that I was a new and inexperienced researcher, and 
by recognizing this, I learned from experience as I went along and re-evaluated my 
approach. 
 
Another unexpected factor of the research was the constant negotiation of power 
relations between the interviewees and myself.  I went into the field believing 
researchers were afforded with a certain degree of respect, which was entirely 
inaccurate.  I did not expect to be spoken down to, ignored and even flirted with.  
This was another learning experience, however, I was able to negotiate and play 
different positions (mostly subordinate roles), which allowed me to obtain the 
information I needed and strengthened my research skills and patience. 
 
I argued that the in-depth interviews, participant observation, and textual material 
were the appropriate methods to collect the data I needed to answer the research 
questions.  However, I identified some gaps in the data that could have been filled 
had I conducted observations at diaspora associational meeting (which was not 
possible as the associations that invited me to their meetings were located outside 
of London and the notice they gave me was too short) and interviewed some 
British MPs, US senators and the human rights organisations (like Amnesty and 
Human Rights Watch) that support the Gambian diaspora.  Additionally, I should 
have interviewed more people in The Gambia receiving diaspora remittances and 
other forms of support. 
 
However, despite the many issues I encountered whilst out in the field, I was able 
to collect rich descriptions and individual points of views from and about the 
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Gambian diaspora, their development contributions and political interventions at 
‘home’.  Additionally, this research meets the empirical need for an in-depth study 
of the role small diaspora groups play in development as well as in politics at 
‘home’ and fills the knowledge gap about the Gambian diaspora in the UK and the 
US. 
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Chapter 5: 
Developing The Gambia: the Contributions of the 
UK and US Gambian Diaspora      
 
                                                                  
This first empirical chapter discusses and analyses the development contributions 
of the UK and US Gambians diaspora at the family, town/village, and national 
levels and in different economic sectors in The Gambia.  This chapter addresses 
first the research question of, how, why and where does the diaspora contribute to 
development in The Gambia? It also speaks to the broader literature of ‘migration 
and development’ as well as the narrower literature in ‘African diaspora studies’ 
and ‘diasporas and development’. This chapter is divided into three sections after 
the introduction. The first section looks at the different scales of diaspora 
contributions in The Gambia.  These scales are presented in the order of priority 
according to the interviewees. Here I argue that the diaspora focus is on the family 
scale, and to a lesser extent town/ village and national.  In fact, it is seldom that the 
Gambian diaspora makes direct contributions to national development projects.  
This chapter argues that some scales of intervention are much more significant to 
people in the diaspora than others, but even that there are some contradictions 
between them in the sense that contributions at some levels (eg the household) 
might undermine national development goals (eg to decrease social inequalities). 
The second section looks at the Gambian diaspora contributions to the education, 
health, housing, and agriculture sectors in The Gambia.  The aim here is to 
analyse their contributions to the development of these sectors and I argue that 
some sectors are far more amenable to diaspora development interventions than 
others because relatively small, intermittent interventions are more likely to have 
positive outcomes in say a school setting than an agricultural one. In addition, the 
kind of interventions agriculture needs (eg farm to market roads) are not 
necessarily the kinds of intervention the diaspora can provide, whereas they can 
make more useful piecemeal interventions (eg the provision of desks) in school 
settings. Lastly, the third section is the conclusion, which brings together the main 
arguments and discussions in this chapter. The overall argument in this chapter is 
that development contributions by the Gambian diaspora are family-led partly 
because of the centrality of families, and the strong obligation they have towards 
them (Lindley 2010, Mercer and Page 2010, Hammond et al 2011, Enoh 2014, 
Sinatti and Horst 2014, Horst et al 2014). But, if the Gambian diaspora felt less 
marginalized then even though families would remain key, still some remittances 
might go to national development.   
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5.1 Introduction 
 
The empirical evidence in this research revealed that out of the 82 interviews 
conducted, approximately 80% of interviewees believed the development 
contributions of the Gambian diaspora are highest at the family level, roughly, 15% 
stated at town/village level and 5% at the national level. As with other diaspora 
African groups like the Somalis, the Gambian diaspora showed that they too have 
a strong feeling of obligation towards their families (Hammond et al. 2011).  
However, in contrast to the Somali diaspora, the gross national development 
contributions of the Gambian diaspora is significantly less, when compared to 
US$ 130-200 million per year sent by the Somali diaspora for relief and 
development purposes (Hammond et al. 2011). Nevertheless, 100% of the 
interviewees in the diaspora claim they provide financial support to their families 
every month.  This speaks to the literature that emphasizes the importance of 
family to the diaspora (Stark and Lucas 1988, Mohan 2006, Lindley 2010, Mercer 
and Page 2010, Hammond et al 2011, Hammond et al 2011, Hammond 2011, 
Enoh 2014). 
 
The essence of the Gambian diaspora is their commitment to their families, which 
motivates them to contribute to development at ‘home’.  This chapter argues that a 
sense of belonging and desire to want to help their families persists despite any 
state-scale activities. This is also despite their attitude to the Gambian government.  
The empirical research revealed that the contributions from the diaspora to The 
Gambia mainly involve sending remittances and material goods to their families at 
‘home’. This is parallel to Mohan’s (2006) findings in his study of the Ghanaian 
diaspora in Milton Keynes, whose main obligation is also to their families and to a 
lesser extent friends at ‘home’ (874).  The remittances to The Gambia are typically 
used to pay for goods and services, house-building projects, school fees, medical 
bills and fund various development projects in their towns/villages.  However, it is 
seldom for the Gambian diaspora to contribute directly to national development 
projects, rather, their remittances have an indirect impact on the national economy 
because they indirectly generate sales tax revenue when recipients in The Gambia 
spend remittances. Nevertheless, the Gambian are still celebrated at ‘home’ for 
improving the living conditions of the majority of people in The Gambia (Wanyama 
2013; 17).  
 
According to the interviews, a key reason why some members of the Gambian 
diaspora are not making direct contributions at national level is because they 
believe the government does not want them involved in national projects. This is 
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despite the Gambian government making available treasury bills for investment via 
the commercial banks, which members of the diaspora can access if they hold 
current bank accounts in these banks48. The government has also made efforts to 
reach out to the diaspora, through it is Ministry of Foreign Affairs, International 
Cooperation and Gambians Abroad.  For example, in January 2012 the ministry 
organized the first “Consultative Meeting between the Government of the Republic 
of The Gambia and Gambians in the Diaspora”. According to the press release 
from the Office of the Gambian President, the main objective of the consultative 
meeting was to harness the potentials and talents of Gambians in the diaspora, 
including those serving in international organizations and others engaged in private 
ventures, which can be beneficial to the country. The release also stated, “the 
meeting will facilitate the evaluation of the extent to which latent potential residing 
in the Diaspora could be utilized to the fullest in support of Vision 2020 goals and 
objectives” (Kebbeh 2012).  However, the government did not follow up policies, 
recommendations or other actions after the consultative meeting (Kebbeh 2013). 
Some interviewees in the diaspora saw this as the government not being serious 
about engaging the diaspora in national development. The subsequent situation in 
The Gambia is that diaspora contributions to families rarely translate to sustainable 
national development (Newland 2011).  This is because remittances to families for 
private consumption make no direct contribution to national public infrastructures 
like improving roads and transport, power supply, large-scale water supply, 
education and health infrastructure (Mercer et al. 2008).   
 
5.2 Scale and Diaspora Development Contributions in The Gambia 
 
Family 
The interviews suggest that there are a significant number of Gambians living 
abroad who are sending remittances ‘home’.  Diaspora remittances have been 
described as the ‘new development mantra’ for the international development 
sector for over a decade (Kapur, 2003) because of their ‘development impact’ in 
countries of origin (Kapur 2001, 2003, Nyberg- Sorensen et al. 2002, Gundel 2002, 
Turner et al. 2003, IOM, 2006, de Haas 2006, 2012, Terrazas 2010, Davies 2012, 
Judge and De Plaen, 2011, Newland, 2011, 2013, Ratha et al. 2011, Agunias and 
Newland 2012, Crush et al. 2013, Gamlen 2014, Mercer and Page 2014, Resende 
– Santos 2015, Chikanda et al. 2016) and securing household food security and 
educating children (Crush 2011). 
                                                                
48 http://www.cbg.gm/securities/pdf/operational-notice-tbill-transfers.pdf 
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According to the 49 interviews undertaken with the UK and US Gambian diaspora, 
they conscientiously send money and material goods to their families every month.  
They also claimed to remit on average between £200 and £600 per month to cover 
household expenses at ‘home’.  One interviewee stated: 
 
I look after a family of 25-30 people and I have a family here (in the UK).  
The money I send is for the upkeep and maintenance of my family, and 
this includes feeding, accommodation, and paying school fees.  They only 
depend on me directly.  I also send second hand stuff from here and I set 
up a shop for my brother to run, so if ever there is a delay in sending 
money my family can go to the shop and get money from there.  I send 
money 2 to 3 times a month. (Interviewee 38, male, 40s, skilled 
professional) 
 
This corroborates the majority of findings from the literature, which asserts that 
diasporas send remittances to their families to pay for feeding, school fees, 
clothing, healthcare, accommodation, utility bills, religious celebrations, weddings, 
and burials (Mercer et al. 2008, Judge and Plaen 2011).  But to what extent is 
paying for private consumption a development contribution given that the literature 
argues that poverty alleviation is the end goal for development? (de Haas 2012, 
Chami and Fullenkamp 2013). And must the contributions of the diaspora be at 
macro rather than the micro level to pass as development?  In which case, do 
remittances have to be used in more economically productive ways (such as 
investing in family run businesses) in order to achieve this end goal, or would it be 
more helpful to look at how these micro-contributions are helping to alleviate 
household poverty?  As one interviewee in the diaspora puts it “at the moment any 
development contribution is at the micro scale – my family” (Interviewee 27, male, 
40s-50s, educated professional). Therefore, can it be argued that remittances used 
to pay for food, shelter, education, and health are helping to improve the living 
conditions of families, thus meeting the ‘development’ indicators used in the 
production of the HDI for example?  
 
On the other hand, ‘The Gambia Integrated Household Survey 2010’, revealed that 
remittances received by families in The Gambia are not as frequent as it has been 
suggested in the interviews.  According to the survey, only 24% of the beneficiaries 
said they received remittances monthly, 15% quarterly, 33% occasionally, and 28% 
receive remittances annually (60). However, this survey was conducted five years 
ago, therefore, the data on receiving remittances may be different now.  But, there 
is still a strong possibility that remittances sent by members of the Gambian 
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diaspora are not as frequent or regular as the interviews claim because as argued 
in chapter 2, remittances are volatile and unsecure financial contributions 
(Nyamongo et al. 2012). This raises the question about whether remittances are a 
less sustainable form of development (Gupta et al 2007, Mullings 2012, Nyamongo 
et al. 2012, Chacko and Gebre 2013).  
 
Nevertheless, the focus here is to determine how remittances are used in The 
Gambia to contribute to development.  For example, 100% of the interviewees in 
the diaspora stated that part of the remittances they send ‘home’ is used to pay for 
school fees. The empirical evidence suggests that paying school fees is a big 
challenge for many families in The Gambia.  And although there are state schools, 
which cost significantly less than private and international schools, the many 
hidden costs such as uniforms, transportation costs, school lunches, books and 
stationary mean that some poor families cannot afford to pay for their children’s 
education. Few analysts would question the link between children’s education and 
development. But I argue that having someone in the diaspora paying school fees 
not only lifts a huge burden off these families, it potentially increases the chance of 
sustaining families from poverty. For example, it is assumed that the better 
educated a person is, the more chance they have to acquire good paying jobs 
(provided they are available) and thus having educated children is insurance for 
parents.  Therefore, the link between children’s education and development is that 
education has the potential to expand human capacities and improve the quality of 
life of people, which according to the literature in development studies defines what 
is ‘human development’.  
 
I also argue that increasing access to education at family level contributes to the 
development of the education sector because according to The Gambia Ministry of 
Basic and Secondary Education’s Country Status Report (2011), “The Gambia is 
still among the most advanced SSA countries in terms of actual enrolments and 
completion indicators at all level….”(24).  The graph below shows a steady 
increase of national enrolment rates in The Gambia, in Lower Basic Education 
(LBE), Upper Basic Education (UBE) and Senior Secondary School (SSS) from 
2014 to 2015.  Though this makes it difficult to separate the three scales of 
analysis used here, it is plausible to draw links between the contributions of the 
diaspora to the increase in national enrolment rates. In this instance, family-scale 
interventions have consequences for national development indicators.  
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Figure 8: National Enrolment Rates in The Gambia 
 
Source: Joint Ministry of Basic and Secondary Education Sector Progress Report 
(2016) 
 
Additionally, approximately 35% of the 49 members of the UK and US Gambian 
diaspora interviewed claimed their families solely depend on the remittances they 
send ‘home’.  Roughly, 45% stated their families partly depend on their remittances, 
10% said they share the responsibility with their siblings, and 5% did not respond 
to the question.  However, the belief amongst 10% of the interviewees is that 
diaspora remittances are responsible for the outright survival of households in The 
Gambia.    According to an interviewee: 
 
Majority of Gambians rely entirely on remittances… everybody relies on 
somebody outside to help them…those who do not have families outside 
are doomed.  They are the ones you see begging in the streets 
(Interviewee 11, male, 50s, activist) 
 
This interviewee is a strong critic of the government and exaggerations (families 
being doomed and begging in the streets) in the statement were common amongst 
the openly anti-government participants. This statement is clearly a perception and 
not reality because the empirical evidence suggests that there are people in The 
Gambia not merely surviving but thriving without financial support from the 
diaspora. For example, retired return migrants from middle-class backgrounds are 
receiving good pensions from previously working for international organizations. 
Additionally, there are young business owners who are running successful 
businesses in the country. According to Carling (2004), this is also the case for 
‘classic returnees’ in Cape Verde. However, anecdotal evidence collected from 
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informal discussions in The Gambia revealed that many wealthy parents are 
providing financial assistance to their children and relatives in the diaspora, thus, 
suggesting that remittances do not flow one way in The Gambia. This perhaps 
challenges the literature that argues that remittances create dependency in 
receiving countries (Skeldon 2005, 2008, Davies 2012, de Haas 2012, Page and 
Mercer 2012, Horst et al. 2014).   
 
This is not to dispel the fact that sometimes receivers underreport the remittances 
they receive from members of the diaspora because they want to hide the fact of 
such money coming in from potentially acquisitive friends and family, or they want 
to be able to exercise moral pressure on other members of the diaspora for more 
remittances.  However, the fact that only 35% of the interviewees stated their 
families solely depend on their remittances makes the argument that people in The 
Gambia without family in the diaspora are ‘doomed’ hard to sustain empirically.  In 
addition, the proportion of 89,634 Gambian people living abroad (IOM 2015) 
compared to the total population of 1.8 million in 201349 would also suggest that 
the statement is untenable.  This makes the point that remittances are only going 
to some families in some parts of The Gambia, which according to ‘The Gambia 
Integrated Household Survey 2010’ is the urban areas like Kanifing which received 
33% of total remittances in The Gambia in 2010 (60).  Therefore, should the 
argument be that remittances create development disparities in The Gambia as 
opposed to dependency? (Skeldon 2005, 2008, Davies 2012, de Haas 2012, Page 
and Mercer 2012) 
 
Nevertheless, such statements are self-aggrandising and they suggest some 
degree of post-hoc justification for why some members of the Gambian diaspora 
(including this interviewee) claim to have the right to be engaged in politics in The 
Gambia. By asserting their importance in the field of remittances and development, 
they justify their entitlement to be engaged in politics. So, even when the 
conversation is framed around development it quickly comes back to politics too. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                                
49 With an average growth of 3.3 percent per annum making it approximately 2 million (Population and 
Housing Census Preliminary Results 2013) 
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The graphs below show the remittances rates, poverty levels, and emigration rates 
in The Gambia. 
 
Figure 9: Migrant remittance inflows in The Gambia  
 
Source: Assembled by Sainabou Taal from The World Bank remittance data inflow 
2016. 
 
Figure 10: Percentage of Gambians Living under $1.25 per day 
 
Source: Assembled by Sainabou Taal from the Government of The Gambia 
Integrated Household Survey 2003, 2010 and Poverty Assessment 2008 
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Figure 11: Emigration rates of Gambians 
 
Source: Assembled by Sainabou Taal from the World Bank bilateral migration 
stock 2000, 2010, and 2013.  IOM Gambia country profile 2015  
 
These graphs show poverty levels in The Gambia decreasing as emigration and 
remittance rates are steadily increasing.  Thus suggesting that the higher the 
emigration of Gambians, the more money there is coming into the country and 
therefore poverty will be less.  However, this is inaccurate because the empirical 
evidence revealed that remittances entering the country are not sufficient to meet 
the development needs.  For example, to implement the activities of the Poverty 
Reduction Strategy Paper II (2007-2011) in The Gambia, the government 
committed US$ 100.5 million and donors committed US$ 174 million (IMF 2010), 
which exceeded the US$ 116 million of remittances that entered the country in that 
same year. Therefore, remittances can only possibly be a part of the explanation 
for poverty reduction in The Gambia.  Again, it is possible here to see politics-
development connections. Some of the political popularity of the ruling APRC 
regime among resident Gambians might reasonably be explained in relation to 
delivering development and poverty reduction just as the President claims.  
  
Moving on to discuss the responsibilities the Gambian diaspora feel they have 
towards their families.  Approximately 75% of the interviewees in the diaspora 
stated they send money to their families is because they believe it is their 
responsibility to take care of them. One female interviewee explains, “it’s a 
responsibility.  It’s what I do because since I have been here, I am more well off 
than them so I see it as my responsibility to support them” (Interviewee 7, female, 
30s, highly educated professional).  This supports the argument in chapter 2 that 
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migrant women also engage in the practice of remittance sending (Niimi and Reilly 
2008, UN-INSTRAW and UNDP 2010, Hammond 2011). However, 15% stated that 
they felt guilty about their families being exposed to extreme poverty whilst they 
enjoy a better life abroad.  As another interviewee in the diaspora puts it, “how can 
I enjoy life in the US when Gambian people do not even know where their next 
meals are coming from?” (Interviewee 5, male, 50s, academic/ activist).   5% said 
they wanted to give back to their parents “it is our duty to take care of our parents 
because they took care of us” (Interviewee 19). Another 5% claimed they felt they 
were being manipulated by people exaggerating their level of struggle in order to 
get support from the diaspora, “the people on the ground tell lies to the diaspora to 
get their money” (Interviewee 19).  These findings align with claims in the literature 
that diasporas have a non-negotiable obligation to towards their families (Lindley 
2010, Mercer and Page 2010, Hammond et al. 2011, Enoh 2014).  However, part 
of the literature also recognizes that family members play on the conscience of the 
diaspora to get money from them. Horst (2004) narrated the experience of a 
participant who visited their family in Mudug in Somalia, only to discover that their 
relatives had been manipulating their conscience by saying their condition of living 
was very bad when in reality their standard of living was in many ways better than 
the participant’s life in Europe.  This led to them reducing the money they sent 
‘home’ from $800 to $400 a month as well as reduce their feeling of guilt. However, 
only a small proportion of interviewees in the Gambian sample complained about 
this, and it was far outweighed by interviewees who said that sending money to 
their family was their responsibility. 
In addition, being seen to be doing the right thing is also an important motivation 
for family remittances. During an informal discussion with a member of the 
Gambian diaspora in the UK, this person claimed that they believed some 
Gambians in the diaspora support their families to avoid being talked about by their 
peers in negative terms.  They explained that the disadvantage of being from a 
small country is that people are connected in so many different ways, that it makes 
it easy for a person’s reputation to be affected. You have to be seen to be doing 
what is considered right as a ‘social norm.’ In a way, this is a kind of ‘politics’ in that 
the social rule in the diaspora is that you should remit and allocate resources with 
your family budget. Therefore, within the Gambian diaspora, the visibility of this 
peer pressure is particularly pronounced.  For example, if parents in The Gambia 
are seen to be struggling (which the interviewees interpret as not dressed well and 
living in poor conditions) by neighbours or visitors then people assume that they 
are not being taken care of by their children in the diaspora.  A case study from a 
research participant revealed that on their last visit to The Gambia, they came 
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across friend’s mother looking unwell and dressed ‘inappropriately’ at a wedding.  
Therefore, they called that friend and informed them of this, but because others 
had also made the same observation, rumours began spreading about that family. 
Consequently, members of the diaspora travelled to The Gambia to take care of 
their mother because they felt embarrassed about what people were saying about 
them.  This is interesting because it shows that it is not enough for the diaspora to 
meet the needs of their families, rather they have to meet those needs in a manner 
that is acceptable to their peers, which can be difficult to sustain. 
 
However, the relationship between the diaspora and their families at ‘home’ is 
mutually beneficial.  Mazzucato (2010) calls this reverse remittance because she 
asserts the diaspora are getting something in return for their remittances, including 
a stronger sense of belonging.  According to the empirical evidence, many 
Gambians in the diaspora enjoy the benefits of having the economic power in their 
families and like being included in the decision-making process, which ordinarily 
would be limited to the parents and elders, who have the experience of age.  As 
one interviewee puts it: 
When you provide economic support to any household it gives you power, 
that power results in your voice being respected and they are more likely to 
listen to you… in our culture we are supposed to listen to our elders, 
however, this is changing because it is the young people who are 
abroad… when it comes to daily family activities like weddings and naming 
ceremonies and issues we are being asked our suggestions and they are 
listening to us because we have the economic power. (Interviewee 4, 
female, 40s, highly educated professional/ activist)   
 
There is a strong possibility that the economic power of the diaspora puts them in 
positions of decision-maker in their families.  It is particularly interesting that a 
Gambian woman made this statement, as it shows that remittances also shift 
gender relations in The Gambia like it does for Somali women in Lewiston, USA 
(Hammond’s 2011) who through their remittances were allowed participate in the 
diya system. However, what is not clear in this statement is how the Gambian 
diaspora in general and women in particular use remittances to get their families to 
listen to them and what politics are being played. For example, are Gambians in 
the diaspora using their economic power to coerce or persuade their families to 
listen to them?  Yet again, the line between politics and development is looking 
rather thin even when viewed from a discussion of family-scale remittance sending. 
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Lastly, the 52 interviews conducted in The Gambia revealed that all the participants 
recognized the contributions of the diaspora to their families, however, the group 
that appeared most appreciative were the male and female students aged between 
(20 and 30) attending the University of The Gambia.  These groups of students 
described the diaspora as “heroes and heroines…”, “bread-winners of this country" 
51) and "people who are generous and hardworking" (Interviewees 51, 52). This is 
perhaps unsurprising in the context that the money they receive from their family 
members in the diaspora is helping to sustain them in education. Therefore, their 
enthusiasm and sincerity in describing the Gambian diaspora not only showed they 
valued the benevolence but they also expressed their own aspirations to someday 
travel out of the country and send money ‘home’ to take care of their families. 
However, it would be hard to measure the ‘inspiration’ provided by the existing 
diaspora for a younger generation, but if international migration does lead to 
development within The Gambia, then such inspiration is also part of the 
development process in itself. Yet, there is a political point to be made here too. If 
young people’s thoughts are focused on working overseas, their motivation for 
engaging in local politics in The Gambia is significantly reduced and the incentive 
to campaign for political change does not exist if your aspirations are to live 
overseas.  
Town and Village 
There are multiple functioning Gambian diaspora associations in various host 
countries like Norway, Sweden, UK, and the US.  This research interviewed 10 UK 
Gambian diaspora associations.  And though you do not have to be a member of 
such an association to be a member of the diaspora, many of those who are most 
animated about development issues do join associations.  This is partly because 
such associations can provide a vehicle for development (Mercer et al. 2008, 
Lampert 2009, Evans 2010) and partly because those with a strong sense of 
belonging are most likely to be engaged in transnational development activities. 
60% of the associations stated they are engaged in development projects in 
various towns and villages across The Gambia.  They send books and materials to 
schools (Interviewee 1550), give scholarships to outstanding students to attend high 
school (Association 3), and raise funds for disaster relief (Association 4). 
 
The recent projects the Gambian diaspora associations in the UK have been 
involved with are diverse. For example, in 2011, the Reading Gambia Association 
sent 30 bicycles to schoolchildren. In June 2012, the Gambia United Society 
                                                                
50 Member of Amitage Secondary School alumni association 
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reportedly raised £10,000 for farmers affected by famine and the Brufut 
Association purchased an ambulance for the Brufut health centre 51 . All of the 
interviewees who belong to these associations stated that their attachment to their 
town and villages is enhanced through their participation in hometown associations 
and their engagement in development projects in their towns/villages Mercer et al. 
2008, Lampert 2009).  For example, a member of one of the associations claimed 
they felt a “sense of belonging back ‘home’ because I have an emotional 
attachment to Brufut.  That is why I contribute financially through the Brufut 
association” (Interviewee 42, male, 40s, highly educated professional).  This 
finding is in line with the wider literature, which argues that diasporas contribute to 
development in their ‘home’ town or village because they have an emotional link to 
that place (Mercer and Page 2010, Mavroudi 2015, Moniruzzaman 2016). 
 
These associations are contributing to development by increasing access to health 
and education for the people in the towns and villages. These are key 
‘development’ indicators for expanding human capacities and achieving improved 
quality of life for people in the locality.  Giving direct support to people by 
sponsoring children in education (who are not close relatives) will improve their 
long-term economic prospects (Durand et al. 1996, Connell and Conway, cited by 
Lindley 2007).  And donating medical supplies, equipment, and ambulances to 
community health centres and hospitals will facilitate better health achievements 
and support economic productivity.  As the World Health Organization (WHO) has 
rightfully stated, health is imperative to development both in its own right and 
instrumentally because a healthy population is more productive. Again, the 
boundaries between the scales of diaspora intervention seem to be breaking down 
here. These town/village scale interventions are good for the nation as a whole but 
as I have mentioned earlier, I am keeping the three scales separated to reflect the 
worldviews of interviewees in the diaspora.  However, there are paradoxes in the 
findings in this section because on the one hand, they challenge the literature, 
which argues that the capacity of hometown associations to improve the material 
quality of life is limited because it is not their main function and they are not always 
very good at delivering projects (Mercer et al. 2008, Evans 2010). But on the other 
hand, they corroborate with the same literature, which argues that diasporas have 
long-term commitments to development in their hometown (Mercer et al. 2008; 
230) and they prefer to fund projects that increase access to healthcare and 
education to people (Mercer et al. 2008, Lampert 2009). 
                                                                
51 Brufut Village is an old settlement, increasingly however, land is being sold to private individuals and 
estate developers due to the high demand for plots to build housing space. Brufut is located in Kombo 
South District, West Coast Region and is 23km by road to Banjul capital.  The population is 
approximately nine thousand people. http://www.accessgambia.com/information/brufut.html 
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National 
 
According to Teferra (2015), diaspora remittances are the single most important 
foreign direct investment in some African countries.  For example,  in some 
countries (especially small and island economies) such as Cape Verde or indeed 
The Gambia, remittances provide a very significant proportion of GDP. But for 
much larger countries (such as Ghana or Nigeria) the volume of remittances may 
be greater but they make up a smaller proportion of overall GDP. Therefore, 
suggesting that the significance of remittances changes from nation to nation. 
However, remittances entering The Gambia through official channels like banks 
and money transfer bureaus constituted over 20% of the country’s GDP in 2013 
according to World Bank data. 
 
This 20% GDP contribution from diaspora remittances is believed to go into to 
national development because the monies are used to purchase goods and pay for 
services, which are taxed. However, there are no transaction taxes on remittances 
arriving in The Gambia, but the sender pays a fee52 for the recipient to receive the 
exact amount they are sent.  But, some of the goods and services paid for by 
remittance are taxed (VAT) at the point of sale. For example, the VAT applied to 
the supply of goods, services and imports is at a rate of 15% in The Gambia.  
However, food and drinks for human consumption is exempt from these taxes 
except imported food and drink53 (PWC 2013; 43) and it is likely that diaspora 
remittances are used to purchase imported goods because The Gambia has an 
importer economy 54 .  Other exempt services that are paid for by diaspora 
remittances include school fees, medical bills, prescription drugs, transportation, 
rental of residential property, small businesses, domestic electricity and water55.  
But it is very hard to trace a path between remittances and government revenues. 
Instead, most analysis tends to think about this in terms of GDP. Therefore, 
perhaps it would be helpful to look at government expenditure in health and 
education for example, and compare it to the amount of remittances coming into 
the country in order to create links between remittances and national development.  
For instance, according to World Bank data, the Gambian government expenditure 
on health and education in 2013 was 6.5% and 2.8% of GDP and the percentage 
of remittances in that same year more than double government spending on these 
public services.  However, looking at it from this perspective is unhelpful because 
data on taxes in The Gambia shows that only a very small percentage of diaspora 
                                                                
52 Western Union charges £4.90 for every £200 sent from the UK 
53 A quick guide to Taxation in Gambia: September 2013 PWC 
54 In 2014, the country imported $1.14B and $187M of that was food stuff 
(http://atlas.media.mit.edu/en/profile/country/gmb/) 
55 http://businessingambia.com/gambia-vat-exempted-goods-and-services/  
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remittances end up as tax revenue and it becomes difficult to see how diaspora 
remittances are making significant contributions to the Gambian economy through 
taxation.  
 
On the other hand, the interviews revealed that 80% of the interviewees in the 
diaspora believe their remittances are contributing to the country’s economy 
through taxation because they pay taxes for their land and building projects in The 
Gambia. According to an interviewee: 
 
I pay tax on the property, which is worth 2.2 million dalasi.  I paid 
75,000.00 dalasi ($230956), which goes to the government.  Contributing to 
the country…  I have bought a house though I am not getting all what I 
expected but the 75,000.00 dalasi is going to the government and the 
country (Interviewee 15, male, 40s and highly educated professional).  
 
This interviewee is a highly educated professional and there is a sense of accuracy 
in this statement in terms of the amount of tax they paid for their property. However, 
concerning their comment about their tax contributing to the country, this is 
uncertain.  This is because there is no evidence showing how the Gambian 
government spends these taxes. In this statement, there is a clear distinction 
between what is real (the amount paid) verse what is perceived (it is contributing to 
the country).  
 
Some interviewees (5%) in the diaspora also made claims that diaspora 
remittances are responsible for the peace and stability is in the country. They 
argued that their remittances are preventing Gambians at ‘home’ from engaging in 
civil disobedience because diaspora remittances meeting the immediate needs of 
the people.    The same interviewee 15 claimed that:  
 
Gambia is stable and the driving force for the stability is the diaspora 
because if people cannot eat or go to school they will rise up (against the 
government) but because they are getting what they need from the 
diaspora, they are taking whatever the government gives them.  That is 
why there is stability... development in Gambia is from people like you and 
me. (Interviewee 15, male, 40s and highly educated professional) 
 
Clearly, viewing remittances as a driving force for peace and stability in The 
Gambia does not make it a development contribution.  However, it can be argued 
                                                                
56 Based on a historically accurate exchange rate www.exchangerates.org.uk 
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that peace and stability are necessary pre-conditions for development to take place. 
However, this is a perception and not a reality because there are other more 
obvious factors that play a bigger part in preserving peace and preventing popular 
unrest in The Gambia.  The empirical evidence points to fear and coercion from the 
national security services as the main contributor to the peace and stability in the 
country. For example, it is common knowledge that the rights of people in The 
Gambia are often violated by the national security services, particularly those that 
are political opponents and critics of the government (Amnesty International Report 
2015/ 2016 and Human Rights Watch Report 2015).  Additionally, as I have 
mentioned in chapter 4, there are draconian laws like the Information and 
Communication Act, amended in 2013, which permits the government and security 
services to prosecute persons accused of “spreading false news against the 
Government” and more often than not, the ‘false news’ is defined as spreading 
information that is critical of the government.  For example, in September 2013, 
Gambian broadcast journalist Fatou Camara was arrested and charged with 
spreading ‘false news’, because she was accused of providing information to the 
diaspora-owned newspaper Freedom with intent to tarnish the image of the 
President57.  Though I do not know what that information was, but given the small 
size of the diaspora in relation to the overall population, it is inconceivable to argue 
that diaspora remittances are fulfilling the needs of every Gambian, thus preventing 
them from engaging in civil disobedience. 
 
In addition, the idea that diaspora remittances foster development by preserving 
the political status quo corroborates with the literature that argues diaspora can 
contribute significantly to peace building through indirect engagement such as 
contributing to family economic survival (Brinkerhoff 2011 and Hoehn et al. 2011). 
However, it seems more likely that these interviewees are placing emphasis on 
their own contribution to the developmental consequences of preserving political 
stability in order to emphasize how much the country needs the diaspora or to 
justify their interventions in Gambian politics. 
 
Nevertheless, I argue that the Gambian government knows those that are outside 
of the country will always send money to their families regardless of the political 
conditions in the country.  Therefore, even though remittances may not be 
responsible for the peace and stability in The Gambia, they have been responsible 
for reducing the accountability of the government to the Gambian people.  For 
example, 95% of the interviewees in the diaspora stated they would never stop 
                                                                
57 https://www.article19.org/resources.php/resource/37304/en/gambia:-journalist-accused-of-spreading-
false-news-flees-country 
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sending remittances ‘home’ even if it would put pressure on the government to be 
more accountable.  According to a participant in the diaspora: 
 
Whether or not the government improves the social services in The 
Gambia, I would never stop doing what I do for my parents. I can never 
imagine not doing anything for my parents even if they are millionaires 
(Interviewee 29, male, 40s-50s, highly educated professional) 
 
This is a paradox because, on the one hand, the interviewees in the diaspora 
(excluding the five pro-government supporters who were interviewed) have 
criticized the government for not doing enough for the people but on the other hand, 
the same people are saying that they would never stop providing for their families 
even if the government met the needs of the people.  This shows the complexity of 
the relationship between the diaspora and the government and the relationship 
between development and politics.  
 
5.3 The Contributions of the Gambian Diaspora to the Development of the 
Sectors 
 
Health 
 
According to the empirical evidence, Gambians in the diaspora have paid for the 
renovation of health centres as well as built hospitals in respective towns and 
villages, such as Farafenni, Brufut, Brikama, Koina and Sukuta.  According to a 
university student in The Gambia, "one Gambian in the diaspora built a health 
centre for his village Dongoro-Ba” (Interviewee 52).  Further investigation found 
this claim to be accurate. The Dongoro-Ba Health Centre is located in Jarra, in the 
Lower River Region of The Gambia.  The centre was established in 2013 and 
currently has nine staff members providing a range of services to children and 
women, including labour and delivery, ultrasounds and scans.  People visiting the 
clinic have to purchase a ‘ticket’ for five dalasi to be seen by a doctor or nurse, 
after which they have to pay for medication.  According to the informant, the 
monies collected from the patients are used to pay staff and purchase drugs. The 
cost to build this facility is estimated at around 32 million dalasi ($678,541) by a 
board member (Interviewee 71).  The clinic’s website states that the village 
community initiated the creation of the clinic in 2010 and diasporan Alhagie Lamin 
Dem’s (lived abroad) benevolent and philanthropic sponsorship made it possible in 
2013.  The health centre has also received donations such as drugs and medical 
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supplies from international donors like Dutch philanthropist Vera Van Den Broek58.  
The Dongoro-Ba health centre was inaugurated by the Minister of Health and 
Social Welfare, during which he stated: “the construction of the health centre is a 
cornerstone of the July 22nd Revolution and in line with the development 
objectives of the Gambian leader 59 ”.  Continuing with the theme of linking 
development to politics this shows how development successes are used boost the 
profile of politicians in The Gambia even though the government did not fund this 
project.  However, the Minister has attached it to politics by linking it to the 
president’s own development vision. The photograph below is of the Dongoro-Ba 
Health Centre. 
 
Figure 12: Dongoro - Ba Health Centre 
 
Source: Dongoro-Ba Community Health Center Facebook page 
 
In addition, between 2005 and 2007, the Birmingham Gambia Association 
arranged for eight junior doctors from the UK to travel to The Gambia to work for 
one-week, with support from the Ministry of Health and Social Welfare who 
provided accommodation and transportation for the doctors.  Then in 2008, the 
Birmingham Gambian Association arranged for 14 ambulances to be shipped to 
the Royal Victoria Teaching Hospital in The Gambia donated by the Sussex 
Ambulance Services. According to a member of the association: 
 
                                                                
58 http://www.dongorobahealthcentre.gm/index.php/about-us 
59 http://allafrica.com/stories/201304291323.html 
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The Gambian Association in Birmingham realized the need for ambulance 
for The Gambia then step in to negotiate with the Sussex Ambulance 
Service.  After a lengthy going and comings, we were able to secure the 
vehicles fully equipped with all that a modern ambulance needs. The 
Association was able to get some hospital equipment such as beds, 
nurses uniforms and incubators just to name a few. The Association also 
negotiated training for medical personnels.  Shipment for the ambulances 
was partly financed by the Gambia Government and the Association.  
(Interviewee 21, male, 40s, highly educated professional) 
 
There is not data available to quantify the contributions of the Gambian diaspora to 
the health sector. However, I argue that the Gambian diaspora is contributing to 
this sector in more tangible ways than the government given that monies meant for 
health sector development in The Gambia have previously been unaccounted for. 
Therefore, contributions such as building infrastructures, providing drugs, donating 
advanced medical equipment, and helping to build the skills and capacity of 
doctors through the exchange programme are likely to have long-term 
development effects in this sector.  Similarly, these types of contributions appear to 
be the common forms of contributions made by other African diasporas groups like 
the Sierra Leonean, Somali, Ghanaian, Congolese, Rwandan and Burundi 
diasporas, who are also effectively building capacity in health institutions in their 
‘home’ countries60.  However, the impacts of these of contributions are difficult to 
quantify.  
 
On the other hand, the Gambian diaspora is creating jobs for the labourers who 
build or renovate the hospitals and health centres they fund as well as the 
Gambian medical professionals working in these health institutions.  Therefore, it 
can be argued that the Gambian diaspora is contributing to the economy through 
their contributions in the health sector. In addition, the diaspora is supporting the 
capacity building of medical professionals, which is particularly important to the 
sustainable development of this sector as studies by Clemens and Pettersson 
(2008) revealed that there is large-scale emigration of Gambian nurses and 
doctors. For example 53% of physicians and 66% of nurses born in The Gambia 
were practicing outside of the country in 2000 (7) and “for every Gambian 
professional nurse working in the Gambia, likewise about two live in a developed 
country” (8)., However, there is the question of whether there would be the 
capacity to pay the Gambian nurses and doctors if they had not left the country.  
This is a difficult question to answer, which involves a lot of speculation. On the 
                                                                
60 https://diaspora.iom.int/sites/default/files/infosheet/dehpo.pdf 
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one hand, it can be argued that if these medical professionals remained in the 
country and helped to build the sector, it would bring more revenue to the 
government.  But on the other hand, the poor performing economy, high debt 
repayments, and the tax exemption of health services suggest that not much 
money will go back into the sector.  
 
Nevertheless, the fact that the Ministry of Health and Social Welfare have shown a 
willingness to accept contributions from the Gambian diaspora is encouraging for 
those who want to help the sector develop.  Perhaps health interventions are seen 
as exclusively developmental and are not politics. In other words, development is 
providing a shield behind which interventions can be made without having to 
engage in difficult discussions about the political failures of the Gambian state to 
provide these basic services.  
 
Education 
 
The Gambian diaspora in the UK and US are contributing to the education sector 
individually and via their associations (Mercer et al. 2008, Lampert 2009, Terrazas 
2010, Hammond 2011, Amagoh and Rahman 2016.  Approximately 30% of the UK 
associations claim they are funding education projects like summer schools 
(Association 3), whereas 15% of the individuals in the diaspora said they have 
been involved in donating books and school materials to students in The Gambia.  
For example, one interviewee stated, “5 years ago we took $200,000 worth of 
books to the university” (Interviewee 20, male, 40s - 50s, pro-government 
supporter). This claim was unsubstantiated and my ethnographic impression is that 
this was either overstated or false. However, I also cannot prove this. However, as 
discussed in chapter 4, any claims without supporting evidence would be treated 
as perceptions or falsehoods. In this situation, I argue that this claim is false 
because the participant did not give details about how they mobilized and sent 
$200,000 worth of book to The Gambia and who was involved.  Additionally, I have 
worked at the University of The Gambia and have not seen $200,000 worth of 
books at the library.  This is not to say that there is not a small possibility that the 
books were sent but diverted elsewhere or that the participant did send books but 
overstated the amount (the fact that he is a pro-government supporter creates 
further suspicion as they tend to overstate development contributions and 
conditions in The Gambia). However, without actual physical evidence, it is difficult 
to accept this claim as the entire truth.  Nevertheless, the advantage of being in the 
diaspora is that they have flexibility with their contributions because they are 
celebrated regardless of whether or not they contribute the amount they promise. 
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Meaning this participant would be celebrated if he sent $200,000 or $2,000 worth 
of books to the university. 
According to an interviewee in The Gambia, “the government has built schools 
everywhere across Gambia but there are not enough desks and chairs, proper 
functioning toilets or even basic resources for children to get a good quality 
education” (Interviewee 51, male, 20s and university student). This interviewee has 
had first-hand experience in the Gambian school system and therefore has a 
strong desire to see ‘real’ development in this sector.  Therefore, the contributions 
of some members of the Gambia diaspora such as providing equipment that would 
help to develop the institutional capacity and operating ability of the schools is 
arguably more appreciated by students than building more schools.  For example, 
in 2002-03, Association 3 ran a summer school programme at Gunjur Upper Basic 
School, and they supplemented the wages of ten teachers and two teaching 
assistants. 295 students were registered in 2003 (45 more students than in 2002) 
and successfully completed the programme, with nine outstanding students being 
awarded scholarship61 and two students gaining entry to the University of The 
Gambia (Association 3).  This has a long-term developmental impact because 
helping children to succeed in education would improve their long-term economic 
prospects (Durand et al. 1996, Connell and Conway, cited by Lindley 2007). 
Housing  
Roughly, 50% of the interviewees in the diaspora said they have built one or two 
houses in The Gambia. They argued that this contributes to the development of 
this sector and the economy because it is providing shelter, tax revenue, jobs, and 
income for business people amongst other things.  According to an interviewee in 
the diaspora, “I am building a house for my family which is giving employment to 
some local people and they are earning an income. I am paying taxes so the 
government is also eating their share. The house is improving the living conditions 
of my family by giving them a bigger and more comfortable space” (Interviewee 27, 
males, 40s-50s, educated professional). 
This supports the literature, which argues that the African diaspora is sending 
international remittances from OECD countries for house building projects (Plaza 
and Ratha 2011) as well as adds to the literature that argues diasporas are 
responsible for inflating house prices and causing construction booms in their 
‘home’ countries (McGregor 2014). In The Gambia, property prices have risen by 
                                                                
61 http://www.ksa-uk.org/sommer-school-report/4531937008 
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30% in the five years in some areas, and the average cost of a three-bedroom 
property is US$ 100,000 (four million dalasis) and US$ 50,000 (two million dalasis) 
for two bedrooms.  The increase attributed partly to diaspora interest in property in 
The Gambia and partly on tourism (Hatfield 2016).  The inflationary pressures 
created by the Gambian diaspora in the housing sector are on the one hand 
negative for local Gambians who cannot afford to buy or build houses due to the 
high cost of cement and building materials. But on the other hand, the boom in 
construction has been positive for commercial businesses that have expanded to 
areas like Brusubi where there is now a concentration of shops and active trade.  
In addition, the land value in this area has increased significantly, which is also 
positive for local Gambians who bought their land in Brusubi for a cheap price but 
are selling it at a much high rate. 
A popular building contractor (Interviewee 5962) in The Gambia informed me that 
they build at least three houses per year costing between two and four million 
dalasis63, for members of the Gambian diaspora.  However, they explained that a 
large proportion of labourer working in The Gambia are from Senegal, and not local 
Gambians, thus the money they earn is being remitted to their families in Senegal.  
The contractor also stated that building materials like rods, cement, doors, 
windows fitting and furniture are imported from Senegal, China, Dubai, UK, or the 
USA and not purchased from traders in The Gambia.  In fact, they only purchase 
raw materials from The Gambia, such as sand and washed stones for aggregates, 
which they get from beaches in Sanyang.  This suggested that the contributions 
the interviewees believed the diaspora are making to housing sector are not as 
great as they assumed to be.  However, this was data collected from only one 
contractor and perhaps other contractors in The Gambia would tell a different story. 
But irrespective of this information, I continue with the theme of linking 
development to politics by arguing that diaspora houses contribute to infrastructural 
development as it is making parts of the country aesthetically pleasing, raising the 
profile of the government and adding to their rhetoric of bringing development to 
the country.   
Modernising the Housing Stock  
 
Roughly, 70% of the interviewees in The Gambia argued that the Gambian 
diaspora is modernizing the housing stock in the country and thereby contributing 
                                                                
62 This interviewee originates from Senegal but decided to set up a constructions business in the 
country because they said there is a high demand in The Gambia for house building, 
63 US  $51,229.51 to $102,459.00 based on a historically accurate exchange rate of $39.04 to 1GMD 
www.exchangerates.org.uk 
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to development.  According to a student in The Gambia, “most of the beautiful 
mansions belong to the diaspora” (Interviewee 52). The majority of participant 
share this notion that the Gambian diaspora is contributing to the infrastructural 
development of the country.  For example, a member of the Gambian diaspora 
claimed “the diaspora are making invaluable contributions to the socio-economic 
development of the country.  If you travel around the country you see many people 
overseas have put up structures, which contributes to the infrastructure of the 
country” (Interviewee 14, male, 50s, professional/activist).  This statement is clearly 
only relevant in the urban areas where there is a concentration of houses built by 
members of the Gambian. However, diaspora constructions are not spread across 
the country especially in the rural areas, therefore, creating uneven development in 
The Gambia (Davies 2012).  
 
The photograph is an example of the kind of houses built by members of the 
Gambian diaspora. It has four bedrooms, multiple bathrooms, and is located in an 
upcoming area called Kerr Serign, where there are many houses with similar 
grandeur belonging to the diaspora.  The ‘modern’ features of this house are the 
grand size of the house, the design and architecture, the air conditioning unit that is 
attached to the far right side of the house, the swing set and the shape and style of 
windows (which are not the conventional rectangular shapes you would find in old 
houses in The Gambia).  The grounds around of the house are kept neat and tidy 
and the grass is irrigated and freshly groomed.  In fact based on this picture alone, 
I would argue that this house does not look like it is located in one of the poorest 
countries in West Africa. 
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Figure 13: House owned by a member of the Gambian diaspora 
 
Source: Sainabou Taal 
 
Whereas the next photograph below is of a typical Gambian family house.  This 
three bedroomed house is located in the affluent area called Fajara.  However, 
there are obvious differences in the style and design of the house to the one above.  
Gambian people today do not find this house as impressive as the one above 
because it is a modestly sized bungalow, the design is plain and the windows are 
the standard rectangle shape with obvious burglar proofing (which is considered 
out-date. Though this house displays some features of modernity such as satellite 
dishes and air conditioning, I argue that Gambians are more likely to see the house 
above as making the bigger contribution to development than this older style house. 
For my interviewees, this modernization of housing was a visible sign of Gambian 
development.  
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Figure 14: House owned by resident Gambian 
 
Sources: Gambia Property Shop64  
 
Modernizing the housing stock in The Gambia contributes to economic 
development because it raises the house prices (McGregor 2014, Hatfield 2016), 
thus more tax can be collected and it improves the appearance of the country, 
which would presumably attract more tourists and foreign investors. However, this 
adds only one aspect of growing the tourism sector, as the country also has good 
weather, beaches, political stability and is in close proximity to Europe, which also 
attracts tourism and foreign investors. 
 
On the other hand, the interviews revealed that diaspora do not build houses for 
the purpose of development even though links can be made. However, 45% of 
interviewees in the diaspora built their houses for their families, 25% for investment 
(rental property) and 15% stated that they wanted to eventually return ‘home’.  This 
supports part of the ‘migration and development’ literature, which argues that 
development is not a motive for emigration rather it is a secondary consequence of 
migration (Bréant 2013).  But for one member of the Gambian diaspora, the reason 
people build big modern houses in the country is to show their families and 
affiliates that they have achieved success and also to elevate their social status 
within The Gambia.   
 
                                                                
64 http://www.gambiapropertyshop.com/africa/gambia/city-of-banjul/fajara/property/fajara-m-section-3-
bed-house-and-3-stores-for-rent 
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Ostentatiousness - showing off, and competition.  Of course, these 
variables largely depend on the personalities involved, their family’s social 
status.  So most of our diaspora and transnational migrant actions, aims 
and ambitions are inseparable from our social realities in the homeland 
(Interviewee 42, male, 40s, highly educated professional) 
 
What this interviewee is saying in this statement is that he believes Gambians in 
the diaspora are motivated to build houses to show off and conform to societal 
expectations and not for the purpose of development.  This is because the social 
realities in the country are such that a person’s success in the diaspora is often 
measured by their ability to build a house at ‘home’. This is statement is arguably a 
perception and reality in the sense that the interviewee perceives members of the 
Gambian diaspora as “ostentatious” and ‘show off”.  However, the reality is that 
Gambian society places pressure on the diaspora to prove their success with 
material things like a house (Kabwe and Segatti 2003, Mazzucato 2010). However, 
the residual outcome of such constructions is development and, in some context, it 
is more comfortable to think about these houses in developmental terms than as a 
demonstration of personal success.  
 
Agriculture 
 
The research found that some members of the Gambian diaspora are investing in 
the agriculture sector by establishing farms, agro-processing firms and marketing 
and distributing agricultural products in The Gambia.  The literature on the African 
diaspora and development does not pay much attention to diasporas in agriculture, 
perhaps because the kind of interventions agriculture needs (eg farm to market 
roads) are not necessarily the kinds of intervention the diaspora can provide (as 
mentioned in the introduction of this chapter). However, according to IFAD, African 
diaspora groups like the Somalis are investing in the agriculture sector in their 
‘home’ countries by providing financial support to business owners in agriculture 
and thus helping to enhance food security in Somalia.  For example, IFAD 
supported eight Somali diaspora investors in the AgriFood Fund programme in 
Somalia, to which they contributed 40% to 60% of the US$ 435,600 financing that 
was awarded to six business owners in agriculture (IFAD 2016). In The Gambia, 
there are a number of diaspora-owned agriculture businesses like Deggeh Foods 
International, which, is an agro-processing firm that exports products like palm oil, 
cassava, mangos, peanut butter and moringa to the US and other West African 
countries and was established in 2007.  Then there is EverGreen Farm established 
in 2011, which is a five-hectare farm located in Manduar and Jambur in the 
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Western Division of The Gambia where they grow and sell fruits and vegetables.  
This is a 2 million GMD (USD $67,363) ongoing project and in 2014, EverGreen 
Farm won the Gambia Chamber of Commerce and Industry (GCCI) Business Plan 
Competition Award and with it the sum of 1,000,000 GMD (USD 25,157,23 65).  
Lastly, there is Farm Fresh established in 2015, which markets and distribute fruits 
and vegetables in The Gambia.  This is the first online food service in The Gambia, 
and the owner is a return migrant. 
However, only one interviewee in the diaspora claimed to have provided financing 
for a family farm. They explained:  
Right now I am helping my younger brother start a poultry business.  I 
have spent GMD 200, 000.00 dalasi (USD $4644.6866) to build the chicken 
house, buy the chickens and the feed.  Initially, I use to spend money to 
feed my family, but now that I have invested in the poultry business, I have 
made my family self-sufficient (Interviewee 41, male, 30-40s and post-
graduate student).   
From the interviews, it appeared that the participants in the Gambian diaspora 
were not engaged in this sector. However, the development contributions from the 
agricultural businesses listed above arguably include create employment, offer a 
market to farmers to sell their products and help them export their products as well 
provide tax revenues. However, unfortunately, there was no data available to 
conclusively determine the extent of the Gambian diaspora is contributing to the 
development of this sector.  
5.4 Conclusions 
 
This chapter addressed the research question how, why and where does the 
diaspora contribute to development in The Gambia? Using the empirical data, this 
chapter discussed the various areas in which the Gambian diaspora contributes to 
development in The Gambia. It also identified the different types of contributions 
they make at ‘home’ and explained the motivations behind them. In this chapter, I 
argued that the Gambian diaspora is making the most contribution directly to their 
families, which is helping to augment household consumption and alleviate 
household poverty (de Haas 2012, Chami and Fullenkamp 2013).  In addition, six 
out of the ten associations were funding development projects in their ‘home’ 
                                                                
65 Exchange rate of Dalasi to US Dollars in May 2014 was at 39.75 http://usd.fxexchangerate.com/gmd-
2014_05_22-exchange-rates-history.html 
66 Exchange rate of Dalasi to US Dollars in May 2015 was at 43.06 
http://www.exchangerates.org.uk/USD-GMD-30_05_2015-exchange-rate-history.html 
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towns/villages (Mercer et al. 2008, Lampert 2009, Evans 2010), they claimed this 
was because they have an emotional link to that place (Mercer and Page 2010, 
Mavroudi 2015, Moniruzzaman 2016).  In this empirical research, I found strong 
notions of autochthony and the ‘politics of belonging’ were the key drivers for some 
members of the Gambian diaspora to assist the country in development as well as 
in politics (Lampert 2009, Kleist 2013, Kleist and Turner 2013).  Lastly, the 
interviewees made no direct contributions to national development but felt the 
government is benefiting significantly from their remittances through taxation. 
These claims were disproved by the empirical evidence, which showed that goods 
and services paid for by diaspora remittance contributed a tiny percentage to tax 
revenue.  
 
Another key finding from this research was that some scales of intervention are 
much more significant to people in the diaspora than others but it is hard to keep all 
three scales entirely separate. Sometimes contributions at one scale complement 
another (eg paying family members school fees improves national development 
indicators about school attendance).  But sometimes there are contradictions 
meaning that directing remittances to the small proportion of Gambian families who 
have members overseas is likely to exacerbate spatial and social inequalities, 
which undermines development (Davies 2012, Skeldon 2005, 2008, Page and 
Mercer 2012).   Nevertheless, the majority of the individuals in the Gambian 
diaspora are driven to make financial and material contributions to their families’ 
wellbeing because they believe they have a non-negotiable obligation to towards 
their families (Lindley 2010, Mercer and Page 2010, Hammond et al. 2011, Enoh 
2014, Sinatti and Horst 2014, Horst et al 2014). It was clear from the interviews 
that the relationships those in the diaspora have with their families in The Gambia 
are separate to the state. In this way, the intervention people make draws a strong 
separation in peoples’ minds between the development benefits of these 
interventions and their role in Gambian politics. For example, if these remittances 
are not about the state then they are not about politics. Yet, it is suggested here 
that there are a number of ways in which they have a political effect. For example, 
they reduce the civil engagement of the people (Obadare and Adebanwi 2009) and 
allow the government to be unaccountable to the people (Saine 2009). 
 
In addition, this research revealed that some sectors are far more amenable to 
diaspora development interventions than others because relatively small projects 
(such as school desks, books or bikes) can have a positive effect in education and 
health. It is quite easy to organize such an intervention and bring it to a conclusion. 
In contrast, setting up an agro-industrial enterprise or building a house requires 
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considerably more risks, planning, capital and time. Nevertheless, I found it 
particularly difficult to measure the impact of their contributions to these economic 
sectors partly due to the lack of data.  However, by using case study examples of 
groups like the Somali diaspora in agriculture I was able to show that agriculture is 
an area of interest for diaspora intervention. In essence, these findings revealed 
that some sectors are basically easier to intervene in than others from the 
diaspora’s perspective. But even so, one of the attractions of engaging these 
sectors is that they are unambiguously developmental and generally by-pass 
debates about interfering in politics. 
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Chapter 6:  
The Barriers to Developing The Gambia 
 
This chapter speaks to the same academic literature as chapter 5 but focuses on 
the obstacles that prevent the Gambian diaspora from being effective agents of 
development in The Gambia. This chapter is divided into three substantive sections 
after the introduction.  The first section discusses and analyses the barriers at 
family and town/village level such as managing demands and high expectations, 
dependency and misappropriation of diaspora money.  The second section 
discusses and analyses the barriers at the government level, which includes the 
marginalization of the diaspora from national development projects, fear of physical 
safety in The Gambia, fixing exchange rates, and high levels of bureaucracy.  The 
third section discusses the institutional challenges, including operating diaspora 
associations, brain drain and the associated lack of skilled capacity, and academic 
freedom. The final section concludes the chapter by drawing together the key 
arguments and discussions. 
 
6.1 Introduction 
 
This chapter primarily discusses the barriers the interviewees in the diaspora say 
they encounter when attempting to contribute to development in The Gambia.  
These barriers exist partly because of the politicization of development in the 
country, (which means the state determines who to engage in national 
development and controls resource allocations) and partly because there are high 
expectations and demands placed on the diaspora (which often means their 
resources are directed at family level, and thus rarely go towards productive 
investments). The main argument in this chapter is that the politicization of 
development within the country creates a fundamental barrier for the diaspora. 
Since the government claims a monopoly on the credit for delivering development 
and uses development as a political tool to preserve its reputation with the 
population, some members of the Gambian diaspora do not wish to participate in 
national development for fear of further entrenching the power of the state. I further 
argue that it is the responsibility of the government and policymakers in The 
Gambia to establish diaspora-engagement policies and targeted incentives that 
would attract diaspora investments.  For example, lower tariffs on imported raw 
materials and equipment (a policy used in Mali), reduce or give diasporas 
discounts on certain state taxes (a policy used in Senegal) (Agunias and Newland 
2011), create treasury bonds and stocks to Gambians living abroad (an incentive 
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used in Rwanda) (Fransen and Siegel 2013) or set up ‘one-shop stops’ to help 
investors in the Gambian diaspora avoid having to move between different 
ministries and have legislations that allow for new businesses to be established in 
a few days (policy also in Rwanda (Lemarchand and Tash 2015) .  Even though 
these policies and incentives will not guarantee investment from members of the 
Gambian diaspora, however, the findings from the interviews suggest that some 
want to invest in the country but will only do so when they feel their capital and 
physical safety is not at risk.  Nevertheless, for those in the Gambian diaspora who 
want to contribute to development at present, their options are to either direct their 
contributions through local NGOs like the Gambian United Society diaspora 
association in the UK in 2010, when they received no response from the Ministry of 
Health after expressing their interest in supporting  flood victims.  Thus, they 
directed £10,000 to the Gambian Red Cross.  Or the Gambian diaspora can direct 
their contributions to fund village development projects that would contribute to key 
development indicators such as in the areas of health and education.  Such 
projects (Dongoro Ba health centre and exchange programme for UK medical 
doctors) seem to be welcomed by the government. 
This chapter responds to the objective set out by Ragazzi (2014) to find out “why 
certain states engage or do not to engage with their population abroad” (76).  In the 
article ‘A comparative analysis of diaspora policies’, Ragazzi (2014) creates a 
typology of sending states, against which he assesses various explanatory 
frameworks. However, the typology does not include politically repressive states 
like The Gambia, thus, I look to the empirical data to explain why the government 
does not engage the diaspora. As one interviewee in the diaspora puts it “we (the 
diaspora) are not even allowed to participate (at national level) – [President] 
Jammeh has said he does not want our ideas” (Interviewee 28, male, 40s and 
highly educated professional).  This interviewee is not a member of the political 
Gambian diaspora, however, the fact that they commented about feeling 
marginalized in homeland affairs creates the impression that the wider Gambian 
diaspora has a shared feeling of exclusion in national development. On the other 
hand, an economist in The Gambia attributed the exclusion to the political 
affiliations of the Gambian diaspora.  He explains that the “government places too 
much emphasis on the political affiliation of the diaspora rather than their 
development potential….” (Interviewee 61, male, 60, economist/former civil 
servant/highly educated professional). There is some truth in both claims, but the 
aim of this chapter is to analyse the barriers highlighted by the interviewees and to 
determine whether they are ‘real’ or they provide an excuse for some interviewees 
in the diaspora to be inactive in development at ‘home’. 
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6.2 Family, Town and Village 
 
Managing the Demands and Expectations of the Family 
 
All the interviewees in the diaspora stated that they felt compelled to send money 
‘home’ to their families, to cover the cost of food, shelter, bills, education, 
healthcare, and other immediate needs.  In chapter 5, I argued that these could be 
viewed as micro development contributions that would help the diaspora achieve 
their end goal of alleviating their own families from poverty.  For example, one 
interviewee in the diaspora stated, “I am working for my family, the money is for my 
mother, wife and children and sometimes extended family…” (Interviewee 35, male, 
40s-50s, highly educated professional).   
 
However, from the 35% of interviewees in the diaspora who claim their families 
depend solely on their remittances, 10% stated that their families in The Gambia 
have high expectations, and at times they have to make sacrifices in order to meet 
their demands (Hammond 2011).  For example, some interviewees stated that their 
families increasingly ask for money for things they do not consider to be 
necessities. One interviewee explained, “sometimes I have to deny my family here 
to send money there and they don’t always spend it as they should” (Interviewee 
13, male, 40s, highly educated professional).  
 
In chapter 5, I also argued that feelings of guilt combined with high levels of 
poverty in the country play an important part in driving the diaspora to succumb to 
the demands of their families.  For example, one interviewee stated, “if my mother 
calls and tells me she is starving then I have to send her money” (Interviewee 11, 
male, 50s, activist). Some interviewees seemed overemphasized their 
responsibilities particularly those that are involved in politics. However, they also 
simultaneously claim that people in The Gambia exaggerate the struggles of living 
in a poor country (Horst 2004). This contradicts the picture of an easy and 
untroubled regular flow of remittances.  In addition, this same interviewee stated 
they send remittances religiously every month to their family, thus it is unlikely that 
their mother will be starving.  
 
Nevertheless, it can be argued that the demands from ‘home’, however 
unreasonable, are not a barrier for the diaspora, as it has not stopped them from 
providing the financial and/or material support to their families.  In fact, only a small 
proportion of the sample in the Gambian diaspora felt this was a barrier, whereas, 
the majority felt they are reciprocated for their contributions with a strong sense of 
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belonging and pride.  Thus, 40% of the interviewees said they were happy to 
support the needs of their families, because as one interviewee explained “I feel 
proud and happy to be able to assist them with whatever they want as things are 
not easy for some of them who are not working so it’s a pleasure for me to help 
out.” (Interviewee 21, male, 40s, highly educated professional). 
 
Dependency 
 
The idea that diaspora remittances create dependency among recipients (Skeldon 
2005, 2008, Davies 2012, de Haas 2012, Page and Mercer 2012, Horst et al. 
2014) was also highlighted as a barrier in the interviews with the Gambian diaspora.  
Approximately 18% of the interviewees expressed the view that dependence on 
remittances is a barrier for the diaspora because people look to them instead of the 
government to fill socio-economic development gaps. According to an interviewee 
in the diaspora: 
 
The negative impact of remittances is, the more money we send increases 
the levels of dependency.  The people think it’s the responsibility of their 
family to take care of them and not the government. (Interviewee 41, male, 
30s-40s and postgraduate student) 
 
This interviewee feels perhaps this burden more because he is a student. However, 
the opinion that remittances decrease accountability of government (Saine 2009) 
supports existing research that states remittances reduce the civic engagement of 
recipients (Obadare and Adebanwi 2009). It also illustrates how difficult it is to treat 
development as distinct from politics. For example, while their maybe many 
Gambians at ‘home’ who are comfortable asking their family members in the 
diaspora for help, a significant proportion of them will not use their votes to 
leverage resources or accountability from the government. For instance, the 
average voter turnout for the presidential elections in The Gambia has decreased 
from 1972 and 199267 to 2001- 201568, from 71% to 62.30%. At the same time, it is 
hard to disentangle this cause of political inaction from other factors as more than 
half of the interviewees believed the reduced civic engagement of Gambian people 
is attributed to the fear of state-sanctioned violence in The Gambia.  For example, 
the protest against the Gambian government by school students in April 2000 
resulted in the death of 14 students and 1 journalist, after the security forces 
opened fire on them.  More recently, the protest organized by supporters of the 
                                                                
67 http://africanelections.tripod.com/gm.html 
68 http://www.electionguide.org/countries/id/80/ (25/7/2016) 
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UDP opposition political party resulted in one death and the incarceration of the 
party leader.  According to students at the university: 
 
There is the fear of criticizing the government, so people stay silent.  
Freedom is lacking here, we are talking now, but we are also looking over 
our shoulders.  People are politically terrorized and nobody wants to stand 
and debate about politics. (Interviewee 51, male, 20s) 
 
Fear, as discussed in the introduction chapter, is defined in the literature as an 
emotion, which is at most time subjective.  However, the anecdotal and empirical 
evidence collected in The Gambia confirmed that fear of state-sanctioned violence 
is ‘just’ because critics of the government have been publicly persecuted by the 
national security forces.  Therefore, in this case, fear is real and an objective 
emotion in The Gambia. In addition, fear can also be used to explain for why 
people in the country depend on diaspora remittances and not on the government.  
 
Furthermore, the interviews in The Gambia and the diaspora also revealed that 
people believed development assistance from the government depends on the 
political affiliations of groups in different geographical areas.  This is perhaps 
another explanation for the dependency of diaspora remittance. For example, 
according to a student in The Gambia, “those who support the APRC political party 
have development at their door step” (Interviewee 51, male, 20s).  And according 
to an interviewee in the diaspora:  
 
In 20 years, the energy sector has not improved and this is key to 
development but he (President Jammeh) makes sure he has power in his 
own village.  He is diverting resources where it is not needed.  Kanilai is an 
isolated village where all development is (Interviewee 39, male, 30s-40s 
and highly educated professional/ activist) 
 
Analyst Donald Wright (2015) reported in his book ‘The World and a Very Small 
Place in Africa. A History of Globalization in Niumi, The Gambia. 3rd ed’, that 
Kanilai village (where President Jammeh is from and has a significant number of 
supporters) was one of the only villages in The Gambia to have electricity, 
streetlights, paved roads, and running water. This claim supports the view in the 
wider literature on African politics that resource allocations are directed to areas 
where there is voter support (Abdulai and Hickey 2014).  Nevertheless, 
approximately 65% of the interviewees in the diaspora claimed they would not 
encourage people to engage in civil disobedience for the sake of holding the 
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government accountable.  This is because there are fears that it would trigger a 
civil conflict. For example, one interviewee in the diaspora professed, “we do not 
want war… if conflict happens then women and children will perish.  We do not 
want what happened in Syria to happen in Gambia” (Interviewee 25, male, 30s and 
pro-government supporter). This argument is interesting not because it fits in with 
the rhetoric of President Jammeh and his many supporters that interference from 
the diaspora would lead to instability in the country. But because the current global 
humanitarian crisis in Syria and the role of outside forces in perpetuating the civil 
conflict in that country has arguably made some Gambians afraid of the 
transnational intervention of the diaspora even if it is done under the shield of 
‘development’.  This shows the Gambian diaspora are in a difficult position 
because, on the one hand, they want the government to be held to account, but on 
the other hand, they do not want family members to suffer from poverty.  As such, 
this feeling of responsibility will not allow the Gambian diaspora to stop sending 
remittances, which of course creates dependency. 
 
The ‘Misappropriation’ of Diaspora Money by Family and Village Members 
 
The ‘misappropriation’ of diaspora money occurs when members of the diaspora 
send money for their own personal projects or to contribute to group projects but 
that money is not spent as intended. When this occurs, the diaspora would usually 
react by either discontinuing the project or directing their money to other people 
they trust.  For example, one interviewee in the diaspora explained, “they do not 
feel guilty about taking our money.  It has gotten to the extent that if someone 
outside wants something in Gambia, they have to get someone local to buy it on 
their behalf so their families do not know it is for them” (Interviewee 4, female, 40s, 
professional/ activist). That is to say, if money was being sent for a diaspora 
house-building project it might be that it is sent directly to a supplier of materials 
rather than via a family member.  
 
‘Misappropriation’ at Family Level 
 
Only a small proportion of the interviewees (5%) raised ‘misappropriation’ of 
diaspora money sent for personal projects as an issue in The Gambia.  A female 
interviewee in the diaspora explained her experience with her brother-in-law 
‘misappropriating’ £20,000 she sent to her sister for a personal project (Interviewee 
70, female, 30s, highly skilled professional).  She expressed her fury was further 
heightened when she learned her brother-in-law had used some of that money to 
marry a second wife.  There is an important question of gender here as both 
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interviewees 4 and 70 are women complaining about their families ‘unjustly’ taking 
their money. Within the feminist literature, there is the argument that gender 
relations at ‘home’ are not shifted by remittances, as Beth Buggenhagen (2004) 
found in her study of Senegalese women. In this sense, the men remain as the 
head of the household and control the income that enters the home. Therefore, it 
can be argued that perhaps the brother-in-law felt it was their responsibility to 
make decisions about how that money was spent, even though it was meant for a 
personal project.  The brother in law could also argue that the money was used as 
part of a broader family project because a new wife will contribute to the household.  
However, there is no evidence to support this claim but it does raise questions for 
further research.   For example, who has the right to determine ‘misappropriation’, 
the giver or the intended/expecting receiver?  
 
Nevertheless, since only a small proportion of interviewees highlighted this as an 
issue it would be hard to conclude that diverting remittances is a major problem for 
the entire sample. Though it was no doubt a significant barrier for interviewees 4 
and 70, to whom it has happened and they felt disheartened that their family 
‘squandered’ their money. Particularly as the personal projects interviewee 70 was 
funding was to provide accommodation and sustainable income for their family.  
These interviews cast doubt on claims from elsewhere in the literature that the 
African diaspora benefit from support with their investments from family members 
at ‘home’ (Mazzucato’s 2010; 460).  
 
‘Misappropriation’ at Town and Village Level 
 
The interviews also revealed that diaspora money for town/village developments 
project had been ‘misappropriated’ by members of town/village.  According to an 
interviewee in the diaspora:  
 
I started something to help the community in terms of health.  I started a 
pharmacy and 10% of profits were to go back to the community.  What 
happened then is I realised the people I was dealing with were more 
interested in their personal gain than helping the community.  After that I 
did not go ahead with it (Interviewee 27, males, 40s-50s and educated 
professional) 
 
Though, only one interviewee from the sample had had the experience of their 
money being ‘misappropriated’ by town/village members.   This arguably has a 
larger impact on development, as it would have benefitted more people than at 
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family level. Again, it would be interesting to have heard this story from the 
opposite perspective, why, after all, would those people putting work into the 
project from the Gambian side not expect to see benefits? Can they really be 
expected to be in a position to be as altruistic as the donor? Nevertheless, this 
barrier has prevented interviewee 27 from supporting development in their 
community and perhaps explains why development contributions by the diaspora 
are at times believed to not improve the material quality of life in the homeplace 
(Mercer et al. 2008) as it prevented them from being able to implement their 
projects.  This data also tells us something about the limited understanding and 
empathy on both sides of the diaspora/home resident divide.  
 
6.3 The Government Scale 
 
This section argues that there are four key barriers to enrolling the diaspora into 
Gambian development that operate at a government scale. First, and most 
significantly there are the contested claims about whether the diaspora is actively 
marginalized by the current government in The Gambia. Second, there is the 
question of the disincentive associated with the ‘political risk’ of investing in 
businesses in The Gambia because the government cannot be trusted from a 
business perspective. Third, there is the manipulation of exchange rates by the 
government, which discourages investment by over-valuing the Gambian dalasi 
and finally, fourth there is the high level of bureaucracy associated with starting a 
business in The Gambia. This section provides evidence from those in the 
diaspora of the impact of these factors on their willingness to engage. However, 
government official and pro-government members of the diaspora refute the claims 
that these are barriers to engaging and instead argue that they are used by the 
diaspora as excuses for their inactivity in national development.  
 
Marginalization of the Diaspora in National Development 
 
The marginalization of the Gambian diaspora in national development has meant 
that Gambians abroad have had very limited participation in the country’s 
development agenda.  According to the interviews, the government’s decision to 
largely exclude the diaspora from national development projects is attributed to 
President Jammeh and his supporters being extremely frustrated by the political 
interventions of some groups in the Gambian diaspora. These groups have set out 
to expose the activities of the government, such as the human right violations, 
political repression and mismanagement of the economy.  This has resulted in 
mutual distrust.    
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According to some pro-government supporters in the interviews, the political 
interventions of some members of the Gambian diaspora are responsible for the 
government marginalizing the wider diaspora from national development projects.  
An employee of the Gambian government in the US stated “the very few who are in 
politics are creating a stumbling block for the majority of Gambians” (Interviewee 
24, male, 30s-40s, diplomat).  This interviewee gave the impression that he 
received the interventions of the diaspora as a personal attack, presumably 
because he is an employee of the Gambian government.  In addition, during the 
interview, he was extremely defensive and aggressive almost appearing as though 
he was trying to bully me into agreeing with his criticisms of the political diaspora.  
It was clear that he felt he had to counteract the claims made by members of the 
diaspora in particular against the government. Therefore, he added that “the 
problem is on the side of the Gambian diaspora, the government has created an 
enabling environment for people to come and do something” (Interviewee 24) 
 
These claims made by interviewee 24 and the pro-government supporters perhaps 
stem from the activities of some political groups in the Gambian diaspora who are 
using social media sites like Facebook and Twitter to criticize the government.  The 
picture below was taken during the rainy reason in The Gambia and shared on 
Facebook by the diaspora-owned online newspaper Gainako. The caption reads 
‘Jammeh’s Vision 2020 is picture perfect’.  Vision 2020 is the government’s 
development blueprint as mentioned in chapter 3, and one of its aims is “to develop 
inland road and water-way transport networks 69” in The Gambia by the year 2020. 
The Internet had allowed this group to produce, and circulate national political 
content from outside the nation (Bernal 2013; 246), which the government and its 
supporter are highly against 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                                
69 http://statehouse.gov.gm/vision-2020-part-1-long-term-objectives/ 
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Figure 15: Social media post criticizing government development efforts or lack 
thereof 
 
Source: Gainako Online Newspaper Facebook page 
 
There is a paradox associated with this post because though some members of the 
political diaspora have publicly mocked the Vision 2020 development strategy. The 
development desires of the diaspora for The Gambia are those listed as key 
objectives in this document (improved infrastructure, economic growth, 
strengthened public sector institutions and increased human resource capital). 
Therefore, from the perspective of pro-government supporter, it would be better for 
the diaspora to support the government in delivering these objectives rather than to 
mock them. Whereas the aim of the political diaspora is to disprove claims made 
by the government that development is taking place under President Jammeh 
because they recognize that ‘development’ is one of the reasons for his popularity 
in The Gambia.  
 
The interviews also suggest that many people in the Gambian diaspora want 
respect from the government. Some interviewees stated that they want the 
government to acknowledge the scale and value of remittances to The Gambia70 
                                                                
70 Which might include more accurate data collection in relation to remittances 
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and therefore acknowledge that the diaspora is making significant contributions to 
the nation.  
 
Jammeh came to the US a few years ago and made a derogatory remark 
about the diaspora saying we are only here as dishwashers which show 
his lack of understanding of what is floating his economy… donor money is 
drying up, and they are depending on the remittances that are coming from 
the diaspora.  (Interviewee 4, female, 40s, professional/ activist) 
 
According to the literature, donors are pressuring African countries to redefine their 
relationships with their citizens abroad (Iheduru 2011) because they are 
increasingly recognizing the developmental potential of migrants (Ratha et al. 2011 
and Gamlen 2014). However, the empirical evidence suggests that the Gambian 
government is unlikely to succumb to pressure from international donors.  For 
example, in 2013 President Jammeh withdrew the country from the 
Commonwealth of Nations on the grounds that it is a “neo-colonial institution,” but 
the suspicion in the international media71 is that this decision was a reaction to a 
Foreign and Commonwealth Office report in 201372, which singled out The Gambia 
for its poor human rights records. Therefore, the government will not legitimize the 
contributions of the diaspora because they view the Gambian diaspora as hostile 
opposition.  Reciprocally, some members of the Gambian diaspora will not 
legitimize President Jammeh’s leadership and internal development successes 
because he will not allow the diaspora to participate in national development. This 
in itself creates a major barrier for diasporas engagement in national development. 
 
On the other hand, government officials in The Gambia dispute claims made by the 
diaspora that they are marginalized in national development.  For example, a civil 
servant at the Ministry of Trade argued that the government offers financial 
incentives, tax exemptions or delayed tax payments to investors and this includes 
the diaspora. According to this interviewee: 
 
The government provides Special Investment Certificates and protection to 
investors thus making it difficult for the same foreign items to be imported.  
They also protect investors’ money therefore, I do not see a barrier for 
someone to come and invest … the environment is very liberal.  No 
restrictions or conditionality (Interviewee 57, male, 50s-60s and civil 
servant) 
                                                                
71 http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-24376127 
72 Human Rights and Democracy: The 2012 Foreign & Commonwealth Office Report 
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However, despite presenting what appears to be a good incentive for diaspora 
engagement, I got the impression that this interviewee was also aware of the 
frustrations of the diaspora (though I felt they would not admit it in an interview). 
The Special Investment Certificates he referred is indeed available to the diaspora 
but the issue is that some members of the Gambian diaspora do not believe that 
the government would protect their investments. For example, one interviewee 
explained, “I lost 3 plots of land because the government took them and then sold 
them to other people even though I followed right channels to buy the land” 
(Interviewee 4, female, 40s, professional/ activist). This view is in line with research 
elsewhere that suggests that diaspora investors are very sensitive to the arbitrary 
and inefficient way in which some states work (Gamlen 2008;13).  To further 
elaborate on this, the empirical evidence revealed that there are several cases of 
land grabbing by the Government of The Gambia.  For example, Dr Malanding 
Jaiteh (a Gambian who teaches Geographic Information System (GIS) for 
International Studies at Columbia University in the US) set up a ‘Landing grabbing 
in The Gambia’ website73 where people can report if their land has been taken by 
President Jammeh (for himself, or for one of his companies Kanilai Group 
International or Kanilai Farms or Presidential Farms).  The website provides aerial 
views of where land have been reported to be taken and they are marked as 
verified or unverified reports.  In addition, some interviewees used well-known 
cases of land grabbing in places like Batokunku (located in the Kombo South, 
Western Division)74 (where the government demolished privately owned houses) to 
justify why they believe investing in The Gambia is too risky. In addition, two 
interviewees said they would rather invest in land and properties in neighbouring 
Senegal because they believe the environment there is more conducive, there are 
fewer risks and no language barriers. 
 
However, the pro-government supporters in the diaspora claimed to have a good 
relationship with the government and this is centred on aspirations for development. 
For example, on the 19th December 2014, an interviewee shared photographs on 
Facebook of themselves, the Ambassador and embassy staff with other members 
of the diaspora.  They included a caption, which read: 
 
…Thanks to God and everyone that made it possible for this important 
meeting to take place for the betterment of all Gambians and The Gambia 
we all love…the embassy doors are open to all Gambians.  The meeting 
was open for all Gambians to hear from the Charge de Affair Hon Sheikh 
                                                                
73 https://gambia.crowdmap.com/main 
74 http://www.maafanta.com/laminceesayjammehaninsult 
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Omar Faye welcome Uncle Falai and show the commitment of the 
Gambian government to reaching out to everyone who wants peace for the 
country and national development  
 
What is especially interesting about the Facebook post is that ‘Uncle Falai’ 
(Baldeh) served as a member of the political diaspora in the US for over 20 years, 
but in 2014, he decided to ‘reconcile’ with the government.  Thus, rather than 
seeing this event as a step from the government to engage the Gambia diaspora in 
national development, the meeting was criticized trying to  ‘ridiculing’ the political 
diaspora by winning over one of their veterans activists.  This shows that there are 
also for the government because their attempts to engage the diaspora are 
instantly dismissed by their critics. Therefore, it would be interesting to see who 
would participate if policymakers in The Gambia established diaspora-engagement 
policies.  This also raises the question, are the Gambian diaspora genuinely 
interested in investing in national development or do they use the disincentive of 
‘political risk’ and a breakdown of relations between government and diaspora as 
an excuse to justify their inactivity?   
 
Questions of citizenship articulate closely with questions of belonging, and a strong 
sense of belonging is more likely to generate a willingness to participate in 
development (Lampert 2009, Kleist 2013, Kleist and Turner 2013, Ragazzi 2014, 
Moniruzzaman 2016). The interviews revealed a strong sense of belonging to The 
Gambia, however, I argue that when that sense is challenged (for example in 
relation to questions of citizenship) it reduces the likelihood of individuals 
participating in development initiatives. For example, an interviewee in the diaspora 
stated,   “the diaspora are citizens they should be accorded basic respect for 
political rights and civic duties.  But the diaspora is disenfranchised because we 
are not allowed to vote or participate in politics because the government does not 
see us as citizens” (Interviewee 13, male, 40s-50s, and activist).  The denial of 
voting and other rights is a barrier that prevents engagement with development.  
 
Nevertheless, according to the 1997 Constitution of the Republic of The Gambia, 
citizenship can be acquired by birth, by descent and by naturalisation. And as the 
interviewees in the diaspora were born in The Gambia, there are no questions 
about their citizenship according to the laws of the land.  Therefore, the barrier is 
not citizenship but the lack of opportunity to exercise their rights as citizens.  For 
example being voting in president elections.  In other African states, the practice of 
political participation is being reshaped through voting and the extension of 
citizenship rights across borders (Ragazzi 2014) precisely to enrol diasporas into 
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national development visions.  And many Gambians in the diaspora want the right 
to participant in elections. As one interviewee puts it: 
 
Presently, diaspora Gambians cannot vote during elections. In my view, 
Gambians in the diaspora should be allowed to participate in our national 
elections. The need to enfranchise Gambians in the diaspora should be an 
important electoral reform and a preoccupation of all, as it is only fair that 
genuine efforts are made to give eligible overseas Gambians the 
opportunity to exercise their civic rights. The way forward, it must be 
underscored, must include the need to recognize and welcome Gambians 
abroad to participate in future national elections. Gambians in the diaspora 
have been contributing significantly to the country’s socio-economic 
development and as a result, the Electoral Act should be amended to allow 
diaspora Gambians to perform their civic duties and choose their leaders in 
national elections. (Interviewee 3, male, 40s-50s and academic) 
 
This statement also suggests the diaspora should be repaid for contributing to 
development with voting rights. However, for this to happen the government would 
have to see the diaspora as ‘real’ development partners, which they do not.  This 
goes back to the claims made earlier that the popularity of government largely 
depends on the fact that people see them as the sole entity that brings 
development to the country.  Therefore, allowing the diaspora to take part in 
national development would threaten this image and allowing them to vote would 
threaten their power and control over the people and resources (Enoh 2014).  
 
Physical Security  
 
A small proportion of the interviewees expressed fear of their own physical safety 
in The Gambia as a result of their political activity in the diaspora. Individuals in 
such circumstances have a further disincentive for investing back ‘home’ though 
they do claim to be contributing to development through their political interventions.  
Part of the reason these interviewees said fear was a barrier is because of the 
disappearance of two US Gambian men, in May 2013, who were believed to have 
been mistaken by the national security forces as opponents trying to ‘destabilize’ 
the government. According, to reports from the Washington Post, Alhagie Ceesay 
and Ebou Jobe (who were American citizens but had been born in The Gambia) 
travelled to The Gambia in order to invest in a computer service business after 
cashing in their savings from their retirement plans in the US.  But on arrival, they 
were being tracked by the Gambian Intelligence Agency (NIA) (for reasons 
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unknown) as they moved around the country.  They stopped communicating with 
their families around the end of June 201375 and have not been seen ever since.  
 
The disappearance of Alhagie Ceesay and Ebou Jobe triggered a large-scale 
reaction from the Gambian diaspora.  Their families and members of the politically 
active diaspora have been campaigning online and staging protests in the US, 
demanding to know what happened to these two men. And recently in October 
2016, US officials wrote to the Gambian government enquiring into their 
whereabouts.76 This event has demotivated some interviewees from investing in 
The Gambia.  For example, according to an interviewee in the diaspora:  
 
There are lots of barriers for people from abroad who want to invest in the 
country.  I have heard stories about people going to set up business and 
having problems.  Two Gambian-Americans disappeared and the 
government is not doing anything about it. Personally, I am a Gambian and 
would love to be in Gambia and invest but I am not comfortable going 
there (Interviewee 15, male, 40s and highly educated professional). 
 
However, despite this being a genuine concern for some participants in diaspora, a 
great majority of them said they could travel back ‘home’ without the fear of their 
physical safety being threatened because they are not involved in politics.  
Therefore, it seems most participants see the barrier as politics and not to physical 
security. In which case, fear is subjective to those involved in the politics.   
However, the fact that the participants kept repeating the story of the 
disappearance of the two Gambian-Americans during the interviews suggest 
physical security has had a wider impact on the diaspora as a whole. Perhaps this 
incident has made people in the diaspora consider the risks involved in travelling 
‘home’ but not prevented from going to The Gambia. This barrier is distinctive to 
the wider literature on ‘diaspora and development’ in that discussion of physical 
safety tends to focus on refugees fleeing violence in their countries of origin 
(Lindley 2007, Eckstein and Najam 2013, Enoh 2014) but not on people returning 
to their ‘home’ countries. 
 
Fixing of Foreign Exchange Rates 
 
In May 2015, the Gambian dalasi depreciated D80 to £1, D52 to $1 and D60 to 1 
Euro.  15 years earlier 1 US dollar had bought 13 dalasis. However, when this 
depreciation occurred, the Office of the President released a statement ordering all 
                                                                
75 http://www.huffingtonpost.com/jim-moore/two-americans-disappear-i_b_4850904.html (27/09/2015) 
76 https://gambia.smbcgo.com/the-gambia-agrees-to-u-s-request-to-deport-its-citizens/ 
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banks and currency bureaux to sell foreign currency at the following rates, £1 at 
D50, $1 at D35, and 1 Euro at D4077.  This was not the first time foreign exchange 
rates in The Gambia has been dictated in this manner, an act that the IMF has 
strongly warned the government against78. For example, President Jammeh took 
similar action in August 2013, when he ordered the rate of US dollar to be reduced 
from D38 to D35 to $179. 
 
Figure 16: Dollar-Dalasi exchange rates 1990-2016 
 
Source:http://fxtop.com/en/historical-exchangerates.php?C1=USD&C2=GMD&A= 
1&DD1=01&MM1=01&YYYY1=1990&DD2=11&MM2=11&YYYY2=2016&MA=1&Y
A=0&LANG=en&CJ=0 
 
According to discussions on a group80 set up on the mobile application ‘Viber’, by a 
member of the diaspora, to which I was invited to join. The diaspora participants 
were frustrated that President Jammeh was interfering with the foreign exchange 
rates because they saw the depreciation of the dalasi as an opportunity for them to 
reduce the amount of remittances they send ‘home’.  One contributor stated: 
The Gambian dictator has issued an order to force the dollar down from 
D55 to D35 and the pound is coming down from D80.50 to D50.  Now it is 
up to us in Europe and America to hold our money. He is ruining the 
                                                                
77 http://www.kaironews.com/the-foreign-exchange-rate-crisis-2/ 
78 https://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/scr/2015/cr15272.pdf 
79 http://www.statehouse.gm/Press-releases/Forex-Exchange-Bureau-Licenses-null-void_13082013.htm 
(27/09/2015) 
80 Viber is a free call and message app.  The group is called ‘Peaceful Change’, there are 168 
participants living mainly across Europe and the US 
 173 
country badly, and he wants us to suffer.  Don't send money to Gambia.  
Let the market dictate.  
However, the empirical evidence suggests that Gambians in the diaspora did not 
stop sending money to their families because they believed the people would suffer 
and not the government.  As one interviewee in the diaspora explained, “it’s our 
people who will suffer first before the President feels it” (Interviewee 25, male, 30s, 
pro-government supporter).  In this case, there was a sense of powerlessness 
amongst the diaspora because they could not do anything when President 
Jammeh took the decision to change the exchanges rates. However, this was 
considered another disincentive in the group for engaging in development or 
investing in The Gambia. 
In addition, for many people in the diaspora, the depreciation of the dalasi and 
attempt to manipulate exchange rates is a sign of economic mismanagement by 
the Gambian government. Therefore, as the price of goods and services increase 
(inflation) the diaspora have to send more money to their families to cover the 
same costs, and perhaps this creates a barrier for them to engage in other 
development activities.  According to an interviewee in the diaspora, "when the 
economy goes bad and things start to cost more it’s the diaspora that have to send 
more money to cover costs and the diaspora feel it more than those on the ground”  
(Interviewee 4, female, 40s, professional/ activist).  
 
High Levels of Bureaucracy 
 
Some interviewees in the diaspora claimed they experienced high levels of 
bureaucracy when they attempted to register a business in The Gambia. This 
echoes research elsewhere that suggests the ease of opening a business is an 
important factor for investors. For example, in Uganda, the government offers 
privileged tax and planning codes for diaspora investors, which works as an 
incentive for the diaspora81. And in Rwanda, the government is widely credited by 
the business community for setting up ‘one-shop stops’ to help investors avoid 
having to move between different ministries and for introducing legislation to 
enable new businesses to be established in a few days (Lemarchand and Tash 
2015). 
 
One interviewee in the diaspora provided a detailed explanation of the frustrations 
he experienced when he tried to register his business in The Gambia.  This 
                                                                
81 Home: The Compendium of Diaspora Investment & Business Opportunities. 
http://www.ugandainvest.go.ug/wp-content/uploads/2016/02/Compendium-of-Investment-and-Business-
Opportunities-Vol-I.pdf 
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interviewee described it as a tedious, costly, and time-consuming process.  And in 
the end, he became discouraged and decided not to continue with the business.  
 
There is so much bureaucracy involved.  I had planned to open a business 
in Gambia but the bureaucracy was frustrating.  Even applying for licenses 
or getting applications approved is frustrating.  At the end that put me off.  
They don’t see it as I am trying to invest in my country and will create jobs 
and therefore I should be getting support.  But if you don’t have patience or 
you are on a short business trip in Gambia, then it is a big problem.  And it 
is not only me who has experienced this, I have friends who have wanted 
to set up businesses and they experienced the same bureaucracy, which 
frustrated them too. (Interviewee 33, male, 40s-50s and highly educated) 
 
However, on the contrary to the challenges experienced by this interviewee, the 
guidelines on the requirements for business registration82 issued by the Gambia 
Investments and Export Promotion Agency (GIEPA) spells out a very 
straightforward and not too costly process of registration.  For example, the 
requirements include: a Memorandum and Articles of Association, photo ID, 
registration form (free of charge), reserve a unique company name (costs 500 
GMD) and Tax Identification Number (TIN) (cost 500 GMD)83.  Lastly, there are the 
registration fees of 1000 GMD, and if applicable a corporation fee ranging between 
10000 GMD to 25000 GMD. So if the report from this interviewee is correct then 
the problem lies not in the regulations, but their implementation.   
 
In addition, bureaucracy is not solely the responsibility of the government as 
corruption from civil servants also has an effect.  However, during an informal 
conversation with a lawyer from The Gambia84 who registers businesses for his 
clients in the diaspora.  He stated that he did not agree with the claim that high 
levels of bureaucracy are preventing the diaspora from establishing businesses in 
The Gambia.  The lawyer argued that if the diaspora genuinely wanted to set up 
businesses in the country then they have the opportunity to do so. I got the 
impression that they were implying that sometimes individuals in the diaspora are 
being disingenuous about their intentions to invest in the country.  However, this 
lawyer is well placed in Gambian society, and they have contacts at these offices 
to help them to speed up the process of registering a business, whereas the 
                                                                
82 http://www.giepa.gm/node/12 
83 The reservation of company, TIN and registration fees total to GMD 2000 which equals to USD 
$47.23. GMD 10000 = USD $236.13. GMD 250000 = USD $590.31 (exchange rate of dalasi to dollar 
42.35 as of August 2016- http://www.xe.com/currencyconverter/convert/?From=GMD&To=USD) 
84 This was an informal conversation in London with the lawyer who was on holiday, and we were 
having a general conversation about some of the finding in the research, when the topic of some 
participants not wanting to invest in business The Gambia because of bureaucracy came up  
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members of the Gambian diaspora may not have the same levels of social capital. 
Without connections, there may well be some significant barriers to registering 
businesses in The Gambia, which affects the diasporas willingness to invest.  
 
6.4 Institutions 
 
Barriers Associated with Diaspora Associations  
 
The barriers to undertaking more development in The Gambia outlined by the 10 
Gambian diaspora associations that were interviewed in the UK in 2013 were 
broadly consistent. They pinpointed the low-level of participation by members, 
limited collaboration between associations, and emerging issues of tribalism85 as 
their most significant issues. According to all the associations, the decrease in the 
number of members attending meetings has led to a drop in income from 
membership fees. The associations stated these pose a challenge to their survival 
because they rely on the fees to cover their administration costs.  20% of the 
associations attribute the decrease of members to petty disputes, 20% to people 
being too busy to attend the meetings, 10% to members having issues with their 
immigration status and 50% to members simply not wanting to pay the fees.  
 
However, one interviewee in the diaspora gave a different reason as to why they 
believed the UK Gambian associations are experiencing low levels of participation.  
They claimed that some associations are not transparent with how they spend the 
monies they collect from their members, thus the people are sceptical about paying 
the fees.  The interviewee stated: 
I recently contacted Crawley Gambia Association because I wanted to join.  
But rather than being told about the association I received a text 
requesting I pay membership fees.  I was not even told what these fees 
cover (Interviewee 44, male, 30s, highly educated professional/ activist).   
These findings are similar to the study of the Congolese diaspora associations in 
London, which revealed that a lack of transparency in diaspora groups discourages 
other members from being part of the association (Gardin and Godin 2013). 
However, the low level of participation by members can also be attributed to other 
factors such as the internal heterogeneity of the Gambian diaspora, which means 
not every person is interested in participating in associations.  In addition, another 
                                                                
85 The term tribalism is being used because it is the terms used by the participants in this research 
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reason could be that members have moved away from the area or transferred to 
other associations. 
 
Furthermore, the limited collaboration between associations is another barrier to 
the implementation of development activities for six associations who claimed to 
have development projects in The Gambia. These associations argued that they 
could have a bigger impact if they came together and worked on common causes, 
rather than individual associations duplicating each other’s projects.  
 
Our has not worked with any other Gambian associations on projects in 
Gambia, as when the flood relief project was ongoing we were not aware 
that Gambian United Society was also raising funds for the same project.  
When we became aware of it, it was too late to collaborate with them 
(Association 4) 
 
Clearly, this is attributed to the lack of communication and coordination between 
the associations. However, some associations have recognized this to be a 
problem and therefore have nominated one association to act as the coordinating 
body for their development projects.   According to an interviewee: 
 
The objective of GUS is to become a coordinating body for Gambian 
diaspora association in the UK and to act as a platform where all the 
Gambian associations can work together and collaborate on projects in the 
UK and in Gambia  
 
However, there is still the problem of associations being fragmented.  According to 
one association, “the challenge we face is the fragmentation amongst the groups 
as there are many small Gambian diaspora associations in the UK that are based 
on religious and village association” (Association 10). The consequence of this is 
that the different associations are competing with each other because “there is fear 
amongst the associations that one would supersede the other” (Association 3).  
Certainly, collaborating on projects in The Gambia is positive for development, 
however, only if there are financial resources available.  This leads to another 
barrier identified by associations in the interviews.  It seemed they were not aware 
of the external opportunities available in the UK. “We have challenges trying to 
obtain financial resources to fund projects here in the UK and in Gambia” 
(Association 4).  These findings are parallel to those in the study by Plaza and 
Ratha (2011) about African diaspora groups in Denmark.  The data revealed that 
those associations also did not know about the existing funding opportunities in 
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Denmark. Yet, there are organizations, such as the International Organisation for 
Migration (IOM), who work with diaspora associations. The ‘Common Ground 
Initiative’ co-funded by Comic Relief and the UK Department for International 
Development (DfID) provides funding for diaspora organisations in the UK. The 
African Foundation for Development (AFFORD) support diaspora associations that 
want to engage in development in their ‘home’ countries.  
 
The final barrier (highlighted by 30% of the associations) was the issue of tribalism, 
which they claimed affected the cohesiveness of their associations.  According to 
one association, “there is division among members of the association, as members 
tend to be reluctant to work together, I speculate that it is due to tribal differences” 
(Association 4).  This is in line with the literature which provides extensive 
discussions on the divided nature of diaspora associations due to such issues, 
which the leads to low levels of cohesion, trust and development effectiveness 
(Mercer et al. 2008, Fransen and Siegel 2013).  Nevertheless, in chapter 3, I 
argued that there is great tolerance between ethnic groups in The Gambia. And 
ethnic differences are only significant in the political sphere where parties are 
criticized for putting the interest of one ethnic group over the other. Perhaps these 
differences are now creeping into associations, which are institutions that make 
rules about where resources are allocated, like the government.  Nevertheless, my 
ethnographic impression was tribalism that the issue of tribalism is a perceived 
barrier because even though members of associations are ethnically 
heterogeneous, there was no real evidence to suggest that tribalism was causing 
divisions in the associations.  This is because these associations seem to identify 
themselves by place rather than along ethnic lines. 
Brain Drain and Weak Institutional Capacity 
 
The issue of brain drain and weak capacity of institutions in The Gambia from a 
human resources perspective was another key area of discussion by the interviews. 
Approximately 65% of interviewees in the diaspora and in The Gambia stated that 
this is a barrier to development. The loss of skilled human capital has subsequently 
affected the private and public sectors in the country.   According to a private 
business owner in The Gambia, “it is hard for us to fill vacancies because we do 
not have qualified people here.  We discard 90% of the applications we receive.  
This is because the people with the skills do not want to stay here” (Interviewee 64, 
male and 40s-50s).  Clearly, this increases the risk of businesses failing in The 
Gambia and is, therefore, a barrier for those in the diaspora wanting to run a 
business in The Gambia. This finding is in line with research elsewhere which 
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argues that brain drain is connected to the recurring patterns of underdevelopment 
in ‘developing countries’ (Bréant 2013). For example, the health sector is 
particularly affected by brain drain in The Gambia (Clemens and Pettersson 2006) 
and so is the Gambian civil service as many civil servants were reported to have 
left to work for international organisations such as the United Nations and the 
World Bank (Rohey Wadda 2000). In addition, according to the United Nations 
Department of Economic and Social Affairs 201586, women are migrating from The 
Gambia in large numbers, as are young people.  The data also states that 
Gambian women make up 47.3% of international migrants, 34.6% of The Gambia’s 
international migrants are aged between 0-19 years, 63.4% are 24-64 years old, 
and 2.0% are 65+.  This data shows the highest age range of Gambian migrants 
are those in prime working age.  
To address this problem, the Gambian government has attempted to bridge the 
gaps caused by brain drain by establishing the University of The Gambia.  But, 
from personal experiences of teaching third and fourth year undergraduate 
students at the Brikama campus, from September to December 2014, I found the 
skills and capacity of graduates were low. This is largely because the university 
lacks the institutional capacity to provide a good quality of education.  For example, 
the university suffers from a shortage of lecturers, poorly equipped classrooms and 
a poorly stocked library (which counters the claim made by interviewee 20 that they 
donated US$ 200,000 worth of books to the university). In fact, reading materials 
are often provided by the lecturers, who have to contend with limited printing 
facilities, access to computers, poor Internet and inconsistent electricity supply.  
According to an interviewee in The Gambia:  
The government keeps boasting about establishing a university and 
training Gambian doctors but these ill-trained students are just killing 
people at the hospitals and no one dare says anything.  Since UTG started 
producing these doctors, the death rate at the government hospital is at a 
record high (interviewee 45, male, 30s, private business owner) 
Though, I cannot substantiate the claim that Gambians student doctors are killing 
people in the hospitals. I can, however, confirm that the University of The Gambia 
has not filled the gaps created by the emigration of highly skilled Gambians. The 
problems of brain drain in The Gambia has weakened institutional capacity and 
inhibited development.  However, within the literature, the optimistic reply to this 
problem are the brain gain and brain circulations arguments, which posits that 
                                                                
86http://www.un.org/en/development/desa/population/migration/publications/wallchart/docs/MigrationWal
lChart2015.pdf 
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individuals returning ‘home’ with skills, knowledge and capital acquired from 
abroad can counter problems of brain drain and enhance development in their 
‘home’ countries. These are believed to be more sustainable forms of development 
contributions by the diaspora than remittances (Gupta et al 2007, Ratha et al. 2011, 
Mullings 2012, Nyamongo et al. 2012, Chacko and Gebre 2013, Gamlen 2014).  
 
Subsequently, during an interview with Professor Muhammadou Kah (the former 
Vice-Chancellor of the university) in 2013, he claimed that the university had 
benefitted from input from the diaspora when it was part of an extension 
programme of St Mary’s University Canada and after it became autonomous.  Kah 
claimed he and his wife were part of the first members of the Gambian diaspora to 
teach at the university in the summer of 1997/98, as did Professor Samba Jobe, 
Professor Cordu Njie (Dakar) and Professor Joiner.   In addition, when the 
university was established with a campus in Brikama, more members of the 
academic Gambian diaspora went to teach. Kah went on to say that the role of the 
diaspora in the development of university is evolving particularly now (in 2013) that 
the university has a web presence.  He claimed to frequently reach out to members 
of the Gambian diaspora he knows work in academia but he would only get few 
responses. Clearly, there are paradoxes in this statement because initially Kah 
created the impression that the diaspora is willing to contribute to the development 
of the university, but he then goes on to say that only a few would respond to his 
calls.  I got the sense that something had changed to make the Gambian academic 
diaspora unwilling to support the development of the university, but Kah was not 
going to speak on it.  Therefore, based on my own personal experience at the 
university and data from one interviewee in the diaspora. I argue that the reason 
for this change was due to the lack of academic freedom at the university. For 
example, I was aware those national security officers were planted in classes, 
particularly those covering subjects in political science. In addition, one interviewee 
in the diaspora explained how they were arrested and detained for 72 hours and 
tortured after attending an academic forum in The Gambia where they spoke 
against the practice of worshiping idols.  Apparently, this was seen as a criticism 
directed at President Jammeh who engages in this practice. Since this experience, 
this interviewee has not returned to The Gambia because they claimed, “fear is 
one of the barriers that stop me from going back and I cherish my academic 
freedom” (Interviewee 29, male, 40s- 50s and highly educated professional).   
 
Furthermore, the coercion of Gambian academics is also extended to those at 
‘home’, which has led to lecturers fleeing the country because of fear. Similar to 
Dick Ranga’s (2015) findings (in his article ‘The role of politics in the migration of 
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Zimbabwean teachers to South Africa’) that political violence in Zimbabwe has 
significantly contributed to the emigration of teachers to South Africa. The fear of 
state-sanctioned persecution by lecturers in The Gambia is real and supported by 
case study evidence. For example, there was the case of Sait Matty Jaw, a history 
lecturer at the university who was first arrested in November 2014 and later 
charged with ‘conspiracy’, ‘failure to register a business,’ and ‘disobeying statutory 
duty’ in 2015, for working on a poll survey on ‘good governance and corruption’ for 
the market research company FACT International Ghana Ltd 87. This clearly has 
an impact on the teaching quality in the university, which subsequently has an 
impact on the quality of graduates being produced as well as an impact on the 
human resource and institutions capacities in the public and private sectors of The 
Gambia.  
 
6.5 Conclusion 
 
In this chapter, I discussed the different barriers the interviewees in the diaspora 
said they encountered when attempting to contribute to development in The 
Gambia.  The aim of this chapter was to analyse the extent to which these barriers 
prevented the participants from making development contributions at ‘home’. I 
argued that the politicization of development in The Gambia created fundamental 
barriers for the diaspora because the government monopolizes development to 
safeguard their popularity in the country.  Therefore, the government is not willing 
to recognize the contributions of the diaspora in fear that it would affect their image 
as the only party that delivers development in The Gambia. This combined with the 
breakdown in relations between the government and the diaspora has resulted in 
the Gambian diaspora being marginalized in national development.  
 
Politics seemed to appear as the key barrier for the diaspora in The Gambia, even 
at the family level. For example, I argued that the dependency on diaspora 
remittances were attributed to politicians directing development resources to areas 
where they have voter support and ordering state-sanctioned violence against 
those they perceived as opponents. In addition, Gambians at ‘home’ are scared to 
challenge the government about the development gaps because evidence has 
shown the fear of political persecution was real and objective in the Gambian 
context. However, according to the government officials and pro-government 
supporters, some members of the Gambians diaspora were using politics as an 
excuse to be inactive in development at ‘home’. And the marginalization of the 
wider Gambian diaspora is the consequence of small groups criticizing the 
                                                                
87 http://communities.lawsociety.org.uk/human-rights/interventions/2015/gambia-sait-matty-jaw-human-
rights-defender-at-risk/5046450.fullarticle 
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government. This shows the difficulty in trying to separate ‘politics’ and 
‘development’ in The Gambia.  
  
In this chapter, I also argued that Gambians in the diaspora would invest directly at 
the national level if there were diaspora-centred policies and incentives in place 
(even though the interviewees did not make it clear which policies and incentives 
they wanted, except for the right to vote). However, what is not clearly understood 
from this research is; how does not having targeted diaspora engagement policies 
or incentives a barrier for national development in The Gambia? The assumption in 
the literature is that diasporas need incentives to contribute to national 
development at ‘home’ and diaspora-engagement policies encourage investment 
(Newland 2004, Torres and Kuznetsov 2006, Ratha et al. 2011, Gamlen 2014). 
The data required to answer this question, I argue could come from reviewing case 
studies of other African countries such as Cape Verde, Burundi, Ethiopia, Ghana, 
Nigeria, Rwanda, Senegal and Uganda that have successfully implemented 
diaspora-centred policies and incentives. And the questions that should be 
answered from this review are; how did the government build a relationship with 
their diaspora? How did they discover what their diaspora wanted and where they 
would invest? How much was the diaspora investing in national development 
before they introduced diaspora- policies and incentives? This last question would 
compare diaspora contributions before and after the policies and incentives were 
introduced, which would be particularly useful for countries like The Gambia to 
have a clearer picture of what diasporas can or cannot bring to the country. 
Answering these questions would also allow the researcher to conclusively 
determine how not having diaspora centred policies and incentives could be is a 
barrier for national development in The Gambia.  
 
This case study of the Gambian diaspora adds to the fields of African diaspora 
studies because it shows the relationship between the diaspora and the state is not 
as tidy as in other African countries like Ghana or Senegal.  In addition, the 
findings highlight the need for more comparative work on state-diaspora relations 
(Délano and Gamlen 2014) in this field. For example, the current relationship 
between the Gambian diaspora and the government suggests that it would take 
more than targeted diaspora engagement policies and incentives for the Gambian 
government to able to tap directly into diaspora resources.  The Gambian diaspora 
partly believes the government would protect their investment in The Gambia.  
However, mostly because the diaspora is dissatisfied with the political leadership of 
the country and the government is dissatisfied with the political interventions of 
some members of the Gambian diaspora.  To address this issue, policymakers in 
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The Gambia have to create and uphold legislations that would protect diaspora 
investments in The Gambia, whereas the diaspora has to set aside their political 
activities and focus on building a relationship with the government on shared 
development aspirations. However, both would be very difficult to achieve.  
Lastly, the findings in this chapter provides an explanation of why Gambians in the 
diaspora are not contributing directly to national development projects.  This data is 
helpful to policymakers in The Gambia who in the future may seek to engage the 
diaspora in national development.  An understanding of the barriers to engagement 
would allow the Gambian government to introduce the right policies to remove said 
barriers.  However, it is also important to recognize that the internal heterogeneities 
within the Gambian diaspora mean these barriers are not homogenous to the 
entire sample group.  For example, some interviewees in the diaspora did not 
identify with these barriers and were content with limiting their contributions at the 
family level, whilst others preferred to invest in their host country or simply did not 
have the financial resources or capacity to engage in national development in The 
Gambia. 
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Chapter 7: 
Getting Involved Politically: the 
Transnational Engagement of the Gambian 
Diaspora  
 
In this chapter, the empirical focus shifts away from having ‘development’ at the 
centre of the analysis to having ‘politics’ at the centre. In the next chapter, the 
subject focuses on the relationship between the two. This chapter speaks to the 
literature on the transnational political engagement of diasporas. It has four 
sections after the introduction.  The first section discusses the political mobilization 
of the Gambian diaspora in the UK and US.  The second section talks about the 
triggers for their interventions in politics at ‘home’.  The third section discusses the 
justifications for their intervention.  The fourth section assesses the impact of their 
interventions in politics and the final section concludes the chapter by drawing 
together the key arguments and discussions. 
7.1 Introduction 
According to the literature on the transnational political engagement of diasporas, 
their involvement in homeland politics (peaceful or otherwise) is nothing new (Lyon 
and Mandaville 2012, Boccagni et al. 2015, Adamson 2015).  The Jewish diaspora 
in the 20th century provides a classic example of the role diasporas play in the 
domestic politics of their homeland (Adamson 2015). The literature generally 
argues that a diaspora can either engage in conflict or support a peaceful 
resolution of violent conflict.  However, in the case of The Gambia, I argue that the 
diaspora has for the most part been involved in peaceful opposition to the 
homeland government. Except for the recent incident, which took place on the 30th 
December 2014, when six Gambian dissidents from the US attacked the State 
House in an attempt to overthrow the government while President Jammeh was 
out of the country88. Although this was a very controversial event, the Gambian 
diaspora has mainly been engaged in mobilizing politically in their host countries, 
to highlight the deteriorating human rights conditions in The Gambia.  For example, 
on the 1st October 2015, the Gambian diaspora civil society group, ‘Coalition for 
Change – The Gambia’ organized the ‘International Civil Society Forum on The 
Gambia: Human Rights; Democracy; Governance; Transparency; and Regional 
Security’ at the Marriot Hotel in lower Manhattan, New York.  This event brought 
                                                                
88 http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-africa-30694726 
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together two key Gambian political opposition party leaders, international human 
rights organizations and Gambian activists to share information and engage in 
discussions about the current political and human rights situation in The Gambia. 
They invited me to attend as a non-aligned observer. 
 
On the morning of the event, I walked eagerly up the stairs and through the doors 
of the Marriot Hotel feelings excited and anxious, as I did not know what to expect 
from this meeting.  Essentially, I wanted to collect data that would add value to the 
thesis as well as get a clearer understanding of how the Gambian opposition 
political party leaders felt about the diaspora being involved in politics in The 
Gambia.  However, whilst waiting for the forum to start, I looked around the venue 
and concluded the diaspora did not pick up bill for this event.  I was aware that 
these were financially challenged groups and it seemed unusual that they could 
afford to have this event at a five-star hotel in downtown Manhattan.  My suspicion 
was that one or more of the human rights organizations funded the event, however, 
I was not able to verify this because the main organizer did not respond when I 
asked him about the funding of the event. 
 
At around 8:30 am, some participants started trickling in, but they were not 
Gambians, they were from the international human rights organizations such as 
Amnesty International and Human Rights Watch.  By 8:45, I started seeing some of 
the Gambians arriving and I proceeded to introduce myself.  It was clear that I was 
the only person who came from the UK but wondered why members of the UK civil 
society groups did not attend. 
 
During the meet and greet session, I was approached by one of the organizers 
who seemed delighted to meet me in person as we had only spoken over the 
telephone.  We engaged in a long discussion about the event and our expectations.  
I had the opportunity to ask them why there was no representation from the UK 
Gambian civil society groups and they explained that they extended an invitation to 
the UK groups and some said they would attend, but cancelled at the very last 
minute.  During this conversation, I also heard that the Gambian Ambassador and 
some pro-government supporters were invited, but chose not to attend.  They did 
not want to be seen supporting this group because the Gambian Ambassador and 
some pro-government supporters felt the event would be too critical of the 
government.  
 
Just as the facilitator asked us to take our seats, I posed a final question, which 
was if the leaders of the Gambian opposition political parties had arrived, as I had 
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not seen them.  The organizer explained that only two out of the four major parties 
were going to attend, and they were Hamat Bah, leader of the National 
Reconciliation Party (NRP) and Omar Jallow (OJ), leader of the People’s 
Progressive Party (PPP).  The informant stated that the leader of the United 
Democratic Party (UDP), Ousainou Darboe (which is largest opposition party) was 
supposed to attend; however, they cancelled at the last minute due to poor health.  
The organizer seemed sceptical about this reason because according to them 
“Darboe has been travelling around Gambia campaigning every weekend last 
month” (Interviewee 12, male, 50s-60s, highly educated/ activist). I got the 
impression they thought it was suspicious that Darboe had fallen ill at the time of 
the forum.   
  
However, after receiving criticisms from the diaspora for not attending the forum, 
the UDP issued a press release on 3rd October 2015 explaining that Ousainou 
Darboe could not attend the forum, due to “unexpected circumstances beyond his 
control89”.  They claimed they were not represented at the forum because the 
organizers said they could not pay for the person they had nominated to replace 
Darboe to attend.  According to the statement, the National Executive of the party 
had nominated Honourable Momodou Sanneh to replace Darboe at least 10 days 
before the forum.  However, the organizers said they could not fund Honorable 
Momodou Sanneh’s trip because they were over budget, which according to UDP 
was ‘strange’ because the organizers previously claimed to have the budget to pay 
for all the opposition party leaders to attend the forum90. My assessment was that 
the organizers were only interested in having the party leaders present presumably 
because they felt the leaders had the authority to convince their parties to accept 
the diaspora’s request for unity.   
 
On reflection, the conversation with the organizer highlighted three key issues: first, 
there is an obvious lack of active popular support in the diaspora for the events 
organized by the Gambian civil society groups. Whereas there is much more 
extensive participation online, thus the disembodied online space is a more 
accessible political space than formal parties, associations and physical meetings 
like the forum. Second, the diaspora was having difficulty bringing together the 
Gambian opposition political parties, because it seems these parties did not see 
the value of working cohesively with each other or with the diaspora. The 
opposition would be more effective if they united and the diaspora supported one 
party rather than spreading their resources across the different parties.  Third, the 
                                                                
89 http://gainako.com/?p=9433 (2015) 
90 This press release was published in all diaspora online newspapers, because UDP received a large 
amount of criticism from the diaspora for not attending this event.  http://gainako.com/?p=9433 
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disinterest and disengagement of the Gambian Ambassador in the US 
demonstrates the disconcertingly unproductive relationship the Gambian 
government has with Gambian civil society groups, which perhaps explains why 
some members of the Gambian diaspora have resorted to unconventional, illegal 
and violent methods (such as attempting to overthrow the government), in order to 
make things happen. 
 
Once the event finally began at around 10 am, I observed there were many empty 
seats in the room.  The photographs below illustrate this, however, a few more 
people arrived later on in the day but not enough to fill the room. 
 
Figure 17: Civil Society Forum in New York 
 
Source: Sainabou Taal 
 
At the start of the morning session, a representative from Human Rights Watch 
played a short video 91 and although this video had a profound impact on some 
members of the audience.  During the break, I overheard one opposition party 
leader and another participant comment that the video and presentation by the 
representative repeated things they already knew. But the leader expressed that 
they have no other choice but to sit and listen. I suspect they recognized that the 
Gambian civil society groups in the diaspora have few significant allies, and the 
                                                                
91 Human Rights Watch produced this video and it is entitled Gambia: Torture, Repression Create State 
of Fear. It contains accounts from victims of torture at the hands of the Gambian Government.  
https://www.hrw.org/ -photos/video/2015/09/17/gambia-torture-repression-create-state-fear 
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human rights organizations are key. There is also the politics of diaspora politics, 
which reflects their relative powerlessness and the challenges they face in enrolling 
not only other Gambians but also non-Gambian allies to their cause.  Thus as I 
returned back to my seat, I wondered if the high priority given to human rights 
issues in The Gambia was the diaspora’s and political opposition’s choice of 
agenda or whether they were responding pragmatically and strategically to 
someone else’s agenda in a context where it is hard to get attention for their 
political cause.  
When the opposition party leaders took centre stage, I was reminded of an 
argument made in the literature which states that ‘home’ country politicians are 
often more interested in the diaspora’s money than their ideas (Tölölyan 2007).  I 
got the impression that the political party leaders were not interested in engaging 
the diaspora in politics at ‘home’, particularly in the long term, and that they only 
granted the diaspora audience because they felt they needed to reciprocate for the 
financial support they receive from the diaspora.  I came to this conclusion 
because both leaders failed to answer adequately my questions about what they 
were going to give the diaspora in return for their support.  One leader seemed 
confused by this question as they thought I was suggesting giving members of the 
diaspora political positions in Gambian government. Which was not what I meant, I 
was thinking more along the lines of extending voting rights to the diaspora but I 
purposefully did not make this clear because I wanted to hear from them what roles 
they saw the diaspora playing in politics at ‘home’.  One of the leaders responded 
by saying he would not make any promises to the diaspora and the other leader 
ignored the question. 
During the question and answer session I also observed that one of the opposition 
leaders conducted himself in a very dictatorial manner.  He was arrogant and tried 
to dominate the discussions by excluding other voices, which clearly frustrated 
some of the other participants at the forum. For example, whilst answering a 
question from an audience member, this opposition leader noticed the person who 
asked the question was engaged in a conversation with their neighbour and was 
clearly not listening to them speak.  Therefore, he stops in mid-sentence, leant 
over the table pointing his finger at that person and called them out for not listening 
to them. This startled everyone in the room and there was an awkward silence as 
people looked at each other disapprovingly. My ethnographic impression was that 
it felt like a competition between the diaspora and the opposition politicians but 
organisers did not give a follow-up interview thus I was not able to glean their 
impressions afterwards.  
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The personal histories of these political leaders also fostered cynicism and 
scepticism in the audience.  The fact that these opposition party leaders have been 
leading their parties for as long as Jammeh has been President shows that they 
too are reluctant to relinquish the power they have in their respective parties.  
Therefore, I asked myself, why are the Gambian civil society groups not making 
more effort to engage President Jammeh and his government, when the opposition 
parties seem unwilling to help them have a place in politics at ‘home’. Perhaps, it is 
because President Jammeh does not have any tolerance for opposition, making it 
is difficult for the groups to engage him and his government as opposed to the 
opposition parties who share their frustrations. 
Irrespective of the low-level of political debate at the forum, it was considered a 
success by those who organized it and the participants because it provided a 
convivial space for the diaspora, political opposition and international community to 
discuss the political and human rights conditions in The Gambia as well as develop 
a strategic plan to push for reforms of the election practices in the country.  This 
involved the opposition parties writing a joint letter to ECOWAS demanding for 
pressure to be the Government of The Gambia to reform: 
 
- Voter registrations and attestation 
- Appoint a new independent IEC Chairman 
- Allow the opposition parties access to the media 
- Allow the opposition parties permits to hold rallies 
- Reduce the deposit requirements by parties for presidential 
elections 
- Stop the harassment of political opponents 
- Amend the constitution to ensure anyone over 65 can stand for 
presidency  
 
The meeting resolved to solicit help from influential members of the Gambian 
diaspora to engage key players in their host governments. However, after the 
meeting, things went quiet and I had no more insight as to whether these plans had 
been implemented. I found the forum to be a bit disappointing and underwhelming 
because it was poorly attended, and though there were some productive 
conversations, there were also a lot of differences and disagreements hidden 
behind the friendliness. 
 
The literature on transnational diaspora politics argues that the political 
engagement of diasporas at ‘home’ can take different shapes, such as forming civil 
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society groups that mobilize to engage in diaspora activism such as online cyber-
activism, demonstrations and protest, advocacy, fundraising and lobbying in their 
host countries to facilitate their inclusion in homeland politics.  The literature also 
asserts that advances in telecommunications and international travel has made it 
relatively easy for diasporas to maintain political links with ‘home’ and to be 
involved in shaping domestic and international policies (Brinkerhoff 2009, Esman 
2009 and NurMuhammad et al. 2015).  The versatility in the roles diasporas play in 
politics at ‘home’ and in their host country is illustrated in this case study.  However, 
Lyons and Mandaville (2012) argue that little is known about how politics in the 
country of origin have been transformed by the current upsurge in the political 
activism of increasingly mobile transnational population.  Thus, one of the aims of 
this chapter will be to assess how the political interventions of the Gambian 
diaspora have transformed politics in The Gambia.  
The main argument in this chapter is that the ability of the Gambian diaspora civil 
society groups to influence political change in The Gambia is limited because they 
are fragmented, despite the fact that they all claim to share the same agenda: 
democratization, good governance and peaceful regime change.  In addition, the 
lack of cooperation between the Gambian opposition political parties makes it 
increasingly challenging for the Gambian diaspora to have their desired impact on 
politics in The Gambia.  The findings of this research challenge the literature, which 
argues that diasporas can directly influence politics from abroad (Hägel and Peretz 
2005, Vetovec 2005, Baser and Swain 2008, Lyon and Mandaville 2012). 
Using ‘social movement theory’ (McAdam et al. 1996, Sökefeld 2006, Marsden 
2014, Quinsaat 2015) as the main theoretical framework to explain the mobilization 
of the UK and US Gambian diaspora civil society groups.  Another aim of this 
chapter is to demonstrate how the diaspora seeks to influence democratic political 
change when faced with the challenge of divided and self-serving opposition 
parties and politicians.   
7.2 The Political Mobilization of the Gambian Diaspora in the UK and US 
The literature on transnational diaspora politics argues the political mobilization of 
diasporas can occur in many different forms, yielding both positive and negative 
outcomes (Vertovec 2005, Smith and Stares 2007, Baser and Swain 2008, Hoehne 
et al. 2011).   For example, diasporas can mobilize to fund political oppositions, 
organize protests and demonstrations, engage in online political activism, lobby 
host government to create policies that challenge or support ‘home’ governments, 
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or they can mobilize to support peaceful reconciliation and post-conflict 
reconstruction efforts at ‘home’.  
 
The Gambian diaspora has been mobilizing politically since 2001 when some 
members sought to influence the outcome of the 2001 national elections by 
building an alliance with all the opposition political parties in The Gambia (Saine 
2009).  Since then, the number of Gambian civil society groups in the diaspora has 
risen but their activities have remained broadly the same.  For example, they are 
still raising funds, lobbying the international community, engaging in advocacy and 
staging protests to create awareness about the deteriorating human rights 
conditions in The Gambia.  The Gambian diaspora civil society groups have been 
using tools such as online newspapers and radio and social media to mobilize 
amongst themselves and to engage the wider Gambian population at ‘home’ to 
challenge what they see as the regressive political, social and economic conditions 
in The Gambia.  
 
It is no secret that the aim of the Gambian diaspora civil society groups is to 
accelerate democratic change in The Gambia, and some members believe the 
upcoming national elections in December 2016 provides a political opportunity 
(McAdam et.al 1996, Sökefeld 2006) to work together with the Gambian political 
opposition parties to influence the outcomes of the election.  Therefore, using the 
social movement theory (McAdam et al 1996, Sökefeld 2006, Marsden 2014, 
Quinsaat 2015), I argue that the 2016 presidential elections offer the Gambian 
diaspora a legal and constitutional framework within which they can make claims 
for their community and identity to help the rise of a social movement and to 
challenge the status quo.  For example, the private meeting held the day after the 
forum in New York revealed that some participants had agreed to put the 
opposition party leaders in touch with their contacts who they believe have 
influence in ECOWAS.  They offered to lobby this regional institution and bilateral 
partners such as the Nigeria Government on behalf of the opposition parties to put 
pressure on the government to reform the recently passed Electoral bill. According 
to a participant at the meeting:  
 
The Gambian government does not have the funds to hold elections 
because they have severed relationships with donors. The UN is not 
contributing to the process, Taiwan use to donate ballot boxes which they 
are no longer doing, ECOWAS ruled the last elections were not free or fair 
so they may not observe these elections and Gambia withdrew from the 
Commonwealth who also use to provide funds for elections.  The only 
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possible support may come from Nigeria.  So we have to engage Nigerian 
President Buhari who seems to have the eye of the world leaders as well 
as engage former Nigerian President Obasanjo to seek their own personal 
intervention on situation in the Gambia.  Also, Nigeria has good control of 
ECOWAS so if we engage Nigerian leaders then that will influence 
ECOWAS. (Male participant, New York, 2015) 
This statement shows the diaspora trying to be pragmatic and strategic with their 
interventions. However, this participant was also being optimistic in thinking that 
ECOWAS can push Jammeh into reforming the Electoral Bill when history has 
shown the Gambian Government took no notice of ECOWAS previously when they 
declared that the 2011 elections were not free and fair.  
 
However, with the 2016 elections quickly approaching some of the Gambian 
diaspora civil society groups have been directing their support to the political 
opposition parties that are active at ‘home’, by providing them with the financial 
resources to campaign effectively.  The social movement theoretical framework 
would describe this activity as a mobilising structure, whereby various UK and US 
Gambian diaspora civil society groups who share the same issues (Sökefeld 2006; 
269) have come together to influence the elections through increasing the 
resources of the opposition political parties.  According to an interviewee who co-
founded one of the diaspora civil society groups in the US: 
 
Our success in the diaspora to a large degree is to support the opposition 
to take part in elections.  To begin the process of elections and for them to 
state what they need so the process can begin.  The mere fact that we are 
not on the ground limits how much we can do.  All we can do is provide 
funding and encourage negotiations between opposition parties, but if they 
do not take the bull by its horn and set aside their differences then it will 
affect the impact the diaspora can have (Interviewee 5, male, 50s-60 and 
academic/activist). 
 
Such views express an ongoing faith among Gambian diaspora activists in the 
possibility of democratic change.  The electoral process is their peaceful, legal 
route to change. But what this statement does not quite capture is the other half of 
the diaspora’s activity, which is lobbying the relevant international organizations to 
put pressure on the Gambian government to hold free and fair elections.  The two 
aspects of intervention go hand in hand, as the opposition parties participating in 
the elections would not make any difference if the elections were not free and fair.  
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However, there is another constraint for the Gambian diaspora in participating in 
politics in The Gambia, which is a divided opposition.  
 
The aims of the Gambian Civil Society Groups in the UK and the US  
 
21st century diaspora politics is transnational and occupies a virtual political space.  
The Gambian civil society groups based in the UK and US have their members 
dispersed around the world in countries such as Senegal, Sweden, and France.  
As such, the physical mobilization of members is often challenging especially when 
it comes to getting people to attend meetings and protests.  Naturally, these 
organizations tend to implement their activities in places where they have the most 
members, but then some people feel left out and therefore, form their own 
organizations, often with similar aims and objectives.  The table below details the 
different Gambian diaspora civil society groups in the UK and the US and the aims 
of each group. 
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Table 9: The Gambian diaspora civil society groups in the UK and UK 
Groups Location Aims (with sources) 
Gambia Democratic Action Group 
(GDAG) established in   2004 (Perfect 
2016) 
US Restore democracy in 
The Gambia 
Save The Gambia Democratic Project 
(STGDP) established in 2004 (Perfect 
2016) 
US Create an environment in 
the Gambia within which 
democracy and all its 
instruments can be 
nurtured and enhanced 
for a better Gambia92 
(This organization is 
dormant) 
Campaign for Human Rights Gambia 
(CHRG) established in “September 2010 
in response to the increasing number of 
political killings and human rights abuses 
taking place in The Gambia93” 
UK CHRG aims to raise 
awareness of the 
increasingly critical 
human rights situation in 
The Gambia and to 
mobilize public opinions 
to put pressure on the 
Gambia government to 
protect its citizens and to 
fully investigate these 
killings94. 
Sene-Gambia Human Rights Defense 
League is a human rights group that 
established in  2010 
UK The aim is to “showcase 
human rights concerns in 
The Gambia and 
Senegal- but mainly the 
Gambia to the Gambian 
people, human rights 
organizations, and UK 
government and the 
EU”95 
Campaign for Democratic Change 
(CDCG) was created to provide a 
platform broad enough for a concerted 
UK The aim is the restoration 
of democratic governance 
in The Gambia with, as 
                                                                
92 http://groupspaces.com/STGDP 
93 http://www.gambiacampaign.org/about/ 
94 http://www.gambiacampaign.org/about/ 
95 https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=nsg-4DHlVB8 
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effort towards supporting the cause of 
change in The Gambia.96 Established in 
2011. 
 
essential features, 
upholding the rule of law, 
respect for human rights, 
free and fair elections so 
as to produce 
governments that reflect 
the wishes of the citizens, 
and governance in both 
the political and economic 
spheres, that conforms to 
internationally accepted 
norms of transparency 
and accountability97 
 
Coalition for Change – The Gambia 
(CCG) describe themselves as a non-
partisan organization that was started in 
April 2011 to challenge the dictatorship 
and restore basic freedoms in The 
Gambia through non-violent action 98 
US The CCG’s aim is 
“positively changing the 
human rights 
environment in The 
Gambia, in collaboration 
with several organizations 
and groups.  AfRO / 
Open Society 
Foundations International 
Advocacy have supported 
this project, including a 
mission to Geneva in 
2014”99.   
Democratic Union of Gambian Activities - 
DC (DUGA) describes themselves as an 
umbrella movement to unite Gambians 
around the world.  This group was 
established in 2012. 
 
US “End tyranny in all its 
forms Usher in a new 
democratic Gambia that 
shall guarantee to the 
people peace, progress, 
prosperity and liberty 
Guarantee people the 
unhindered rights to 
                                                                
96 http://www.cdcgambia.com 
97https://docs.google.com/viewer?a=v&pid=sites&srcid=ZGVmYXVsdGRvbWFpbnxjZGNnYW1iaWF8Z3
g6NTQ2ZmJhOTIzNmJlYjc1ZA  
98 https://changegambia.org 
99 https://changegambia.org 
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determine their manner of 
government through a 
transparent, democratic 
electoral process”100.  
 
Gambia Consultative Council (GCC)  
“101is a coalition of politically active 
Gambian dissident organizations, 
groups, and unaffiliated individuals from 
home and around the world, united by 
the burning desire for political change in 
the Gambia” The group was established 
in 2013 
US “unifying Gambians 
everywhere into a 
coordinated and 
productive monolithic 
organization”102 
Committee for the Restoration of 
Democracy in the Gambia (CORDEG), 
describe themselves as an independent, 
non-profit transnational democratic 
umbrella organization that is committed 
to peaceful, non-violent democratic 
change in the Gambia. They were 
formed in March 2014. 
US “CORDEG is a 
progressive organization 
that is aimed at facilitating 
dialogue among 
Gambians about the 
Gambia, with a view to 
finding solutions to our 
country’s myriad 
problems. 
 
CORDEG aims to expose 
and arrest his (President 
Jammeh’s) criminal 
economic exploitation of 
conflict and human 
suffering. 
 
CORDEG will remain a 
democratic whole of its 
constituent parts, 
representing a broad 
range of ideas, strategies 
and plans aimed at 
                                                                
100 DUGA Mission Statement 
101 http://gccfreegambia.com/about-us/ 
102 http://www.maafanta.com/mathewkjallowgccpressrelease 
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defeating tyranny in our 
country through peaceful 
agitation and building in 
its place a just, stable and 
prosperous Gambia”103. 
National Resistance Movement Gambia 
(NRMG) was formed in 2014 by former 
Gambian soldiers living in exile.  They 
say that they are prepared to remove the 
“illegitimate” Gambian government by 
any means necessary.   
US “To restore democracy 
and the rule of law to the 
Gambia”104. 
Gambia Movement for Democracy and 
Development (GMDD)  
US To support the restoration 
of genuine democracy, 
human rights and respect 
for the rule of law in The 
Gambia105. 
Gambia Youth for Unity (GYU) structured 
youth activism organizations. Established 
in May 2015 
UK To host and collectively 
engage Gambian youths, 
supporters alike, both in 
the diaspora and within 
The Gambia.  
Source: Assembled by Sainabou Taal 
 
On the surface, “restoring democracy” and “improving human rights” appears to be 
the shared explicit focus of almost all these groups.  Their mission to promote what 
they believe is an ideal (or at the very least better) style of governance in The 
Gambia is central to this agenda as are ideas that existing political practices 
(tolerance of multiple parties and regular elections) are essentially a performance 
that masks a lack of real democratic sentiments in The Gambia.  One interviewee 
explained that although democracy may appear to be at the forefront of these 
groups’ agenda, the human rights aspect is what is of great importance to the 
Gambian diaspora civil society groups, as they believe that “democracy in the 
absence of human rights is not real democracy” (Interviewee 44, male, 30s, highly 
educated professional/ activist).  Again, social movement theory can be used here 
                                                                
103 CORDEG Mission and Vision statement, that was presented to the public and shared with diaspora 
media houses in March 2014 
104 https://www.facebook.com/National-Resistance-Movement-Of-The-Gambia 
672127789514233/info/?tab=page_info 
105 https://www.facebook.com/Gambian-Movement-for-Democracy-and-Development-GMDD-
119354478143261/info/?tab=overview 
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to explain how these civil society groups frame issues using language such as 
human rights and democracy to justify their political mobilization and intervention.   
 
Consequently, the fact that the Government of The Gambia fails to respect and 
protect the rights of Gambians has resulted in some of these groups becoming 
more of a resistance movement hoping for dramatic change rather than a 
movement for democratic reform.  That is to say, their activities seek to actively 
undermine the sustainability of the existing regime, rather than merely reform the 
current political system by making modest changes.  However, the Gambian 
diaspora civil society groups do not call themselves a resistance, as they want 
support from the international community, which requires them to avoid direct 
action and constrain their own activities to demands for reform of democratic 
practices. Clearly one of the main reasons these groups want President Jammeh 
removed from power is because they view him as the biggest violator of the rights 
of Gambians and therefore an obstacle to achieving the kind of democratic political 
system some members of the Gambian diaspora want to see in the country.    
 
However, the interviews revealed that a small number of the interviewees in the 
diaspora were concerned that there would be a political vacuum if Jammeh were 
removed from power. They argued that this could lead to political confusion and 
chaotic consequences.  One interviewee expressed the view that, “we do not want 
violence or political vacuum.  We need to rationalize, sit down and put aside our 
emotions so we can think of a plan that would not lead to the demise of the country” 
(Interviewee 16, male, 30s and pro-government supporter).  To this small 
proportion of people, the aims of the civil society groups are better at indicating the 
‘ends’ of their activities than the ‘means’.  As such, I got the impression that these 
individuals do not believe the political diaspora have a meaningful plan for what to 
do in a post-Jammeh Gambia. For example, plans of how they intend to support 
the country and the people of The Gambia to transition into their preferred style of 
democratic governance.  In addition, the interviews also revealed that the politically 
involved diaspora has little to say on how it seeks to address resistance from 
groups that are pro-Jammeh, though presumably, they would seek to do it in a 
democratic manner, by persuading them of the legitimacy of an alternative political 
leadership. 
 
The Political Activities of the Gambian Diaspora in the UK and US 
 
The political mobilization of the Gambian civil society groups in the UK and US has 
primarily involved staging demonstrations outside key locations in the UK and US.  
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Part of the literature argues that host countries play an important role in facilitating 
the environment for diasporic actions in homeland politics (Zapata-Barrero et al. 
2013).  And certainly, the UK and the US have been valuable hubs for members of 
Gambian diaspora to engage in politics at ‘home’ with very little risk (Adamson 
2015).  For example, in August 2015 the UK diaspora civil society groups staged a 
demonstration in front of the House of Parliament. 
 
Figure 18: Gambian diaspora demonstrations in London 
Source: Gambian Youth and Women Forum Facebook Page 
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Figure 19: Gambian diaspora protesting outside the UK House of Parliament 
 
Source: Gambian Youth and Women Forum Facebook Page 
 
Though I did not attend this demonstration, I received reports from one of the 
organizers (Interviewee 44, male, 30s, highly educated professional/ activist) that 
roughly 50 people attended and they were mostly men and all young people.  
According to the feedback, the atmosphere was very lively. 
 
The civil society groups in the UK and US also organize conferences, meetings, 
and symposiums in various locations in the UK and US.  These forums allow them 
to openly engage in discussions about the political conditions in The Gambia. For 
example, in February 2013, the Democratic Union of Gambian Activists organized 
a meeting on “Escalating the resistance against the Jammeh regime106” and prayer 
vigil at a town hall in Washington DC. In February 2014, Campaign for Democratic 
Change Gambia107 organized a symposium and general meeting, in London and 
they invited the leader of the PPP opposition political party, Omar Jallow.  
 
These meetings provide a convivial space for explicit and critical discussion to take 
place, however, they tend to be small because attendance is always lower than 
expected.  Nevertheless, the meetings are often streamed live on the diaspora 
radios so they reach a wider audience.  These meetings tend also to be attended 
by mostly young to middle-aged Gambian men, and possibly a few older first 
generation Gambian men who may be living, effectively, in exile. 
                                                                
106 http://civilsociety-gambia.org/426/ 
107 https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=r3HXbTT5-VY EXPLAIN 
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The photograph below was taken at the Human Rights Symposium on the Death 
Penalty in The Gambia in July 2015.  I attended, as a non-aligned observer and 
there were roughly twenty people from the UK Gambian diaspora, mainly young 
men, but also four women.  There was only an older Gambian man, who was a 
panellist. 
 
Figure 20: Human rights symposium in London 
 
Source: Sainabou Taal 
 
These political meetings rarely draw a large number of female participants. 
However, at this meeting, I observed that the four Gambian women who attended 
were disengaged with the political discussions.  It was clear that the men 
dominated the meeting and the women were there just as observers. However, 
towards the end of the meeting, the men encouraged the women to share their 
opinions because they said they wanted a gender balance (they only realized this 
the end of the meeting) but the women seemed uncomfortable with that. However, 
a female participant stood up and made a generic statement about wanting political 
change in The Gambia without really going into much detail. This female 
participant spoke in English and Wollof (local language) but was extremely shy. I 
got the impression that perhaps she lacked confidence because her English was 
not very strong and during the discussions, everyone spoke English. However, 
during the break, I saw the same four women confidently engaging with the men, 
laughing and teasing them about personal things.  This was very confusing as this 
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was not how they presented themselves during the discussions where it was 
obvious that they were uncomfortable with openly talking about politics. However, 
occasionally I noticed the female participants nodding their heads in agreement 
with what was being said, which indicated that perhaps there was some level of 
engagement but this was very private. This observation supports the existing 
literature, which argues that the role of women in transnational politics is mostly 
invisible and private (Krook and Childs 2010, Mügge 2013).  However, unlike the 
same literature, which also argues that men actively subdued the voice of women 
in politics (Mügge 2013) in this case the Gambian women at this meeting made the 
conscious decision to subdue their own voices. It is difficult to understand why 
these women behaved in this manner, but I was not able to speak to them after the 
meeting due to time constraints. However, in an attempt to bring a nuanced 
analysis to this observation I would argue that perhaps the women preferred to 
keep their opinions private because the men dominated the forum with their 
presence. And maybe if more women attended the meeting then they would find 
confidence in numbers. Though this is difficult to prove there is some merit in this 
argument in that the photograph below of the women in the UDP opposition party 
protesting shows them expressing courage in their numbers.  These women were 
demonstrating against the arrest and detention of their party leader Ousainou 
Darboe, on Kairaba Avenue in July 2016. It illustrates that some Gambian women 
are actively involved in politics at ‘home’, yet they seem less to the fore in the 
diaspora. 
 
Figure 21: Photographs of women in the UDP opposition political party 
demonstrating  
Source: ‘Peaceful Change’ Group on Viber  
 202 
However, the Gambian women at the forum in New York presented a different 
image in that they appeared as dynamic as the urban women who were part of the 
‘miniskirt revolution’ in The Gambia in the 1960s.  These women were engaged in 
the discussion, well educated, vocal and confident in sharing their opinions, even 
though they too were small in number.  For example, one female participant made 
the statement that108 “women extend the voice of government but they are not 
represented” (female participant, New York, 2015).  What she meant by this was 
that she believes Gambian women are very effective at mobilizing themselves to 
support political parties in The Gambia but when it comes to occupying high 
positions or making decisions in these parties, they are often left out.  This 
perception speaks to the feminist literature, which argues that fewer women than 
men holding top-level political positions and women participating in politics are 
often relegated to more ancillary roles such as cooking, doing clerical work and 
mobilizing female voters (Krook and Childs 2010).  These case studies 
demonstrate the internal heterogeneities of Gambian women in the diaspora, in 
that their environment, education level and political interests determine their 
political engagement.  
 
The Role of the Internet in Gambian Diaspora Politics 
 
The Gambian diaspora groups rely heavily on the Internet and social media for 
their political mobilization because they are cheap and effective tools for 
communication. The literature asserts the Internet serves as a space for national 
and transnational political ideologies and culture to be expressed and counter-
expressed behind the safety of your computer screen (NurMuhammad et al. 2015).  
Thus, the Internet serves as a key resource for the Gambian civil society diaspora 
groups to advertise their events and to safely engage people in debates and 
discussions about political, economic, and social issues in The Gambia.   
 
The Gambian diaspora have a heavy presence on Facebook and Twitter, they own 
online newspapers and radio stations such as Freedom Newspaper 109 , Kairo 
News110, Kibaaro News111, Gainako112, Jollofnews113, Banjulfocus114 and Faturadio 
Network115, as well as run blogs116.  This allows them to have a geographically 
                                                                
108 This participant is recognized for openly condemning the government of the Gambia during the UDP 
stand off with government. Thus, she has gained a lot of respect from the Gambian diaspora. 
109 http://www.freedomnewspaper.com 
110 http://www.kaironews.com 
111 http://kibaaro.com 
112 http://gainako.com 
113 http://www.jollofnews.com 
114 http://www.banjulfocus.com 
115 www.faturadio.com/ 
116 http://sidisanneh.blogspot.co.uk 
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widespread impact as well.  According to a Gambian blogger who writes critical 
pieces about the government of The Gambia: 
 
Related to my activity as a blogger I have much more impact at the 
international level.  Most international organizations follow me and I get a 
lot of correspondence on email.  It’s an open dialogue and exchange with 
these organizations… (Interviewee 2, male, 60s-70s, former civil servant/ 
activist) 
  
Critics of this kind of ‘digital activism’ argue that this new model of activism 
(sometimes called ‘clicktivism117’) undermines the intensity and quality of political 
engagement because engagement becomes a matter of clicking on a few links 
(White 2010).  However, for small groups like the political Gambian diaspora, who 
face persecution in The Gambia and have limited financial resources, the Internet 
is clearly the best option for them to engage in politics at ‘home’.  Furthermore, part 
of the diaspora politics literature supports this form of activism because it argues 
that the power of diasporas is intensified via social media (Siapera 2014), largely 
because it allows those engaged in virtual politics to unite groups around a political 
causes and galvanize them for action with few risks (Simon Turner 2008, Bernal 
2013, Eric Turner 2013, NurMuhammad et al. 2015, Quinsaat 2015, Adamson 
2015).  
 
Additionally, the Internet allows the politically involved Gambians in the diaspora to 
keep the wider Gambian population and international community informed and 
aware of what is going on in the country.  To illustrate, the Internet was the most 
useful tool for the Gambian diaspora to let the world know about the attempted 
coup on the 30th December 2014.  The diaspora online media outlets became very 
active in disseminating information about the coup plot and the plotters within 
hours of it taking place.  The Internet also provided a mask for those who wanted 
to contribute to the discussions about the attempted coup but did not want to 
disclose their identity.  According to a student in The Gambia, “the diaspora are 
contributing to the political awareness of the people inside and to the wider world” 
(Interviewee 51, male, 30s and student).  This supports the claims made in the 
interviews that the diaspora is a vital source of information for the wider Gambian 
population. 
 
                                                                
117 Clicktivists – online petitions and mass email alerts  - a tool used by digital activists believed to 
cheapen political engagement process. 
https://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2010/aug/12/clicktivism-ruining-leftist-activism 
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The dissemination of political information is one of the most influential practices of 
the diaspora in terms of its political impact in the ‘home’ country.  The virtual 
transnational political space includes The Gambia, however, information does not 
move as freely as it does in the diaspora because the government blocks the 
online diaspora papers like Freedom Newspaper.  But, Gambians (particularly in 
the urban areas) seek out other websites that would allow them to access Freedom 
Newspaper. For example, at one point in 2010 Gambians at ‘home’ (including 
myself) could only access Freedom Newspaper via a website called ‘anonymouse’. 
However, this is not to suggest that information only flows one way into The 
Gambia, rather most of the information (rumours, gossips, insults, confidential 
letters, data and photographs) the diaspora report on social media and in their 
newspapers come from people in The Gambia. For example, Freedom Newspaper 
publishes articles written by a popular informant who goes by the alias ‘the Soldier’.  
This person claims to work at the State House in The Gambia and shares 
information about President Jammeh’s activities and reactions to events.  Certainly, 
there are questions about the validity of the information and whether this person is 
even in The Gambia and working at the State House.  However, the comments left 
on the articles suggest that people are interested in the information ‘the Soldier’ is 
sharing. 
 
The challenge from the perspective of the diaspora is to assess the veracity of that 
information and to measure its persuasive effects both at ‘home’ and in the 
diaspora.  In Gambian politics, the government treats rumours and falsehoods as a 
punishable crime and people are persecuted under the Information and 
Communication Act 2013 (see p. 121).  They also do the same for facts and 
realities that are portray the government in a negative light.  In which case the 
government labels those facts and realities as ‘false information’ and persecute the 
accused. However, in diaspora politics, sometimes members would create or 
publicize rumours and falsehoods to push an agenda or to create an avenue for 
discussions about a particular topic.  Thus, making some readers believe this 
information is real. 
  
Nevertheless, information shared by members of the Gambian diaspora has to 
compete for its audience in a world of information.  However, 27% of the politically 
involved interviewees in the diaspora feel they can build resistance against the 
government by making Gambians at ‘home’ aware of the activities of President 
Jammeh.  These interviewees gave the impression that Gambians at ‘home’ did 
not know much about the political activities of President Jammeh.  According to an 
interviewee in the diaspora, “the diaspora are actively involved in educating people 
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in The Gambia about what the government is doing”  (Interviewee 13, male, 30s-
40s and highly educated professional/activist). 
However, disseminating information is not without challenges as there have been 
times when diaspora online papers have been penalized for spreading false news 
and circulating rumours.  The newspapers had to accept blame and issue 
rejoinders.  For example, in August 2010, a Gambian businessman, Amadou 
Samba (who is a close ally to and business partner of President Jammeh) filed a 
lawsuit in the US against the diaspora-owned Freedom Newspaper, for falsely 
reporting in 2009 that he was arrested over a coup attempt and linking him to drug 
trafficking.  The editor of Freedom Newspaper was forced to retract the story and 
publish a rejoinder118.   
 
Certainly, some Gambians may see this as the negative aspect of relying on the 
diaspora for information and thus may trigger unexpected reactions from those 
receiving the information.  For example, the Facebook post below shows the owner 
of Freedom Newspaper Pa Nderry Mbai sharing information about President 
Jammeh’s annual ‘meet the people tour’ in which he states an agent of theirs was 
on the Jammeh’s private boat.  Supporters of the government felt this was a threat 
to President Jammeh and therefore, responded to this post in an irate manner. 
This shows the diaspora are not guaranteed support just because they share 
information they believe the people should know about the government. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                                
118 http://www.mfwa.org/country-highlights/gambia-human-rights-violations-in-2010/ 
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Figure 22: Comment about President Jammeh being monitored 
 
Source: Freedom Newspaper, Facebook Page 
 
Figure 23: Response to figure 22 
 
Source: Freedom Newspaper, Facebook Page 
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Comments: 
“You are very wicked and heartless peoples. If it was your brothers and 
sisters you wount pray for that to happen to them.  Allah will always be with 
President Jammeh but you devils. You are bad citizens. May your prayers 
reflect back on you!!!!” (Facebook 2015) 
 
“He is going to cross in peace wat can u do even ur stupid so call agents 
cant stop him u bastard old man to hell with ur stupid so call struggle. God 
is always wit president jammeh, u idiots cant hurt him, u bastard stupid dog” 
(Facebook, 2015) 
 
Although there was no evidence to suggest that trolls were paid by the government 
to write these comments or that it represents the views of the entire Gambian 
population.  However, I would argue the comments are only the view of those who 
managed to see the post or who decided to respond.  Nevertheless, what is 
interesting about these types of exchanges is that they are not one-sided, as the 
empirical evidence revealed that members of the political Gambian diaspora also 
exchange personal insults with the pro-government supporter.  As a result of this 
behaviour, some interviewees commented that they disapproved of these types of 
exchanges from the diaspora to pro-government supporters. For example, 
according to an interviewee in the diaspora, “people in the diaspora that are 
involved in politics from afar are making things worse.  They are aggressive people 
going on social media and insulting people, which is not going to help” (Interviewee 
27, male, 30s-40s, educated). This interviewee tried to come across as 
disinterested in the politics at ‘home’ by claiming to be unaware of the political 
situation in The Gambia.  However, the fact that he explicitly stated he was against 
the political interventions of the diaspora suggests that he knew more about it than 
he was willing to say. This shows another paradox between what people say and 
what they do within the Gambian diaspora 
 
The online activities of the Gambian political diaspora have triggered pro-
government supporters in the diaspora to counter their claims against the 
government in the interviews. According to one pro-government supporter, “some 
people are talking rubbish on the radio like Freedom ...  I am not going to listen to 
them and there are thousands of people who are not listening to them” 
(Interviewee 19, male, 50s and pro-government supporter).  It may well be that this 
interviewee jumped to this conclusion because it is no secret that Freedom 
Newspaper and its editor Pa Nderry Mbai are staunch and consistent critics of 
President Jammeh and his supporters.  However, the point here is that the very 
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freedom of these forms of media can also be their undoing in relation to their 
capacity to be persuasive.  Furthermore, there is little evidence from the interviews 
that this source of information is changing opinions of President Jammeh and the 
practices of politics in The Gambia.  
 
7.3 Triggers for Political Activity Among the Gambian Diaspora 
 
What events would move someone from being politically inactive in the diaspora to 
being politically active? The interviews and empirical evidence revealed the 
triggers for diaspora intervention in politics in The Gambia include human rights 
violations, abuse of power, economic mismanagement and political repression. 
When the government is accused of perpetrating what people might call a ‘crime’ 
against citizens, for example ordering arbitrary arrests of oppositions or interfering 
with the judicial system.  The source of information is extremely important as if 
something bad happens to someone and it is reported by the diaspora, it is more 
likely to galvanize support from people.  For example, in March 2015, gender 
activist Aminata Manneh went into hiding after she posted a video on Facebook 
exposing a police officer brutally beating a ten-year- old girl. The diaspora 
newspapers (Freedom, Fatunetwork, and Kibaaro) reported her disappearance, 
which galvanized people to start a campaign called “where is Aminata” 119 .  
However, it was later discovered that she had left the country and made her way to 
the UK120.   
 
The diaspora’s political mobilization is often framed around conditions in the 
country, for example, human rights violations, corruption, and abuse of power.  
Part of the literature on social movement theory argues that framing is the strategic 
effort by groups to transform certain events into substantive issues that help to 
define grievances and claims, as well as those that legitimize and mobilize action 
(Sökefeld 2006; 270).  For example, 35% of the interviewees in the diaspora 
claimed their intervention in politics in The Gambia was triggered by the April 2000 
shootings of students. According to one interviewee:  
 
I did not start out as politically committed, but I was writing about Gambia.  
I became an activist following the shootings of students on 10th -11th April 
2000.  That is when I began to be active and go beyond just writing about 
the conditions.  I could not stand by being scholarly distant anymore.  I 
                                                                
119 http://kairabanews.com/where-is-aminata-manneh-missing-gambian-university-student/ 
120 the information abut Aminata being in the UK was provided to me by her family member in the UK 
who is a personal friend  
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could not sit and watch my country go down the drain and say nothing. 
(Interviewee 5, male, 50s-60s and academic/activist) 
 
The April 2000 shootings were a shock to the nation and to the diaspora in 
particular, as nothing like that had ever happened before in The Gambia.  
According to these interviewees, it was a wake-up call because for the first time 
people started noticing the brutal nature of the current regime. This event was 
arguably the first to legitimize the political mobilization of the Gambian diaspora 
against the government. Subsequently, human rights conditions in The Gambia 
worsened after this event and the political mobilization of the diaspora has become 
more pronounced. The harsh political conditions and the ‘real’ fear of state- 
sanctioned violence in the country are reflected in the increasing number of 
Gambians seeking asylum outside of the country.  For example, I reported in 
chapter 3, that Gambian asylum applications in EU countries in 2015 was 12,395, 
rising from 960 in 2008. Since 2004, there have been a number of events that have 
pushed Gambians, particularly journalist to seek asylum in Senegal, Europe and 
the United States. For instance, in December 2004, Deydra Hydara a prominent 
journalist and owner of opposition newspaper The Point, was murdered121. Then in 
March 2006, the editor-in-chief and general manager of The Independent 
newspaper was arrested and tortured and the newspaper was closed down122.  In 
August 2009, six journalists including three members of the Gambian Press Union 
were convicted of sedition and defamation, sentenced to two years in prison and 
fined approximately US$ 10,000 123 .  Then in 2012, the government arbitrarily 
closed The Standard and Daily Newspapers as well as Teranga FM radio station124.   
 
The extent of the human rights violations in The Gambia is captured in the Human 
Rights Watch 2015 report ‘State of Fear, Arbitrary Arrests, Torture, and Killings’, 
which contains testimonies and statements from 38 victims and witnesses of 
human rights violations in The Gambia (9).  These included journalists, political 
opponents, LGBT people, opposition party members, civil servants, and former 
national security officers.  Some of the victims have subsequently fled the country 
to Senegal, UK, and the US.  One interviewee stated: 
 
                                                                
121 https://www.amnesty.org.uk/press-releases/uk-gambia-uk-trade-unions-and-amnesty-international-
call-halt-journalists-trial 
122 http://www.dc4mf.org/sites/default/files/plight_of_gambian_exiled_journalists_0.pdf 
123 https://www.amnesty.org/en/latest/news/2009/08/six-gambian-journalists-sentenced-prison-
20090807/ 
124 http://www.dc4mf.org/sites/default/files/plight_of_gambian_exiled_journalists_0.pdf  
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I was a prominent journalist who worked for the Daily Observer125, one of 
the most important newspapers operating in The Gambia during the period 
of military rule.  I spearheaded a strong opposition to the military regime in 
The Gambia for two years and more.  However, following several threats 
on my life, I was forced to move to the United Kingdom in late 1996 
(Interviewee 3, male, 40s-50s and academic)  
  
The standard rebuttal to these claims by President Jammeh is that these 
individuals are disingenuous, and they are fabricating stories to boost their claims 
for asylum and the whole human rights framing is really just a ruse for international 
migration.  However, in a speech given by Jammeh at a political rally in Basse 
(Upper River Region) in May 2014, he made a policy pronouncement against gays 
when he was quoted saying “Some people go to the West and claim they are gays 
and that their lives are at risk in the Gambia, in order for them to be granted a stay 
in Europe. If I catch them I will kill them126.”  Shortly after an anti-gay bill was 
passed in parliament confirming the risk of persecution of gays.    
 
Since 1994 there has been significant evidence of President Jammeh and his 
government arresting and persecuting his critics and political opponents (Saine 
2002, Saine 2009, Saine and Ceesay 2013, Perfect, Foreign and Commonwealth 
Office 2013, UN Human Rights Council 2014, Human Rights Watch 2015, Amnesty 
International 2015, 2016).  These actions clearly provide motives for the diaspora 
to intervene in politics, particularly as the empirical evidence revealed that some of 
the people involved in the political interventions in the diaspora were once victims 
of Jammeh and their testimonies have an impact on the diaspora.  For example, Dr 
Amadou ‘Scattred’ Janneh’s whose case will be discussed in more detail later in 
this chapter.  
 
On the other hand, the high levels of corruption in the country also work as a 
trigger according to interviews.  Some participants argued that President Jammeh 
is spending state resources to increase his own personal wealth.  According to one 
interviewee in the diaspora, “Jammeh came and said there was too much 
corruption which people agreed to but then he (Jammeh) realized he can make 
money for himself.  Now he is not only the commander and chief but business and 
chief” (Interviewee 39, male, 30s-40s and highly educated professional/ activist). In 
                                                                
125 The Daily Observer is one of the main newspapers in the Gambia http://observer.gm. However, since 
the coup in 1994, it has become a pro-government newspaper.  They are often criticized for being bias 
in favour of President Jammeh, as they do not report news that is seen as opposing the President and 
his government.  This could be attributed to the fact that the President appoints the Editor –in –Chief of 
the newspaper. 
126http://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/africa/the-7-worst-things-gambias-president-yahya-
jammeh-has-ever-said-about-gay-people-9977170.html 
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addition, according to another interviewee in The Gambia whose partner works at 
the Central Bank of The Gambia, “the Central Bank of The Gambia is his 
(Jammeh’s) own personal bank” (Interviewee 45, male, 30s, private business 
owner). Corruption is not unique to The Gambia but the interviews suggested that 
Gambians believe it is often at the extreme end of the scale.  For example, 
according to the Chairman of a government institution in The Gambia, “President 
Jammeh has been selling rice that was donated by the Japanese government to 
the Gambian people. He was selling it to the people for 500 GMD a bag, 
additionally, he has taken 40,000 tonnes of rice seeds donated to the national 
research institution for his own farms” (Interviewee 47, male, 60s, retired civil 
servant/agriculture expert)127. In 2003, President Jammeh gave a radio interview 
where he said he was selling rice and giving the proceeds to The Jammeh 
Foundation For Peace which aims to assist the less fortunate around the world, 
particularly the poor and the needy128.” Although I could not substantiate these 
claims on either side, the point is that stories like this fuel the anger that pushes 
people in the diaspora to get involved. Given that The Gambia is one of the poorest 
countries in the world, it is frustrating to members of the diaspora if the Jammeh 
Foundation For Peace is making profit to support the poor in other countries. 
Therefore, it matters less whether these stories are true or false, what matters is 
whether people are willing to believe them. The precise complexities of the 
President’s involvement in rice sales are unclear, but the rumours are enough to 
provoke action.  
 
The interviews also revealed that 60% of the interviewees believe the abuse of 
power by the President is another major trigger for the Gambian diaspora to 
intervene in homeland politics. According to an interviewee in the diaspora, who 
used to work in a senior position in the Gambian government and is now involved 
in the political struggle of the diaspora: 
 
The regime has formed into a one-man show of Jammeh.  State resources 
are spent to celebrate his birthday, when he talks he says my country, I 
own the country…  He is engaged in every sphere of the economic activity.  
With this type of system, no one should be blamed for looking at Jammeh 
when it comes to solving the problems of the country… people are 
arrested and locked up for disagreeing with Jammeh…Ministers do not 
have power to do anything in their ministries… policies are drafted without 
consulting them and if they agree to anything at international meetings 
                                                                
127 Unverified information 
128 http://www.statehouse.gm/kanilaifarm-interview/interview-president.htm 
 212 
without consulting him, he would pull out and they would be arrested 
(Interviewee 14, male, 50s, professional/activist) 
 
It is a fact that President Jammeh owns many private businesses in the country 
under the company name Kanilai Group Investment (KGI).  This again is a major 
concern for the diaspora, as his company is accused of putting local Gambians out 
of business.  For example, President Jammeh’s company sells school uniforms, 
bread, fish, meat, cement, rice, vegetables, and rams during the religious 
celebration of Eid (Tobaski).  The photograph below was taken in Banjul outside 
MaCarthy Square, a few weeks before the Tobaski celebrations.  The rams belong 
to President Jammeh and one interviewee told me they were delivered to the 
square and sold by military personnel.  According to an informal discussion I had 
with an informant who bought one of these rams, they explained that the buyers 
are not allowed to choose the ram they want.  Instead, they have to tell the military 
officers how much money they want to spend, and the officer picks a ram in that 
price range.  The informant stated it was a frustrating experience for them, as 
people could not reject what they were given because the military men were 
aggressive and they carried weapons.  
 
Figure 24: President’s sheep in McCarty square in The Gambia 
Source: Sainabou Taal 
 
For the interviewees in the diaspora, stories such as this fortify their belief that 
there is an abuse of power by political elite for personal economic ends in The 
Gambia.  This is a powerful trigger for the diaspora’s political mobilization because 
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it is a source of resentment and frustration for the diaspora (and for the people in 
The Gambia).  Thus, 20% of the diaspora interviewees insisted that they are 
speaking and acting in the name of those at ‘home’ who are afraid to speak out.  
As one interviewee puts it, “people in the Gambia are afraid to voice their opinions 
about the government.  But in the diaspora, we are free to say what we want so we 
do it for them” (Interviewee 7).  
 
7.4 Justifications for Political Interventions from the Diaspora  
 
The interviews revealed that some 40% of interviewees justify their interventions in 
politics as their responsibility as ‘citizens’ of The Gambia to save the people from 
the ‘tyranny’ of having a ‘despotic’ leader. One interviewee explained, “Jammeh is 
a tyrant and people are living in tyranny” (Interviewee 11, male, 50s, activist). This 
view aligns with global justifications of ‘liberal interventionism.’ These political 
science theories argue that a direct intervention (including the use of force) is 
justified if a state loses its legitimacy by failing to practice good governance and 
engaging in illegal political behaviour like widespread corruption, leading to poor 
economic performance (Johnson et al. 1984, Tesón 2001 and Atkinson 2008). 
Liberal interventionism describes a doctrine that is normative, geopolitical, and 
military.  It justifies intervention in foreign countries, including the use of violent 
force, in order to promote Liberal Values (freedom, democracy and human rights) 
(Peksen and Comer 2012).  Liberal interventionism flourished in the 1990s in the 
Balkans and Sierra Leone but was still used in Iraq in 2003 and Libya in 2011 to 
explain why ‘the West’ was justified in using the military in foreign countries, a 
justification that was (sometimes) sanctioned by the UN.  This doctrine has 
changed over time.  Its latest iteration is the ‘Responsibility to Protect’ (R2P) idea 
(Graubart 2013).  The UN adopted this in 2005 and it allows the international 
community to deploy force when a state fails to protect its own citizens from 
genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing, and crimes against humanity.  The UN 
Security Council Resolution 1973 called on all members states to take ‘all 
necessary measures... to protect civilians’ in Libya for example.  The language, 
ideas and terms of liberal intervention are subsequently deployed not by state 
actors, but by transnational actors. For example, when the Gambian diaspora 
argue that their interventions are justified on the basis that evidence has shown the 
Government of The Gambia engaging in widespread corruption, mismanaging the 
economy, and most importantly, violating the human rights of the Gambian people 
by abusing the monopoly of legitimate violence and manipulating elections. 
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However, the main difference between the way this idea is invoked in Libya and in 
The Gambia relates to its military dimension and the fact that this is not a situation 
of inter-state negotiation at the UN but is largely an encounter between a state and 
its own citizens living beyond its borders. The effectiveness of liberal 
interventionism according to its advocates William Ewart Gladstone, Woodrow 
Wilson, and Tony Blair, is the possibility of armed liberal interventions in states, 
which are abusing the human rights of citizens (Lipsey 2016), but most Gambians 
in the diaspora reject the use of armed force.  The dilemma here is that diaspora 
activists focus on the ‘original sin’ of the current government, which was its violent 
birth in a military coup.  Therefore, the diaspora is adamant that their interventions 
will not be to overthrow the government by military means but to push for a 
democratic political change in the country. So, the diaspora uses the justification 
for intervention but does not advocate the means. Additionally, the country finds 
itself in a situation where the military is in support of the current government and 
President Jammeh in particular.  For example, military officers are seen openly 
wearing t-shirts and hats with President Jammeh face, particularly during the 
election period. To illustrate, the photograph below was taken on the 10th 
November 2016, the day President Jammeh went to nominate his party for the 
upcoming elections at the IEC and posted on Facebook.  
 
Figure 25: Soldier wearing APRC t-shirt 
 
Source: Gambia Youth and Women’s Forum Facebook page 
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Does the close relationship between President and army amount to a situation that 
justifies external intervention?  One of the ambiguities here is that there were two 
attempted coups by military officers wanting to overthrow President Jammeh in 
2006 and 2007.  Consequently, General Lang Tombong Tamba and six others 
were sentenced to death in July 2010129, though they were pardoned in 2015130.  
This perhaps worked as a deterrent for military personnel wanting to take similar 
actions because President Jammeh has shown that he will not hesitate to 
prosecute military officers if he believes they are plotting against him.   
 
On the other, a key barrier for those in the diaspora who seek to justify their efforts 
to change the government at ‘home’ (even by peaceful means) is that much of the 
population within the country appear to support President Jammeh. It is important 
to recognize that many Gambians support Jammeh and his government, 
irrespective of what the diaspora believe.  However, this does not mean that 
Jammeh is not engaged in human rights violations or that his supporters are not 
aware of it.  Rather they downplay those accusations and emphasize the 
development they argue Jammeh has brought to the country. For example, when I 
observed the July 22nd celebrations (also known to the regime and its supporters 
as The Revolution131’) at the Independence Stadium in Bakau, in October 2014. I 
saw a significant number of Gambians of all ages openly showing support to 
President Jammeh.  They wore his party’s colour (green) and their t-shirts, hats, 
and traditional clothing that had his face plastered on them and they were singing, 
cheering, and dancing. For example, the first photograph below shows an elderly 
Gambian man wearing his t-shirt.  This photo was taken as the man was walking to 
the stadium and he was happy to oblige my request to take this picture. However, 
the second photograph of the crowds was taken in the stadium.   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                                
129 http://www.foroyaa.gm/archives/2367 
130 http://thepoint.gm/africa/gambia/article/more-than-200-pardoned-convicts-released-from-prison 
131 President Jammeh and his supporter refer to the 1994 military coups as the ‘revolution 
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Figure 26: A pro- Jammeh supporter heading to the July 22nd celebrations. The 
caption on this t-shirt says, “His Excellency Sheikh Professor Alhagi Dr. Yahya 
A.J.J Jammeh. 20th Anniversary of the 22nd July Revolution 1994-2014” 
  
Source: Sainabou Taal 
 
Figure 27: July 22nd celebrations at the stadium in Bakau. This is a picture of one 
side of the stadium. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: Sainabou Taal 
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The crowds in figure 27 waited for hours under the scorching hot sun for President 
Jammeh to arrive.  The atmosphere was lively in the stadium as people clapped 
and cheered for the dignitaries arriving. However, during the interval of the military 
band, people listened in silence as the Master of Ceremonies read out the list of 
developments President Jammeh brought to the different sectors of the country 
since 1994.  From my own subjective opinion, the observations at this celebration 
confirmed the claims made by Cowen and Shenton (1996) that Third World” 
dictatorships attempt to legitimize its mandate to rule in the name of development, 
and this is partly to blame for the confusion in development studies as to what 
development means  
 
There was a genuine sense from the crowds that they were in support of the 
regime, however, an argument can also be made that the attendance at the 
stadium does not mean approval or support for President Jammeh and his 
government.  Indeed, there are those in The Gambia who show political allegiance 
to the government because of fear. Though this is difficult to prove, as people 
would not openly admit to it.  However after I left the celebrations, I joined a 
conversation with two people who were watching the event on television.  I 
commented about the large crowds and the support President Jammeh seemed to 
have from the people. But these two informants insisted that most of those people 
in attendance were brought to the celebration by force and that every village chief 
and alkali was given strict instructions to take a busload of people to attend the 
celebrations or risk being prosecuted.  In addition, they told me that every school 
headmaster or mistress was also forced to take school kids to the celebration or 
risk being fired. I was left confused by this information because, on the one hand, I 
witnessed crowds of people cheering and showing support to President Jammeh in 
a very lively atmosphere but on the other hand, I was being told that most people 
were forced to be there. Then on reflection, I decided to treat this information as 
their perception, which they genuinely believed to be true.  But they did not present 
proof to support this claims.  In fact, the way the information was relayed to me 
sounded like ‘hearsay’. But the empirical evidence from my observations supports 
the argument that the people there were sincere in their enthusiasm about showing 
their support to President Jammeh.  This shows the gaps that exist within the 
population about whether or not Gambians really support President Jammeh.  
 
According to some people in The Gambia, the diaspora is wrong for exposing the 
human rights abuses of the government.  In the interviews, they argued that this is 
having a negative impact on the country’s reputation.  In essence, they blamed the 
diaspora for tarnishing country’s image by airing its ‘dirty laundry in public’.  For 
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example, one interviewee claimed, “they go outside and tarnish the images of the 
country” (Interviewee 52). In this instance, the interviewees in The Gambia 
appeared disconnected to those in the diaspora.   Even though they acknowledged 
that the government was abusing the rights of the people, however, they did not 
like the diaspora drawing attention it. But in response to the accusation, some 
interviewees in the civil society groups argued that is President Jammeh who is the 
tarnishing the image of the country. For example, one interviewee explained:  
 
It is Jammeh who is painting the country in bad light. All we are doing is 
telling the people what he is doing. The world is a global village and 
anything that takes place is open to global scrutiny.  Gambia is a hostile 
environment that is creating victims and those victims are narrating their 
stories. Jammeh claiming to cure AIDS is disrespecting himself and the 
image of the country (Interviewee 8, male, 40s-50, lawyer/activist) 
 
Certainly, President Jammeh has been open to international criticism ever since he 
claimed he could Aids on national television132.  But the point here is that when it 
comes to politics the relationship between the diaspora and the Gambians on the 
ground is more complex than either party would appear to believe. Even though 
the Gambian diaspora are celebrated for their development interventions, they are 
also criticized for their political interventions by people at ‘home’. I argue that the 
difficult relationship between the diaspora and those at ‘home’ is heavily influenced 
by the question of remittances.  For example, those at ‘home’ who depend on such 
sources of money are likely to say what they think the diaspora want to hear not 
necessarily what they themselves believe. But for some interviewees in the political 
diaspora, they do not accept such complaints about their interventions in politics 
because they are convinced that they are doing what is right and not necessarily 
what the people at ‘home’ want.  Thus, I was left questioning on whose behalf the 
diaspora are truly intervening and how this relates to the way they justify their 
actions. 
 
7.5 Assessing the Impact of Intervention 
 
One of the claims made by Lyons and Mandaville (2012) is that little is known 
about how politics in the country of origin has been transformed by the current 
upsurge in the political activism of increasingly mobile transnational populations.  
Therefore, the purpose of this section is to assess the impact of the Gambian 
diaspora interventions in politics in The Gambia, UK and US. 
                                                                
132 https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=LYt1gJo3nf8 
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To begin, all the interviewees involved in the Gambian diaspora political activism 
claimed their political mobilization was influenced by contemporary politics in The 
Gambia. They argued that by creating awareness about the political conditions in 
the country, they have subsequently made President Jammeh and his government 
more cautious about its actions, as well as influenced President Jammeh to 
change his behaviour towards the diaspora.   
 
These interviewees mentioned four specific government actions following diaspora 
intervention. First, they claimed to have had an impact in reducing corruption by 
the government. For example, one according to an interviewee in the diaspora:  
 
A friend of mine working in the government departments told me some of 
the newspapers in the diaspora are contributing a lot to highlighting the 
corruption in government and this is making senior level civil servants 
careful of their actions.  They know there are insiders in the ministries 
providing information to the diaspora, and when the diaspora publish it, the 
government investigate and this is what is making them very careful.  This 
happened with someone in the Ministry of Health and when the 
government saw the article about them, they sent auditors to the ministry 
to investigate that person and they found that some of the allegations to be 
true… this to me is a big plus. (Interviewee 36, male, 30s, educated 
professional) 
 
The diaspora considered this to be a very positive outcome because they claimed 
to be doing what Gambians on the ground cannot, which is making the civil 
servants and bureaucrats within the government machine accountable for their 
actions thereby reducing corruption.   
 
Second, according to an interviewee in the diaspora, they were responsible to 
President Jammeh deciding to not take action on a specific issue that would have 
affected development in the farming communities in The Gambia.  For example, 
this interviewee said he had written an open letter to the President of the 
International Fund for Agricultural Development (IFAD) in Nigeria on May 3rd 2014, 
informing them of President Jammeh’s plans to establish the Food Security 
Corporation (FSC) 133 , which they believed would negatively affect the farming 
community.  The interviewee claimed that their letter prompted the President of 
IFAD to visit The Gambia, after which there were no more talks of establishing the 
                                                                
133 http://sidisanneh.blogspot.co.uk/2014/05/an-open-letter-to-ifad-president-kanayo.html 
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FSC.  However, it was difficult to substantiate this claim because according to a 
press release by IFAD on 14th August 2014, their President visited The Gambia to 
discuss investment in smallholder agriculture, strengthen partnerships and work to 
further transform rural areas into economic vibrant business134. Therefore, if there 
were discussions about the FSC they were behind closed doors. 
 
Third, the interviewees argued that the diaspora were responsible for the 
government allowing two UN Special Rapporteurs (Christof Heyns and Juan 
Méndez) into the country to investigate allegations of poor condition in Mile 2 
prison. The diaspora claimed that the sequence of this event started when Dr 
Amadou ‘Scattred’ Janneh (who spearheaded the diaspora campaign on this 
issue) was sentenced to life in imprisonment for distributing t-shirts printed by the 
diaspora civil society group Coalition for Change – The Gambia135 saying “End 
Dictatorship’.  Upon his release in 2012, Dr Janneh returned to the US and started 
campaigning against the poor conditions and treatment of prisoners in Mile 2. 
However, in an effort to dispel these accusations, the interviewees believed that 
the Government of The Gambia allowed the UN Special Rapporteurs to investigate 
the prison. Additionally, one interviewee claimed that some members of the 
political diaspora helped to direct the experts to cases in The Gambia to investigate.  
They also claimed to have given “the UN rapporteurs anecdotal evidence and 
introduced them to personal witnesses who had experienced atrocities in Gambia” 
(Interviewee 14, male, 50s, professional/activist).  After the investigation was 
completed and the rapporteur published their report, this interviewee said he felt 
vindicated because the report confirmed that the national security forces were 
violating the human rights of citizens and the prison was in a poor condition.   For 
example, the report stated: 
 
Throughout the visit, we received many testimonies from people who did 
not want to be identified out of fear for either their own safety or their 
families, and we have therefore asked the Government to reaffirm its 
commitment not to engage in any reprisals136 (Heyns and Méndez 2014).   
 
Fourth, the interviewees also argued that the 30th December 2014 attempted coup 
influenced President Jammeh to change his behaviour towards the diaspora by 
showing a willingness to engage them.  They asserted that this is because 
Jammeh started to see the diaspora as a real threat to his position therefore he 
                                                                
134 http://www.ifad.org/media/press/2014/52.htm 
135https://www.amnesty.org/en/latest/news/2012/01/gambia-must-release-four-activists-jailed-
distributing-anti-government-t-shirts/ 
136http://www.ohchr.org/EN/NewsEvents/Pages/DisplayNews.aspx?NewsID=15267&LangID=E  
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was trying to appease them by granting amnesty to his critics in the diaspora.  
Which was accepted by some key members of the political opposition in the 
diaspora like Falai Baldeh137.  
 
However, this claim of reconciliation between the government and the Gambian 
diaspora should be treated with caution.  The apparent willingness of President 
Jammeh to engage can also be attributed to the fact that he was aware that the 
rest of the world (including key donors) was observing how he managed the 
situation. Though I argued previously that President Jammeh has not succumbed 
to international pressure, the fact that the country has lost significant amounts of 
development aid from the EU, Commonwealth, and US may logically have played 
a part in influencing him to consider his approach in dealing with the diaspora.  
 
Overall, there is a sense that the diaspora is trying to ‘make quite a lot out of quite 
a little’ when claiming to have an impact in politics in The Gambia. Even the 
changes they do claim to have delivered are minimal when compared to their 
overall aim, which is to drive a much more extensive democratization of political 
practice in The Gambia. The consensus is that it would be extremely difficult to 
influence a democratic political change in the country, particularly through elections.  
The expectation amongst the diaspora is that the upcoming December 1st 2016 
presidential elections will not be free and fair, as President Jammeh has already 
started taking steps to secure his win.  Firstly by pushing for the amendments to 
the Electoral Bill, secondly, giving directives to the Chief Inspector General of the 
Police to refuse permits to opposition parties to hold rallies and third, by 
sanctioning arbitrary arrests and torture of political opposition party members, 
including women and young people. 
 
Therefore, are obvious challenges from Gambian diaspora galvanizing support 
from those in the country (including the oppositions political parties) from afar, 
however, there must also be other reasons for the diaspora to have limited impact 
with their interventions? And are those reasons the lack of open participation and 
support from the wider diaspora, limited financial resources, fragmentation of the 
groups and lack of organization? The interviews revealed that the Gambian 
political diaspora have not been able rally large scale support from the wider 
Gambian population because of (1) fear of the consequences for their families in 
The Gambia (2) some people do not agree with diaspora interventions in politics 
and (3) there are some people in the wider Gambian diaspora who do not have 
faith that interventions will succeed in changing politics in The Gambia.  However, 
                                                                
137 https://jollofnews.com/2016/03/23/former-gambian-activist-regrets-opposing-jammeh/ 
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out of all these possible reasons, I argue that fear perhaps plays the most 
important role in discouraging people in the wider Gambian population from openly 
participating in politics at ‘home’. For example, according to an interviewee in the 
diaspora, “I take part in the online discussions but anonymously and I have made 
financial contributions to the movement twice before but I am very anonymous 
because of my loved ones back home and security of family and friends” 
(Interviewee 40, male, 40s, highly skilled professional).  This fear stems from the 
fact that families of political opponent in the diaspora have been targeted and 
harassed by the national security services.  For example, after the 30th December 
2014 attempted coup the government arrested and harassed the family members 
of those suspected of involvement.  This included 14-year-old Mustapha Lowe, (the 
son of one of the coup plotters) was detained for months138.  This makes the fear of 
state-sanctioned violence a real and objective emotion amongst the wider 
Gambian population.  
 
Secondly, the limited financial resources available to the Gambian diaspora 
political groups also affect the impact of the interventions.  Particularly the groups 
that do not have connections with international human rights organizations to help 
fund and advocate for their cause like the group ‘Coalition for Change- The 
Gambia’. Instead, some members of these political groups use their own personal 
money to rent space for their meetings and print t-shirts and placards for their 
demonstrations.  According to one participant, he has personally paid for the 
printing of t-shirts, placards and bought a bullhorn for demonstrations because his 
group did not have the money (Interviewee 44, male, 30s and highly educated 
professional/ activist).  
 
There is also the issue of fragmentation between the Gambian civil society groups, 
which in some instances were caused by generational differences. Typically, in 
The Gambia, there is a hierarchy in decision-making processes based on age and 
gender.  For example, it is the older men in society who hold the decision making 
power, and this structure exists in the diaspora as well.  However, the growing 
number young and educated Gambians in the diaspora are challenging this 
structure and demonstrating their independence by forming their own civil society 
groups, such as Gambian Youth for Unity (GYU).  This group organized protests 
and engaged in online activism without the support of the older and more 
experienced civil society groups. This has contributed to the challenge of unifying 
or even aligning the various Gambian civil society diaspora groups together.  As 
such, approximately 80% of the interviewees in the diaspora claimed they did not 
                                                                
138 http://afrol.com/articles/25158 
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believe the political diaspora is having any impact with their interventions. For 
example, one interviewee in the diaspora asserted, “the Gambian diaspora is just 
making noise and the reason they are not making an impact is because they are 
not united” (Interviewee 31).  
 
Lastly, there is a lack of organization with political interventions, which 
subsequently discouraged some interviewees in the Gambian diaspora from 
getting involved. For example, 55% of the interviewees complained that the 
political events organized by the diaspora started and finished late, and therefore, it 
makes it challenging for those who have to travel long distances to attend. 
Coincidently, I witnessed the poor organization first hand when I observed the 
Campaign for Democratic Change Gambia Symposium in August 2013.  I arrived 
at the venue at the scheduled time, however, no one was there, and the venue was 
closed.  I contacted the organizer and they informed me that the event was not 
going to commence until 3 hours later than the time it was scheduled.  I decided to 
return home but then hours later I received a telephone call from one of the 
organizers informing me that the event had started and they wanted me to return. 
This experience created the impression that there is a lack of ‘seriousness’ with 
their political interventions and this has exposed the groups to criticisms from the 
wider Gambian diaspora. 
 
Effects of The Gambian Diaspora Lobbying in UK and US  
 
Part of the academic literature argues that the diaspora has a role to play in 
lobbying host governments to shape policies in favour of (or to oppose) a 
homeland government (Hägel and Peretz 2005, Vertovec 2005).  The Gambian 
diaspora civil society groups are no different, as they too have been lobbying the 
UK and US governments to change their policies towards The Gambia since 2001.  
Certainly, all the interviewees involved in the political activism of the diaspora 
claimed to have achieved some success with their lobbying activities.  For instance, 
they gave examples such as the UK Border Agency (UKBA) changing its asylum 
regulations towards Gambians in 2012, thus making it easier for Gambian fleeing 
from political persecution to be granted asylum in the UK139, the EU withholding aid 
to the country in 2014,140 and the US government removing The Gambia from the 
                                                                
139 Home office Operational guidance note: Gambia, June 2013. This document incorporated numerous 
research material and publications from human rights organisations such as Amnesty international. 
https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/311873/Gambia_operatio
nal_guidance_2013.pdf 
140 http://www.reuters.com/article/us-gambia-rights-donors-idUSKBN0JO19520141210 
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Africa Growth Opportunity Act (AGOA) in 2015141.  These interviewees explained 
that through their advocacy for human rights in The Gambia, they have been able 
to influence politics in the US and UK.  
 
However, there are some doubts about whether these examples can be attributed 
to the lobbying efforts of the Gambian diaspora alone. Even though there is 
evidence which link the action of some UK members of parliament (MPs) and US 
government officials to diaspora lobbying. For example, UK parliamentarians such 
as Jo Swinson from the Liberal Democratic Party sponsored early day motion 
2727142 in 2012 as well as Labour MP Katy Clark who also sponsored early day 
motions 348143, 1213144 and 1287145 on human rights in The Gambia in 2013 and 
2014.  In addition, members of the Scottish Parliament (MSP) such as Patrick 
Harvie sponsored a parliamentary motion signed by 20 MSPs condemning the 
execution of prisoners in The Gambia146.  And in the US, the Gambian diaspora 
gained the attention of US Senators such as Richard Durbin, which resulted in him 
sending a letter to the Gambian Minister of Justice in 2011 appealing for the 
release of local journalist Chief Ebrima Manneh 147  who was arrested by state 
security in 2006. Lastly, US National Special Advisor Susan E Rice issued a 
statement on human rights violations in The Gambia in 2015 148 , which was 
believed to be in response to the lobbying effort of the Gambian political diaspora. 
The achievement for the diaspora was getting host governments to even discuss 
human right issues in The Gambia, as often, Gambians have the impression that 
the country is of little interest to the international community because it is small and 
has no strategic natural resources. 
                                                                
141 it has been speculated that the Gambia was removed because of the human rights abuses and 
political instability http://www.ictsd.org/bridges-news/bridges-africa/news/united-states-removes-three-
countries-from-agoa 
142 http://www.parliament.uk/edm/2010-12/2727 
143 http://www.parliament.uk/edm/2013-14/348 
144 http://www.parliament.uk/edm/2012-13/1213 
145 http://www.parliament.uk/edm/2013-14/1287 
146Campaign for Human Rights in the Gambia in Edinburgh groups visited the Scottish Government in 
2012 to highlight the human rights violations being perpetrated by the government.  They caught the 
attention of the MSP because President Jammeh had just executed 9 prisoners, which made 
international news.  The issues of human rights in The Gambia became a huge topic of discussion in 
the Scottish parliament and they supported the diaspora’s appeal to the UK government and wider 
international community to ‘seek a resolution at the UN General Assembly condemning the use of the 
death penalty and all human rights abuses in The Gambia and to consider that aid, trade, tourism and 
diplomacy all have a role to play in putting pressure on the Gambian Government to end its abuse of 
human rights.’ http://www.localnewsglasgow.co.uk/tag/campaign-for-human-rights-in-the-gambia/ 
147 The diaspora have been actively advocating to their host governments and international community 
to put pressure on the government to explain his whereabouts.  This letter was sent by the senator in 
response to the advocacy of the diaspora, with support from the human rights organisations and 
Gambian Press Union. https://cpj.org/blog/2011/11/us-senator-again-presses-gambia-on-missing-
journal.php 
148 https://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2015/05/16/statement-national-security-advisor-susan-
e-rice-lgbt-rights 
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However, other players besides the members of the Gambian diaspora have also 
contributed to the UK and US paying particular attention to the human rights 
conditions in The Gambia.  For instance, the international Lesbian Gay Bisexual 
and Transgender (LGBT) community have been lobbying the UK and US 
governments to take action against the Gambian government, since 2014, when 
the government passed a bill imposing a life sentence on homosexuals.  And when 
President Jammeh publically threatened to “slit the throats” of gays and lesbians in 
The Gambia in 2015.   
 
Thus, recognizing the potential for additional external support from the LGBT 
communities, the Gambian civil society groups in the diaspora have changed their 
strategy to solicit help from this community when lobbying the US government in 
particular.  According to a member of the civil society groups in the US:  
 
The diaspora in the US are raising awareness amongst the LGBT 
community who are great lobbyists and activists.  We have been able to 
engage them about how gays and lesbians are being treated in Gambia.  
This partnership is helping to raise awareness and inform policymakers on 
what is going on and it is having an impact. (Interviewee 4, female, 40s, 
highly educated professional/ activist) 
 
Figure 28: Man from LGBT community demonstrating against President Jammeh in 
the US 
 
Source: Gambia Youth and Women’s forum, Facebook page 
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The Gambian civil society groups see the LGBT community as presenting a big 
opportunity to enhance their lobbying power. However, what is interesting about 
this partnership is that the majority of members in the Gambian political diaspora 
do not, themselves, agree with the homosexual “lifestyle.”  This claim was 
confirmed when I observed a meeting in London in July 2015 where it was 
suggested that they invite members of the LGBT community to participant in an 
upcoming demonstration. However, some participants appeared concerned 
because they did not want to be seen publicly supporting homosexuality to the rest 
of the Gambian population. However, it was decided at the end to invite the LGBT 
community to they needed them to make up the numbers.  This finding revealed 
how the Gambian civil society diaspora groups would put their moral and religious 
beliefs that tie them to the country to one side for the sake of achieving democratic 
political change in The Gambia. 
 
However, relations between the Gambian diaspora and the US government have 
not been cordial recently because of the 30th December 2014 coup attempt by the 
six US- Gambian citizens.  This resulted in the FBI arresting and charging four US-
Gambians under the 1794 Neutrality Act, for participating in a conspiracy to attack 
a nation with which the US is at peace149.  When the interviewees were asked how 
they felt about the reaction of the US government to the attempted coup, 45% 
claimed they were unhappy about it.  According to an interviewee who is part of the 
political Gambian diaspora, they were   “absolutely disappointed.  It is hypocritical” 
(Interviewee 11, male, 50s, activist).  On the other hand, 50% of the participants 
claimed they felt it was the right decision, as according to another interviewee “I 
personally condemned the attempted coup. We should not allow violence of any 
form to take control of the government, so their reaction is something that I 
expected.  I am on the side of the US, what they are doing is right thing” 
(Interviewee 31, male, 40, highly educated professional).  And 5% appeared 
indifferent, as one participant explained, “I wouldn’t know because I did not read 
much about it.  I know those involved were prosecuted by US government” 
(Interviewee 73, male, 50s, working professional/ student).   
 
According to an article in the Guardian in July 2015:  
 
Classified State Department cables published by WikiLeaks, running from 
2006 to 2010, reveal a consistent US concern about Jammeh’s “penchant 
for erratic and sometimes bizarre behaviour”, and an awareness of the 
                                                                
149 The Gambian charged were Cherno Njie, Papa Faal, Banka Manneh and Alagie Barro. 
http://www.theguardian.com/us-news/2015/jan/06/gambia-coup-plotters-cherno-nije-papa-faal-model-
us-citizens  
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brutal measures he employed against real and perceived opponents. Yet 
the communications suggest a willingness to look past his abusive 
practices for reasons of national interest. Jammeh assisted in at least one 
CIA rendition during the Bush administration. The cables referred obliquely 
to “specific bilateral [counterterrorism] efforts”, as well as unspecified “US 
aid to the NIA”, Jammeh’s intelligence service. Jammeh assured US 
diplomats that he was committed to assisting the fight against drug 
trafficking, though suspicions abound that the regime has profited from the 
trade150.  
 
Based on the information in this Guardian article, I would argue that it is 
understandable why 45% of the interviewees were frustrated with the actions taken 
by the US government against the coup plotters.  This is partly because the US 
government appeared to have been aware of the political repression and human 
rights violations in The Gambia. However, to maintain this argument would show a 
remarkable lack of understanding of geopolitical realities, whereby the interest of 
international political actors make them overlook certain violations, such as human 
rights abuses, as the leaked documents have proven.  But on the other hand, 
perhaps the interviewees felt that as the US government was known to have 
helped to mobilize the Iraq-American and Afghan–American diasporas in the early 
2000s, when their own national geopolitical and security interests are perceived to 
be at risk (Lyons and Mandaville 2012; 13), that they would do the for Gambians. 
But then again, the Gambian government does not pose a threat to the US, 
whereas the diaspora created a risk by nearly damaging diplomatic relations with 
The Gambia.  Subsequently, the diaspora could have easily lost the political 
goodwill and sympathy they have earned in the US from years of lobbying.  
 
Nevertheless, lobbying appeared to be the most effective strategy by the Gambian 
political diaspora however, it would have been more effective if there were not 
disunity and lack of good organization among the groups. In addition, lobbying has 
also been compromised by alliances with groups like LGBT in the context of a lack 
of lobbying skills and resources in the diaspora acting on its own. Furthermore 
such lobbying has to be understood in the wider context of diplomatic practice and 
geopolitical reality, in which the Gambians have little effective leverage in either the 
UK, the EU or the US even though if it has strategic importance to the US who 
                                                                
150 https://www.theguardian.com/world/2015/jul/21/how-former-us-army-officer-launched-disastrous-
coup-the-gambia) 
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provided anti-terrorist funding and the Russians who are interested in establishing 
a possible naval base in The Gambia151.  
7.6 Conclusion 
 
In conclusion, it is clear that the civil society groups in the Gambian diaspora are 
having some successes with their political mobilization in the UK and US.  For 
example, these groups have managed to get the help of key international human 
rights organizations to expose the human rights violations being perpetrated by the 
current regime.  Integral to this have been transnational networks of information, 
underpinned by new ICTs that have enabled information about what is happening 
in The Gambia to reach the diaspora and from there it has been passed on to 
international organizations of political significance.  In turn, many critical reports 
have been written and statements issued condemning the Government of The 
Gambia for abusing the rights of its people.  Consequently, the country has lost aid 
from one of its main donors.  It is logical, though not provable, to extend this 
conclusion to include the further claim that President Jammeh has made some 
attempts to change policy to counteract the negative image the world has of him 
thanks to the diaspora.  
 
Though democracy already exists in The Gambia in the form of a multi-party state 
system that holds elections every five years, the general assessment is that the 
incumbent party extensively manipulates these elections. The diaspora clearly 
places improving the human rights of Gambians above their other key goal, which 
is to change the government in The Gambia. A change of government is seen by 
most of those interviewed in the diaspora as a necessary precursor to 
democratization. This focus on human rights reflects the pragmatic alliance the 
diaspora have struck with international organisations, which provides them with 
resources and a platform. This is much more easily done with human rights groups 
than LGBT groups. Yet, in relation to changing government and governance in The 
Gambia there is also a sense from the interviews in the diaspora that those who 
are outside fail to take into consideration the fact that their interventions are not 
always welcomed by some members of the Gambian population, and not just by 
those that genuinely support President Jammeh and his government but also by 
those who regard these interventions as counter-productive in relation to 
democratization because they antagonize the government.  
 
                                                                
151 http://us.blastingnews.com/world/2016/04/there-is-more-to-banjul-moscow-relations-than-bilateral-
ties-00877219.html 
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The mutual dependence between those inside the country and those outside who 
are trying to lobby for good governance is illustrated by the ability of the former to 
provide information and stories about political life in The Gambia and the ability of 
the latter to give those stories air and authority via newspapers, radio stations and 
new media.  However, the Gambian diaspora are faced with many other 
challenges that limit their ability to influence a democratic political change in The 
Gambia partly because each group is working individually as opposed to 
collectively and the lack of cooperation from the Gambian opposition political 
parties shows them being unwilling to work with each other or with the diaspora as 
a whole.  During the interviews, there was an overwhelming sense from some of 
the interviewees that they felt the opposition party leaders were more interested in 
their own self-advancement than improving governance in The Gambia.  However, 
they did not make this explicit and instead suggested that some opposition leaders 
drew on the diaspora for financial support and not their ideas.  For example, one 
interviewee in the diaspora argued that “the opposition parties run to us when they 
need money but when it comes to us providing our input and recommendations 
they say you guys are not here so you don’t understand what is going on in the 
country” (Interviewee 4, female, 40s, highly educated professional/ activist).  
Observations from the forum in New York supports this claim as the opposition 
party leaders failed to answer the question about what they planned to give the 
diaspora in return for their support.  
 
On the other hand, President Jammeh has labelled the diaspora as ‘troublemakers’ 
for some time, which was never an issue for his opponents in the diaspora 
themselves since it added to their public profile.  However, the coup attempt of the 
30th December 2014 has confirmed to many Gambians on the ground that his 
labelling of the diaspora is accurate.  This can be seen in the insults some 
Gambians post on social media about members of the diaspora who are politically 
involved.  Thus, President Jammeh has successfully tarnished the reputation of 
some members of the diaspora in The Gambia making it much harder for them to 
engage openly in political activities and debates.  
 
The Gambian diaspora has been effective in mobilizing virtually but not in direct 
overt politics because some members do not want their families to know of their 
involvement in the political struggle, as they still want to maintain their relationship 
with the people in The Gambia.  However, the literature on diaspora in politics 
(especially in relation to violent conflict) and social movement theory remains 
useful in understanding how and why the diaspora intervene in homeland politics. 
The evidence from the Gambian interviewees generally confirms claims from 
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elsewhere that the small size of the diaspora and the particular features of the 
government’s authoritarianism mean that fear about public participation in politics 
in this case study is particularly acute.   
 
The literature also tells us that homeland governments see diaspora interventions 
as positive when they are limited to nation-building activities, like post-conflict 
reconstruction (like the Liberian and Eritrean diasporas) and funding development 
projects (like the Ghanaian, Rwandan and Somali diasporas), but reject diaspora 
interventions in formal politics.  For example, the political interventions of the 
Gambian diaspora have resulted in the government marginalizing them from 
participating in national development projects. Part of the literature argues that 
African states are not entirely committed to engaging their diaspora in homeland 
affairs because of fears that it would threaten their power (Iheduru 2011). I argued 
that President Jammeh now views the diaspora as a serious threat since the 30th 
December 2014 attempted coup.  But, just as it has been stated in the literature 
elsewhere, President Jammeh also recognizes that the diaspora has the potential 
to be significant players in homeland politics (Vertovec 2005, Turner 2013). Thus in 
order to secure his position as President, he will not risk engaging with those parts 
of the Gambian diaspora who are already very critical of him.  However, this has 
not prevented the diaspora from finding ways to get involved in politics in The 
Gambia often via the Internet.  
 
The barriers for the Gambian diaspora to achieve democratic political change in 
The Gambia go beyond the problems of not having collaboration with each other or 
cooperation between the opposition political parties. I would argue that the limited 
civic engagement by the majority of Gambians at ‘home’ also plays a part in why 
the diaspora has not been able to influence democratic political change in the 
country.  For example, the fact that voter turnout has decreased in every 
presidential election means that people are not taking up their civic responsibilities. 
Understanding why people at ‘home’ do not use their voting rights but are happy 
for the diaspora to fight for their rights to be respected and sustain them financially. 
And understanding why the diaspora continue to fight for people who are not using 
their votes to support democratic political change and thus making the political 
interventions of the diaspora more difficult are interesting areas for further research, 
Arguably, if the diaspora wants to influence democratic political change in The 
Gambia, they have to find a way to get those on the ground to votes against the 
current regime the upcoming elections.  
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There is a particular methodological challenge in terms of drawing conclusions 
about the political effectiveness of the Gambian political diaspora, as some of the 
claims made in the interviews were difficult to prove.  For example, claims such as 
the Gambian diaspora being responsible in influencing the EU to withhold aid to 
The Gambia and the US government removing the country from AGOA. It might 
well be that the members of the Gambian diaspora played a role, but such events 
have multiple causes and reflect multiple interests, so it is hard to say with any 
certainty how important the Gambian diaspora was when these decisions were 
made by the EU or the USA.  Perhaps, ironically, it is more useful to think of the 
effect these decisions have on the diaspora. The sense that their efforts might 
have an impact is, according to the interviewees, very energizing. It makes the 
apparently futile and never-ending task of campaigning for democratization feel 
worthwhile from a diaspora perspective if they believe they played a key role 
influencing powerful international organizations. 
 
On the other hand, I also argued in this chapter that much of the information the 
Gambian diaspora civil society groups shared with these international 
organizations about President Jammeh and his government is public knowledge, 
often exposed by President Jammeh himself. For example, he made his feelings 
towards homosexuals very when he addressed the UN General Assembly. And in 
response to that statement, the White House issued their own statement 
condemning the treatment of homosexuals in The Gambia.  This makes it 
challenging for the diaspora to maintain the claim that they are responsible for 
creating awareness about the government perpetrating the human rights violation 
when it appears that President Jammeh is doing it himself.  
 
Lastly, the 30th December 2014 attempted coup showed clearly that elements in 
the diaspora are serious about influencing political change in The Gambia even if it 
meant abandoning the long-standing diaspora commitment to non-violence. 
However, although the coup plot failed, the diaspora did succeed in bringing more 
international attention to The Gambia.  Therefore, the findings presented in this 
chapter adds to the wider debate in the existing literature in African diaspora 
studies by taking a holistic approach to understanding what drives small diaspora 
groups like the Gambians to get into conflict with their homeland government, 
where they can succeed, and the barriers that prevent them from having a more 
significant impact. 
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Chapter 8:  
Relating Politics, Development, and Migration to 
the Gambian Context 
 
One of the main aims of the thesis was to articulate a better understanding of the 
relationship between development, politics and international migration in The 
Gambia. In the previous three chapters, the thesis has sought to draw attention to 
the politics-development relationship when it is relevant, but here that relationship 
is brought into the foreground.  
 
This chapter has two substantive sections after the introduction.  The first section 
discusses the relationship between ‘politics and development’ in The Gambia.  The 
second section focuses on the connection between ‘politics and migration’ in the 
Gambian context.  This section describes the ‘backway’, which is the journey made 
by young Gambian men and women trying to get to Europe on boats. This 
migration route has expanded dramatically as The Gambia’s political situation 
became increasingly authoritarian in recent years. This chapter will conclude by 
trying tease out which sequence of relationships between the three key terms is 
more important than the others in the context of The Gambia. Ultimately, it argues 
for the primacy of politics as the cause of subsequent patterns of migration and 
development. 
 
8.1 Introduction 
 
The causal relationships between development, politics and international migration 
can be thought about in six general ways: the effect of migration on politics and 
development, the effect of politics on migration and development and the effect of 
development on migration and politics (Figure 29). Based on the empirical 
research a number of more specific ideas stand out within this framework. This 
chapter considers six of these ideas in particular: (1) performing ‘good governance’ 
can attract international development aid; (2) performing ‘bad governance’ can be 
a major barrier to the delivery of infrastructure or social welfare projects; (3) 
oppressive political regimes can drive international migration; (4) international 
migrants can contribute significantly to political change in their ‘home’ countries; (5) 
development can help to increase the profile of politicians; (6) politicians can direct 
resource allocation at maximizing voter support, and thus create social and 
geographical development disparities.   
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Figure 29: 6 way causal relationships between politics, development, and migration 
 
Source: Sainabou Taal 
 
Some of these relationships are more interesting than others within the Gambian 
context. For example, discussions about ‘politics and development’ and ‘politics 
and migrations’ allow me to introduce new examples in the debates in this chapter. 
Whereas throughout the thesis, I have already drawn attention to the reciprocal 
relationship between ‘migration and development’ therefore, I will only make some 
brief further remarks on this dimension at this point.   
 
In chapter 5, I discussed how migration leads to development in The Gambia in 
that diaspora remittances alleviate household poverty and fund village 
development projects.  Remittances contribute roughly 20% to the country’s GDP, 
as well as bring vast amounts of foreign exchange. But this needs to be set against 
some of the more negative development effects of emigration. For example, firstly, 
remittances create patterns of uneven development (some social groups benefit 
more than others, some geographical areas benefit more than others).  Secondly, 
migration also masks the extent of the Government’s development failure, because 
as Chami and Fullenkamp (2013) argue, corruption and state failure matters less 
for households that receive remittances (2).  According to Gambian academic 
Abdoulaye Saine (2009), “remittances cushion the regime by rerouting or deflecting 
potential popular protest and frustrations to family members abroad or elsewhere” 
(89).  What this means is that remittances have diverted people’s attention away 
from the shortfalls of the government, thus I argued in chapter 6 that remittances 
reduce the civic engagement of people in The Gambia. Thirdly, the brain drain of 
skilled professionals from The Gambia (Wadda 2000, Docquier and Marfouk 2006 
and Kebbeh 2013) has inhibited the development of the public and private sectors 
in the country. For example, according to an interviewee who is a former civil 
servant in The Gambia: 
 
Politics
DevelopmentMigration
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I attribute the development problems in African development to brain drain.  
Human resources and capacity is the most important asset to development.  
In Gambia, they have square pegs in round holes problem because of the 
brain drain in the country.  For example, the Ministry of Finance and 
Economic Affairs is manned by administrators and not people with 
qualifications in economics. (Interviewee 61 male, 60, economist/former 
civil servant/highly educated professional) 
 
The current brain drain situation in The Gambia illustrates why parts of the 
‘migration and development’ literature argues that countries need to do more to tap 
into entrepreneurialism and skills mobilization of diaspora networks (Mullings 2012) 
as a means to build a more sustainable form of diaspora-led development 
(Nyamongo et al. 2012).  And governments also need to establish policies that 
target migrant investments, skills, knowledge, and entrepreneurial capabilities 
(Ratha et al. 2011, Gamlen 2014) and not just remittances.  But, of course, the 
empirical evidence in the Gambian case reminds us that where there is a major 
breakdown in the relationship between the diaspora and the government such 
policies are futile. The migration-development couplet then is not the focus of this 
chapter, which instead sets out to focus on the politics-migration and politics-
development relationships. 
 
Indeed this chapter also aims to go beyond thinking about the ‘bilateral’ 
relationships between two concepts, to thinking about how all three concepts work 
together as one chain of causal relationships. For example, an interviewee in the 
diaspora explained:  
 
We see the links between politics, migration and development manifest 
itself in the country because it has become difficult for the country to 
achieve economic development because of the poor political leadership 
and where there is economic underdevelopment, citizens tend to migrate, 
denying the country of its human resources.  When you talk to the youths 
they want to leave because of underdevelopment and hopelessness and 
because the regime has not met the economic aspirations of the people, 
so migration has become the best option for them (Interviewee 14, male, 
50s, professional/activist). 
This chapter concludes by arguing that the key pathway through the three 
elements is that politics in The Gambia causes under-development and it is this 
underdevelopment that drives international migration, as illustrated by the dramatic 
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growth of the ‘backway’ migration in recent years. The logical chain could continue 
by reflecting on the development consequences of migration (as the fourth term in 
this argument), but there is more ambiguity at this point since migration has both 
negative and positive consequences for development in The Gambia as has just 
been explained. Whilst there are other possible chains of causation using these 
concepts, the argument developed here is that fundamentally the diaspora story 
starts with the effects of politics at ‘home’ and that this argument reflects the views 
of Gambians at ‘home’ and overseas. 
 
8.2 Politics and Development in The Gambia 
 
The link between ‘development and politics’ is often not clear in the development 
studies literature despite the profound effects political practices have on 
development pathways. Rather development studies tend to treat politics in the 
technocratic, dispassionate form of ‘good governance’.  Conversely, development 
achievements or failures can profoundly shape the political trajectories of African 
countries by either securing or undermining the position of governments. The 
interviews revealed that Gambians tend to define political practice as the activities 
associated with leadership, democracy and governance in the country, which has 
also shaped the way African politics is defined in this thesis (Boone 2003, Hydén 
2013, Thomas 2010).  
 
The relationship between ‘politics and development’ in Africa became a key topic of 
discussion in the late 1960s after many African states gained their independence 
and the focus shifted towards enhancing development in their countries. More 
recent contributions to the debates on the relationship between ‘politics and 
development’ in the ‘third world’ have come from Adrian Leftwich (1993, 2006,) 
who argues that development is inherently a political process, meaning he believes 
that development is a fundamental part of politics. In their paper ‘Politics, 
leadership and coalitions in development’, Leftwich and Wheeler (2011), assert 
that despite the role of politics in development, it is often ignored in technocratic 
debates about the institutional and policy environment (4). However, politics 
matters for all aspects of development, and as such, development is a political 
process that occurs at all levels in all aspects of society (8).  
 
Other scholars who have also contributed to this debate include Heinz Arndt (2011) 
who as mentioned in chapter 2, argues that the relationship between ‘politics and 
development’ is seen in citizens’ assessments of how political leaders manage 
development in their countries.  According to Arndt, political leadership plays a key 
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role in development because leaders whose focus is on the management of the 
state (as opposed to focusing on increasing their own authority) are more likely to 
bring development to their countries.  Arndt suggests that political leaders with 
strong management abilities such as good judgment of people (individuals and 
groups), who know their strengths and weaknesses, have skills in conflict 
resolution, the ability to balance interests, form coalitions and know when to be firm 
and when to compromise (55) are more likely to enhance development in their 
states.  Perhaps, the examples of good political leadership in Africa are the leaders 
who have won the Mo Ibrahim Laureate for enhancing democracy and economic 
prosperity in their countries. Winners such as Joaquim Chissano of Mozambique, 
Pedro Pires of Cape Verde, and Hifikepunye Pohamba of Namibia, though no 
doubt some of their citizens might not agree with this recognition. 
 
However, Abdulai and Hickey (2014) assert that the relationship between ‘politics 
and development’ in Africa manifests in the way politics shapes the actual 
distribution of state resources.  Politics is often materially demonstrated through 
the distribution of scarce public resources, which according to the literature can be 
explained using theories of neo-patrimonialism, (Chabal and Daloz 1999, Bayart 
2009, Boone 2003, Daloz 2003, Ganahl 2014). The core claim here is that patrons 
in positions of authority buy the obedience and support of political ‘clients’ using 
resources stolen from the state (Van de Walle 2007).  Political scientist Harold 
Lasswell (2012) defines this form of politics as “who gets what, when and how.”  
For example, political leaders who for the most part direct resource allocation at 
maximizing voter support (as opposed to meeting the basic needs of all citizens), 
are likely to create deep disparities in the development sphere of a country.  These 
disparities are clearly illustrated in The Gambia. In chapter 6, I discussed how 
government-funded development is geographically concentrated in areas like 
Kanilai where they have strong voter support (Wright 2015) but not in areas linked 
to the political opposition like Wuli West, in the Upper River Region. In 2011 Wuli 
decided to support the President because they claimed to be ‘suffering’ from lack 
of development to which President Jammeh responded, “the choice is yours. I will 
reward those who like me and vote for me,” (Daily Observer 152 , 2011).  The 
situation in Wuli shows how development in The Gambia is often used as a tool to 
reward supporters and punish opponents (Saine 2009). This supports part of the 
argument in the literature on distributional politics in Africa that suggests resource 
allocation decisions are often directed at securing existing voter support (Amutabi 
and Nasong'o 2013, and Hydén 2013) rather than being based on national 
interests. 
                                                                
152 www.archive.observer.gm/africa/gambia/.../wuli-west-we-regret-ever-being-in-the-opposition-... 
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However, one of the limitations of this thesis was the lack of quantitative data to 
show how politics influences the geographical pattern of government investments 
in The Gambia.  This would have allowed for a comparison between the 
infrastructural development of opposition and government-leaning districts.  
Nevertheless, the qualitative empirical evidence has revealed that the interviewees 
believe this form of political practice is occurring and subsequently affecting the 
overall development of the country creating development disparities. 
 
Historically, modernization theorists such as Walt Rostow (1990) and Samuel 
Huntington (1971) have argued that politics is, in fact, a result of development, 
meaning they believe a state has to achieve a certain level of economic growth and 
development in order to then have a strong democratic political system. Therefore, 
development has priority over politics. In contrast, contemporary scholars like 
Leftwich and Wheeler (2011), Arndt (2011), and Abdulai and Hickey (2014) argue 
that a state has to have a strong political system first before they can achieve 
development and economic growth.  History is rarely so tidy in its separation of the 
political and the economic (as most of these authors themselves acknowledged).  
However, it can be argued that both points of view reflect the agendas of a certain 
period. For example, during the modernization period, development was about 
primarily achieving economic growth as a means of ensuring democracy but 
tolerating more authoritarian regimes to get there. This tolerance of African 
dictators often also suited the global geopolitical interests of the Cold War when 
superpowers turned a blind eye to their clients’ political abuses of African citizens. 
In contemporary society, however, development is, in theory, seen as contingent 
on maintaining political stability and improving democratic rights, which are viewed 
as vehicles for further development and economic growth under the language of 
‘good governance’. Even so, some authoritarian and undemocratic rulers are still 
tolerated because their countries are seen as African development success stories 
(Rwanda, Ethiopia, and Uganda).  However, what is more, important to understand 
is how these relationships manifest themselves in the individual country context. 
 
Based on the interviews, 75% of the interviewees in the diaspora argued that ‘bad 
political leadership’, and ‘bad governance’ is directly inhibiting development in The 
Gambia.  As discussed in the introduction chapter, politics is about the socially 
constructed rules by which a group of people live (Heywood 2013), it is also about 
dialogue and arguing about what these rules should be in public, which is seen as 
central to politics in some contexts. Politics is a social and public activity.  However, 
the interviewees said this was not the case in the Gambian context, rather the 
practice of politics is limited to President Jammeh and his small group of loyalists.  
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This they said leaves room for the government to engage in corruption, without any 
accountability.  Incidents such as the ‘oil saga I’ and ‘oil saga II’ which involved the 
Nigerian Government giving the Gambian government a significant amount of 
crude oil and money that has not been accounted for (Saine 2009, Perfect 2016) 
and an unaccounted for $35 million loan from Taiwan (Saine 2009), are evidence 
of Gambian government corruption according to these authors.  
 
Without public participation and debate of the current rules, the diaspora argued 
that the political choices made by President Jammeh are having a negative impact 
on development. Amartya Sen (2001) argues in his book ‘Development as 
Freedom’, that human development includes certain freedoms such as political 
participation (17). In addition, those political scientists who are also interested in 
development have always seen meaningful, effective and widespread participation 
in politics as a key development indicator (Huntington and Nelson 1976, Leftwich 
1993). Political participation is defined as “all voluntary activities by individual 
citizens intended to influence either directly or indirectly political choices at various 
levels of the political system” (Kaase and Marsh 1979 cited by Grasso 2016: 13). In 
essence, political participation is about citizens taking part in the conduct of public 
affairs (UN 2005), which is perhaps the most important element for Gambians. 
Thus, it may be the case that the liberalization of the rule-making process is 
‘development’, for the people at ‘home’ and in the diaspora and what they would 
define as ‘good political leadership’. 
 
However, the interviewees create the impression that they believed the actual 
existing process of making political choices in The Gambia is unilateral. 
Development is what the government think it should be, and not what the people in 
The Gambia need it to be.  For instance steady universal electricity supply, 
constant running water and a good drainage system to avoid flooding during the 
rain seasons. This was brought up in discussions of representation in Gambian 
politics. Political representation within modern studies of political science is loosely 
defined as having decision-making government institutions that reflect the wants, 
needs, and demands of the whole public in proportion to different interests within 
that public (Schmitt and Thomassen 1999). Thus, typically around the world, there 
is under-representation of women within political bodies in relation to the proportion 
of the population. The definition of political representation emerged from historical 
scholars such as Thomas Hobbes (1651), who argued in his book ‘Leviathan’ that 
the represented transfers power to a representative and thus have a very little 
political role because they have given consent to whatever is done in their name. 
Meaning that the representative has the absolute power and authority to do what 
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they think is in the best interest of the represented. However, representation in the 
current democratic era means people do not simply authorize the representative to 
speak on their behalf but they have the right to participate in political process even 
after they have elected their representative (Knight 2010). Therefore, as an ideal 
practice, political participation and representation should co-exist, even though in 
reality this is much more difficult to achieve.  For example, in chapter 7, the ruling 
APRC party has 43 out of the 44 seats in National Assembly (of whom under 10% 
are women), and though the people elected them, it can be argued that the 
government appears selective in which elements of model democratic political 
practice it chooses to adopt. For instance, they encourage public participation in 
elections but not in policymaking. Thus, it seems representation in Gambian 
politics has not evolved with the times.  Perhaps because the government wants to 
appear democratic to achieve legitimacy and to obtain aid from western 
democracies, but in reality engages in autocratic practices in an attempt to remain 
in power. In this case, acceptance of the validity of existing forms of political 
representation can be viewed as an obstacle for those in the diaspora who want to 
achieve democratic political change.  
 
The interviewees listed three recent political choices made by President Jammeh 
and implemented without public debate, which they said affected development in 
The Gambia (in terms of the expansion of human capacities and quality of life (Sen 
2001; 144).    First, in 2014 the Vision 2016 development policy153 was introduced, 
which aimed to ban imported rice into the country (a staple food in the country) in a 
bid to make The Gambia ‘rice self-sufficient’ by 2016.  The second political choice 
was declaring the country an Islamic State in 2015, which interviewees believe has 
discouraged western donors.  And third, was increasing ferry tariffs for Senegalese 
transporters, which led to Senegal closing its borders to The Gambia for several 
months in 2016 severely affecting imports and exports of goods. In addition, in 
2013, President Jammeh made the unilateral decision to withdraw the country from 
the Commonwealth, which is believed to have had an impact on development aid 
in the country.  However, due to limitations of space, this section will focus on the 
three more recent events listed above. 
 
In his statement at the US-Africa Leaders Summit in Washington in August 2014, 
President Jammeh announced, “we have recently launched Vision 2016 initiative 
for food self-sufficiency, especially in rice production.  The goal is that by the year 
2016 all the rice consumed in the Gambia would have been locally produced” (2).  
Although this plan may sound impressive to the international audience as well as 
                                                                
153 http://statehouse.gov.gm/visions/vision-2016/ 
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create a good impression amongst his supporters, some interviewees argued that 
President Jammeh made this declaration to maintain a narrative of perpetual 
development and create a sense of an on-going national project rather than 
because such a goal is feasible, or even desirable.  Development is being used 
here to increase the political reputation of President Jammeh. However, according 
to an agricultural expert in The Gambia, the reality is the country is nowhere near 
being self-sufficient in rice production because the government does not have the 
pre-requisites in place to achieve the aims of Vision 2016.  The interviewee 
explained that: 
 
Vision 2016 in my view should have been a project like its preceding rice 
development project such as the Jahally-Patcharr, with components clearly 
defined and well arranged and described to attain the desired goal of self-
sufficiency in rice.  The questions that should have been asked are; how 
much rice do we need?  The total rice import is at 160,000 to 175,000 tons 
annually.  Is this rice consumed totally by Gambians?  No.  Some are re-
exported.  Total rice production is 60,000 tons, paddy or un-milled.  After 
milling, you may be lucky to recover 60% as milled or cleaned rice, or 
36,000 tons.  With this in mind, I would have looked into the total cultivated 
land area available in the entire country for rice productions, in order to 
meet our needs.  It is imperative to have at least 80,000 hectares or say 
100,000 hectares suitable for rice cultivations, with suitable soil and 
adequate water, rainfall and irrigation.  Adequate rice seeds, improved soil 
fertility, fertilizers to increase rice yield, combined harvesters, and not 
using hand sickles or cutlasses.  Therefore, Vision 2016 was just a hollow 
dream, even up to 2026 is not going to be possible because the requisites 
for rice self-sufficiency are not in place (Interviewee 47, male, 60s, retired 
civil servant/agriculture expert) 
 
However, knowing that the necessary prerequisites are not in place for this plan to 
succeed. What are the political effects of Vision 2016?  Certainly, the main one is 
that it boosts President Jammeh’s popularity amongst Gambians whether it 
succeeds or not.  The mere fact that Jammeh came up with this initiative shows 
him thinking about what would make the people happy, in this case, the possibility 
of reducing the cost of rice.  Though by banning imports he may well actually 
increase the cost of rice. The second effect is that this project was great leverage 
to gather support for the presidential elections. The fact that the government has 
injected a small quantity of money into rice farming, creating jobs and revenue for 
farmers and is promising much more money in the future will help him draw votes 
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from the farming community, even though the scheme has not delivered the results 
it promised.  
 
Migration also plays a role in the Vision 2016 plans. On the one hand, the large-
scale migration of Gambians could have implications on this plan because it means 
a shortage of labour to work on these farms.  On the other hand, those in the 
diaspora that are interested in development, see this plan as an opportunity to 
invest in small-scale rice farming or help find investors that can invest in this 
projects. This would ultimately increase the chances of achieving rice self-
sufficiency and perhaps reduce dependency on other countries (as imported goods 
should logically be more expensive than local products). It might also allow the 
diaspora to reduce the amount they remit to households for food consumption.  As 
it stands buying a bag of rice (costing between 1,300 (£24) and 1,600 (£29) dalasi) 
is one of the more expensive foods to purchase. However, part of the political 
diaspora’s project is about revealing the government’s motivations for their political 
activities so vision 2016 was always treated with scepticism by most in the 
diaspora, including most interviewees.  
 
At a political rally on 11th December 2015, President Jammeh declared that The 
Gambia is now an Islamic State154, despite the country’s constitution clearly stating 
that The Gambia is a “Sovereign Secular Republic” (1997; 20). This clearly raised 
suspicion amongst some members of the Gambian population as well as insecurity 
amongst the Gambian Christian communities. For example, on February 3rd 2016, 
The Knight of Saint Peter and Paul, a Catholic group in The Gambia, wrote a letter 
to President Jammeh, in which they stated: 
 
The declaration of The Gambia as an Islamic State is naturally not a 
welcome development within the Christian faith.  In a society so integrated 
like the Gambia, the move, unfortunately, places emphasis on what makes 
us different, with a potential to tear us grievously apart, rather than what 
binds us together … Governments can give even their most sincere 
assurances and efforts, but then somehow, over-zealous religious 
adherents may feel that government has not gone far enough in 
entrenching their faith and then take the law into their own hands… Our 
fear is not of our Muslim brothers and sisters, with whom Christians have 
amicably lived, worked, inter-married, and socialised since living memory.  
It is the fear of the alien fringe elements, even from outside the country, 
                                                                
154 http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-africa-35359593 
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who will consider this declaration as a window of opportunity to propagate 
intolerance155  
  
This statement shows there are genuine concerns within the Gambian Christian 
communities that the country could become exposed to Islamic fanaticism.  
However, according to Western media, this declaration combined with Jammeh’s 
anti-West sentiments particularly against the British and US governments has left 
the country even more isolated156 and thus affected levels of development aid.  But, 
there is no evidence that Western countries have cut or frozen aid due to this 
declaration, rather Russia has recently signed an agreement of military cooperation 
with the Government of The Gambia157 to provide military support and training, 
despite the EU and UK withholding aid. Nevertheless, some Western media insist 
that declaring the country an Islamic State is a strategy to appeal to Arab Gulf 
states that also harbour anti-Western sentiments and to attract aid from countries 
like Kuwait and Bahrain158. In which case appealing to the Arab Gulf states is a 
pragmatic solution to find aid for the development of the country in the context of 
the loss of aid from major historic donors. According to an article published in the 
Huffington Post, The Gambia has secured “development assistance from high 
GDP, conservative Muslim countries with foreign policies less dominated by 
traditional Western human rights concerns, including Qatar and the UAE. These 
have included 11 loans totaling $91.1 million from the Kuwait Fund for Arab 
Economic Development” (DeFreese 2016).  So, it can be argued that this was a 
clever geopolitical strategy, which has worked.   
 
The political effect of declaring the country an Islamic State is difficult to determine, 
because though it may boost President Jammeh’s popularity amongst the Muslim 
religious clerics, it has not received any ‘real’ reaction from people in the country.  
In fact, the empirical evidence revealed that it was the diaspora and political 
opposition parties who mostly spoke out against it, by posting videos on social 
media, writing articles and starting the campaign “not in my name – Gambia is not 
an Islamic State” on Facebook159. But there have not been any public outcries from 
the Christian communities in the country.  However, this could be because of a 
number of reasons such as the fear of state-sanctioned violence, or the one million 
dalasi (£18,740) Christmas gift the Christian community received from Jammeh on 
                                                                
155 http://thepoint.gm/africa/gambia/article/our-view-on-the-declaration-of-the-gambia-as-an-islamic-state 
156 http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-africa-35359593 
157 http://observer.gm/russia-gambia-sign-agreement-on-military-cooperation/ 
158 http://www.economist.com/news/middle-east-and-africa/21685736-how-tiny-west-african-tourist-trap-
turning-itself-islamic 
159 https://jollofnews.com/2015/12/13/gambians-react-to-jammeh-s-declaration-of-an-islamic-state/ 
http://gainako.com/dc-gambian-christian-organization-cries-foul-over-islamic-state-declaration/ 
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the 23rd December 2015,160 or this community not taking the declaration seriously 
because Jammeh told Gambians to emulate Jesus Christ who, preaches and 
values peace161 in his Christmas message in December 2015 Jammeh. Thus, for 
the general Gambian population, in particular, the Christians, this declaration is 
another one of Jammeh’s erratic episodes to be ignored.  
 
I argue that this declaration has had no impact on development in The Gambia, 
and perhaps its purpose was to divert attention away from the failing economy162. 
This declaration has also had no impact on politics in The Gambia.  However, at an 
international level, it has exposed Gambian government to more criticism because 
the worry is that it opens the door for Islamic extremists in the sub-region. 
Lastly, the dispute between the Government of The Gambia and the Senegalese 
Transport Union in February 2016 resulted in the border closure for several months.  
The government’s decision to increase the ferry tariff 163  for all Senegalese 
registered trucks entering the country triggered a dispute that affected the 
economy and food security. The majority of food products consumed in the country 
come from or via Senegal, which also acts as a key element of The Gambia’s 
export route to other African countries.  According to a speech by the leader of the 
PPP opposition party, “the move to increase the ferry tariff to almost one hundred 
percent was economic suicide.164” The border closure caused the inflation of food 
prices, food shortages, more frequent and longer lasting electricity outages, as well 
as loss of revenue from the export trade.  According to an informant in The Gambia 
at the time, “This border closure is starting to affect us.  Nawec (national electricity 
company) is off today.  Most of the spare parts and supplies come from Senegal.  It 
will be a chain effect…Watch.”  This informant explained that the electricity outage 
was due to one of the generators at the national electricity company (NAWEC) 
being faulty and the government not being able to repair it because the parts come 
from Senegal.  In actuality, the parts could have been flown in, however, the point 
here is that this dispute illustrates how a political decision to increase the ferry tariff, 
affected the everyday lives of the people as well as inhibited the economy, thereby 
halting ‘development’.   
 
Part of the definition of politics in this thesis is that in theory, it is about conflict-
resolution (Nicholson 2004, Crick 2013) in the context of scarce resources and 
                                                                
160 http://observer.gm/president-jammeh-gives-d1m-christmas-gift-to-christians/ 
161https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=X9b9zYsnOeU 
162 http://africanarguments.org/2016/01/28/why-does-jammeh-want-to-make-the-gambia-an-islamic-
republic/ 
163 CFA 1000, which is roughly GMD 26,000.00, an equivalent to approximately £433163, (Forayaa 
Newspaper, 26/02/2016) 
164 http://www.freedomnewspaper.com/gambia-leading-gambian-politician-blames-jammeh-
gambiasenegal-border-closure/ 
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different people wanting different things. But what if instead of resolving conflict 
politics starts it? In which case does this dispute show the Gambian government 
abusing its power, by manipulating government institutions in the interests of the 
politically powerful? (Squires, 1999) Or could another interpretation be that 
perhaps the government is trying to increase revenue to develop the Gambian 
transportation sector by increasing the ferry tariff.  For example, by improving the 
transport sector the country cater adequately for trans-shipment of goods to other 
countries in the sub-region (both coastal and land-locked), which is a key long-term 
development objective in the Government’s Vision 2020 development blueprint165. 
The point being made here is that there is more than one way to view the role of 
politics in development in The Gambia even though some members of the 
Gambian diaspora tend to focus on it being negative presumably to justify their 
own interventions. Even so, the broad point emerging from all three of these 
examples is that President Jammeh made them arbitrarily in his own interest 
without meaningful input from elected representatives and certainly without the 
consultation or participation of the wider Gambian public.  
 
The decision to increase the ferry tariffs had political effects in that it affected 
President Jammeh’s popularity in The Gambia and gave the opposition political 
parties leverage to use against him during the upcoming presidential elections. The 
reason being that most Gambians and Senegalese value the relationship between 
the two countries, which use to be one country until it was divided by artificial 
borders created by British and French colonizers.  Even now, people in both 
countries are often inter-related, and they enjoy free movement between the two 
countries, visiting relatives and engaging in small business ventures.  Additionally, 
the geopolitical position of The Gambia (surrounded on all its landward sides by 
Senegal) means that the country needs Senegal for more than just its economic 
survival. Its security and protection also depends on Senegal, because it can be 
argued that the small size of the country makes it vulnerable to external threats.  
Thus having neighbours like Senegal to lend additional military support in 
threatening situations is vital for the country. On the other hand, Senegal also 
cannot afford for The Gambia’s national security to be threatened by external 
forces because it would affect them. Therefore, demonstrating the importance of 
this interdependent (if asymmetric) relationship and undermining has subsequently 
been a politically unpopular decision in The Gambia. 
 
To change the optic away from politics as the primary causal mechanism for a 
moment, it is next worth considering the role development plays in causing political 
                                                                
165 http://statehouse.gov.gm/vision-2020-part-1-long-term-objectives/ 
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effects in The Gambia.  As I have argued throughout the thesis, development is 
integral to ensuring President Jammeh’s popularity at ‘home’.  However, according 
to some interviewees, President Jammeh uses development funds meant for the 
country to increase his personal wealth,166 retain power and continue to abuse the 
rights of people.   It is difficult to substantiate some of these claims, and certainly, 
President Jammeh would never admit to these allegations.  However, the empirical 
research has uncovered some activities, which perhaps could be interpreted in 
ways that would support this view. For example, the lack of transparency of how 
development funds are spent has led many in the diaspora to believe that 
President Jammeh is stealing money meant for the country. In June 2015, the 
diaspora newspaper Kibaaro reported:  
 
On January 17th 2012, Jammeh wrote to Trust bank ordering it to pay a 
sum of $2, million from Gambia’s coffers, to his dollar account, which was 
meant for his Jammeh Foundation for Peace.  The check number 2664 
was initially from the Embassy of the Republic of China (or Taiwan) and 
was signed by Sand Chen donated to the people of the Gambia, but 
President Jammeh diverted that same cheque to his dollar account with 
HSBC167 (Darboe, 2015) 
 
Photographs of the cheque and a letter from President Jammeh instructing the 
diversion of funds with his signature accompanied this very detailed report.  Such 
actions have caused members of the Gambian diaspora to reject the political 
choices President Jammeh makes unilaterally and in private. The fact that he has 
openly made statements like “his great-great grandchildren will never know what 
poverty is” (Saine 2009; 157), has made people question how he can guarantee 
this on a salary of $20,000 per annum if he is not stealing from the country (Saine 
2009).   
 
In addition, some interviewees argued that development funds allow Jammeh to 
remain in power. This is because they see Jammeh being celebrated by those at 
‘home’ for development successes that have been funded by development aid and 
not out of Jammeh’s own pockets as the government have led Gambians to 
believe168. On the other hand, organizations such as the IMF have prevented the 
country from reaching economic turmoil because it has not been able to meet its 
financial obligations.  On 2nd April 2015, the IMF approved emergency financial 
                                                                
166 https://jollofnews.com/2015/03/06/gambia-will-never-develop-or-progress-under-yaya-jammeh-
presidency/ 
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168 http://www.aljazeera.com/indepth/opinion/2012/08/2012817922920726.html Jammeh celebrated for 
development when it was aid - 
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assistance under the Rapid Credit Facility (RCF) of $10.8 million169.  However, the 
diaspora created an online petition against the bailout because they claimed, 
“Gambians do not want a bailout that would strengthen Yahya Jammeh’s 
dictatorship and misrule170.”  But according to the IMF, this bailout was in response 
economic slippages because of a decline in tourism (which is the country’s 
principle foreign currency earner) due to the Ebola outbreak171.  When this situation 
occurred, critics in the diaspora tried to make linkages between economic stability 
and politics and drew to the conclusion that financial mismanagement and 
government corruption has put the country’s economy in this dire position.  
However, supporters of the regime saw the acceptance of the bailout as Jammeh 
taking steps to prevent the people from suffering the outcomes of external causes.  
Therefore there were no complaints from people at ‘home’ (outside of the 
opposition parties) about the lack of a public debate before the government chose 
to take a bailout that increases the country’s foreign debt.  Again, this shows the 
divergent interpretation of political practices in The Gambia by those outside and 
inside the country. 
 
However, the main political impact of development in The Gambia is that 
development money is used in political ways, but under the disguise of 
development, which is presented as outside politics.  For example, it can be 
argued that building roads, creating a national television and radio service and 
even establishing the University of The Gambia are all ‘development activities’ that 
can also be used to police the country by ensuring tighter controls over the people. 
For example, roads provide means for the army and national security forces to 
travel around the country policing people. The heavy censorship of the Gambian 
Radio and Television Station (GRTS) creates biased national news. And the 
university is not an autonomous academic institution because President Jammeh is 
the Chancellor.  According to an informant who is a graduate of the university, in 
2010 they were told the university was going to cancel their degree programme in 
‘political science’ because President Jammeh said it would breed politicians. This 
last claim cannot be proven, however, the erratic behaviours of President Jammeh 
make it easy to believe that the university is being used to try to produce certain 
kinds of graduates with particular values and views that favour the government. 
  
A paradox in The Gambia is that development aid allows Jammeh to continue 
abusing the rights of Gambians.  Improving the protection of human rights was a 
                                                                
169 http://www.imf.org/external/np/sec/pr/2015/pr15155.htm 
170 http://gainako.com/gambians-petition-imf-against-bailing-out-jammehs-fiscally-irresponsible-
government/ 
171 https://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/scr/2015/cr15272.pdf 
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key condition placed on the government before they could receive international aid. 
However, it took a long time for donors to recognize that the country has failed to 
meet this condition and it was only after many years of such political abuses that 
donors agreed to cancel aid. However, other donors such as Libya, China, Iran, 
and Saudi Arabia that have poor human rights records still continued to provide 
financial support in the form of aid and loans to the regime. This continued aid flow 
was used to boost Jammeh’s popularity, which is based on his perceived 
‘development’ contributions to the country.  Therefore, having money available to 
spend on development projects here and there allows him and his supporters to 
further justify his leadership even when he is violating their human rights. This is 
interesting because it raises the question of what needs to come first, economic 
development or political development in The Gambia. Interviews suggest that 
people at ‘home’ are more interested in the economic development side of the 
equation than the political as such they will tolerate oppression from the regime in 
exchange for economic development (displayed by their lack of civic engagement).  
In which case, is politics a development process in The Gambia? Or is it the case 
that poor people in The Gambia are more worried about next meal than their 
political freedom. And therefore, they would rather sacrifice their civic rights in 
order to subsist (even if they would prefer not to live under an autocratic regime)? 
This means that people at ‘home’ will also accept a loss of political rights if it 
means possibly paying less for rice and having a hospital or school in their village 
rather than having to travel to the city for medical treatment or education. And 
perhaps the diaspora is not able to understand this because they live in societies 
where they do not have to choose between politics and economic development. 
The question is, where does that leave the political diaspora and should their 
intervention be focussed on politics or development?   
Lastly, international politics has a great impact on development in The Gambia. Its 
human rights issues have lost the country several of its major donors such as the 
EU, who in 2015 withheld 33 million euros of development aid172.  The rift between 
the country and the EU was further expanded when President Jammeh expelled 
Agnes Guillaud, the EU charge d'affaires from the country.  This has had a 
profound effect on development at all levels because the EU funded projects in 
infrastructural development, climate change mitigation, and justice reform.  The 
Gambian example supports the claims that development is closely tied to effective 
diplomatic skills and international politics (Staudt 1991, Brinkerhoff and Brinkerhoff 
2006).  However, the diversion of aid to buy votes has made donors became 
increasingly wary. For example, according to an informant who was an aviation 
                                                                
172 http://www.reuters.com/article/us-gambia-eu-aid-idUSKBN0OX2HZ20150617 
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expert in The Gambia, President Jammeh used one million dollars donated to the 
country for the Free Girls Education Initiative, to purchase a second-hand aircraft 
called Ilyushin IL-62 to be the Presidential Jet in 2005.   
 
Therefore, what is ‘political’ and what is ‘developmental’ cannot be easily 
separated in The Gambia. This relationship has a greater impact at the grassroots, 
where people are more reliant on state-funded institutions. Thus, the development 
intentions of government should always be open for discussion even if critics see 
them as self-interested.   And despite the Gambian government being able to 
convince people at ‘home’ that their political choices are resulting in development 
for the country as a whole.  However, a general overview of this relationship tells 
us that politics in The Gambia is an ‘anti-development machine’ (to invert James 
Ferguson’s formula), as formal politics is often a barrier to active development in 
the country. 
 
8.3 Politics and Migration in The Gambia  
 
According to the literature, the relationship between ‘politics and migration’ is most 
visible when political violence and a deteriorating economic condition causes 
people to leave a country (Schmid 2016).  The migration of Gambians in recent 
years has been driven by political repression, fear of persecution and economic 
deterioration (Kebbeh 2013).  But regional instability and conflicts have also pulled 
other West African nationalities into The Gambia.   
 
As mentioned in chapter 6, according to Dick Ranga’s (2015) the political violence 
in Zimbabwe has significantly contributed to the emigration of teachers to South 
Africa.  However, there have been shifts in the debate whereby some scholars are 
arguing that a bad political environment can no longer drive migration because the 
current global refugee crisis has led some countries to be less welcoming of 
migrants. Thus, Africans are choosing to remain in their ‘home’ countries because 
there are no hospitable spaces for them elsewhere (Herbst 2014).  
Certainly, Herbst’s argument seems plausible because the immigration of EU 
citizens to Britain played a part major in driving a significant proportion of the 
British public to vote ‘Leave’ in the EU referendum (Brexit) recently.  However, it is 
improbable that the lack of hospitable space has deterred all Africans from 
emigrating as the empirical evidence suggests that many young Gambians from 
taking the ‘backway’ to reach Europe and risking their lives at sea or in the Libyan 
desert. In 2015, 5,500 Gambians made it to Italy via the ‘backway’ according to 
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data from the Italian Ministry of Interior (Hunt 2015). This figure is not 
disaggregated by gender, nevertheless, an article written by the Washington Post 
in June 2015, entitled ‘Africa exodus. Tiny Gambia has a big export; Migrants 
desperate to reach Europe’, features a story of a 38-year-old Gambian man named 
Susso, who was determined to leave the country, via the ‘backway’ despite one of 
his cousins being left to die in the Libyan desert by his smugglers and another 
cousin drowning at sea173.  This supports the central finding from research in the 
region that migrants are defiant and determined in the face of dangerous journeys 
(Carling and Talleraas 2016).  
Susso’s explanation for considering the ‘backway’ to Europe was not directly linked 
to politics, as he claimed to be motivated by his desire to earn enough to support 
his family.  However, politics plays a part in that the lack of employment 
opportunities and economic prosperity in the country drives men like Susso to take 
the ‘backway’. This counters the argument made by analyst Hein de Haas (2011) 
in an article on his blog spot entitled ‘Development leads to more migration’174.  In 
which De Haas claims “development increases people’s capacities and aspirations 
to migrate”, in the sense that development allows people to get the money they 
need, visa and qualifications to migrate. But on the other hand, it should also be 
acknowledged that the desire of many young Gambians to live in the ‘West’ drives 
them to immigrate to Europe on boats (Janson 2014). For example, to many young 
Gambians, the West represents economic prosperity, success, happiness and a 
chance at a better life. It is these ideas that young Gambians use to assign 
meaning to the ‘backway’ migration. A young male informant in The Gambia 
narrated to me that his friend made it safely to Europe via the ‘backway’ and soon 
he will try his luck and once he reaches Europe he will work to send money ‘home’ 
and buy his dad a car. Thus, I argue that the idea of what can be achieved living in 
the West also contributes to what drives young Gambians to go the ‘backway’. It is 
not only a sense of frustration with the political situation in The Gambia.  
 
The findings revealed that approximately 40% of the interviewees (including both 
those in the diaspora and in The Gambia) link the recent ‘backway’ migration to the 
political conditions in the country. According to a female interviewee in The 
Gambia:  
 
The backway is the biggest business in the Gambia.  “Government is 
eating the youths” - that is the new saying in Gambia.  The youth here are 
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so demotivated.  There are no opportunities at all for them.  That’s why 
they are getting on boats.  I heard that 1,400 Gambians land from boats 
every month in Italy.  That’s not to mention the ones that die on the way.  
The population between the ages 18-35 is slowly becoming extinct.  The 
beaches are even empty.  Here, everyone I ask for, they tell me ‘dem na 
backway’ (gone the backway) (Interviewee 72, female, 30s, highly 
educated/ skilled professional) 
 
This statement shows that there is concern amongst Gambians about the ‘backway’ 
problem. Though there are clearly some exaggerations in this statement. However, 
the expressions are meant to demonstrate the magnitude of the problem rather 
than being literal. The international media has also set out to make connections 
between the rise of ‘backway’ migration and the political conditions in The Gambia.  
The BBC News, Washington Post, Guardian, Economist, and Telegraph have 
featured stories on how the political repression, human rights violations, and 
poverty are driving young Gambians to emigrate.  However, as there have been no 
in-depth systematic peer-reviewed studies that explore why young Gambian men 
are emigrating, it is difficult to know definitively the extent to which politics plays a 
role in driving this form of migration in The Gambia. 
Yet, the Gambian political opposition parties and critics of the government have 
accused President Jammeh of not doing enough to prevent young Gambians from 
going the ‘backway’.  Partly, because President Jammeh has shown a lack of 
sensitivity to this ‘crisis.’ According to reports from opposition sources, in June 
2015 President Jammeh was quoted at a meeting in Sukuta saying “May your 
souls rest in peace in the Mediterranean Sea, in advance175" and again in Ebo 
Town, where he said “I heard that many of your sons died on the ‘backway’ to 
Europe, I also know for a fact that many of them in this meeting are planning to 
embark on the journey. May they all die at sea176”. In other words, immigration is 
perceived as an act of treachery or national betrayal.  
 
There is a gender element to ‘backway’ migration, which is often ignored in the 
media.  The fact that young Gambian women are also taking the ‘backway’ to 
Europe and dying on the way 177 is not reported as much as the men. However, the 
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general impression given in reports about the women going the ‘backway’ is that 
they are isolated cases.  Perhaps because there is no disaggregated data 
available to know how many Gambian women take this migratory path or arguably, 
the belief is that only the men are brave enough to make this dangerous journey.   
 
The most obvious impact of migration on politics in The Gambia is that government 
find it difficult to implement development projects because of the shortage of labour 
and in particular of skilled professionals and artisans. However, the empirical 
research suggested that some critics of the government felt the migration of young 
Gambians is beneficial for the regime. According to a blog article by a member of 
the Gambian diaspora, President Jammeh is benefitting politically from the 
‘backway’ migration of youths because they are a potential source of political 
opposition 178. This is in line with existing research, which argues that youth bulges 
could be a source of political instability and violence (Urdal 2011, Azeng and Yogo 
2013).  However, Gambian youths have not engaged in any civil disobedience, 
apart from the April 2000 student protests.  This suggests that having a youthful 
population may not be a particular threat to the government.  Furthermore, the 
same blog article suggested that President Jammeh is personally engaged in 
human trafficking. They base this claim on the US State Department Human Rights 
Report on The Gambia.”179 Part of the report did discuss issues of trafficking-in-
persons in The Gambia, but it did not link it to President Jammeh.  
  
According to a report by Human Rights Watch “in 2014, the number of Gambians 
seeking asylum in European Union member states almost quadrupled since 2013” 
(2015, 15), which suggests that political repression and fear of state-sanctioned 
violence has reached a critical threshold and plays a key part in Gambians fleeing 
the country.  However, the Government of The Gambia has tried to address the 
immigration issue of young Gambians in previous years when they introduced the 
‘back to the land’ initiative to encourage the youths into farming in order to have 
gainful employment. But this initiative does not offer incentives such as land for 
people to establish their own farms, instead, Gambians are called upon to work on 
President Jammeh’s farms. It is understandable, if this is true, why some 
interviewees believe that politics is all about the President and his circle.  
According to one in the diaspora, “Gambia is owned by one man, and he has a 
group of unqualified and uneducated lawmakers in parliament that always support 
President Jammeh” (Interviewee 12, male, 50s-60s, highly educated/ activist).  I 
got the impression that this interviewee came to this conclusion because there is 
                                                                
178 ‘How Jammeh continues to benefit politically and financially from the human migration’ 
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sufficient evidence in The Gambia, to suggest that Jammeh does not only 
dominate the political space in the country, but also every aspect of Gambian 
society.  His presence is felt everywhere in the country as his pictures are 
plastered in hospitals, public, and private institutions, billboards and streetlights.  
Thus, it is comprehensible that some Gambians have a very negative perception of 
politics in The Gambia.   
 
The photograph below was taken in October 2014 and on this day I counted over 5 
similar size posters and 30 small posters of President Jammeh along Kairaba 
Avenue, which is approximately one mile long.  
 
Figure 30: A poster of President Jammeh and APRC flag affixed to a lamppost   
  
Source: Sainabou Taal 
  
8.4 Conclusion  
 
In this chapter, I argued that politics in The Gambia causes underdevelopment and 
it is this underdevelopment that drives international migration as is illustrated by the 
dramatic growth of the ‘backway’ migration in recent years. This is the key 
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relationship between politics, migration and development in The Gambia. The 
findings revealed that a significant proportion of interviewees believed that ‘politics 
and development’ go hand-in- hand in the Gambian context.  They expressed the 
view that politics inhibits development and causes the emigration of Gambians, 
which in turn has a significant impact on development in the country for either good 
(via remittances) or ill (via the brain drain). For example, political choices such as 
implementing the Vision 2016 plan, which according to an agricultural expert in The 
Gambia did not have the prerequisites to succeed were believed to have a 
negative impact on development. On the other hand, the findings also revealed 
that development boosts the public profile of President Jammeh and his 
government, as well as allows him to remain in power and increase his personal 
wealth. The general overview of the relationship between ‘politics and development’ 
in The Gambia is that politics in The Gambia is an ‘anti-development machine’, as 
political practices are a barrier to active development in the country.  
 
The empirical research on the relationship between ‘politics and migration’ in The 
Gambia revealed that some links can be drawn between the political repression 
that exists in the country and the migration of Gambian people (particularly 
journalist and political opponents). For example, there has been a significant 
increase of Gambians fleeing political persecution and seeking asylum in EU 
countries in recent years, according to Eurostat figures.  In addition, the lack of 
opportunities for young Gambians has also played a part in driving them to go the 
‘backway’, as well as their desire to be in ‘West’ where they believe they will find 
economic prosperity, success and a chance of a better life, which they think is 
unattainable in The Gambia.   
 
Within these relationships, the Gambian diaspora plays a significant role, 
particularly where development shortfalls affect individual lives. However, the 
diaspora could play a bigger role by investing and helping some of the 
development plans to succeed such as the Vision 2016 or Vision 2020.  This would 
ultimately benefit the people they support at ‘home’. However, throughout the 
thesis particularly in chapters 6 and 7, I presented different reasons for why the 
Gambian diaspora will not invest in national development projects.  But the main 
reasons being the fraught relationship and lack of trust between some members of 
the Gambian diaspora and the Government of The Gambia.  Subsequently, the 
diaspora has been marginalized from national development and the diaspora will 
not make investments in the country outside the family level.  However, when the 
government tried to open dialogue with the diaspora they were met with resistance 
because some members of the Gambian diaspora strongly dislike and disapprove 
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for President Jammeh and his leadership.  This messy relationship is arguably why 
‘politics and development’ do not go beyond the national scale and leaves little 
room for international interventions from the diaspora.  What I mean by this is that 
‘politics and development’ are controlled by the state and there is no avenue for 
interference from outside the country. Thus, the constant push for the state to 
respect and protect the rights of Gambians by international elements of the 
population has resulted in President Jammeh isolating the country and taking his 
frustrations out on his opponents. Not being able to influence political change in 
The Gambia is a major problem for the diaspora because they have families at 
‘home’ that are relying on them for their survival due what they believe are poor 
political choices made by President Jammeh in particular. 
Nevertheless, the challenge in trying to develop a relationship between 
development, politics and migration in The Gambia is that the majority of Gambian 
people have the same perspective of these relationships.  That is one man; 
President Jammeh is to blame for the problems of The Gambia. Thus, even when I 
tried to introduce nuance to the discussions such as looking at the effects of 
colonialism on development and politics in the country, the interviewees always 
found a way to bring it back to the actions of President Jammeh. I am certain this is 
because he has entrenched himself in Gambian society and the lives of people at 
‘home’.  But frustrating because any attempts to engage in more interesting 
discussions reverted back to President Jammeh.  
Finally, the empirical research suggests that the sequence of priority for many in 
the diaspora is first politics, then development.  The diaspora view politics as the 
head of the ‘snake’, which directs the rest of the body. Whereas for people at 
‘home’, the sequence of priority is arguably, development, then migration and then 
politics, because arguably their focus is their economic survival and the ability to 
eat.  Therefore, they see migration (of themselves or their families), more than 
politics as the most viable means to facilitate social mobility.  Furthermore, the 
most important relationship for the diaspora is the ‘politics and development’ 
relationship, because like much of the academic literature they see development 
as an inherently political process. In essence, they recognize the government has 
control of the key resources, which they distribute as they wish, thus development 
at the national scale is controlled by political calculations. Whereas for those at 
‘home’, the most important relationship is ‘migration and development’.  For many, 
they see migration as their only opportunity to achieve what I define in this thesis 
as ‘development’ that is an expansion of their human capacities and quality of life, 
both for themselves and for their families.  Which is why it is more common to see 
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parents in The Gambia encourage their children to emigrate than to stay back and 
contribute to development at ‘home’ or indeed fight for political change.  
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Chapter 9: Conclusion 
 
9.1 Introduction 
 
Two weeks before this thesis was submitted on the 1st December 2016, the 
Gambian people went to the polls and voted to remove President Jammeh from 
power.  The election thrilled and surprised many Gambians both at ‘home’ and 
overseas.  The result endorsed some of the claims made in this thesis (for example 
the importance of uniting the opposition parties in a coalition) but would have 
changed some of the other claims (for example around the idea that the electorate 
was intimidated by President Jammeh’s control of the military and media).  The 
peaceful democratic change that occurred under very precarious conditions will be 
marked as one of the greatest achievements of Gambian history.  The crucial role 
the diaspora played in helping the coalition opposition party win the elections is 
discussed in more detail later in this chapter.  
 
This thesis is not only important because it fills gaps in the academic literature but 
also because it has recorded the views of a group of interviewees in what turned 
out to be a critical moment in the country’s history. Many of my interviewees felt 
this research could make a valuable contribution to the country by trying to 
synthesize different aspects of migration, development and politics and by 
presenting its findings to Gambians abroad and at ‘home’ in a way that might 
continue the political process of democratization and development.  I cannot say 
whether my interviewees were just being kind or diplomatic when they said this or 
indeed whether they saw me as a spokesperson who would present their own 
actions in an uncritical light. However, I share their hope that it can contribute to an 
ongoing transnational deliberation about The Gambia’s future. 
 
The first section after the introduction provides a summary of the thesis, in 
particular discussing the answers to the research questions, the findings and how 
they fit in the literature.  The second section moves on to discuss my thoughts 
about the weaknesses and limitations of the study.  The third section discusses the 
academic contributions of the thesis, and the fourth section focuses on the 
implications of the research for policy and for future studies.  The chapter ends with 
discussions of the recent elections and my final thoughts.  
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9.2 Summary of the Thesis  
 
The aim of this thesis was to understand the role and significance of the UK and 
US Gambian diaspora in seeking to shape politics and development in The 
Gambia (see p. 17).  And the question that underpinned this study was to find out 
whether small diasporas, in particular, can contribute to development and politics 
at ‘home’ and thereby inform thinking at disciplinary and inter-disciplinary levels at 
the intersection of migration studies, development studies and politics.  
 
Within the literature on diasporas and development, I learned that diaspora 
remittances are used for different developmental purposes: increasing household 
spending, (Gupta et al 2007, Nyamongo et al 2012, Gamlen 2014); augmenting 
private consumption and alleviating household poverty (de Haas 2012, Chami and 
Fullenkamp 2013); making investments in health, education, housing, and profit-
oriented businesses (Terrazas 2010, Hammond 2011, Amagoh and Rahman 2016).  
Remittances are also used to fund village- development projects, mostly via 
diaspora associations (Mercer et al 2008, Lampert 2009).  The findings in chapter 
5- address research question 1 as it reveals that the Gambian diaspora contributes 
to development at the different scales and sectors in the country.  However, their 
contributions are greatest at the family level and they involved mainly sending 
remittances and material goods.  This is driven by a sense of obligation to their 
families.  The interviews revealed that remittances sent by the Gambian diaspora 
are used for different purposes, but hardly directed at national development 
projected. This partly because the majority of the interviewees felt marginalized by 
the government.  Instead, they argued that their contributions at family level are 
having an indirect effect on the national economy because their remittances are 
used to pay for taxed goods and services.  For example, tax on land and other 
purchases in The Gambia. Additionally, their remittances also bring foreign 
exchange into the country.  The findings in this chapter add to the literature that 
emphasizes the importance of family to the diaspora (Stark and Lucas 1988, 
Mohan 2006, Lindley 2010, Mercer and Page 2010, Hammond et al 2011, 
Hammond et al 2011, Hammond 2011, Enoh 2014), as the interviews revealed that 
on average Gambians in the diaspora remit £200 - £600 to their families at ‘home’ 
for their upkeep each month.  This also supports the literature, which argues that 
diasporas have a strong feeling of obligation to their families (Lindley 2010, Mercer 
and Page 2010, Hammond et al 2011, Enoh 2014, Sinatti and Horst 2014, Horst et 
al 2014).  Similar examples can be found in the Ghanaian diaspora in Milton 
Keynes (Mohan 2006) and the Somali diaspora in the US (Hammond 2011).  
Remittances also have a gender and age element as it arguably gives women and 
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young Gambians leverage in families. Thus, the questions that this raises are; what 
role do remittances play in changing the family dynamics and gender-relations? Do 
parents feel obligated or forced to agree with their children in the diaspora because 
their children have the economic power?  Do remittances create conflict within the 
family, for example, if the younger sibling abroad is being included in family 
decision-making processes and not the older sibling in The Gambia?  This seems 
a profitable field for future work.  
 
In chapter 6, the interviews revealed that the marginalization from national 
development projects is the main barrier for the members of the Gambian diaspora 
who want to be involved in national development. This finding neither confirms nor 
differs from the existing academic literature, which argues that diaspora 
engagement policies will encourage diasporas to contribute to development at 
home (Agunias and Newland 2011, Gamlen 2014).  This is because there are no 
such policies in place in The Gambia thus, it is difficult to predict how the diaspora 
would react to them.  The questions this raises are: how can the diaspora be 
included in national development in the context where the trust between them and 
the government has been lost? Should the diaspora stop their political 
interventions and focus on building a relationship as a development partner?  Or 
are their political interventions done in the name of development because they 
believe having a democratic government will result in development in the country at 
some later point?  
 
Chapter 7 addresses research questions 2 and 3 as it shows the different 
mobilization strategies of the Gambian diaspora in the UK and US.  It also 
discusses how people in The Gambia and the international community respond to 
the political interventions of the Gambian diaspora.  The literature on the 
transnational political engagement of diaspora recognizes that the geographical 
boundaries of politics have changed over the years to the point where diaspora 
groups are able to participate in the politics of their homelands from afar (Lyons 
and Mandaville 2012, Boccagni et al 2015).  Part of the argument is that 
telecommunications and international travel have made it relatively easy for 
diasporas to maintain political links with ‘home’ (Brinkerhoff 2009, Esman 2009 and 
NurMuhammad et al 2015). In this chapter, the findings revealed that the UK and 
US Gambian diaspora have mobilized in various ways to intervene in politics in 
The Gambia. The Internet has played a vital role in their interventions (Simon 
Turner 2008, Bernal 2013, Eric Turner 2013, Siapera 2014, NurMuhammad et al 
2015, Quinsaat 2015, Adamson 2015), as has easy international travel, which 
facilitated the six dissidents from the US to travel to The Gambia to attempt to 
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overthrow the government on the 30th December 2014.  From the findings, I 
learned that the Internet allows members of the Gambian political to reach a wider 
audience with their political interventions.  It also allows those who want to engage 
to do so anonymously.  In addition, political events at ‘home’ also provide an 
opportunity for the Gambian diaspora to use the Internet to “participate in real time 
in homeland current events and to produce and/or circulate national political 
content from outside the nation” (Bernal 2013; 246).  
 
The empirical evidence suggested that lobbying activities of the Gambian diaspora 
have not been as effective as they could have been because of their disunity and 
lack of good organization.  The general impression of the political interventions of 
the Gambian diaspora is that they try to ‘make quite a lot out of quite a little’ when 
claiming to influence politics in The Gambia.  This is because (until very recently) 
the changes they claim to have delivered are minimal when compared to their 
overall aim, which is to drive a much more extensive democratization of political 
practices in The Gambia. In which case the questions raised here are: to what 
extent is the Gambian diaspora responsible for the recent democratic political 
change that took place in The Gambia?  What changes did they make to their 
intervention strategies that made it possible for them to play a part in influencing 
political change in The Gambia in December 2016?  
 
The political mobilization of the UK and US Gambian diaspora can be understood 
using social movement theoretical framework (McAdam et al 1996, Sökefeld 2006, 
Marsden 2014, Quinsaat 2015).  Events such as the April 2000 killings and the 
imprisonment of the UDP political leader Ousainou Darboe provided political 
opportunities for members of the Gambian diaspora to set up mobilizing structures 
and to frame their interventions in ways that were justified.  However, using the 
theory of liberal interventionism (Johnson et al. 1984, Tesón 2001, Atkinson 2008, 
Peksen, Comer 2012, Lipsey 2016) to justify the political interventions of the 
Gambian diaspora was not very convincing because in the interviews, members of 
the political diaspora were adamant that their interventions will not involve the use 
of force but will push for peaceful democratic political change in the country.   
 
In chapter 8, addresses research question 4 as it showed the complex series of 
relationships connecting politics, migration, and development in The Gambia.  
However, the key pathway through the three elements is that politics in The 
Gambia causes underdevelopment and it is this underdevelopment that drives 
international migration as is illustrated by the dramatic growth of the ‘backway’ 
migration in recent years.  The findings showed that President Jammeh is engaged 
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in neo-patrimonial political practices (Chabal and Daloz 1999, Bayart et al 1999, 
2009, Boone 2003, Daloz 2003, Ganahl 2013), which have triggered members of 
The Gambia diaspora to intervene in politics and development at ‘home’.  For 
example, the findings revealed that President Jammeh directs state resources to 
areas like Kanilai where he has voter support (Lasswell 2012).  The relationship 
between ‘politics and migration’ in The Gambia is visible because the political 
repression and deteriorating economic conditions are driving Gambians to leave 
the country (Schmid 2016).  On the other hand, I argued that the political impact of 
the ‘backway’ migration of young Gambians is indirect as there are other factors 
driving them to make the dangerous journey to Europe, for example, their desire to 
be in the West.  But the political mismanagement of the economy has created little 
opportunity and the chance for economic prosperity for young Gambians, thus 
pushing them to leave for Europe.  
 
9.3. Weaknesses and Limitations 
 
One of the weaknesses of this research is the shortage of secondary quantitative 
data.  This thesis would have benefitted from incorporating more quantitative 
figures when showing the impact of diaspora contributions to development in The 
Gambia, particularly in the different sectors that interested me like health and 
education.  But there were obstacles to accessing this information.  As I mentioned 
in chapter 4, people at ‘home’ are extremely cautious about sharing official data (if 
they have it) because of the fear that they would get in trouble with the authorities if 
that information is used to portray the government in a negative light.  Another 
weakness of this research was that I could only interview one building contractor. 
Therefore the claims about diaspora house-building projects not having much 
impact in terms of creating jobs and revenue for local merchants in The Gambia 
would have held more weight if I was able to interview more contractors.  But due 
to the time constraints of the contractors, it was difficult to convince those that were 
approached to take part in the research.  Perhaps another way around this would 
have been to visit construction sites and ask questions, but this would have raised 
suspicion and been too risky.   Additionally, the majority of my fieldwork in The 
Gambia was done during the rainy season, therefore, there was not much 
construction taking place.  The third weakness of this research is not interviewing 
more young people in The Gambian about the ‘backway’ migration.  This would 
have allowed me to get a better sense of why they were choosing to make the 
dangerous journey and perhaps get a gendered perspective from the women, 
which appears to be missing in current reporting about this type of migration. 
However, this problem did not come to the forefront until 2015 when I had already 
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left the country.  The fourth weakness was not interviewing British MPs, US 
senators and the human rights organisations (like Amnesty and Human Rights 
Watch) that support the intervention of the Gambian diaspora. This perhaps would 
have allowed me to conclusively determine whether the Gambian diaspora did play 
a role in influencing the actions taken by the UK and US government against the 
Gambians government as some interviewees had claimed. 
 
9.4 Contribution of the Thesis 
 
This thesis contributes to the academic field of African diaspora studies in three 
ways.  First by analyzing a case study group who have previously received very 
little research attention.  This thesis fills this gap by providing an in-depth analysis 
of the development contributions made by the Gambian diaspora in the UK and the 
US and also by analyzing their political interventions in The Gambia.  Like many 
case studies, this one is distinctive in the sense that there are few other diasporas 
that have found themselves trying to articulate political alternatives in a context 
where their opponent has so many resources to control ideas and they have so few.  
The very unimportance of The Gambia on the world stage makes it important from 
an academic point of view to understand what role can resource-limited diasporas 
play in the politics and development of small states of limited importance? 
 
The second contribution that this thesis makes is it helps to develop ideas about 
small diaspora groups, by showing how they contribute to socio-economic 
development and intervene in politics at ‘home’ with few resources and little 
influence in their host countries. In this thesis, I defined small diaspora as groups 
that are small in size, from small countries and have limited financial resources. I 
argued that small diaspora can be an equally important development resource for 
their ‘home’ countries as large groups like the Jewish, Chinese and Indian.  
However, within the diaspora studies literature there is less attention was given to 
small diasporas (cf Butler 2001, Sheffer 2013), which is surprising because there is 
an increasing number of them and they are becoming more visible. As some global 
cities become ‘super-diverse’ (Vertovec, 2007) the experience from the ‘host-
country’ perspective is a rapid expansion in the number of small diasporas.  In the 
case of London, for example, there is a dramatic increase in the number of 
Gambians, Ivorians, Cameroonians, and Congolese alongside the larger African 
diasporas who are better established such as the Ghanaians and Nigerians. More 
attention needs to be paid to these newer, smaller diasporas by scholars of 
development and migration.  Yet, it is clear that some of these groups will have 
more impact in Africa than others. It is not just about the size of the diaspora per se, 
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but the wider character of the group and its relationship to ‘home’. The key factors 
that matter when shaping the development influence of a small diaspora are the 
size of the population at ‘home’, the unity and level of organization within the small 
diaspora, the amicability of the relationship with the ‘home’ government and the 
economic position of those in the diaspora. Small diasporas have both advantages 
and disadvantages as for example, it is easier to achieve unity within a small 
diaspora than a large one (an advantage) but it is harder to raise large sums of 
money or hold a dramatically large demonstration in a host country 
(disadvantages). From this perspective, I argue for more research attention to be 
given to these small groups and for distinctions to be drawn within the category 
‘small diasporas’ between those that are significant to homeland development and 
those that are not.  As such, this research aimed to contribute some knowledge to 
this area, by using this case study group of the small and financially strapped 
Gambian diaspora, who despite these characteristics are important to development 
because the country is small and because weak economic management in The 
Gambia has inflated the importance of their remittances.  
The third contribution is that this thesis adds to the discussions about ‘conflict 
diaspora’ but in situations of non-violent conflict.  In this sense, it keeps the idea of 
political conflict, without necessarily assuming it is violent conflict. In some contexts 
(Sri Lanka or the Balkans for example) diasporas have an increasingly problematic 
reputation as catalysts of violent conflict. It is assumed that in post-conflict 
situations the presence of a politically active diaspora is likely to increase the risk 
of violence re-starting because diasporas tend to be more extreme in their politics 
than homeland populations. They can foment hostility and fund armed struggles at 
limited risk to their own safety (Lyons and Mandaville 2012, Boccagni et al 2015). 
What the Gambian case shows, however, is that it is also possible for some 
diasporas to find coherence through a shared political struggle whilst (generally) 
remaining consistently opposed to violent conflict.  The thesis has developed new 
ideas of a ‘conflict diaspora’ in the context of non-violent conflict. Recognizing that 
the Gambian diaspora does not fit within the standard definitions of ‘conflict 
diaspora’ that are in the literature. The thesis argues for the broadening of the 
definition to capture this group and uses their transnational political activities to 
illustrate their conflict with the government. The literature asserts that a ‘conflict 
diaspora’ is one that has been produced by violent conflict. For example, refugees 
who flee from wars either because they were civilians or combatants produce such 
a social formation or a diaspora whose binding ties are about a specific insurgency 
or moment of violence (Cohen 2008).  Or stateless diaspora, who are likely to 
support irredentist, secessionist and national liberation movements in their 
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homelands, even if these are actively involved in bitter conflicts (Sheffer 2007, 
Tölölyan 2007). The point I want to make here is not to diminish diaspora groups 
like the Liberians, Ethiopians and Eritreans who come from places that really have 
experienced war but to try and claim some solidarity with them in the Gambian 
case. The argument is that ‘violence’ can take forms other than war or insurgency 
and in the Gambian case there are no armed struggles but there is violent 
repression by an authoritarian government, which is a form of conflict.  This thesis 
shows that the conflictual diaspora-homeland political relations outside the context 
of actual armed conflict, post-conflict reconstruction, or peace-building are 
important for further exploration in the field of transnational diaspora politics. I 
argued that real peace is not just the absence of war rather it is the opportunity for 
development, protection of rights and political inclusion. Without this diasporas find 
themselves in conflict with their ‘home’ governments and become defined by that 
conflict.  
9.5 Implications of the Thesis 
 
Future Research  
 
1. There is a need to research the impact of differences within 
diasporas on transnational politics by moving beyond 
methodological nationalism within the field and by recognizing 
diversity within any diaspora. 
The literature in diaspora studies stresses the social heterogeneity of diasporas 
(Werbner 2010, Mavroudi 2015, Chikanda et al 2016). For any researcher studying 
the Gambian diaspora, it is important to recognize their diversity (despite its small 
size) as this would help to create a better understanding of the complex variety of 
relationships with 'home' as well as 'host' countries.  For example, even though the 
Gambian diaspora groups have a shared history of belonging to one place, their 
affinities to ‘home’ are different. The interviews suggested that a significant 
proportion of Gambians in the UK and US have a strong connection with the 
country, particularly through their families who motivate them to stay connected as 
well as to send money ‘home’ (Moniruzzaman 2016).  However, there were also 
Gambians in the diaspora who preferred to have limited involvement with ‘home’ 
and rather their focus was on putting down roots and integrating into their host 
countries, like some members of the South African diaspora in Canada 
(Ramachandran 2016).  Thus, they had no interest or involvement in transnational 
politics.  In light of these findings, I propose to move beyond the methodological 
nationalist assumption within the field of migration because it treats groups within 
the nation-state as homogeneous.  “By conflating society and a territorially 
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organized nation- state, scholars tend to produce the assumption that common 
territorial and national origin produces ‘common individuals’ who necessarily have 
the same rights, loyalties and culture” (Nowicka and Cieslik 2014; 3). The criticism 
of methodological nationalism by analysts like Ulrich Beck is that the concept does 
not acknowledge the changing realities in the modern world, thus it does not help 
us to understand how transnational processes alter concepts of society in the age 
of globalization (Nowicka and Cieslik 2014). This is important as it has been 
argued that global and transnational forces that limit their ability to decide on policy 
shape nation-states and control migration flows (Saber 2014: 2). Britain’s 
difficulties of managing migration in the context of EU membership illustrate this 
issue. These criticisms are based on the perspective that methodological 
nationalism is the assumption that “the nation/ state/ society is the natural social 
and political form of the modern world” (Wimmer and Schiller 2002: 301).  
According to Wimmer and Schiller (2003) there are three variants of 
methodological nationalism that have shaped social science and influenced 
mainstream migration studies, 1) ignoring or disregarding the fundamental 
importance of nationalism for modern societies, this often is combined with 2) 
naturalization, i.e., taking for granted that the boundaries of the nation-state delimit 
and define the unit of analysis, 3) the territorial limitation, which confines the study 
of social processes to the political and geographical boundaries of a particular 
nation-state (578).  In essence, what this means is that the nation–state is taken as 
the natural unit of reference in the analysis of citizens in social research (Ahponen 
2016: 5). Subsequently, the risk of talking about ‘a Gambian diaspora’ is that it 
overlooks two key dimensions. First the internal differences within the groups   For 
example differences based on ethnicity, class, religion, social status, political 
affiliation history (Chikanda et al. 2016; 5) as well as education and migration 
history (Carling et al. 2013).  These are imperative to explore to understand the 
intricate and diverse relationships diasporas have with their country of origin 
(Lyons and Mandaville 2012). Second, future research could usefully consider 
affinities that cut across national boundaries. For example, the story of ‘backway’ is 
not unique to The Gambia but says more about youth, gender, employment and 
opportunity across West Africa. There is nothing specifically Gambian about 
seeking to find ways from West Africa into Europe, yet the analysis of such 
movements focuses on nationality quite heavily. 
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2. There is a need to do more research on the motivations of diasporas 
to engage in development even though it is increasingly recognized 
that their impacts are quite limited.  Diaspora-led development may 
be less effective than its promoters in the development policy world 
would suggest, but even if it is not paradigm shifting it still merits 
further analysis because it is an aspiration of many who are outside. 
 
Within the literature on ‘diaspora and development’, it is widely believed that 
diasporas are contributing to development at ‘home’ (de Haas 2006, 2012, 
Terrazas 2010, Newland, 2011, 2013, Ratha et al 2011, Resende – Santos 2015).  
However, a small part of the literature also argues that diasporas do not 
necessarily contribute to development at ‘home’ to the extent or in the ways 
suggested in the literature, rather remittances are insecure financial contributions 
that can be affected if the circumstance of the person sending it were to change. 
Nyamongo et al (2012), assert that the “volatility of remittances appear to have a 
negative effect on the growth of countries in Africa’ (240).  And Gupta et al (2007) 
add that data from 233 poverty surveys in 76 developing countries, including 24 in 
sub- Saharan Africa showed “a 10 percent rise in the remittances to GDP ratio is 
associated with a fall of a little more than 1 percent in the percentage of people 
living on less than $1 a day” (4).  Thus, suggesting that remittances do not have 
much economic impact on poverty reduction in ‘home’ countries.  Nevertheless, 
from the interviews, the Gambian diaspora believed their remittances were having 
a significant impact on the development at ‘home’, in particular improving the 
quality of life of people who receive the money.  And though this may be true for 
the people in The Gambia receiving financial assistance from the diaspora, it is not 
the case for all Gambians.  I argued that the proportion of Gambians in the 
diaspora is small in relation to the population, thus it is inconceivable that the 
diaspora is fulfilling the needs of every Gambian.  Seeing the diaspora as the key 
actor of development would clearly be unconvincing. Given this conclusion (that 
there are limits to what diasporas do) it might seem logical to say that there is a 
reduced need for more research in this field.  However, the point is that for some in 
the diaspora ‘development’ remains a key topic, so there is still a need for research 
about new places, projects and processes in the field. To get a better 
understanding of what motivates the Gambian diasporas to contribute to 
development at ‘home’, it is pertinent for future research to explore how 
development and political conditions at ‘home’ can shape the character of those 
relationships, which vary for different groups in the diaspora.  This would help 
academics, policymakers, and development practitioners to know where and when 
they can get more access to diaspora resources.   
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3. There is a need for more research on the controlling role played by 
the intermediaries delivering diaspora-led development and political 
interventions who are based in Africa.  There is a need to recognize 
the importance of local actors at ‘home’ in facilitating as well as 
affecting the development contributions and political interventions of 
diasporas.  
 
One finding of the research that requires further analysis in the future is the role of 
actors at ‘home’, and their capacity to determine the effectiveness of diaspora 
political engagement.  Existing research has drawn attention to the need for 
analysis of actors and the political patterns of migrant communities in all their 
diversity in order to get a good understanding of how politics in countries of origin 
have been transformed by diaspora involvement (Lyons and Mandaville 2012).  
Thus far, the focus has been on analyzing the role of homeland governments in 
affecting diaspora political interventions. Without sympathetic allies at other scales 
through whom the diaspora can work the political space in which they can operate 
is highly constrained. During the time of this research, the political opposition 
parties in The Gambia refused to unite and accept non-financial support from the 
diaspora, which greatly affected the ability of the diaspora to influence democratic 
political change in The Gambia.  Therefore, it is particularly important for 
researchers to look at the role of local actors when evaluating the impact of 
diaspora contributions in their countries of origin because local actors play a 
significant role in either making the activities of the diaspora successful or 
unsuccessful.  As they are on the ground and they know the country context better 
than the diaspora.  For example in chapter 6, I presented a case study of a 
diaspora funded development project (diaspora-funded pharmacy for the 
community) ending because of ‘misappropriation’ by members of the community.  
On the other hand, a better understanding of this story might be gained by hearing 
from those who are accused of misappropriating the money as well as from those 
who sent it. Furthermore, actors at ‘home’ can view the diaspora as threats and 
thus refuse to support their endeavours.  For example, in chapter 7, I argued that 
President Jammeh labelled the diaspora as ‘troublemakers’ for some time, which 
was never an issue for his opponents in the diaspora themselves since it added to 
their public profile.  However, the coup attempt of the 30th December 2014 has 
confirmed to many Gambians on the ground that his labelling of the diaspora is 
accurate.  This subsequently made the diaspora appear to be a real threat to 
national security and thus they received many criticisms from the people in The 
Gambia.  Local actors may also only be interested in using diaspora-funded 
projects to enhance their own profile, status, and authority.  For example, in 
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chapter 7, I also argued that the opposition party leader at the forum in New York 
gave the impression that they were only interested in diaspora money to fund their 
political campaigns, and not their ideas.  Clearly studying the role of local actors in 
future thinking about diaspora-development research would help to create a better 
understanding of why diaspora-funded activities at ‘home’ succeed or fail. 
 
Policy implications 
 
Now that a democratic political change has taken place in The Gambia, the first 
policy implication should be extending voting rights to Gambians in the diaspora 
like in other African countries such as Cape Verde, Senegal, Mali, etc. (Iheduru 
2011, Ragazzi 2014, Bermudez and Lafleur 2015). I would argue that this would 
strengthen the diaspora’s commitment to national development180, increase their 
sense of belonging (Ragazzi 2014) and obligation towards helping the country 
achieve the desired development.  Other policy options would also include 
introducing privilege tax exemptions for diaspora investors as in Uganda, creating 
a Government one-stop shop for investors and offer diaspora treasury bonds and 
stocks as in Rwanda.  Arguably, these policy options would help remove the 
obstacles to investment described by the interviewees in Chapter 6.  I anticipate 
that introducing these policies in The Gambia will also allow those that are serious 
about contributing to the development of the country to do so without feeling 
marginalized by the government. 
 
9.6 Update and final thoughts 
In the four years of conducting this research project, I never would have imagined 
that by the end of it I would be reporting that the Gambian diaspora has succeeded 
in helping the Gambian people to achieve democratic political change in the 
country through peaceful elections.  This is because the empirical research 
uncovered so many challenges and shortfalls in their interventions (such as the 
fragmented nature of their work and the lack of coordination in their efforts), it 
seemed almost impossible that they would be able to influence real, fundamental 
political change in the country.  But at the eleventh hour, the opposition parties 
came together to form a coalition to contest the 2016 Presidential elections on 
December 1st and with that push and the financial backing from the diaspora they 
won. Adama Barrow, the President-elect spent some years living and studying in 
the UK, so understands the diaspora perspective, which is encouraging in terms of 
                                                                
180 It is interesting how an academic commitment to critiquing methodological nationalism struggles in 
the face of the tools of national policy-making and questions of citizenship in practice.  
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healing the divisions that have emerged over the last two decades between 
Gambians in government at ‘home’ and those overseas.  The outcomes of the 
elections proved the validity of my arguments about the need for unity amongst the 
opposition parties and the potential importance of a small diaspora in shaping the 
trajectories of their ‘home’ countries.  Without the cooperation of the opposition 
political parties, the diaspora would not have been able to play such a big part in 
the elections.  
But exactly how did the Gambian diaspora have an impact on the elections? 
Around August 2016, a small group of the politically involved diaspora formed a 
taskforce whose aim was to convince the leaders of the political opposition parties 
in The Gambia to consider nominating a single candidate who will be the flag 
bearer for a united coalition party in the upcoming presidential elections181. This 
was a covert operation that was not shared with the wider Gambian diaspora, 
however, once the opposition had agreed to unite, the Gambian population was 
introduced to the ‘possible’ flag bearer for the opposition coalition, Dr Isatou Touray.  
She was selected on the basis that she is a gender activist with many years of 
grassroots experience and she was highly educated.  The proposal was that the 
flag bearer would lead the coalition government for three years to allow all parties 
to work together to ‘rectify’ the constitution, afterwards another presidential election 
would be held where each party can stand.  However, after some discussion the 
between the opposition parties they appeared not keen to have Dr Touray as the 
flag bearer.  This is because some argued that she was showing signs that she 
would renege on the conditions that were agreed upon in this plan.  The parties in 
The Gambia had their own conference and nominated Mr Adama Barrow, a 
businessman, to be the flag bearer, thus rejecting the candidate selected by the 
diaspora. The political diaspora still got behind the coalition candidate and raised 
approximately sixty-eight thousand dollars 182  for their campaign.  They also 
became heavily involved in broadcasting the political campaigns of the coalition on 
social media and diaspora media, because the state-owned television station was 
not giving impartial coverage to the campaigns183. Additionally, the diaspora called 
on their families and friends in The Gambia to register for voting cards and to vote 
for the coalition. The night before elections, the government blocked the Internet 
and international calls184, which they said was a move designed to reduce the risk 
                                                                
181 This is privilege information from a member of the task force 
182 https://www.gofundme.com/2016-gambia-coalition 
183 http://mgafrica.com/article/2016-11-16-gambias-jammah-arrests-three-journalists-as-presidential-
election-campaign-begins 
184 http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-africa-38157127 
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of unrest185. However, SMS services was still working so the diaspora were able to 
make contact with people at the polling stations and receive the results from the 
polls.  By 5pm the diaspora started sharing the (unverified) results with the wider 
population, which were in favour of Barrow.  By doing this, they created a situation 
whereby the IEC could not easily report any other result without their being some 
form of civil disobedience. Thus, when the IEC declared Adama Barrow the winner 
twenty-four hours later, President Jammeh was put under pressure to concede.  
The general impression from the many posts on Facebook and Twitter was that 
Gambians everywhere were proud that they came together to effect a peaceful 
democratic change in the country. But, from the perspective of this thesis, it was 
also important that people started praising members of the politically involved 
Gambian diaspora in a way they had not done before.  The post below is one of 
the many examples that were published on Facebook. 
Figure 31: Facebook comment on members of the politically involved Gambian 
diaspora 
 
Source: Gambian diaspora member’s Facebook post 
However, the question now is: how will development be managed given that 
political change has been achieved in The Gambia?  According to Adama Barrow’s 
‘My Vision and Mission’ statement published before the elections.  He aims to 
                                                                
185 http://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/africa/gambia-election-president-yahya-jammeh-shuts-
down-internet-phones-polls-open-a7449371.html 
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“promote and consolidate Democracy, Rule of Law, Good Governance and respect 
for the Human Rights of our people186”. As well as to “revamp the agriculture sector 
and the economy through investments and job creation for Gambian youths”187.  At 
this stage, it is a fairly vague manifesto.  It can be argued that this seems very 
abstract because it is not clear how the coalition government plans to implement 
development or how development resources will be distributed.  Perhaps it is too 
early to tell but clearly, there are bigger challenges ahead that may get in the way 
of the new government meeting the bold promises they have made to the Gambian 
population.  These challenges include fixing the structures and institutions of the 
country to allow for ‘real’ development to occur; restoring relationships with key 
donors like the EU, Commonwealth, US and UK; and managing the very limited 
resources in the country.  The goal is to avoid recycling the actions of the previous 
regime, where ‘development’ was more about talk than action.  However, the focus, 
for now, is for the coalition government to restore democratic order, as Gambians 
believe this is a necessary first step for development.  And even though parts of 
the literature argue that having a democratic state is not a necessary prerequisite 
for development (Leftwich 1993) or that democracy makes no material difference to 
the lives of the poor (Ross 2006 cited by Nooruddin 2010; 169) the current hope in 
The Gambia is that democracy will be a catalyst.  The hope is that practising a 
better style of democracy in The Gambia will attract international donors and 
investors by regaining the faith of those who want The Gambia to succeed and by 
producing a more predictable business environment with less political risk.  Thus, 
even though the future is still very uncertain for The Gambia, the outcomes of the 
elections have given the people at ‘home’ and abroad hope and faith that it will be 
a brighter one. 
 
 
  
                                                                
186 https://jollofnews.com/2016/11/25/gambia-2016-adama-barrow-my-vision-and-mission/ 
187 http://www.kaironews.com/coalition-to-restore-democracy/ 
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Appendix 1 
Identifier 
 
 
 
 
 
Gender 
 
 
  
 
 
Country 
 
 
 
 
 
Method 
 
 
 
 
 
Month 
 
 
 
 
 
Year 
 
 
 
 
 
Additional information 
 
 
 
 
 
Age range 
Interviewee 1 Male US Telephone April 2015 Religious leader living in exile  Old 
Interviewee 2 Male US Skype March 2015 Former civil servant and political activist Old 
Interviewee 3 Male UK Email May 2015 Academic Middle age 
Interviewee 4 Female US Telephone April 2015 Highly educated, professional and activist Middle age 
Interviewee 5 Male US Skype April 2015 Academic and activist Middle age 
Interviewee 6 Male UK Telephone March 2015 Skilled professional Middle age 
Interviewee 7 Female UK Telephone March 2015 NGO worker  Young 
Interviewee 8 Male UK Telephone March 2015 Lawyer and activist Middle age 
Interviewee 9 Male UK Telephone March 2015 Skilled professional Middle age 
Interviewee 10 Male US Telephone March 2015 Academic and activist Middle age 
Interviewee 11 Male US Telephone March 2015 Former journalist and activist Old 
Interviewee 12 Male US Telephone March 2015 Highly educated, professional and activist Middle age 
Interviewee 13 Male US Skype March 2015 Highly educated, professional and activist Middle age 
Interviewee 14 Male US Face-to-face March 2015 Professional and activist Middle age 
Interviewee 15 Male UK Face-to-face March 2015 Highly educated professional  Middle age 
Interviewee 16 Male US Telephone March 2015 Pro-government supporter and skilled 
professional  
Young 
Interviewee 17 Male US Skype  March 2015 Highly educated professional Young 
Interviewee 18 Male UK Telephone March 2015 Activist Middle age 
Interviewee 19 Male US Telephone March 2015 Pro-government supporter and radio 
personality 
Middle age 
Interviewee 20 Male US Telephone March 2015 Pro-government supporter and skilled 
professional 
Middle age 
Interviewee 21 Male UK Telephone March 2015 Highly educated professional Middle age 
Interviewee 22 Male US Telephone April 2015 Skilled professional Old 
Interviewee 23 Male UK Telephone April 2015 Retired diplomat Middle age 
Interviewee 24 Male  US Telephone March 2015 Pro-government supporter and diplomat 
 for Gambian government 
Young 
Interviewee 25 Male UK Telephone March 2015 Pro-government supporter and skilled  
professional  
Young 
Interviewee 26 Male UK Telephone April 2015 Skilled professional Young 
Interviewee 27 Male UK Telephone March 2015 Educated professional Middle age 
Interviewee 28 Male UK Telephone March 2015 Highly educated professional Middle age 
Interviewee 29 Male UK Telephone March 2015 Highly educated professional  Middle age 
Interviewee 30 Male  UK Telephone March 2015 Skilled professional Middle age 
Interviewee 31 Male UK Telephone March 2015 Highly educated professional  Middle age 
Interviewee 32 Female US Telephone March 2015 Highly educated professional and activist Middle age 
Interviewee 33 Male UK Telephone March 2015 Highly educated professional  Middle age 
Interviewee 34 Male UK Telephone March 2015 Former Gambian civil servant –  
highly educated profession  
Middle age 
Interviewee 35 Male UK Telephone April 2015 Highly educated professional  Middle age 
Interviewee 36 Male UK Telephone April 2015 Educated professional Young 
Interviewee 37 Male UK Telephone April 2015 Educated professional Middle age 
Interviewee 38 Male UK Telephone April 2015 Former state house chef –  
now works in the hospitality sector  
Middle age 
Interviewee 39 Male US Telephone April 2015 Highly educated professional and activist Young 
Interviewee 40 Male UK Face-to-face April 2015 Highly educated professional  Middle age 
Interviewee 41 Male UK Telephone April 2015 Economist/ PhD student Middle age 
Interviewee 42 Male UK Telephone March 2015 Highly educated professional  Middle age 
Interviewee 43 Male UK Face-to-face August 2015 Lawyer Middle age 
Interviewee 44 Male UK Face-to-face September 2015 Highly educated professional  
and activist  
Young 
Interviewee 45 Male Gambia Face-to-face September 2014 Private business owner Young 
Interviewee 46 Male  Gambia Face-to-face August 2014 Retired civil servant  Old 
Interviewee 47 Male Gambia Face-to-face August 2014 Retired civil servant and agriculture 
 expert 
Middle age 
Interviewee 48 Male Gambia Face-to-face October 2014 Political opposition party leader Middle age 
Interviewee 49 Female Gambia Face-to-face September 2014 Academic and gender activist Middle age 
Interviewee 50 Female Gambia Face-to-face September 2014 Rural farmer Middle age 
Interviewee 51 1 Female and 5 Males Gambia Face-to-face December 2014 Students Young 
Interviewee 52 3 Females and 21 
Males 
Gambia Face-to-face December 2014 Students Young 
Interviewee 53 Male Gambia Face-to-face September 2014 Private business owner Middle age 
Interviewee 54 Male Gambia Face-to-face September 2014 Private business owner Young 
Interviewee 55 Male Gambia Face-to-face September 2014 Civil servant Middle age 
Interviewee 56 Male Gambia Face-to-face August 2014 Retired non-Gambian Old 
Interviewee 57 Male Gambia Face-to-face August 2014 Civil servant Middle age 
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Interviewee 58 Female Gambia Face-to-face September 2014 Retired academic and Gambian historian Old 
Interviewee 59 Male Gambia Face-to-face September 2014 Building contractor Young 
Interviewee 60 Male Gambia Face-to-face August 2014 Academic  Old 
Interviewee 61 Male Gambia Face-to-face August 2014 Economist, former civil servant and 
 private business owner 
Middle age 
Interviewee 62 Male Gambia Face-to-face August 2014 Economist/ retired civil servant  Old 
Interviewee 63 Male Gambia  Face-to-face September 2014 Civil servant Middle age 
Interviewee 64 Male Gambia Face-to-face November 2014 Private business owner Middle age 
Interviewee 65 Male UK Face-to-face February 2013 Highly educated professional  Middle age 
Interviewee 66 Female UK Telephone February 2013 Development practitioner Middle age 
Interviewee 67 Male US Telephone April 2013 Highly educated professional and  
activist  
Young 
Interviewee 68 Male Gambia Face-to-face February 2013 Academic Middle age 
Interviewee 69 Male Gambia Face-to-face February 2013 Former President of The Gambia Old 
Interviewee 70 Female UK Face-to-face March  2013 Nurse Young 
Interviewee 71 Male Gambia Telephone July 2016 Skilled social activist  Young 
Interviewee 72 Female Gambia Telephone March 2015 Highly educated and skilled professional  Young 
Interviewee 73 Male UK Telephone May 2015 Working professional and student Middle age 
Association 1 Birmingham Gambia 
Association 
Birmingham Telephone April 2013   
Association 2 Brufut Association  Manchester Telephone April 2013   
Association 3 Kombo Sillah 
Association 
Slough Telephone April 2013   
Association 4 Reading Gambia 
Association 
Reading Telephone April 2013   
Association 5 Gambian Association 
Crawley 
Crawley Telephone April 2013   
Association 6 Coventry Gambian 
Association 
Coventry Telephone April 2013   
Association 7 Portsmouth Gambian 
Association 
Portsmouth Telephone April 2013   
Association 8 Sukuta Association Birmingham Telephone April 2013   
Association 9 Greenwich Gambian 
Association 
London Telephone April 2013   
Association 10 Gambia United 
Society 
London Telephone February 2013   
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Appendix 2: UK Gambian Diaspora Associations 
Name 
reasons for 
being 
established 
History of the 
association 
Activities and 
services 
Development 
projects in Gambia 
Challenges/ 
Barriers 
Reading 
Gambian 
Society 
 
RGS take part in 
limited development 
projects in Gambia  
 
RGS was established 
in 2005 after a 
Gambian in the 
community passed 
away.  The people 
came together to 
raise funds to 
repatriate the body 
back to Gambia 
 
RGS became a 
registered charity on 
the 09/06/2010  
 
RGS has 114 
registered members 
 
Members are 
required to pay £5 
membership fee 
every month 
Monthly meetings  
 
Fundraising events  
 
Private tutoring to 
children of 
members 
Ships and donate 
clothes to poor 
people in in Gambia 
 
Purchased and 
shipped 30 bicycles 
to Gambia in 2011 
as part of the 
disaster relief project 
 
Donated t-shirts to 
Gambia School of 
Nursing - for 
Alzheimer 
awareness 
Getting members 
to actively 
participate in the 
Association’s 
activities 
 
Increasing 
membership 
amongst Gambians 
in the community 
 
Lack of awareness 
of the association 
by Gambians living 
in the area 
 
Division between 
members of the 
association 
 
Lack of financial 
resources and 
space 
 
Shortage of 
volunteers to 
provide private 
tutoring to children. 
 
Kombo Sillah 
Association 
KSA is a hometown 
association that takes 
part in development 
projects in Gunjur, in 
Gambia  
 
Established in 2000, 
and registered as Ltd 
Business in 2012 
 
KSA was established 
because there were  
a significant number 
of Gambians from the 
same area in Gambia 
(Gunjur) living in the 
same area in UK- in 
Slough 
 
KSA headquarter is 
now located in Bristol 
 
KSA has between 
Raising funds for 
repatriation  
 
Support for 
immigration issues. 
 
Organize cultural 
events and 
concerts with 
Senegambia artists 
The summer school 
project at Gunjur 
Upper Basic School, 
 
Collecting and 
shipping hospital 
and supplies to 
Basse Hospital 
 
Repairing the only 
ambulance at 
Gunjur hospital 
 
Providing 
scholarships to 
outstanding students 
to attend high school  
 
Organising people 
and keeping the 
level of 
participation high.   
 
Trying to get the 
other Gambian 
Associations in UK 
to agree to form a 
federation of 
Gambian 
associations in the 
UK.   
 
Encouraging 
collaborations of 
projects in Gambia 
and in the UK.   
 
Creating 
awareness of the 
association to 
Gambians in the 
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300-500 members. 
 
Membership fees 
either £5 every 
3monthly or £20 – 
yearly 
community 
 
Increasing 
memberships  
 
Competition 
between the 
different 
associations  
 
No involvement 
with association 
activities by the 
Gambian High 
Commission 
 
People 
discouraging other 
from joining the 
associations – 
including the 
Gambian High 
Commission from 
attending KSA 
meeting 
Gambia 
United 
Society 
The GUS is working 
to become a 
coordinating body for 
the Gambian 
associations in the 
UK.   
 
GUS works on limited 
development projects 
in Gambia 
 
GUS was established 
in 1997 and has 
registered as a 
charity in October 
2005 
 
GUS is locate in 
London 
 
United Gambia was 
established when a 
member in the 
Gambian community 
passed away and his 
family could not afford 
to repatriate the body 
back to Gambia for 
burial.  The 
community came 
together to raise 
funds and from this 
members in the 
Organizes cultural 
activities like music, 
dancing, clothing 
and art 
 
Help Gambians to 
integrate with other 
culture as well as 
promote Gambian 
culture within their 
communities   
 
Organize 
educational 
activities- targeting 
young British born 
Gambians. Using 
Griots (traditional 
storytellers) to teach 
them about 
Gambian history 
and cultural 
practices.  
 
Organize concerts 
with Gambian and 
Senegalese artists.   
 
Support Gambian 
owned businesses 
in the UK by helping 
them reach the 
Gambian people in 
Raise fund for 
malaria treatment 
sleeping nets  
 
Fund raise for 
national disasters.  
On 30th June 2012, 
GUS raised 
£10,000 for 
Gambian Red 
Cross Society to 
help Gambian 
farmers that have 
been affected by 
the famine. 
 
No information 
about the number 
of Gambians (legal 
and illegal) living in 
the UK, therefore, 
most Gambians 
cannot be reached 
and offered their 
services. 
  
Issues of 
immigrations as 
there are some 
Gambians residing 
in the UK illegally 
and therefore, are 
reluctant to join the 
association or 
provide any 
information 
 
Tribalism amongst 
the Gambian 
diaspora in UK 
 
Gambian 
associations are 
fragmented and 
scattered all over 
the UK  
 
Government of The 
Gambia does not 
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community started to 
recognize the 
importance of forming 
an association to 
support the 
community 
 
GUS has 300 
registered members, 
however the turn out 
to some of their 
events is around 500 
the UK  
 
Provide referral 
services for people 
wanting to purchase 
Gambian art and 
clothing  
 
 
engage the 
diaspora groups as 
they are seen as 
threats and anti- 
government.  
Therefore, the 
Gambian Embassy 
in the UK does not 
acknowledge or 
work with diaspora 
association groups.  
They also ignore 
any attempts made 
by the associations 
in the UK to 
engage with them. 
 
The government 
ministries in the 
Gambia refuse to 
provide information 
to the association 
when they attempt 
to get involved in 
national 
development 
projects 
 
Portsmouth 
Gambian 
Society 
PGS has no direct 
involvement in 
development in 
Gambia 
 
The association was 
established in 2008 
when a member of 
the community 
passing away. The 
community came 
together to raise 
funds to repatriate the 
body back to Gambia 
for burial 
 
PGS has 80 to 100 
registered members.  
And the association 
has a £5 monthly 
membership fee. 
 
Organize cultural 
programmes  
 
Organize 
community 
religious 
celebrations  
 
Organize summer 
Barbeques 
PGA has no direct 
involvement in 
development 
projects in The 
Gambia however 
they work with 
Milton High School 
in Portsmouth who 
do charity work in 
the Gambia.  The 
PGA provide advise 
parents and pupils 
about Gambia 
Mobilising the 
Gambian 
community and 
driving active 
membership 
participation   
 
Division between 
members, 
particularly petty 
disputes between 
women 
 
The Gambian 
youth men are 
difficult to engage 
in associations 
activities 
 
No external funding 
 
Collecting the £5 
monthly 
membership fee 
from members 
 
Greenwich 
Gambian 
Association 
GGA is not 
involvement in 
development in 
Gambia  
Organize religious 
celebrations  
 
Offer learning 
Not involved in 
development 
projects in The 
Gambia 
Collecting 
membership fees 
from members 
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GGA was established 
in 2011 because 
there was no formal 
representation of 
Gambians in 
Woolwich.  
 
GGA has 45-60 
members, and 
families are required 
to contribute £100 a 
year, while individuals 
contribute £60 a year 
 
support to 
Gambian children 
and adults in the 
community 
Host summer 
family day outings 
and football 
tournaments for 
Gambian 
community 
 
Offers legal advice 
on immigration 
matters  
 
Run study groups 
for children 
preparing for 
Increasing member 
attendance at 
meetings 
 
Getting members 
to volunteer their 
time 
UK Sukuta 
Association 
 
SA is a hometown 
association which 
takes part in some 
development projects 
in Sukuta, Gambia 
 
Established in 1995 
by a group of 
Gambians from 
Sukuta 
 
SA is located in 
Birmingham 
 
It has 100 registered 
members and  
membership fee is 
£20 yearly 
Annual fund raising 
events  
 
Organize family 
day out  
 
Annual general 
meeting 
 
Funds Sukuta 
Sponsorship 
Committee, which 
offers loans to 
members of the 
community 
 
Raise fund for 
Sukuta secondary 
school and health 
centre. 
 
Driving attendance 
at their events 
 
Obtaining external 
funding 
 
Expenses incurred 
by immigration 
issues of members, 
who the 
association support 
Brufut 
Association 
BA is a hometown 
association that has 
limited involvement in  
development projects 
in Gambia 
 
The association was  
established in 2006/7 
because there was a 
large concentration of 
Gambian from Brufut 
living in Manchester 
 
 
BA has 100 
registered members 
and the membership 
fee is £5 a month 
The association 
provide support to 
Gambians living in 
Manchester 
particularly with 
issues of 
immigration and 
repatriation of body 
 
Funded the 
purchase of one 
ambulance for 
Brufut Health Centre 
Getting members 
to attend meetings 
 
Getting member to 
make financial 
contributions to the 
association 
 
Birmingham 
Gambian 
Association 
Established in 1999 
as a result of an 
elderly member of the 
Gambian community 
Support members 
with immigration 
problems  
 
Arranged for 8 junior 
doctors to visit 
Gambia and work 
for a week in the 
Challenging getting 
volunteers to run 
the afterschool club 
 
 298 
passing away.   
 
The association has 
200 members and the 
monthly membership 
fee is £5  
 
 
Support 
repatriation of 
bodies 
 
Offers an 
afterschool club for 
children-  
 
Organize cultural 
events and 
concerts with 
Gambian 
musicians 
 
Raise funds for 
their services  
 
Organize football 
tournaments every 
year 
Provides Gambian 
history lesson to 
British born 
Gambian 
hospital from 2005 
to 2007  
 
 
Sent 14 ambulances 
Gambia and 
uniforms donated by 
the Sussex 
ambulance service 
to Gambia in 2008 
 
 
Sent hospital beds 
and medical 
equipment donated 
to the Gambia 
 
Lack of external 
funding  
 
Lack of office 
equipment at the 
association 
headquarters 
 
Coventry 
Gambian 
Association 
Established in 2008 
to address the needs 
of Gambians in the 
community 
 
The association has 
120 registered 
members and there is 
a £5 monthly 
membership fee 
 
Offers summer 
school for 
Gambian children  
 
Organize religious 
celebrations 
 
Disseminate 
information about 
weddings, naming 
ceremonies and 
death in the 
community 
 
Not involved in 
development in The 
Gambia 
Attracting 
Gambians to join 
the association 
 
Driving 
participation by 
members 
Gambian 
Association 
Crawley 
GAC has no direct 
involvement in 
development in 
Gambia 
 
Established in 
October 2008 
because are a large 
number of Gambians 
living in Crawley and 
the people wanted to 
have a formal 
structure 
 
GAC have 120 
registered members 
and the membership  
fee is £10 every three 
months 
Organize Religious 
celebrations 
 
Offers educational 
activities- such as 
hosting a one day 
seminar to talk 
about HIV/AIDS 
 
Creates 
awareness about 
drugs awareness 
and Islamic 
extremism  
 
No direct 
involvement in 
development 
projects in Gambia. 
 
Driving 
membership  
 
Issues of 
transparency in 
association, as 
there are concerns 
that funds are not 
use for their  
purpose  
 
